PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 39
REPORTS, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF ROBERTS
COMMISSION, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, NAVY
COURT OF INQUIRY, AND HEWITT INQUIRY, WITH
ENDORSEMENTS
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attach
79716
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946
m.fi
. A'S
) !-U-
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi-
gan
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from
North Carolina
JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
Pennsylvania
BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
tive from California
FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
Wisconsin
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
William D. Mitchell, General Couneel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel
Julb M. Hannaford, Assistant Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
II
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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
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Hearings
Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
Dec. 31, 1945. and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 through 25
26
27 through 31
32 through 33
34
35
36 through 38
39
Exhibits Nos.
1 through 6.
7 and 8.
9 through 43.
44 through 87.
88 through 110.
Ill through 128.
129 through 156.
157 through 172.
173 through 179.
180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
Roberts Commission Proceedings.
Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
Clarke Investigation Proceedings
Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
m
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 157
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1. Report of Roberts Commission, dated January 23, 1942 1
2. Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board dated October 20, 1944 — 23
3. Appendix No. 1 : Supplemental Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board on
phases mentioned in House Military Affairs report which relate to
the Pearl Harbor disaster 179
4. Exhibits A and B to appendix No. 1 (above) 219
5. Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board 220
6. November 25, 1944, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for
Secretary of War, re APHB report 231
7. September 14, 1945, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for
Secretary of War, re Lt Col. Henry C. Clausen’s Investigation 270
8. September 14, 1945, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for
Secretary of War, re APHB Top Secret Report reviewed in connec-
tion with Clausen Investigation 283
9. Report of Naval Court of Inquiry, dated October 19, 1944 297
10. Addendum to Navy Court of Inquiry findings of fact 323
11. First endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by Navy Judge
Advocate General for Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and
Chief of Naval Operations, dated November 2, 1944 330
12. November 3, 1944, memorandum from CincUS and CNO to Secretary
of Navy, listing parts of Navy Court of Inquiry record that contain
information of super secret nature 332
13. Second endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by CincUS and
CNO to Secretary of Navy, dated November 6, 1944 (not made
public) 335
14. Paraphrase of second endorsement (item 13) which was made public— 345
15. Third endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by Secretary of
Navy, dated December 1, 1944 354
16. Fourth endorsement (undated) to Navy Court of Inquiry report, and
fourth endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Secretary of
Navy (not made public) 355
17. Paraphrase of fourth endorsement (item 18), dated August 1945, made
public August 29, 1945 371
18. December 3, 1944, memorandum, from CincUS and CNO to Secretary
of Navy, commenting on report of Army Pearl Harbor Board 383
19. Third endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by CincUS and CNO
to Secretary of Navy, dated August 13, 1945 387
20. Second endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Navy Judge Advo-
cate General for CincUS and CNO. dated August 10, 1945 388
21. First endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Secretary of Navy,
dated July 25, 1945 389
22. Report of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt to Secretary of Navy, dated July
12, 1945 390
IV
REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION
1
REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION
The President,
The White House.
January 23, 1942.
Sib : The undersigned were appointed by Executive order of Decem-
ber 18, 1941, which defined our duties as a commission thus :
to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed
forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941.
The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for
sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the
part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as
were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned ; and, if so, what these
derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor.
The Congress speedily supplemented the Executive order by grant-
ing the Commission power to summon witnesses and examine them
under oath.
The Commission held three meetings in Washington, December 18,
19, and 20, and, on the latter day, proceeded to Honolulu, T. H., where
the Commission arrived December 22 and held meetings December
22, 23, 24, and 26 at the headquarters of the Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, and December 27, 29, 30, and 31, 1941, and January 2
and 3, 1942, at the submarine base, Pearl Harbor; and January 5, 6,
7, 8, and 9 at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu. January 10 the
Commission left Honolulu for Washington, D. C.; held meetings Jan-
uary 12, 13, and 14; arrived at Washington January 15 and held
further meetings January 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23.
The Commission examined 127 witnesses and received a large num-
ber of documents. All members of the Military and Naval Estab-
lishments, and civil officers and citizens who were thought to have
knowledge of facts pertinent to the inquiry, were summoned and
examined under oath. All persons in the island of Oahu, who be-
lieved they had knowledge of such facts, were publicly requested to
appear, and a number responded to the invitation and gave evidence.
Various rumors and hearsay statements have been communicated to
the Commission. The Commission has sought to find and examine
witnesses who might be expected to have knowledge respecting them.
We believe that our findings of fact sufficiently dispose of most of
them.
The evidence touches subjects which in the national interest should
remain secret. We have, therefore, refrained from quotation of testi-
mony or documentary proof. Our findings, however, have been made
with the purpose fully and accurately to reflect the testimony which
as respects matters of fact is substantially without contradiction.
It is true, as we have found, that due to the enormous demand on
the Nation’s capacity to produce munitions and war supplies, there
2 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was a deficiency in the provision of materiel for the Hawaiian area.
This was but natural, in the circumstances, and was well known to
the Government departments and local commanders. We have made
no detailed findings on the subject since, as will appear from our
report, we find that this deficiency did not affect the critical fact of
failure to take appropriate measures with the means available.
At our hearings reference was made to what has long been a matter
of common knowledge — that there are, and have been, diverse views
of national policy respecting the basing of the entire United States
Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, T. H. We feel that the national policy
in this matter is one that has been settled by those responsible for
such decisions and that it is not within our province — that of finding
the facts respecting the attack of December 7, and the responsibility
for the resulting damage to the United States — to discuss any such
topic.
Regrettable loss of life and extensive damage resulted from the
air raid. The nature of that damage and the details of the measures
taken to repair it have no direct bearing on the execution of the man-
date appointing this Commission, and the subject is dealt with in
our report only to the extent that it bears on questions of responsi-
bility for the disaster.
The evidence taken covered a wide scope. The Commission inten-
tionally invited such latitude of testimony and inquiry in the belief
that thereby incidental light might be thrown upon the main issues
involved. As an example, the Commission heard evidence to show
what had been done at Pearl Harbor and on the island of Oahu by
naval and military commands subsequent to December 7, 1941, in
the view that this might throw some light upon the matters sub-
mitted for our consideration. Again, the Commission heard much
testimony as to the population of Hawaii, its composition, and the
attitude and disposition of the persons composing it, in the belief that
the facts disclosed might aid in appraising the results of investiga-
tive, counterespionage, and antisaootage work done antecedent to
the attack of December 7, 1941.
The Commission visited the naval base at Pearl Harbor and air
fields of the Military and Naval Establishments, as well as the Army
posts and forts and certain of the coast fortifications on the island
of Oahu.
The minutes of each meeting of the Commission are of record.
The statements of witnesses received in the meetings previous to
that of December 22 have been recorded in summaries. All testimony
received at the meeting of December 22 and the subsequent meetings
was stenographically reported and transcribed.
The oral evidence received amounts to 1,887 typewritten pages, and
the records and documents examined exceed 3,000 printed pages in
number.
Appended hereto is a map of the island of Oahu showing the location
of the principal naval and military establishments.
All the testimony and evidence received have been considered and,
as the result of its deliberations, the Commission submits the
following :
REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION
3
Findings of Fact
I
About 7: 55 a. m. Honolulu time (1 : 25 p. m. eastern standard time)
on Sunday, December 7, 1941, Japanese forces attacked Army and
Navv installations and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Oahu, T. H.
Although the United States and Japan were at peace on that morn-
ing, Japan planned to announce to the Secretary of State of the United
States at 1 p. m. of that day, eastern standard time (7 : 30 a. m. Hono-
lulu time) the severance of diplomatic relations and simultaneously to
attack the island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor. The military prepara-
tions for this breach of international faith and honor were put in train,
and the forces for its consummation had been dispatched weeks prior
to any intimation of the planned severance of relations.
n
The Territory of Hawaii comprises the group of islands known as
the Hawaiian Islands. This group consists of the larger islands —
Hawaii, Maui, Molokai, Oahu, and Kauai — and a number of smaller
islands. They extend from Hawaii in the south some 300 miles in a
northwesterly direction, including Kauai in the north. For purposes
of certain developments and protection, the islands of Midway, Wake,
Johnston, Palmyra, Christmas, and Canton had been placed under the
responsible naval and military heads in the Hawaiian area.
The importance of the Territory of Hawaii from a national defense
standpoint is the fact that Pearl Harbor, the main outlying naval
base in the Pacific, is located in the island of Oahu, one of the Hawaiian
group. For this reason all measures for the protection and defense
of the Territory have centered in and around Oahu, the other islands
being garrisoned by minor forces only. A main outlying naval base,
such as Pearl Harbor, is intended for the use of the fleet for taking
on fuel and supplies, for recreation and rest of the fleet personnel, and
for the repair and refitting of ships.
m
It has been well known that the policy of the United States as to
affairs in the Pacific was in conflict with the policies of other govern-
ments. It was realized by the State, War, and Navy Departments
of the United States that unless these policies were reconciled war in
the Pacific was inevitable.
IV
Plans and preparations against the contingency of war are the
joint responsibility of the military and naval authorities, and, within
the limits of funds and authorizations provided by the Congress, were
being ceaselessly carried out.
Under these plans the general function of the Army is to conduct
militaiw operations in direct defense of United States territory. The
general function of the Navy is to conduct naval operations to gain
and maintain control of vital sea areas, thereby contributing to the
defense of the coastal frontiers.
4 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Specific plans for the protection of the Hawaiian area against
every contingency had been prepared. These included joint Army
and Navy war plans, and War Department and Navy Department
plans subsidiary thereto which establish the Hawaiian coastal fron-
tier, assign tasks and forces to both Army and Navy for its joint
defense, and prescribe that the system of coordination between the
responsible Army and Navy commanders shall be by mutual co-
operation.
V
The responsibility for the joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal
frontier rested upon the commanding generalj Hawaiian Depart-
ment, and the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, the latter act-
ing as a subordinate of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.
The commander in chief of the fleet, in addition, was assigned the
task of protecting the territory within the Hawaiian naval coastal
frontier by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land
and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions within
that frontier, and the further task of covering the operations of the
Hawaiian coastal frontier forces. The commanding general, Ha-
waiian Department, could properly deal, respecting defense measures
and dispositions, with either the commander in cnief of the Pacific
Fleet or the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.
The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet from February 1 to
December 17, 1941, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. The com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, from April 11, 1940, to date is
Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch. The commanding general, Ha-
waiian Department, from February 7 to December 17, 1941, was Lt.
Gen. Walter C. Short.
A local joint defense plan entitled “Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier,” was prepared by General Short
and Rear Admiral Bloch, the latter acting under the direction of
Admiral Kimmel. Each commander adopted a standing operating
procedure, or standing orders, to carry out his obligation under the
joint agreement This joint coastal frontier defense plan was in-
tended to become operative upon order of the War and Navy Depart*
ments or, as agreed upon by the local commanders in the case of an
emergency, a threat of hostile action, or the occurrence of war.
VI
The means available to the Army, for the fulfillment of its mis-
sion, consist of coast defense and antiaircraft artillery, mobile ground
forces, the Hawaiian air force, and an aircraft warning service. The
supporting elements of the Navy consist of local naval defense forces
comprising light surface craft and shore-based aircraft not assigned
to the fleet. The fleet as such was not charged with the defense of
Pearl Harbor, except that certain aircraft attached to the fleet, when
v present, and the antiaircraft weapons of such units of the fleet as
\~were in port, were available.
It was recognized that, prior to furnishing the full war strength
garrison, insufficient forces were available to maintain all the de-
fenses on a war footing for extended periods of time. The respon-
REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION
5
sible commanders made numerous recommendations to the War and
Navy Departments for additional forces, equipment, and funds which
they deemed necessary to insure the defense of the Hawaiian coastal
frontier under any eventuality. The national situation permitted
only a partal filling of these requirements. However, presupposing
timely dispositions Dy the Army and Navy commands in Hawaii, the
forces available to them were adequate to frustrate a surprise air
attack or greatly to mitigate its effectiveness.
I In a letter of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy advised
the Secretary of War that the increased gravity of the Japanese
situation had prompted a restudy of the problem of the security of
the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor. \ The writer stated :
If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities
would be Initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl
Harbor. |
The writer stated that the —
inherent possibilities of a major disaster —
warranted further speedy action to —
increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the
character mentioned * * *.
The letter proceeded :
-frfThe dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con- I
sidered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabo- |
tage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire.
It stated the defenses against all but the first two were then satis- 1
factory! described the probable character of an air attack and urged '
consideration by the Army of dispositions to discover and meet such
attack and provision of additional equipment therefor. It concluded
with recommendations for the revision of joint defense plans with
special emphasis on the coordination of Army and Navy operations
, against surprise aircraft raids. It also urged the conduct of joint
' exercises to train the forces to meet such raids.
The Secretary of War replied February 7, 1941, giving the present
and prospective status of the Hawaiian Department in respect of
airplanes and antiaircraft artillery, and stating with respect to the
other proposals of the Secretary of the Navy that a copy of the letter
was being forwarded to the commanding general, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, with direction to him to cooperate with the local naval authori-
ties in making the suggested measures effective.
^Admiral Kimmel and General Short received copies of these letters
at about the time they assumed the commands which they held De-
cember 7, 1941. fGRear Admiral Bloch also received copies.
The joint coastal frontier defense plan and plans subsidiary thereto)
envisaged the possibility of an air attack and estimated that, if made,
it would most likely occur at dawn. An agreement between the
Hawaiian air force and the commander, Navy patrol wing 2-, estab-
lished the responsibilities for the joint use and operation o£ the avail-
able air forces of the Army and Navy. The standing operating pro-
cedure, Hawaiian Department, and standing orders or the Uruted
t) CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
States Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District also prescribed
measures for protection against air attack. Frequent joint drills and
exercises were conducted during the year 1941 to msure such measures
would be effective.
VIII
For months prior to December 7, 1941, the Secretary of State was
repeatedly in contact with the Secretary of War and the Secretary
of the Navy, not only in Cabinet meetings, but in meetings of the
war council; and on the occasions of those contacts, and in conference
with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, discussed
negotiations with Japan and the growing tensity of the relations
of the United States with Japan. At meetings of the war council
the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations were also present.
The Secretary of State constantly kept the Secretary of War and
the Secretary of the Navy informed of the progress of the negotia-
tions, and all three of these officials were cognizant of the growing
threat of hostilities and of the military and naval needs and measures
consequent thereupon. The Secretaries of War and Navy were in
constant touch with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, and imparted to them the information received from the Secre-
tary of State and the results of their conferences with him. The
latter officers in turn advised the responsible commanders in the field
of the progress of events and of the growing threat of hostilities.
'The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area were aware that
previous Japanese actions and demonstrated Axis methods indicated
' that hostile action might be expected prior to a declaration of war.
IX
| October 16, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department,
and the commander in chief of the fleet were advised by the War and
Navy Departments of the changes in the Japanese Cabinet, of the
probability of hostilities between Japan and Russia, and of the pos-
sibility of an attack by Japan on Great Britain and the United States.
Both commanders were warned to take precautions^ and to make
preparatory dispositions which would not disclose their strategic in-
tentions or constitute provocation as against Japan. Admiral Kimmel
made certain dispositions of units of the fleet, and placed additional
security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.
At that time various task forces of the Navy were engaged in train-
ing operations and maneuvers which were deemed highly important
to the training of the fleet personnel, and the Army was also conduct-
ing intensive training, particularly of its air arm. I The responsible
commanders testified that to undertake increased defense measures
respecting Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian area would necessitate
curtailment of training, if not its virtual suspension, and they thought
the situation was not such as to require this. ,
^/November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message
to Admiral Kimmel, in which he stated that, in the opinion of the
Navy Department, a surprise aggressive movement in any direction
by the Japanese,) including an attack on the Philippines or Guam,
was a possibility ; that the doubt as to favorable outcome of pending
REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION
7
negotiations, the statements of the Japanese Government, and the
movements of its army and naval forces, supported this opinion. The
communication enjoined secrecy to prevent complication of the tense
existing situation. The message advised that the Chief of Staff of
the Army requested that the local senior Army officers be advised
that he concurred in the despatch. This message was seen by both
the commander in chief of the fleet and the commanding general of
the Hawaiian Department.
| The responsible commanders in Hawaii knew that negotiations had
been continued through October and November, and were awaiting
further developments. November 27, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the
Army informed the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, that
the negotiations with Japan seemed to be ended, with little likelihood
of their resumption; that Japanese action was unpredictable; that
hostilities on the part of Japan were momentarily possible!; that in
the event hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired
that this Nation should not commit the first overt act; that the depart-
ment commander was not to be restricted to any course which would
jeopardize his defense. The message directed him, even prior to
hostile action, to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures
as he deemed necessary, but to carry them out in such a way as not
to alarm the civil population or disclose his intent. He was directed
to restrict the information contained in the message to the minimum
of essential officers, and to report to the Chief of Staff the measures
taken. The purpose of this message was communicated by the de-
partment commander to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.
On the same day (November 27 ,1941), the Chief of Military Intelli-
gence sent a message to the intelligence officer on the staff of the com-
manding general, Hawaiian Department, directing him to inform the
commanding general and his chief of staff that negotiations with
Japan had practically ceased; that hostilities might ensue; and that
subversive activity might be expected.
I On the same day (November 27, 1941), the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions sent a message to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet,
which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a N
war warning: that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize
conditions in the Pacific had ended ; that Japan was expected to make
an aggressive move within the next few days; that an amphibious/
expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or
possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment of Japa-
nese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. It
directed the execution of a defensive deployment in preparation for
carrying out war tasks. \ It stated that Guam, Samoa, and continental
districts had been directed to take appropriate measures against sabo-
tage, and that a similar warning was being sent by the War Depart-
ment. It ordered that the addressee inform naval district and Army
authorities. The commander in chief of the fleet communicated the |
purport of this message to the general commanding the Hawaiian
Department of the Army.
At the time of our hearing General Short had no independent
recollection of the last-mentioned message, although he felt that it
must have been shown to him, " ~
8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
November 27, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, in response to the direction of the Chief of Staff that he report
measures taken, informed the Chief of Staff that he had alerted his
command against sab otag e and that he was maintaining liaison with
the Navy. No reply refer ring to this message was sent by the War
Department; but General Short testified that he considered the Adju-
tant General’s message referred to in the next succeeding paragraph
\v a reply.
x November 28, -1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, received from The Adjutant General of the Army a message
stating that the critical situation required every precaution to be taken
at once against subversive activities, within the scope of the Army’s
responsibility ; that all necessary measures be taken to protect military
establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage, against
propaganda affecting Army personnel, ana against all espionage.
The message disclaimed ordering any illegal measures, and warned
that protective measures should be confined to those essential to se-
curity, so as to avoid unnecessary publicity and alarm. The mes-
sage stated that identic communications were being sent to all air
stations and, on November 28, the Chief of the Army Air Forces sent
such an identic message to the commanding general, Hawaiian Air
Force.
November 29, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, replied to the last-mentioned message, outlining at length and
in detail the measures taken to prevent sabotage of military establish-
ments and property and essential industrial and public-utility instal-
lations. No reply was sent by the War Department to this message.
General Short testified that he considered this series of messages a
tacit agreement that the measures taken were all that were intended
by the Department.
November 29, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message
to the commander in chief of the fleet, which was in substance a quo-
tation of the Chief of Staff’s despatch of November 27 to the com-
manding general, Hawaiian Department; and in addition directed the
addressee to take no offensive action until Japan had committed an
. overt act, and ordered certain action in case hostilities should occur.
November 30, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a despatch
to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and also forwarded
the message to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for his
information, in which it was stated the indications were that Japan
was about to launch an attack on the Era Isthmus, directing the com-
mander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to do certain scouting, but to
' avoid the appearance of attacking. tAdmiral Kimmel testified that
he had viewed this message! as indicating that the Navy Department
was not expecting a Japanese attack on Hawaii. I
* The Navy Department sent three messages to the commander in
chief of the Pacific Fleet; the first of December 3, 1941, stated that
it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying thir
codes and burning secret documents; the second of December 4,
1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and
means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were
necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was
sent to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for information
REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION
9
only) ; and the third of December 6, 1941, directing that in view of
the tense situation the naval commands on the outlying Pacific
islands might be authorized to destroy jonfidfiiitial papers then or
later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that those essential
to continued operations should be retained until the last moment.
t^The foregoing messages did not create in the minds of the respon-\
sible officers in the Hawaiian area apprehension as to probable im- /
minence of air raids. On the contrary they only served to emphasize!
in their minds the danger from sa Dotage and surprise submarine!
attack. VThe necessity for taking a state-of-war readiness which
would have been required to avert or meet an air-raid attack was
not considered.
X
December 1, 1941, the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a bul-
letin which, under the caption “Japanese Naval Situation,” stated :
Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that
extensive preparations are under way for hostilities. At the same time troop
transports and freighters are pouring contlnuaUy down from Japan and north-
ern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indochina and For-
mosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by
small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now
definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days.
To date this task force, under the command of the commander in chief, Second
Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually
concentrating off the southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Bach
constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the
combined air force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division
of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains
in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.
The Naval Intelligence Service in Hawaii, due to lack of informa- \
tion indicating that the bulk of Japanese carriers were at sea, con- l
eluded they were in home ports. 1
XI
At about noon, eastern standard time (6: 30 a. m. Honolulu time), \
December 7, an additional warning message, indicating an almost \
immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan. I
was dispatched by the Chief of Staff after conference with the Chiei !
of Naval Operations, for the information of responsible Army and I
Navy commanders. Every effort was made to have the message reach
Hawaii in the briefest possible time, but due to conditions beyond
the control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message
was delayed until after the attack.
XII
The commanding general, Hawaiian Department, the commander-
in-chief of the fleet, and the commandant. Fourteenth Naval District,
their senior subordinates, and their principal staff officers, considered
the possibility of air raids. • Without exception they believed that the\
chances of such a raid while the Pacific Fleet was based upon Pearl \
Harbor were practically nil. f The attack of Sunday, December 7, 1941, 1
was therefore a complete surprise to each of them.
10 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
| While General Short and Admiral Kimmel conferred frequently
with respect to joint Army-Navy plans and procedures, they did not, I
on or subsequent to November 27, 1941, hold any conference specifi- 1
cally directed to the meaning of the messages received from the War I
and Navy Departments or concerning action required to be taken pur-
suant to those messages. I I
For some time prior to November 27, 1941, the War Department
and the Navy Department had under consideration the possibility of
sending Army airplanes to Wake and Midway and withdrawing
Marine planes then on those islands; of relieving marines stationed
there by the substitution of units of the Army. General Short, Ad- I
miral Kimmel, and Rear Admiral Bloch had been in conference con-
cerning this proposal.
At the time of the receipt of the messages of November 27 by Ad-
miral Kimmel and General Short, respectively, this proposal was a
subject of discussion. General Short held discussions with Admiral
Kimmel on November 27, December 1, 2, and 3 concerning this matter
( in an effort to compose certain differences of view. At one of these
conference^ Admiral Kimmel inquired of his war-plans officer, Cap-
] tain McMorris, who was present, concerning the probability of a
i surprise air attack on Oahu. According to General Short, Captain
McMorris replied there was no probability of such an attack; and,
according to Captain McMorris, his reply was that the Japanese
would never so attack. According to the testimony Admiral Kimmel
• and General Short did not discuss means or measures for Hawaiian
defense to be adopted in the light of the messages. I
On and after November 27, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian
Department, and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, inde-
pendently took such action as each deemed appropriate to the existing
situation. Neither informed the other specifically of the action he was
taking, and neither inquired of the other whether or not any action
had been taken, nor did they consult as to the appropriateness of the
actions taken by them respectively.
After receipt of the messages of November 27 the following action
was taken:
The commanding general, Hawaiian Department, ordered alert No.
1 (see next succeeding paragraph) into effect on November 27, and
it was maintained in effect until December 7. | At the same time he
ordered that the aircraft warning system operate daily from 4 to 7
a. m.f The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, in his ca-
pacity as base-defense officer, called a conference of all the destroyer
commanders of the inshore patrol, advised them that something might
happen, and that they should be on the alert. The commander in
chief of the fleet made certain dispositions of units of the fleet for the
purpose of strengthening his outposts to the south and west of the
Hawaiian Islands, and also issued an order that any Japanese sub-
marines found in the operating areas around the island of Oahu should
be attacked. This order went beyond the authority given him by the
Navy Department.
In the Hawaiian Department’s standing operating procedure gov-
erning the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, three states of
REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 11
readiness were prescribed, known as alert No. 1, alert No. 2, and alert
No. 3. Alert No. 1 was thus defined :
This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands,
with no threat from without
Alert No. 2 was thus defined :
This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than alert No. 1. Security
against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to
defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.
Alert No. 3 was thus defined :
This alert requires occupation, of all field positions by all units, prepared for
maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands.
XIII
The responsibilities of the Army included the installation and oper-
ation of an aircraft warning system for the detection of water-borne
and air-borne craft at a distance from the coast. Throughout the
late spring and summer of 1941 the Army was engaged in tne instal-
lation of permanent facilities for this purpose on the Hawaiian
Islands. Permanent installations had not, on December 7, 1941, been I
completed. vBy November 27, 1941, certain mobile equipment had |
been installed at temporary locations, and was being operated inter-
mittently throughout the day for the purpose of training personnel
in its operation. iOn November 27, 1941, in connection wim the order
for alert No. 1, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department,
ordered that this system be operated each day during the period
from 4 until 7 a. m. It was intended that in the near future the
Navy should have officer personnel in the information center, but up
to December 7 such officers had not been designated. In accordance
with the order in effect, the system closed at 7 a. m. Sunday, Decem-
ber 7. A noncommisisoned officer who had been receiving training
requested that he be allowed to remain at one of the stations, ana \
was granted leave so to do. I At about 7 : 02 a. m. he discovered what '
he thought was a large flight of planes slightly east and north of j
Oahu, at a distance of about 130 miles. He reported this fact at ■
7 : 20 a. m. to a lieutenant of the Army who was at the central infor-
mation center, having been detailed there to familiarize himself with
the operation of the system. This inexperienced lieutenant, having <
information that certain United States planes might be in the vicinity ;
at the time, assumed that the planes in question were friendly planes,
and took no action with respect to them. * The recording of the obser-
vation made indicated that these airplanes were tracked toward the
island and then lost. 1
On November 27, 1941, there was sufficient partially trained per- ^
sonnel available to operate the aircraft warning system throughout
24 hours of the day, as installed in its temporary locations. An \
arc of nearly 360° around Oahu could have been covered. |
Admiral Kimmel, on and prior to December 7, 1941, assumed that
the aircraft warning system was being fully operated by the Army,
but made no inquiry after reading any of the messages of October
and November from the War and Navy Departments as to what
the fact was with respect to its operation.
12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
XIV
The joint coastal frontier defense plan provided that, "when it
became effective, the Army should conduct an inshore airplane patrol,
covering the circumference of the island of Oahu to a distance of
about 20 miles. I Prior to December 7, 1941, no inshore patrol was
conducted, except during drills alid maneuvers. Pilots were being
trained on weekdays, and the training involved flying around the
confines of Oahu from about 8 o’clock in the morning throughout
I the day. | On Sunday morning no inshore airplane patrol was
I conducted.
XV
Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan, when the plan became
effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiat-
ing from Oahu to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to
December 7, 1941, no distant reconnaissances were conducted, except
during drills and maneuvers. The fleet from time to time had task
forces operating in various areas off the island of Oahu and, in
connection with such operations, carrier and patrol planes conducted
reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched, how-
ever, constituted but small arcs of the total arc of 360% and rarely
extended to a radius of 700 miles.
Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have
afforded a measure of security against a surprise air attack.
General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant
reconnaissance, but after seeing the warning messages of October and
November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry
with respect to the distant reconnaissance, if any, being conducted
by the Navy.
XVI
There were, prior to December 7, 1941, Japanese spies on the island
of Oahu. Some were Japanese consular agents ana other were per-
sons having no open relations with the Japanese foreign service.
These spies collected and, through various channels transmitted, in
formation to the Japanese Empire respecting the military and naval
establishments and dispositions on the island.
In Hawaii the local Army Intelligence Service has always devoted
itself to matters pertaining to Army personnel and property; and
the local Naval Intelligence Service to matters pertaining to Navy
personnel and property. In addition, prior to the establishment of
an office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Hawaii, Naval
Intelligence investigated enemy activities amongst the civil popula-
tion. When the Bureau’s office was established it was agreed by the
three governmental agencies, that the Bureau should take over and
become primarily responsible for investigation of matters connected
with the civil population, and that the three services should cooper-
ate with each other. Efforts were made by the Bureau to uncover
espionage activities in Hawaii. The United States being at peace
with Japan, restrictions imposed prevented resort to certain methods
of obtaining the content of messages transmitted by telephone or
radio telegraph over the commercial lines operating between Oahu
REPORT OP ROBERTS COMMISSION
13
and Japan. The Bureau and the local intelligence staffs were unable,
prior to December 7, to obtain and make available significant infor-
mation respecting Japanese plans and fleet movements in the direc-
tion of Hawaii.
In the summer of 1941 there were more than 200 consular agents
acting under the Japanese consul, who was stationed in Honolulu,
T. H. The naval district intelligence office raised a question with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and with the intelligence officer
of the Hawaiian Department of the Army, whether these agents
should not be arrested for failing to register as agents of a foreign
principal as required by statutes of the United States. In confer-
ences respecting this question, the commanding general, Hawaiian
Department, objected to the arrest of any such persons at least until
they had been given notice and an opportunity to register, asserting
that their arrest would tend to thwart the efforts which the Army
had made to create friendly sentiment toward the United States on
the part of Japanese aliens resident in Hawaii and American citi-
zens of Japanese descent resident in Hawaii and create unnecessary
bad feeling. No action was taken against the agents.
It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage in Hawaii
was the Japanese consulate at Honolulu. It has been discovered that
the Japanese consul sent to and received from Tokyo in his own and
other names many messages on commercial radio circuits. This ac-
tivity greatly increased toward December 7, 1941. The contents of
these messages, if it could have been learned, might have furnished
valuable information. In view of the peaceful relations with Japan,
and the consequent restrictions on the activities of the investigating
agencies, they were unable prior to December 7 to obtain and ex-
amine messages transmitted throuh commercial channels by the Japa-
nese consul, or by persons acting for him.
It is now apparent that through their intelligence service the Japa->
nese had complete information. They evidently knew that no task
force of the United States Navy was anywhere in the sector north-
east, north, and northwest of the Hawaiian Islands. They evidently
knew that no distant airplane reconnaissance was maintained in any
sector. They evidently knew that up to December 6 no inshore air-
plane patrol was being maintained around the periphery of Oahu.
They knew, from maps which they had obtained, the exact location
of vital air fields, hangars, and other structures. They also knew
accurately where certain important naval vessels would be berthed.
Their flyers had the most detailed maps, courses, and bearings, so that
each could attack a given vessel or field. Eacn seems to have been
given a specified mission.
xvn
The passes and liberty granted the personnel of the Army and
Navy in Hawaii on Saturday, December 6, were normal for a period
when the forces were not upon a war footing, with the following
exceptions : The normal Army guard had been increased by approxi-
mately 100 percent; two battalions of infantry were held in reserve
for antisabotage defense; antiaircraft_gun crews were maintained
on ships in harbor for instant defense; all Navy personnel, with the
exception of those authorized to be absent, were required to be in
79716 — 46— Bx. 167 2
14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
their quarters at midnight; all places of amusement' in Honolulu
and all entertainments at the Army posts were closed at midnight;
all saloons and drinking places in Honolulu were closed at midnight.
On the night of December 6 numerous officers of the Army and
Navy attended social functions at various points on the island of
Oahu, principally the usual Saturday functions at the various posts
and naval establishments. The commanding general, Hawaiian De-
partment, and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet were both
guests at dinners away from their posts of command on that evening,
but returned to their quarters at an early hour.
The percentages of strength in the Army present for duty on the
island of Oahu at 8 a. m. December 7, 1941, reported by all major
echelons and posts, were: Twenty-fourth Infantry Division, 90 per-
cent; Twenty -fifth Infantry Division, 85.6 percent; Coast Artillery
Corps, 87.5 percent; Air Force, 88.9 percent; miscellaneous, including
department headquarters, ordnance, quartermaster, and medical, 92
f iercent. Estimated general percentage, 88.8 percent. Reports from
arge ships and destroyers that were in Pearl Harbor during the
attack show 60 percent of officers on board and 96 percent of the men.
Of 75 vessels of the fleet, of all kinds, 49 commanding officers were
aboard during the attack and 22 were en route to their ships, 1 was
on another ship, and 1 was on authorized leave, which leaves 2 for
whom we are unable to account.
Intoxicating liquor is sold on the island of Oahu, and men on pass or
on liberty have the opportunity to buy and consume it. Following
the established procedure, at home and abroad, the Army exercises dis-
ciplinary control of men on pass through its military police, and the
Navy of men on liberty by the use of shore patrols. These organiza-
tions take into custody any person showing evidence of intoxication.
On the night of December 6-7, 1941, from 6 p. m. to 6 a. m., arrests of
soldiers by the military police, for intoxication, were 38, and arrests of
sailors by the Navy shore patrol, for intoxication, were 4. By compar-
ison the arrests of civilians for drunkenness on that night were 39.
Thorough inquiry disclosed there is no evidence of excessive drinking
by any officer of either service on that night. The evidence shows that
as respects the use of intoxicating liquor and intoxication, the condi-
tions amongst the men of the Army and of the Navy on the night of
December 6 compare closely with similar conditions for the several
preceding months. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, the usual percent-
age of enlisted strength entitled to passes or liberty took advantage of
such privilege to spend the afternoon or evening in the city of Hono-
lulu. Application of this ratio to total numbers of all the services
then on the island of Oahu and in Pearl Harbor, amounting to about
75,000 men, indicates that no less than 11,000 soldiers, sailors, and
marines visited Honolulu that afternoon and evening.
In normal times more enlisted men of both services are absent from
duty by permission on Saturday nights than on other nights; and on
Saturday nights more officers are customarily absent than on week-
day nights.
On the morning of Sunday, December 7, Army posts and naval ves-
sels and stations were adequately manned, for the readiness and alert
then in effect, by men fit for duty.
REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION
15
XVIII
The attack on the morning of December 7, 1941, was a combined air-
raid and submarine attack on the island of Oahu, a bombardment of
Midway, and a continuous air attack and bombardment on Wake
Island.
Available information indicates that the force attacking Oahu con- \
sisted of either three or four Japanese carriers, with supporting surface 1
craft and a few small submarines, and that this force had maintained \
radio silence during its approach, which, except for the submarines, was
from the northward of Oahu.
In the attack on Oahu a suspicious object was sighted in the pro-\
hibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6 : 30 a. m., by the U. S. S. Antares.
Between 6 : 33 and 6 : 45 this object, which was a small submarine, was
attacked and sunk by the concerted action of a naval patrol plane and
the U. S. S. Ward. A report of this action by the Ward reached the
naval-base watch officer at 7 : 12 a. m., who notified his chief of staff.
The ready destroyer was despatched to investigate, but no alert warn-
ings were issued based upon this report. Another small submarine
was fired upon, depth-charged, rammed, and sunk inside the harbor
between 8 : 35 and 8 : 43 a. m. A third small submarine grounded in
Kaneohe Bay and was captured. There is no evidence of any damage
by torpedoes fired by these submarines.
Pearl Harbor was provided with an antitorpedo net which would
have prevented the entrance of torpedoes into the harbor, and would
have revealed the entrance of a submarine. The procedure prior to
December 7, 1941, was to keep the net closed during the hours of dark-
ness, opening it only when necessary for a vessel to pass through. It
was kept open during daylight hours, on the theory that,' during day-
light, the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel, and other vessels
in the vicinity, would detect a submerged or partially submerged sub-
marine. December 7 the net was opened at 4 : 58 a. m. for the entrance
of two mine sweepers. It was kept open until 8 : 40 a. m., when it was
closed by orders. The net was not damaged. The submarine was first
sighted in the harbor at 7 : 45 a. m. The time of its entrance is not ]
known, but probably it passed in about 7 a. m. I
An estimated force of from 150 to 200 fighting, bombing, and tor-
pedo planes simultaneously attacked Pearl Harbor and all air bases
on Oahu at about 7:55 a. m. All attacking planes had withdrawn
before 11 a. m. As a result of the attack serious loss of life was
caused and serious damage was inflicted on ships in the harbor, and
S lanes, hangars, and other facilities at Hickam Field, Ewa Field,
'ord Island, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field, and Kaneohe.
The major part of the damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted
from torpedoes launched from planes. The torpedoes were of an
obsolete type, altered to increase their explosive load, to decrease
their radius, and fitted with side vanes to insure functioning in
shallow water — a weapon peculiarly adapted to an attack such as
the one delivered upon ships in Pearl Harbor. Many of the bombs
had extra heavy cases, and appeared to be modified armor-piercing
shell.
16 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
December 7, 1941, at 9: 30 p. m. Midway time (11:30 p. m. Hono-
lulu time), a force believed to consist of two cruisers and two de-
stroyers, approached from the southward, opened fire and shelled
Midway Island for about 30 minutes. About noon December 8, 1941
(2:50 p. m. December 7, Honolulu time), some 27 land planes made
a strafing and bombing attack on Wake Island. Some loss of life
and damage to material resulted on each island. Attacks on Wake
continued until its capture on December 22, 1941 (December 21, Hono-
lulu time).
Immediately upon realizing that the Japanese were attacking, the
commanding general, Hawaiian Department, ordered alert No. 3.
The alert was executed with reasonable promptness. At the same
time the commander in chief placed the fleet on a full war basis and
issued a series of orders in an effort to intercept and destroy the
attacking force.
Officers and enlisted men, in defending against the attack, demon-
strated excellent training and high morale. Antiaircraft weapons
aboard ship, which were not already manned, and antiaircraft weap-
ons ashore, which were in position, were promptly manned. Junior
officers and enlisted men on their own intiative procured from stor-
age every possible automatic weapon. These weapons continued in
action during and in spite of low-level strafing and dive bombing
which have been known to demoralize even seasoned' troops. At
least three fighter pilots, in total disregard of their own safety,
attempted to take off in the face of greatly superior forces then at-
tacking their airdrome, but lost their lives in the attempt. A few
fighter planes parked on an outlying gunnery training field, which
was not attacked, took the air. This combined antiaircraft and
fighter action resulted in the destruction of approximately 30 enemy
aircraft, and a number of others were lost at sea because they were
unable to rejoin their carriers.
XIX
f The state of readiness prescribed for Army aircraft prior to the
(attack required them to be ready for flight only after 4 hours’ notice.
The type of alert in effect required all Army aircraft to be con-
centrated in order more effectively to guard against possible sabotage,
instead of being dispersed in order to afford greater security against
air attack, and greater facility in taking the air. This state of
readiness, this concentration of airplanes, and the element of surprise,
all contributed to the effectiveness of the Japanese attack, and re-
sulted in such permanent or temporary disablement of airplanes
that very few fighter airplanes were able to take the air during the
course or the action. For the same reasons it was impossible to get
airplanes into the air in time to trail the Japanese airplanes back
to their carriers.
The aircraft warning system, which was remanned by about 8 : 30
a. m. December 7, 1941, failed during the balance of that day to
furnish any reliable information of enemy aircraft returning to their
carriers. Such information as it afforded indicated enemy forces
to the southward and south westward of Oahu. A report of an actual
contact with an enemy carrier, which later proved to be erroneous,
REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION
17
gave credence to numerous reports from other sources indicating
enemy carriers might be to the southward and southwestward thus
causing futile searches in those areas.
On December 7 naval Task Force 8 was about 200 miles west of
Oahu, proceeding toward Oahu. Another was about 700 miles west
of Oahu. A third, Task Force 11, was in the vicinity of Johnston
Island, about 700 miles southwest of Oahu. These task forces were
engaged in operations connected with strengthening the defenses of
the outlying islands.
On the morning of December 7, 1941, prior to the attack, the follow-
ing searches of sea areas were being made. Six patrol planes were
searching south and southeastwardly from Midway. Three patrol
planes were in the air engaged in a joint exercise with submarines
south of Oahu. Eighteen scouting planes from Task F orce 8 had been
dispatched to scout in advance of the force which was on its way to
Oahu. These scouted to the southwestward of Oahu. After the attack
the followig searches were made: The 3 planes in the air south of
Oahu, according to their standing orders, searched to the northwest
of Oahu a distance of about 375 miles. Nine planes were dispatched
by Task Force 8 and searched to the south and southwest of Oahu.
Carrier planes of Task Force 11 searched in an area about 500 miles
southwestward of Oahu. About 11 : 27 a. m. 2 heavy Army bombers
and 4 light bombers took off to attack a carrier reported about 25 miles
off Barber’s Point. After failure to make contact the 2 heavy bombers
searched first to the southwestward and then in areas to the northwest
of Oahu. The other 4 searched to the southwestward. At 11 : 50 a. m.
6 Navy VS planes searched southward of Oahu. Thereafter 9 planes
searched the sector southwest to northwest of Oahu. Two utility
planes searched northward of Oahu to a distance of 300 miles, and 9
planes which had arrived from carriers and refueled searched some
200 miles to the northward. No contacts were made with enemy air-
craft or carriers, except that 1 Navy airplane was attacked by a Japa-
nese airplane some 300 miles north of Oahu. This incident was not \
reported until the next day.
SUMMARY OF THE MORE IMPORTANT FACTS
Pearl Harbor is an important outlying naval base, and its security
is vital to both offensive and defensive operations. It is the Army’s
function to insure the security of Pearl Harbor against hostile at-
tack, and the Navy’s function to support the Army indirectly by
operations at sea and directly by making available therefor such in-
strumentalities of the Navy as are on the vessels of the fleet when in
harbor and are located or based on shore either temporarily or per-
manently.
Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essential
to success in war and requires that the operations of the Army and
the Navy be coordinated. Under the then existing plans the joint
defense of the Hawaiian frontier was to be coordinated by mutual
cooperation between the commanders concerned. Plans for the de-
fense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier were prepared by the com-
manding general, Hawaiian Department, and the commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District, the latter acting as a subordinate of the
18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Adherence to such a plan
prepared in advance of hostilities does not suffice to relieve com-
manders of their responsibility to apply and adapt the plan to the
situation as it develops.
Where, as here, the defense of an area is the joint responsibility of
two commanders who are to coordinate their activities by mutual co-
operation, the first duty of such commanders in the case of an emer-
gency is conference ana consultation with respect to the measures to
be taken under the existing plans and the adaptation of those plans
in whole or in part to the situation.
At about the time that Admiral Kimmel and General Short as-
sumed their respective commands, the War and Navy Departments
were in correspondence with respect to adequate defense against air
raids on Oahu and the naval base. The correspondence between the
departments exhibits a deep concern respecting the probability of
this form of attack. These commanders were acquainted with this
correspondence. Nevertheless there has been amrongst the responsible
commanders and their subordinates, ithout exception, a conviction,
which persisted up to December 7, 1941. that Japan had no intention
of making any such raid. Consequently this form of attack was a
complete surprise to all of the superior officers of Army and Navy
stationed in the Hawaiian area. This conviction persisted notwith-
standing messages containing warnings and orders, brought to the
attention of both commanders over a period of weeks prior to the
attack. As early as October 16 the commanders were warned of the
possibility of an attack by Japan on the United States and were
/directed to take precautions and make preparatory dispositions in
| the light of this information. A significant warning message was
communicated to both the local commanders on November 24. On
November 27 each responsible commander was warned that hostilities
\were momentarily possible. The warnings indicated war, and war
only.
Both of these messages contained orders. The commanding gen-
eral was ordered to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures
as he deemed necessary. The commander in chief of the fleet was
ordered to execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying
out war tasks. Other significant messages followed on succeeding
days. These emphasized tne impending danger and the need for war
readiness.
In this situation, during a period of 10 days preceding the Japanese
attack, the responsible commanders held no conference directed to a
discussion of the meaning of the warnings and orders sent them, and
failed to collaborate and to coordinate defensive measures which
should be taken pursuant to the orders received. Dispositions as a
result of the messages were independently made by each commander.
Neither of them informed himself of the measures and dispositions
taken by the other.
The dispositions so made were inadequate to meet a surprise air
attack.
Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as
to Japanese dispositions and intent. The lack of such knowledge
rendered more urgent the initiation of a state of readiness for defense.
The personnel, mat4riel, and equipment were insufficient to place
the forces on a war footing and maintain them on that footing for
REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION
19
an extended period. These deficiencies did not preclude measures
which would have to a great extent frustrated the attack or mitigated
its severity.
A considerable number of the Army and Navy personnel were
on pass or liberty December 6, for the reason that the state of alert
or of readiness demanded by the emergency had not been put into
effect. With immaterial exceptions Army and Navy personnel had
returned from leave and liberty hours before the attack ensued, fit
for duty.
Both officers and men responded immediately in the emergency and
exhibited initiative, efficiency, and bravery in meeting the raid.
Based upon its findings of fact, the Commission reaches the following
Conclusions
1. Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essen-
tial to success in war and requires: First, the coordination of the
foreign and military policies of the Nation ; and, second, the coordina-
tion of the operations of the Army and Navy.
2. The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the
War and Navy Departments in close touch with the international
situation and fully advising them respecting the course and probable
termination of negotiations with Japan.
3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled
their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State
and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief
of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with
Japan and the significant implications thereof.
4. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled
their obligations by consulting and cooperating with each other, and
with their superiors, respecting the joint defense of the Hawaiian
coastal frontier; and each knew of, and concurred in, the warnings
and orders sent by the other to the responsible commanders with re-
spect to such defense.
5. The Chief of Staff of the Army fulfilled his command responsi-
bility by issuing a direct order in connection with his warning of
probable hostilities, in the following words: “Prior to hostile Jap-
anese action you are directed to unctertake such reconnaissance and
other measures as you deem necessary.”
6. The Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled his command responsi-
bility by issuing a warning and by giving a direct order to the com-
mander in chief, Pacific Fleet, in the following words :
This despatch Is to be considered a war warning,
and
Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out
the tasks assigned.
7. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area, in fulfillment
of their obligation so to do, prepared plans which, if adapted to and
used for the existing emergency, would have been adequate.
8. In the circumstances the responsibility of these commanders was
to confer upon the question of putting into effect and adapting their
joint defense plans.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
9. These commanders failed to confer with respect to the warnings
and orders issued on and after November 27, and to adapt and use
existing plans to meet the emergency.
The order for alert No. 1 o fthe Army command in Hawaii was
not adequate to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning
/^messages.
/Til. The state of readiness of the naval forces on the morning of
December 7 was not such as was required to meet the emergency
envisaged in the*warning messages.
-02. Had orders issued by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval
Operations November 27, 1941, been complied with, the aircraft warn-
ing system of the Army should have been operating; the distant
reconnaissance of the Navy, and the inshore air patrol of the Army,
should have been maintained ; the antiaircraft batteries of the Army
and similar shore batteries of the Navy, as well as additional anti-
aircraft artillery located on vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor,
should have been manned and supplied with ammunition ; and a high
state of readiness of aircraft should have been in effect. None of
these conditions was in fact inaugurated or maintained for the reason
that the responsible commanders failed to consult and cooperate
as to necessary action based upon the warnings and to adopt meas-
ures enjoined bv the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and
Navy commands in Washington.
^ 13. There were deficiencies in personnel, weapons ? equipment, and
facilities to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended
periods of time, but these deficiencies should not have affected the
decision of the responsible commanders as to the state of readiness
to be prescribed.
14. The warning message of December 7, intended to reach both
commanders in the field at about 7 a. in. Hawaiian time, December
7, 1941, was but an added precaution, in view of the warnings and
orders previously issued. If the message had reached its destina-
tion at the time intended, it would still nave been too late to be of
substantial use, in view of the fact that the commanders had failed
to take measures and make dispositions prior to the time of its antici-
pated receipt which would have been effective to warn of the attack or
to meet it.
15. The failure of the officers in the War Department to observe
that General Short, neither in his reply of November 27 to the Chief
of Staff’s message of that date, nor otherwise, had reported the
measures taken by him, and the transmission of two messages con-
cerned chiefly with sabotage which warned him not to resort to illegal
methods against sabotage or espionage, and not to take measures
which would alarm the civil population, and the failure to reply to
his message of November 29 outlining in full all the actions he had
taken against sabotage only, and referring to nothing else, tended
to lead General Short to believe that what he had done met the
requirements of the warnings and orders received by him.
16. The failure of the commanding general, Hawaiian Department,
and the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to confer and cooperate
with respect to the meaning of the warnings received and the measures
necessary to comply with the orders given them under date of No-
vember 27, 1941, resulted largely from a sense of security due to the
i
REPORT OP ROBERTS COMMISSION
21
opinion prevalent in diplomatic military, and naval circles, and in
the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the
Far East. The existence of such a view, however prevalent, did not
relieve the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the
Pacific Fleet and our most important outpost.
17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate
action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and
December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then
in effect for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction
of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with
the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the
appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostili-
ties. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform him-
self of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other
to i
sions
carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provi-
»ns of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a
lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent .
in their positions as commanders in chief, Pacific Fleet, and command-
i ng general, Hawaiian D epartment. -■
The Japanese attack was a complete surprise to the commanders
knd they failed to make suitable dispositions to meet such an attack/
Each failed properly to evaluate the seriousness of the situation.
These errors of judgment were the effective causes for the success
>f the attack. s'
^i». Causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were :
Disregard of international law and custom relating to declaration
of war by the Japanese and the adherence by the United States to such
laws and customs.
Restrictions which prevented effective counterespionage.
Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressiv&~
Jap anese action in the Far East, and on antisabotage measures.
Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to
the antisabotage measures instituted by the commanding general,
Hawaiian Department.
Nonreceipt by the interested parties, prior to the attack, of the
warnin g message of December 7, 1941.
20. When the attack developed on the morning of December 7, 1941,
the officers and enlisted men of both services were present in sufficient
number and were in fit condition to perform any duty. Except for a
negligible number, the use of intoxicating liquor on the preceding
evening did not affect their efficiency.
21. Subordinate commanders executed their superiors’ orders with-
out question. They were not responsible for the state of readiness
prescribed.
Respectfully submitted.
Owen J. Roberts.
W. H. Standley.
J. M. Reeves.
Frank R. McCoy.
Joseph T. McNarney.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
23
l A] REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Appointed by the Secretary of War, pursuant to the Provisions of
Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, to Ascertain
and Report the Facts Relating to the Attack Made by Japanese Armed
Forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to Make
such Recommendations as It May Deem Proper. Also, To Consider
the Phases Which Related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the Report
of the House Military Affairs Committee, as Directed by the Acting
Secretary of War, in His Memorandum for The Judge Advocate
General, 12 July 1944.
[2?] TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page *
Chapter I. Preamble: Authority for the Army Pearl Harbor Board and
Its Action Taken 1
Chapteh II. Background 9
Chaffer III. The Story of Pearl Harbor 66
Chapter IV. Responsibilities in Washington 218
Chapter V. Wyman and Construction Delays in Hawaii 242
Chapter VI. Conclusions 294
Chapter VII. Recommendations 304
Appendices Second Volume
LEGENDS
RR — Roberts Record. D — Document.
R — APHB Record. Ex— Exhibit.
Italics ours unless otherwise stated.
[i] Chapter I. Preamble: Authority for the Army Pearl
Harbor Board and Its Action Taken
This Board was appointed pursuant to the provisions of Public Law
339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, by Letter Order A. G. O.
8 July 1944 (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44) ) as amended by Letter
Order A. G. O. 11 July 1944 (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (10 Jun 44) ) and
Letter Order A. G. 0. 22 August 1944 (AGPO-A-A 248.7 (2 Aug 44) ) ,
and as supplemented by Supplemental Letter Order A. G. O. 22 July
1944 (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (21 July 44) ) which order made reference
to a memorandum for The Judge Advocate General of 12 July 1944 —
Subject: Report of House Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June
1944 alleging neglect and misconduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman,
Jr., and others, concerning Hawaiian and Canadian Defense Projects,
and which was signed by Robert P. Patterson, Acting Secretary of
1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
War. This supplemental order directed the Board to consider the
phase of the report which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster. 1
Composition of the Board :
Lt. Gen. George Grunert, 01534, USA
Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, 0212769, USA
Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, 02871, USA
Col. Charles W. West, 012774, JAGD, Recorder (without vote)
Col. Harry A. Toulmin, 0205520, AC, Executive Officer (without
vote)
Maj. Henry C. Clausen, O907613, JAGD, Assistant Recorder
(without vote)
[#] The Board interpreted these orders and the memorandum
referred to as confining its mvestigation to the Pearl Harbor disaster.
The Boatd convened 20 July 1944 and was in continuous session from
24 July 1944 to 20 October 1944. It held hearings twice in Washing-
ton, D. C. ; twice in San Francisco, California; and in Hawaii. It has
heard a total of 151 witnesses and has interviewed many additional
potential witnesses whom it found did not have any pertinent infor-
mation. There has been no available document, witness, suggestion
or lead which promised any materiality that has not been carefully
investigated by this Board. Every witness has been invited to give,
in addition to his testimony, any suggestions, opinions, leads to evi-
dence, or any other information that might possibly be pertinent. It
has been our purpose, and we believe we have effected it, to explore
every available piece of information on this subject. We have not
had the opportunity, nor the organization, to comb personally and
exhaustively the official files, but we have called for the pertinent let-
ters, documents, and memoranda. We believe that practically all of
them have been secured, although we have found a few files from which
important and vital papers are missing. In many instances we found
these documents elsewhere or were able to prove them through copies
in other hands.
This Board has been without power of subpoena, but in no instance
has its invitation to appear and testify been ignored.
In view of the fact that the War Department appointed this
[<?] Board, under Joint Resolution of Congress, 3 to examine the
Army’s part in the Pearl Harbor disaster because Congress desired,
as appears from the legislative history of the Joint Resolution, a
more thorough study, it has been necessary to examine the record of
the Roberts Commission and the Roberts Report in the light of the
new testimony adduced by this Board, new witnesses, and new docu-
2 See copies of orders and memorandum, Exhibits 65 to 69, inclusive.
* Public Law 339 — 78th Congress, Chapter 247 — 2d session, S. J. Res. 133, Joint Resolu-
tion : To extend the statute of limitation in certain cases.
“Resolved 6 y the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled , That effective as of December 7, 1943, all statutes, resolutions, laws,
articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons, mili-
tary or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or in-
volved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against
the United States, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or punish-
ment of any person or persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in
connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any
other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or ofTense against the United States,
are hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the extension
provided for in Public Law 208, Seventy-eighth Congress.
“Sec. 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to
f proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described
n section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons aB the facts
may justify.
“Approved June 18, 1944.”
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
25
ments ; and to set forth wherein the Board’s findings are in harmony
with the Roberts Report ; or, if in conflict, are correct and supported
by fuller evidence.
The Board has made, therefore, a careful review of the record and
exhibits of the Roberts Commission. This Board has been materially
helped and enlightened by the Report and Record U] of the
Roberts Commission. We append to this report a section indicating
the additional information and documents which have been made
available as a result of our extended investigation, and which prob-
ably did not come to the attention of the Roberts Commission; or,
at least, were not mentioned in either the testimony, documents or
report of the Roberts Commission.
We have been greatly aided by the Interim Report, Committee on
Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-eighth Congress,
2nd Session, pursuant to H. Res. 30, A Resolution Authorizing the
Committee on Military Affairs and the Committee on Naval Affairs
to Study the Progress of the National War Effort^ and the com-
mittee’s records, counsel, and investigators, with particular reference
to the activities of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., Hans Wilhelm
Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, and others, as such activities had
a bearing upon the Pearl Harbor disaster and what led up to it.
We have oeen aided by the testimony of counsel from that committee
and the complete record of the investigation of that committee
on this subject and its exhibits. We have also heard testimony and
investigated reports and reviewed affidavits of additional affiants,
whose testimony came to light, or documents were discovered, after
the conclusion of the investigation of the Committee on Military
Affairs, as indicated in its Interim Report. We have also been aided
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice,
and the Report of the Tenney Committee in California.
We transmit with this report the recotd of testimony of the
witnesses consisting of 41 volumes and 70 exhibits. In the appendix
to this report is a tabulation in detail of the [5] witnesses
who testified and a list of the exhibits.
In order to facilitate the examination of the Board’s record by
the War Department and by any others who may have occasion to
review the record and exhibits, we append to this report and make a
part of it extensive analysis of the testimony of every witness, in-
dexing each statement by reference to the record, and with cross ref-
erences of those statements to different parts of the record where
similar or different statements on the same subject were made by
other witnesses. We have also added cross references to the same
subject matter in the record of the Roberts Commission or the ex-
hibits presented before that commission. It is, therefore, possible
for anyone reviewing this report to have a complete and, we believe,
exhaustive analysis of every phase of the Pearl Harbor matters, so
that any part of the situation can be easily and promptly reviewed.
In formulating this report the Board has been conscious of the
deep spiritual and moral obligation, as well as its professional and
patriotic duty, to present an impartial and judicial investigation
and report. This we have earnestly endeavored to do, and have
spared no pains or effort to that end. With that spirit animating
our actions, we have deemed it helpful and wise to present the state
26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of mind and the background against which the events of the drama
of Pearl Harbor could be adequately judged ; and to sketch in retro-
spection the events and the knowledge of such events of each of the
principal actors on the scene, so that their actions might be more
fully understood and justly evaluated [6] and judged. At
no time, however, has the Board acted as a court. 4
This is necessary because we are now passing upon the matter
several years after the event. We have endeavored to effect this re-
construction to some degree in the second chapter entitled, “Back-
ground”. The same considerations have been evaluated in the suc-
ceeding chapters, as this background affected the events and actions
of those involved in the matters under consideration. In so doing,
we hope we have avoided the human failing so aptly pointed out by
St. Paul of
forgetting those things which are behind and reaching forth unto those things
which are before.
In Chapter III we have presented the story of Pearl Harbor. This
is a running chronological story of the events that took place leading
up to the Pearl Harbor attack and through that fateful day ana
for a short period thereafter, so far as subsequent events reflected
upon the conditions previously existing. We have discussed in this
Cnapter III the arguments for and against each principal propo-
sition, have examined all of the representations and defenses of
General Short and others involved in this matter. We have en-
deavored to state the surrounding facts and circumstances, the back-
ground, the considerations and factors which influenced each prin-
cipal officer or official in the execution of his duties.
[7-5] Therefore, whoever reads this report will have before him
all of the considerations for and against any proposition, all facts, any
defense or any claim put forward by those interested, and answers to
such questions of import to the services and to the public, in order to
have the foundation for an impartial judgment.
In Chapter IV we continue the story in so far as it pertains to Wash-
ington. In Chapter V we relate the story concerning the Pre-Pearl
Harbor construction activities and in Chapter VI come to Conclusions.
The Board was after facts; and the surrounding conditions, back-
ground, and atmosphere which influenced the actors in this drama and
brought them to their fateful decisions. This we believe we secured
successfully from military and naval personnel of widely varying
ranks ; from civilians of varied stations in life ; and from official and
other contemporaneous publications. The range of witnesses ran
from men in the ranks to Generals and Admirals, and from the hum-
blest in civil life to United States Senators and the President’s Cab-
inet.® Each witness was invited, additionally, to express freely his
views and opinions on the record, and to submit any facts or leads to
the discoveries of facts which might be helpful to this Board.
We set out with no thesis to prove, nor person to convict. Our ap-
4 Whenever any interested witness raised a question of proof that had not been previ-
ously discussed, or fully examined, or any newspaper report raising any question came to
our attention, we endeavored to get an answer so that the whole truth would be known
once and for all.
4 Whenever there was a shadow or a shade of a doubt, we resolved It in favor of running
down the suggestion and introducing proof, if it had any suspicion of materiality
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
27
proach has been, we hope, diligently and completely factual ; and also
equally impartial. Our conclusions are those compelled by the clear
weight of the evidence from the facts set forth in the record.
[ 9 ] Chapter n. Background
1. Introduction
Confusion of Thinking, Organization, Conflict of Opinions and Diversity of
Views ; Nation Not Geared to War.
2. Public Opinion
Psychological Conditions and Their Effect; Army Dependent on Public Opin-
ion and State of Public Mind and Its Readiness for War ; American Public Re-
luctant to Consider A War ; Japan Ready for War.
3. U. S. Policy (1922-1939)
Study of Long-Term Treatment of Japan Important; the Mandated Islands
and Exclusion of the United States and Fortiflcatlon of th'e Islands by Japan ;
the Navy’s Efforts to Get Into the Islands and Its Relationship to the State De-
partment ; Diplomatic Status of Consular Agents of Japan in Hawaii and Their
Spying Activities ; Strong National Policy for the Protection of American Rights
Lacking and Effect Upon the Army and Navy ; the Effect of This Policy on the
Japanese Oriental Trading Mind.
I U. 8. Policy (1939-1941)
Avoidance of a Conflict with Japan 1989-1941 by Avoiding Open Breach ; Ne-
cessity for Delay to Prepare for War; Negotiations Based Upon Lack of In-
cidence. ,
5. Moral Embargoes Versus Japanese Expansion
Morale Embargoes; Economic Sanctions by Direct Embargoes; Coincident
Forming of Public Opinion Against Japan ; Japanese Making No Concessions and
Proceeding with Aggressions ; Threatening Hostile Action ; Lack of Public Un-
derstanding of Importance of Hawaii; War and Navy Departments Mak-
ing [10] Great Effort to Prepare for War with Grave Deflciencies ; Diver-
sion of Resources to Assist England and France Retarding our Own Rearming ;
Coordination of Action by the Government Through Conference in War Council,
Etc.; Lack of Appreciation of Where Japan Would Attack and Miscalculation
of Time of Attack ; Japanese Full Understanding of Our Dilemma.
0. Public Demands Action Against Japanese
National Policy Against War ; Attempt to Negotiate and Apply Economic Sanc-
tions Put Government in Difficult Contrary Positions; Conflicting Elements of
Policy Communicated to Field Commanders to Both Prepare for War and Not
Precipitate an Incident Causing War ; Public Opinion in 1941 More Belligerent
Than the Preparations for War Justified Complicating Government Position.
7. Economic Sanctions Against Japan
The Economic Effect on Japan of Progressive Sanctions Considered in Detail ;
the Rising Tempo of Economic Disaster to Japan and the Decreasing Success of
Negotiations; Inevitable Showdown Between Japanese Economic Strangulation
and Military Action Approaching; the Impasse Reached on November 26, 1941;
the State Department Passes Responsibility for the Nation to the War and Navy
Departments.
8. The Hatoaiian Population Problem
Sabotage Complex ; the Japanese Population Conditions Analyzed in Hawaii ;
the Rising Dominance Economically and Politically of the Japanese Group;
Sabotage of War Action Possible by the Hawaiian Japanese Group; the Diffi-
culty of Alerts Without Disturbing the Civilian Japanese Population To An Overt
Act ; Effect of Japanese Atmosphere in Hawaii and Government Policy Against
Overt Acts Upon the Responsible Commanders in Hawaii ; the Local Opposition
of Commercial Interests to [11] Putting Japanese Under Control ; Official
Reluctance to Put Local Japanese Population under Civilian Surveillance ; Free
Japanese Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in Hawaii.
28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
9. Hawaiian Press
Constant Reiteration of Progressively Increasing Difficulties with Japan and
Threats of War Accentuated the State of Mind of Local Commanders as to Diffi-
culties with Local Population.
10. Summary
Preparatory Period Immense Effect Upon State of Mind of Public Officials and
Commanders ; Our Complacency Our Weakness ; Our National Pride and Vanity
our Weakness ; the Result was Lack of Action, Coordination, Cooperation, Team-
work, and War Spirit; United States Was Unprepared Mentally, Physically, or
as an Organization for War.
[12] 1. Introduction. — The purpose of this explanation of the
background of public and private events as they existed in 1940 and
1941 is this. There existed during this critical period much confusion
of thinking and of organization, of conflict of opinion and diversity
of views. The nation was not geared to war, either mentally or as an
organization. It was a period of conflicting plans and purposes. The
winds of public opinion were blowing in all directions; isolationists
and nationalists were struggling for predominance ; public opinion was
both against war and clamoring for reprisal against Japan; we were
negotiating for peace with Japan, and simultaneously applying eco-
nomic sanctions that led only to war ; we were arming our forces for
war and at the same time giving away much of such armament. The
Administration, State, War and Navy Departments in their policies,
plans and operations were likewise being pushed here and thereby
the ebb and flow of war events, public' reactions, diplomatic negotia-
tions and newspaper attacks.
The War Department bv its actions and its organization was still
on a peacetime basis ; neither its management nor its general staff had
perfected its organization for war or for the conduct of a large enter-
prise. The whole machinery of government was geared to a different
pui’pose and tempo than war. Valiant and brilliant men were strug-
gling to bring order out of chaos, rather as individuals or as small
groups, attempting simultaneously both to establish policies and to
accomplish practical things. As a result a few men, without organiza-
tion in the true sense, were attempting to conduct large enterprises,
take multiple actions, and give directions that should have been
[iJ] the result Qf carefully directed commands, instead of action
taken by conference. We were preparing for a war by the conference
method. We were directing such preparations by the conference
method ; we were even writing vital messages by the conference method,
and arriving at their contents by compromise instead of by command ;
that was the product of the time and conditions due to thetransifion
from peace to war in a democracy.
Such was the confusion of men and events, largely unorganized for
appropriate action and helpless before a strong course of events,
that ran away with the situation and prematurely plunged us into
war.
[1£] 2. Public Opinion. — The disaster of Pearl Harbor and the
responsibilities and courses of action taken by those connected there-
with can better be understood when the background of public opinion
and the state of the public mind are likewise understood. Psycholog-
ical conditions had a material effect upon the events that took place. A M
brief review of the then state of mind of officials and the public; and
the facts known to the public and to the government ; and our national
policy are all necessary in order to view the picture in its proper
nerspective.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
29
Our Army, like other armies of democracies, in its policies and its
actions to a degree was dependent upon and was influenced by public
opinion and the state of the public mind. Successful war is waged
through a state of mind and a state of public readiness for war. A
recognition of this fact is necessary to the understanding of the back-
ground of public opinion and the state of our desire to make war,
which undoubtedly had its influence on the War Department and the
responsible commanders in Hawaii. A brief resume of that situation
will lead to an understanding of what influenced the taking of certain
actions, or the failures to take action, on the part of the Washington
departments concerned and the higher commanders in the field.
For a long period of time prior to the war the public was reluctant
even to consider a war. 6 There was a distinct [15] lack of a
war mind in the United States. Isolationist organizations and prop-
aganda groups against war were powerful and vital factors affecting
any war action capable of being taken by our responsible leadership.
So influential were these campaigns that they raised grave doubts m
minds of such leadership as to whether they would be supported by
the people in/ the necessary actions for our defense by requisite moves
against Japan. ' Public opinion in the early stages had to be allowed
to develop ; in the later stages it ran ahead of preparation for war.
There was little war spirit either amongst the general public or in the
armed forces, due to this conflicting public opinion having its in-
fluence. 7 The events hereinafter recited must be measurea against
this important psychological factor.
At the same time, Japan was pursuing an opposite policy of prepa-
ration. It had been at war for several years in China ; both its people
and government were psychologically and physically geared to war
and were implemented with a polished plan of action and equipment
to do the job. It was animated by cunning, hatred and patriotism in
a land where life is cheap; and nurtured m an atmosphere of insane
nationalism [itf] and oriental intrigue. Japan was a nation
united for the single purpose of world conquest based on more than a
thousand years of conflict.
As Ambassador Grew testified, from the time of his arrival in Japan
in 1932, he constantly developed the theme of the grave necessity for
adequate preparation militantly to implement our diplomatic polisy,
because of J apan’s readiness for war. As he said to Mr. Stimson, then
Secretary of State, in the latter part of 1932 :
The Japanese Army has been built for war, it feels prepared for war, and it
wants war.
And he continued :
At that time I said it would be criminally “short-sighted”, I think not to recog-
nize this fact and be prepared for anything that might develop In the Far Hast,
rhose warnings were, as I say, continued in my telegrams and dispatches
throughout the ten years of my service there, right up to the end.” (R. 4291.)
• The dose vote of Congress on recalling the National Guard from active service and
on a proposal to abandon Lend-Lease clearly reflect public opinion of that day and time in
1941.
T Rear Admiral McMorris testified as to the weak status of our fleet with respect to the
strong Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor, and what would have happened
if our fleet had gone out into deepVdue water to fight : “A fight would have occurred in
v^*ch our losses might have beerreven greater than actually occurred, • * • our own
losses would have been extremely heavy and might well have induded the loss of both our
carriers.” (R. 2878.)
79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 3
30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[ 17 ] 3. U. S. Policy , {1922-1939). — The events leading up to
the Pearl Harbor disaster can only be understood when we examine
our national policy as administered by the State Department. That
policy must be examined back a number of years to see the long-term
treatment of Japan which had its bearing on the Pearl Harbor
disaster.
An early step in a direction considered adverse to the interests of
the United States was our failure to have a showdown with Japan on
its fortifications of the mandated islands.
The Mandate for the German possessions in the Pacific Ocean lying
north of the Equator under date of December 17, 1920, the Convention
for the Control of Trade and Arms and Ammunition between the
Allied Powers under date of September 10, 1919, and the Mandates
between the United States and Japan regarding the former German
Islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator and particularly
the island of Yap under date of February 11, 1922, have the following
in common :
a. “Full power of administration and legislation over the Mandated territory,
Including control of public works and services, the importation of arms, etc. In
short, it was a ‘government in trust/ ”
b. “No military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected
In the territory.”
c. “The Mandatory . . . aUow all missionaries, nationals of any state,
member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the [ 18 ]
territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling.”
d. “Any dispute between Japan and the other nations signing the Mandates,
whether it be the first two Mandates mentioned, or the one direct with thje
United States, are to be settled by a negotiation of ‘The Permanent Court of
International Justice.’ ”
e. “Vested property rights in the Mandated Islands shall be respected and
in no way impaired.”
f. “The existing treaties between the United States and Japan shaU be
applicable to the Mandated Islands.”
g. “The United States and its nationals shall have free access to the island
of Yap on a footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nations and
their respective nationals and all that relates to the landing and operation of
the existing Yap-Guam cable, or over any cable which may be hereafter laid
or operated by the United States or its nationals connecting with the island
of Yap.”
h. There are many other provisions of the same effect of entire freedom of
action with respect [ 19 ] to Yap.*
• The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, advised this Board : “Japan was given under a League
of Nations mandate full power to administer the Mandated Islands as an integral part of
Japan and to apply Japanese laws in the islands. The United States had expressly agreed
in a treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, to administration by Japan of the islands pur-
suant to the League mandate. Among the Japanese laws the operation of which was
extended to include the Mandated Islands was that which stipulated that all ports and
harbors shall be closed to foreign vessels except those that were specifically opened to for-
eign trade. The opened ports in the Mandated Islands were Saipan, Palau, Angaur, Truk.
Ponape, and Jaluit.
“Article II (3) of the Treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated
Islands provided that : ‘Existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be
applicable to the mandated islands.’ Article IV of the Treaty of Commerce ana Navigation
concluded between the United States and Japan on February 21, 1911, contained the follow-
ing provisions : ‘The citizens or subjects of each of the Contracting Parties, equally with
the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, shall have liberty freely to come with
their ships and cargoes to all places, ports and rivers in the territories of the other which
are or may be opened to foreign commerce, subject always to the laws of the country to
which they thus come.’
“By an exchange of notes which took place concurrently with the signing of the treaty
with Japan of February 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated Islands, Japan assured the
United States that ‘the usual comity will be extended to nationals and vessels of the
United States in visiting the harbors and waters of those islands’. The term ‘usual
comity’ in its application to visits by the nationals and vessels of other countries means
the courtesy which is normally accorded by a country to the nationals and vessels of
other countries.”
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
31
Had the United States successfully insisted upon Japan living up
to those treaty stipulations, the entire naval and military structure m
the key Pacific Islands erected by the Japanese might have been made
impossible. Japan, without authority of international law and in
violation of the treaties and mandates above referred to, for nearly
twenty years successfully and completely excluded other nationals
from the mandated territories, and during this time built up army,
navy and air installations of tremendous strategical value.
[20] As a consequence of the foregoing, Japan gained the enor-
mous advantage of a string of naval and air and army bases across our
lifeline to the Philippines and rendered futile and impotent any forti-
fication of our own islands, such as Guam, Midway, Christmas, Pal-
myra, etc. It also placed the dagger’s point at the heart of the
Hawaiian Islands because such a base as Jaluit in the mandated islands
was a thousand miles closer to Hawaii than to the homeland of Japan.
Our policy through the successive years appears to have been based
upon a combination of fear of the Japanese and of an obsession not to
give offense to the Japanese; a policy which because of their temper-
mental characteristics, proved to be one of weakness rather than of
strength; it was also a policy of endeavoring to treat the Japanese! on
the basis that they were civilized and that their word could be trusted
and at the same time one which treated them as if they were uncivilized
and could not be trusted, and consequently we excluded them from the
United States.
We entered the year of 1941 with two purposes in mind : first, to
avoid war and settle our troubles by negotiation, treaties, and con-
tracts ; and, while negotiating, we applied exactly the opposite remedy
of economic sanctions.
Efforts to visit the Mandated Islands, presumably to glean informa-
tion, were said to have been made and were unsuccessful. (R. Miles,
101-107; Pye, 1064-1065; Bloch, 1503, 1527-1529; DeLanev 1702-
1703; Kimmel, 1807-1808; Layton, 3054-3055.) The State Depart-
ment explanation concerning these efforts is set forth below. The net
result was, however, that we did not get into these Islands; the Japa-
nese fortified the Islands and in [ 21] consequence the United
States suffered. The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, presented his
Department’s views as follows:
The matter of visits to the Mandated Islands by American nationals or private
American vessels, just as visits in general by American nationals and American
private vessels to ports and places elsewhere in the world, did not call for a pro-
cedure involving requests through diplomatic channels by this Government to the
Japanese Government and would not therefore have come within the cognizance
of the Department of State, except in cases where, because of a refusal of the
Japanese Government to permit such visits, this Government had taken diplomatic
action at the instance of the American parties at interest. No record has been
found in the Department’s files of any application having been made by the
Department to the Japanese Government for permission for American nationals
or American private vessels to visit the Mandated Islands during the year 1940-
1941, the years concerning which you made inquiry. According to the informa-
tion made available to the Department in 1940, an officer attached to the office of
the Naval Attache in Tokyo inquired in August 1939 at the ticket office of the
Nippon Yusen Kaisha Steamship Company with regard to possibilities of making
reservations for passages were filled for a period of three months. His subsequent
efforts to obtain passage were frustrated by dilatory tactics on the part of the
Japanese. No request for diplomatic assistance was made in that instance.
32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The procedure followed by this Government in asking permission from the
Japanese Government for visits by public vessels to Japanese ports or ports in
Japanese mandated areas was in accord with the procedure followed by this
Government in requesting permission for visits by its public vessels to the ports
of other countries.
No record has been found of any requests in 1940 and 1941 by the War or 1
Navy Department to this Department that there be taken up with the Japanese I
Government proposals for visits to the Mandated Islands or of this Government's I
having approached the Japanese Government during those years in regard to
visits to the Mandated Islands. In previous years the Navy Department at vari-
ous times asked this Department to obtain permission for certain United States
naval vessels to visit certain specified opened and unopened ports in the Man-
dated Islands. The Department of State promptly made representations to the
Japanese Government requesting the necessary permission. With regard to
applications made prior to 1936 the Japanese Government indicated its readi-
ness [ 22 ] to permit American public vessels to visit the opened ports but
not the unopened ports named in the lists submitted by the Navy Department.
The Navy Department, however, canceled the proposed visits to the opened ports
for which permission to visit had been granted. In the approaches made by this
Government in 1936 and in 1987, the Japanese Government, on grounds of incon-
venience, withheld its permission for United States public vessels to visit the
opened ports as well as the unopened ports of the Mandated Islands.
In view of the fact that the Japanese Government in 1936 refused in/ actual
practice to permit visits to the opened ports as well as to the unopened ports in
the Mandated Islands and in view also of the fact that with the termination in
1936 of the Treaty Limiting Naval Armament, signed at Washington in 1922, this
Government became free to fortify the Aleutian Islands, this Government decided
to adopt a more restrictive policy with regard to the admission of Japanese war
or other public vessels to the Aleutians and to Alaska. After 1936 visits by
Japanese public vessels were permitted only to Dutch Harbor, also known as
Unalaska, and, on two occasions, to the Pribiloff Islands which the Japanese were
permitted to visit because of special circumstances arising out of the Convention
of 1911 for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals. Subsequent to 1936
permission was withheld for all visits by Japanese public vessels to the territorial
waters of the western Aleutian Islands.
The Japanese consulate and its consular agents in Hawaii enjoyed
diplomatic immunity. This gave them a free rein in their spying
activities and unrestricted communication by radio and cable with the
mainland of Japan in reporting upon the movements of our fleet and
the status of our armed defenses in Hawaii. 9 Neither the Army, the
Navy, nor the F. B. I. had [23] authority to tap these lines and
find out what was going on because of our own legal restriction, the
Communications Act or 1934. 10
No better example of the failure to control consular agents and the
results thereof can be found than the case of the consul general in
Honolulu. This man had about 200 consular agents in the Islands.
He used the commercial telephone and telegraph for reporting on our
defenses and fleet movements with impunity. When he was arrested
with his agents on December 7th, a large number of his messages were
found in the wastepaper basket, torn up and partially burned. As a
result of eight months’ work in piecing a portion of these together,
• Admiral McMorrls, head of the War Plans Division of Staff of Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet, 1941, said : “I never entertained any doubt, any time during 1941, that the
Japanese were fully informed of all military activities in this area.” (R. 2882.)
“Memorandum of September 29, 1944, from James Lawrence Fly, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission : “The United States was at peace with Japan prior to the
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the Communications Act of 1934, under
which the Federal Communications Commission was organized and from which it derives
Its powers, prohibited the tapping of wires or other interception of messages transmitted
between points in the United States, Including its territories, and a foreign country (Sec-
tion 605). Since that prohibition upon the Commission had not been in any way super-
seded, the Commission did not intercept any messages over the radiotelegraph, cable tele-
graph or radiotelephone circuits between the United States (including Hawaii) and Japan
prior to December 7. 1941."
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
33
Colonel Fielder, G-2 under General Short and since that time G-2 in
Hawaii, produced a number of these reconstructed messages which
clearly revealed that military information was being gathered and
transmitted to Japan. The day before this event took place a radio-
>hone message, that was monitored, between a Japanese doctor’s house
#4] in Honolulu and a newspaper in Japan was heard and re-
>orted, late on December 6, and was given extensive consideration by
General Short and Colonel Fielder, G-2 ; but its exacting meaning
could not be made out. This message is referred to as the Mori mes-
sage. (R. 2961.) The next morning the Japanese struck. The evi-
dent trend of this message was to report upon the state of the naval
defenses and the presence of the fleet as well as the Army defenses.
This Board believes that Japan’s spying activities could have been
determined, the intentions of the Japanese revealed and much im-
portant information gathered, which would probably have prevented
in large measure the Pearl Harbor disaster, had the Axmy and Navy
been permitted, with the F. B. I., to tap these lines and find out what
was going on. If the consular agents were conducting commercial
business, no harm would have been done; if they were not limiting
their activities to consular business, we then had a right to know it
and to take action accordingly, either bv an open breach or by pre-
paring ourselves to meet what they were doing.
Ambassador Grew has well stated that there are three lines of
defense for a nation such as ours ; the diplomatic line of defense, the
Navy, and the Army. However, the diplomatic line — held by the
State Department — ofttimes handicaps and influences the prepara-
tion for the Army and Navy defense lines. As an illustration, the
policy of compromise between economic [25] sanctions and
negotiations 11 in turn influenced War Department action, in that
Short was told by the War Department, which in turn reflected the
so he was told not to alarm the population nor to disclose intent. 12
There appears to be no evidence of a strong policy of standing up for
American rights and boldly stepping out and making the Japanese
behave themselves; and this in the face of the fact that it was well
known that people of the character of the Japanese and their national
attitude of mind respect only force and strength and do not respect
a policy of good intentions nor demands of conduct without means
to enforce same.
The Board is impressed with the necessity for a closer, more ag-
gressive relationship between the Department of State, tne Depart-
ment of Justice, and the War and Navv Departments, in using all
of their facilities as a coordinated team for the defense of the United
States. 1 ®
n The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said : “With regard to the lines along which this
Governments foreign policy with respect to Japan waB directed in 1941, a detailed record
Is given in Chapter XIV of Peace and War (a publication issued by the Department in
1943), and on pages 325-386 of Volume II of Foreign Relations of the United States •
Japan , 1931-1941."
“ The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said : “With regard to your request for an expression
of the Department’s views touching upon the influence of foreign policy ^ipon military
directives, it was not the policy of this Government to take provocative action against any
country or to cause Japan to commit an act of war against the United States."
u The State Department counter proposals of the 26th of November, which Japan con-
sidered as an ultimatum, the day before the Army and Navy, Marshall-Stark memorandum
could be delivered asking no ultimatum, is a case in point. Mr. Hull said after delivering
his ultimatum that he washed his hands of the matter and left it to the Army and Navy.
(R. Stlmson, 4051-4053, 4078-4079.)
34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[26] The Japanese policy was typical of the oriental mind,
which is predominantly a bargaining mind, asking twice as much as
they expect to get and then settling on a compromise. Any show of
weakness merely strengthens the hand of the bargainer, and any
crack in the bargainer’s front causes him to lose face and bargaining
power. Therefore the action of the United States in demilitarizing
Guam by removing its guns and other equipment and thus attempt-
ing to show Japan the peaceful intentions of the Untied States, was
undoubtedly considered by Oriental Japan as an evidence of weak-
ness and merely served to put our interests backward instead of for-
ward. (R. 3062.)
[27] 4. U. S. Policy , ( 1989-191+1 ). — We had been following the
policy immediately before the war which broke out between Ger-
many, England, and France, of veering away from anything that
would precipitate a conflict with the Japanese. In view of the tense
international situation, particularly after the outbreak of the Euro-
pean War in August 1939, it became apparent that it would be neces-
sary for us to redouble our efforts to avoid any open friction with the
Japanese, both because we wished to devote what resources were avail-
able to the assistance of England and France, with whom we were
in deep sympathy; and also, for the further purpose, that we were
inadequately prepared to meet any attack from Japan in the Pacific. 14
[28] As events became more critical in 1940 and 1941, the neces-
sity of following a policy for delay and apparent appeasement of
Japan increased to one of great national urgency. We were faced
with a dual load of unpreparedness for any war and the necessity
of sending England and France what equipment and supplies were
available.
It was, therefore, natural with this factual situation to bow to the
necessity of avoiding war by trying to appease Japan. We found it
expedient to lean over backwards to avoid any appearance in Hawaii
of a war-like or belligerent attitude, particularly, in view of and
towards the large Japanese population of the islands. 15
Our general national policy and, particularly the War Department
policy, very naturally conveyed itself to the Commanders in residence
in Hawaii. Their acts were colored and their dispositions tempered
by the repeated cautions in this direction as we sought for time to
prevent an untoward incident from precipitating war with Japan
before we were ready to meet it. The fact that tney were not more
fully advised of the progress towards a critical international situation
in the Pacific must be taken into account.
14 Captain Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, gave this very significant testimony, when
asked if the American Navy, with two of its carriers, had discovered the task force that
attacked Hawaii and had attacked this force at sea, what would have been the outcome :
’‘Captain Layton. I think the American forces here would have taken the licking of
their life, first, because the American people were not psychologically prepared for war.
“General Russell. How would the psychology of the American people influence a naval
engagement off of Oahu?
“Captain Layton. I am referring to the American Navy as a part of the American
people, and I use this example : During the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a portion of
a squadron of American carrier planes were then flying in from a carrier to Ford Island.
They were attacked by Japanese fighters, and it is to be observed that these planes were
armed with machine gun ammunition and machine guns ready to fire, and I can find no
record of any of these carrier planes firing one single shot at any Japanese plane/' (R
3047.)
u 160.000 Japanese w'ere in the Islands, composing about one-third of the population.
(R. 2947.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
35
This policy of avoiding any act to offend the Japanese was offset to
some degree by one at right angles to it, of the application of commer-
cial restrictions which tended to strangle her economic life and her
preparation for war. For instance, the refusal to sell scrap to Japan,
the abrogation [29] of Japanese commercial rights under
treaty and the failure to renew that treaty with Japan, the oil embargo
and similar incidents were at variance with this general policy.
The net result was a national policy towards Japan which reflected
itself in the “Do-Don’t” type of instructions that characterized the
messages from the War Department to Hawaiian Commanders up until
December 7, 1941.
The policy of our government as practiced by our public officials
in their attitude towards Japan was not one of appeasement openly,
but it was that in effect. Every effort was being exerted to prevent a
rupture of relations with Japan, while presenting a show of face by
economic sanctions to restrain Japanese aggression. Every effort was
made to maintain the status quo until we were ready. Time was our
most precious commodity in 1941.
[50J 5. Moral Embargoes Versus Japanese Expansion . — No
competent understanding can be gained of the relationship with Japan
unless we break down the problem into its essential aspects. Japanese
industry had received a succession of serious blows by reason of our
successive steps of not renewing the commercial treaty with Japan,
the cutting on of scrap to Japan, the cessation of our trade in silk with
Japan, the oil embargo, the freezing of credits and assets, and numerous
other incidents. On the diplomatic front, strong efforts were being
made to maintain the status quo leading up to the final visit of Japanese
special Ambassadors to the United States terminating with Pearl
Harbor. This situation generally trended, however, towards placat-
ing and appeasing Japan with such firmness as was necessary to keep
the negotiations going.
During all of this period the government was not supported by a
public that was war-minded ; just the contrary. Public irritation was
increasing, but it was still hoping to avoid war. On the contrary,
Japan’s attitude toward the United States was one of increasing hos-
tility. Its policy was to conduct its aggressions starting in 1935
against China, as rapidly and as effectively as its resources would
permit, while maintaining a diplomatic screen and pretense of con-
sidering the views of the United States. Being unable to agree with
them, it had no intention of doing so whatsoever.
During this period Japan made no concessions. It was quite ap-
parent that she would continue her course until the patience of the
United States was exhausted ; and the United States was forced into
a position of an open breach — the time of that breach was stipulated
clearly to the President [31] November 27 by General Mashall
and Admiral Stark. The delivery of the counter proposals to Japan
on November 26 anticipated that time — war came before we were fully
prepared.
It was well known that Japan’s entry into all wars of the past had
been characterized by the first overt act of of war coming simultane-
ously with the declaration. The services, both Army ana Navy, were
well aware of this Japanese characteristic. It was, therefore, to be
36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- expected that an unexpected attack would be made bv Japan as the
first indication of a breach of relations. This is well expressed by
the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who testified :
General Russell. Then you were not surprised at the air attack on
the 7th of December?
Mr. Stimson. Well, I was not surprised, in one sense, in any attack that
would be made ; but I was watching, with considerably more care, because I knew
more about it, the attack that was framing up in the southwestern Pacific.
And I knew also that there was a concentration in the mandated islands — I
know now, because I was shown by General Arnold the letter about the telegram,
and an order ; so that that was an additional threat, and that might fall on either
Hawaii or Panama. (R. 4072.)
Indeed, Ambassador Grew on January 27, 1941, sent the State
Department the following message :
Tokyo, January 27, 19il — 6 p. m.
(Received January 27 — 6:38 a. m.)
A member of the Embassy was told by my . . . colleague that from many
quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack
on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese Military forces, in case of “trouble”
between Japan and the United States ; that the attack would involve the use of all
the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass
this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed
fantastic.
Grew.
[52] Japan, well knowing the policy of the United States had
been to avoid war to the limit of its endurance, took advantage of our
situation. It was, therefore, obvious that the United States would
have to avoid friction with Japanese nationals as that would be a
ready excuse for Japan to precipitate the issue prematurely. On the
other hand, sabotage was to be expected from these Japanese na-
tionals. A large body of them, as in Hawaii, was a potential source
of great danger, not only as to what they might do, but as the basis
of precipitation of an international incident with Japan.
The public generally did not understand the importance of Hawaii.
It had no appreciation of the danger except as the press became in-
creasingly insistent in pointing out the progress of the advance to-
wards war and the likelihood that this outpost would be involved
in the conflict as one of the first line elements of our western defense. 1 *
The War Department was urging officially and privately that every
effort be made to delay the declaration of war by Japan because of
our serious state of unpreparedness and because much of our available
military resources were being utilized to assist the United Nations.
The battle of the Atlantic was the predominant factor in the public
mind and dominated the policy of the War Department, as evidenced
by the transfer of a considerable part of the Pacific Fleet to the At-
lantic. Therefore, the entire consciousness of the war [ 33 ] De-
partment was directed towards avoiding any incident that might
precipitate war with Japan while, at the same time, exerting its efforts
to prepare for such a war. The War Department was confronted
with a grave lack of planes, antiaircraft guns, and other implements
14 Fortune magazine polled the public in late 1039 and made a report in January which
showed that 55% of those questioned were in favor of defending Hawaii ; 25% not to de-
fend ; and the balance did not know what they wanted.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
37
of war with which to equip Hawaii with an adequate defense mechan-
ism. The previous delay in implementing our defense had left us,
two years after war had started in Europe, gravely lacking in our
preparations. The strong anti-war group in the United States made
it unwise for the United States to take stronger action against Japan.
These general policies apparently were the subject of discussion of
the War Council. 17 Its policies were reflected [J5] in the ac-
tions of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, as to measures taken for defense
in the Pacific. It is necessary to keep these factors in mind in reading
the messages from the War Department to the Commanding General of
the Hawaiian Department. The handling of Japan had been a mix-
ture of diverse policies; and this reflected itself in War Department
messages to Hawaii, which both told Short to prepare for defense and
at the same time to do nothing in preparing it that might precipitate
trouble with the local Japanese population or excite the local public.
As evidence of this was the fact that Short responded to the situation
by selecting an anti-sabotage alert and the War Department took no
exception to it. These two conflicting courses of action were reflected
in the messages and in the policies of the War Department; they ac-
count in part for the attitude of mind of Short and others in the
Hawaiian Department. Whether justified or not, we consider later.
Then, too, official War Department thought on the subject of Pacific
defense was almost wholly concentrated as to what might happen
37 There is some apparent confusion of that testimony in the use of this term, and the
two bodies to which it refers. The situation was clarified by the testimony of Mr. Stimson,
who said :
“The first subject that was listed here is that of the ‘War Councils’. By the ‘War
Councils’ we meant the meetings that were held by the Secretary of State, possibly the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval
Operations, from time to time, to discuss the relations between the Japanese Empire and
the American Government.
**•*«••
“The name ‘War Council’ is the name of a statutory body which was created in, I
think, the National Defense Law of about 1920; but it was purely a War Department
board. It did not have any members from the Navy or from any other department in it.
• *•••••
“The War Council was in effect and used to meet, usually on Wednesdays, in the times
that we were talking over, but it consisted solely of myself, my assistants, civil assistants,
and the Chief of Staff and such other officers as I Invited in ; and it had nothing to do
with the Navy or matters outside of this Department. But we did have two sets of
meetings — they can hardly be dignified by the ‘organization’ — but early, very soon after
Mr. Knox and I came into the Government in 1940, we decided that we ought to meet
regularly, and we ought to meet with the Secretary of State ; we were approaching im-
portant matters ; and so we went to the Secretary of State and asked him if he had any
objection to meeting with us once a week. He agreed cordially, and accordingly we began
meeting on Tuesday mornings at 9 :30 every week, whenever we were present in Wash-
ington, or able to come, and those series of [J{] meetings went on until Mr.
Knox died ; they lasted right through.
“They were perfectly informal and unofficial meetings, but they were very regular, and
we met once a week regularly ; and during the time at which you are about to inquire,
just before Pearl Harbor, we had extra meetings. In fact, we were in such a meeting on
the Sunday morning that the Japanese attacked. The meetings took place in the State
Department, Mr. Hull’s office, and during that time the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of the Navy, and myself were in constant contact.
“The other set of meetings were meetings called by the President, which he usually
called with great regularity — the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary
of the Navy, the Chief of Staff — that was, of course, General Marshall — the Chief of Naval
Operations, who was at that time Admiral Stark ; and sometimes, General Arnold. Well,
that was also Improvised, so to speak ; it had no custom before it. It was created in the
light of the approaching emergency, and among ourselves, as a nickname we called it the
*war Cabinet/ or the ‘War Council.* or something like that ; and evidently Mr. Hull, from
what you say, used that expression in his White Paper.
“There was no regular day set for the meetings of that body. They met on the call of
the President, at his office ; and during this time about which you particularly ask, the
autumn of 1941, they were meeting very frequently, also ; and, fortunately. I have records.
I have kept records during the time that I am here, in which I have set down very briefly,
and witboqt much reference to good English sometimes, what was taking place, Including
everything that was important, that I deemed to be Important; in regard to the crisis
that was coming along; and including these meetings; so that I am in a position where
I can give you dates of these meetings pretty fully.” (R. 4041-4043.) (General Marshall,
R. 5-6.)
38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to the Philippines, the intermediate islands, and Panama. It was
there that the main attack, in the first phase, was expected from Japan.
No early attack was expected on Hawaii. As the Chief of Staff testi-
fied,. it was a surprise to him. (R. 9.)
All efforts were being made towards strengthening these outposts.
Such modern bombing aircraft as could be made available was being
flown to the Philippine theater. Likewise, efforts were being made to
strengthen the defenses of Midway, Guam, Wake, and other localities
judged to become the first [55] involved. The Hawaiian de-
fense was clearly secondary at that time, although prior thereto it was
considered as our strongest outpost and had first priority on equip-
ment and maintenance. (R. 14, 184.)
Planes flown from the mainland as late as December 7, 1941 to
Hawaii en route to the Philippines were not supplied with ammu-
nition until they were ready to depart from Hawaii. General Arnold
explains this was because of the necessity of carrying sufficient gas to
insure a safe arrival. (R. 168.) This too led to a state of mind, both
officially and personally, in the responsible officers of the Hawaiian
Department, tnat, even if war with Japan was about to start, Japan
would not initially attack Hawaii. It was felt that Hawaii was quite
well down on the list of objectives of Japan, as those parts of Ameri-
can territory closer to Japan would be the first to feel the blow and
that the implementing of other defenses must give way in priority to
those thought to become the first involved. (R. 2872.)
Japan shrewdly calculated and estimated correctly this state of
mind. It arrived at this conclusion and acted accordingly, tempo-
rarily by-passing the Philippines and the intermediate American
islands, for a direct attack on Hawaii December 7, 1941, just as Am-
bassador Grew had clearly warned in his message of January 27, 1941.
So clearly did Japan understand our national psychology that it
selected Sunday morning, early, as the time for attack, well knowing
this to be the best time to achieve surprise. Japan took, as the Chief
of Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force estimated, a 50 to 1 shot. Later,
it will appear how well that venture was [ 57 ] prepared and
executed, and how well timed as an answer to our counter proposals
of November 26, which the Japanese considered an ultimatum; be-
cause it was on and after the delivery of that document against which
General Marshall and Admiral Stark warned too late, that the task
force of Japan that attacked Hawaii moved out of its rendezvous at
Tankan Bay on the 27th or 28th of November to launch the attack
against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. 18
[55] 6. Pvblio Demands Action Against Japanese . — Our na-
tional policy has been to avoid war. The difficulty with our policy
appears to have been its conflicting nature, in that in the case of
Japan we desired to avoid war, to continue in business with Japan,
and at the same time to prevent Japanese aggression by both negotia-
tion and simultaneously to apply economic sanctions against Japan.
As our nation was not prepared for war, it left the administration,
particularly the State Department, without the full support of the
} >ublic so it could proceed with a firm policy toward Japan; and it
eft the War and Navy Departments without sufficient means to imple-
ment a more aggressive policy towards Japan.
u The best attainable evidence supports this statement (R. 3033.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
39
The result of this conflicting situation made it extremely difficult
for the State Department to handle negotiations with Japan, which
well knew our national policy. It was difficult both to negotiate
for a peaceful solution of differences with a nation such as Japan, and
at the same time impede negotiations by applying economic sanctions
such as the freezing of assets and credits, the cutting off of the supply
of oil and scrap, and the termination of a commercial treaty witn
Japan.
This conflicting element of policy reflected itself in the actions
directed by the War Department to its field commanders, who were
required to both take all the necessary precautions to meet war and
at the same time to take no steps either to excite the civil population
or to precipitate war by overt acts. Such a policy was particularly
difficult to carry out in Hawaii, where there was a very large propor-
tion, some thirty percent, of the population of the nationality of
[39] Japan. The danger, therefore, was great in carrying out
the War Department policy, that in our preparations for war we
would precipitate an issue with Japanese nationals in the Hawaiian
Islands which would be an excuse by Japan to open hostilities.
This state of public mind was further inflamed to demand action
by the Government against Japan, because of the latter’s open aggres-
sions in 1941 ; but effective action was impossible of fulfillment be-
cause of the long public policy of only maintaining a very modest
army and navy. Public opinion can change far faster than a nation
can make ready for war. The time element of making preparations
for war is so long that it always lags behind a sudden change of
public views, as in our case with Japan. Our public opinion had
changed against Japan faster than preparations for war could be
made.
This left the Department of State with the most difficult task of
negotiation without means of enforcing its views by force of arms.
It likewise left the War and Navy Departments unable to fully sup-
port the State Department in its negotiations. This led to a compro-
mise solution, due to this public opinion as expressed by the press, in
the form of a resort to economic sanctions.
But the difficulty with economic sanctions was that, while it indi-
cated a firm policy on the part of the United States, it also so aggra-
vated the situation in that it made negotiations difficult of either
progress or consummation. At most, our national policy was one
of defensive character while waiting for the preparations for war
to catch up with the new state of the public mind that Japan should
be made to [ 40 ] behave herself and that our government should
do something about it.
7. Economic Sanctions Against Japan . — In 1938 and 1939 a series
of “moral embargoes” or commercial sanctions were applied to Japan
by the United States. During those two years there had been brought
about a cessation of the United States’ export to Japan of airplanes,
aeronautical equipment, and certain other materials. There also re-
sulted a state of decline of export to Japan of strategic materials, and
as of July 1940, under the Export Control Act, the President had cur-
tailed or prohibited the export of basic war materials. Licenses were
refused for the export to Japan of aviation gasoline and most types of
machine tools as of September 1940.
40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The testimony of Ambassador Grew throws light upon the effect and
result of embargoes. He said :
During the period up to, I think it was, the autumn of 1940, 1 took the position j
that economic embargoes against Japan — and embargoes are in the nature of |
sanctions and therefore are always interpreted as international insults— I took
the position that we should not put embargoes on Japan, until we were prepared
to go all the way through with whatever might result from those embargoes.
I pointed out that when we put embargoes against Japan into effect, our relations
with that country were bound to go steadily down-hill and it might, and probably
would, end in war ; and that until we were prepared to go to war with Japan,
I felt it would be very short-sighted to get into a situation where we might be
obliged at a later date to withdraw those embargoes. There is nothing so
conducive to a lowering of national prestige, reputation, and authority as to make
threats and then have to recall those threats or modify those threats. We saw
that working out in the relations between Great Britain and Italy at the time of
the Abysinnian campaign.
[ 41 ] But, in the autumn of 1940, I telegraphed the Secretary of State that I
felt that time had then come, since Japan was threatening not only our national
interests, but, I would say, our vital national interests; I felt that the time had
come to consider, not whether we must call a halt to Japan’s expansion, but
when. It seemed to me at that time, whether we were fully prepared for war I
or not, that we must in our own interests put those embargoes into effect ; and |
shortly thereafter, those embargoes were put into effect.
Our relations then started directly on a downhill course, and they ended
in war ; but at least we were more prepared for war at that time, than we had
been two years earlier.
It was in the fall of 1940 that we cast the die and adopted economic
sanctions. And we find it significant that about June 1940 General
Herron as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department upon
Washington orders went into an all-out alert into battle positions with
live ammunition for six weeks. (R. 212.)
In September the export of iron and steel scrap was prohibited.
The effect of the United States policy was to cut off from Japan by the
winter of 1940-1941 the shipment of many strategic commodities, in-
cluding arms, ammunition, and implements of war, aviation gasoline
and many other petroleum products, machine tools, scrap iron, pig
iron and steel manufactures, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, and a vari-
ety of other commodities important to a war effort.
Further parallel to this course of action by the United States was
the decision in August 1941 between President Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Churchill of Great Britain that the United States and Great
Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new
moves of aggression, tJiat the United States would continue its con-
versation with the [4#] Japanese government and offer her
a reasonable and just alternative to the course upon which that country
was embarked. 19
As was stated in the White Papers 20 as to economic sanctions, he
(Grew) said that
considering the temper of the people of Japan it was dangerously uncertain to
base United States policy on a view that the imposition of progressive and rig-
orous economic measures would probably avert war ; that it was the view of the
Embassy that war would not be averted by such a course . . . Finally he
warned of the possibility of Japan’s adopting measures with dramatic and dan-
gerous suddenness which might make inevitable a war with the United States.
u "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931-41,” Department of State
Washington, p. 129. ’
90 “Foreign Relations
Peace and War, United
ton, D. C.”
of the United Btatee, Japan, 1031-1941, VoL I and Vol. II : and
Btattt Foreign Policy, mi-1941, Department ot 8t*te. Washing'
REPORT OP ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 41
As Ambassador Grew testified in summary :
However, I can sap, in brief compass, that the trend of our relations during
the period you mention ; that Is, the years 1940 and 1941 ; was almost steadily
down-hill; we, of course, in our embassy in Tokyo, leaving nothing undone to
arrest that trend; and I think everything was done that could possibly have
arrested it, in our work in Tokyo. But, we were up against what I would call
a “tidal wave” of military extremism in Japan ; and I think the results as culmi-
nating in Pearl Harbor proved that fact.
The testimony of Ambassador Grew as to his actions as reflected in
the State Department’s White Papers and in extracts from his diary
indicate that he too was acting under what [4-?] apparently
was a conflicting policy but with a full recognition of the mevitable
date of a final trial of strength with Japan. A review of Grew’s com-
munications to the State Department in the year 1941 is an excellent
perspective of the course of the fatal events that led to Pearl Harbor.
On January 27, 1941, he communicated by wire with the State
Department indicating that an attack on Pearl Harbor by all means
available to the military and naval forces of Japan was being dis-
cussed, and he felt that it was so serious that it should be reported,
even though it was fantastic to consider it; on February 1 he said the
outlook was never darker for peace ; on July 25 the United States froze
Japanese assets, causing bitter Japanese resentment; on August 18 he
reported the Japanese protest on U. S. economic pressure; on August
29 the United States applied the oil embargo, decided to send oil
tankers to Russia and a military mission to China ; on September 6
Grew reported the statement of the Japanese Premier tnat if the
United States continued its economic sanctions it would prevent any
settlement for six months to a year after they terminated, and on
September 29 Grew sent an important message to Washington that
the Japanese could only be brought to a halt by a show of force. He
S ointea out that any agreement would be a mere breathing spell for
apan, that war was likely in any event, and unless results were shown
in the negotiations, more than had been demonstrated to date, the
Japanese would conclude the United States was only playing for time
and would act accordingly. On September 30 Grew protested at the
secrecy of our conversations with Japan as practiced by the United
States without advising the public, [4£] whereas it was com-
mon knowledge in Japan.
On October 9 he significantly reported that the frozen-credit policy
of the United States was driving Japan into national bankruptcy and
she would be forced to act. His prediction was correct, because Tojo,
the only Japanese Premier to stay on the active Army list in that
position, was made Premier on October 16. There was an indication
of trouble when the Premier of Japan was a dominant military figure
on the active Army list, and on October 25 he reported that the Em-
peror ordered the Privy Council before him and asked them if they
intended war. When they refused to answer, he instructed them that
there should be no war with the United States. This was the final
effort by conservative Japanese to avoid war. The next step would
probably be war itself.
Grew warned on October 30 that the situation was fraught with
the greatest danger. On November 3 he said that war was not only
possible but probable and that Japan was preparing for hostilities
*‘with dangerous and dramatic suddenness.” It was on that date that
42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Kurusu left for Washington, refusing to take a later clipper for “tech-
nical reasons”, the significance of which was apparent.
On November 7 Secretary Hull informed the Cabinet
that relations between Japan and the United States were "extremely critical"
and that there was “imminent possibility” that Japan might at any time start a
new military movement of conquest by force. (White Papers, p. 136.)
This was followed by warnings of the impending seriousness of the
situation in speeches made by Secretary of the Navy Knox and Under
Secretary of State Welles, November 11, 1941.
[45] The White Papers continue :
On November 17 Ambassador Grew cabled from Tokyo that we could expect a
“sudden Japanese Naval or military attack in regions not then involved”.
Secretary Hull on November 25 and November 28 at meetings of
high officials of this government,
stated there was practically no possibility of agreement being achieved with
Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time
with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our
national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy. The Secretary ex-
pressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an
assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central
point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously
with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for the
purpose thereof. (White Papers, p. 144.)
It does not appear that such a statement was sent by the Army and
Navy to their field forces.
On November 26 the Secretary of State handed the President’s
Ten Points of Settlement to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. 1
These proposals were verbally rejected by the Japanese Ambassadors
at once, but they inquired as to any other basis of negotiation or a
modus vivendi. The following day, at the request of the Japanese
Ambassadors, the President received them and Secretary of State Hull,
at which time the President reaffirmed with finality the “Ten Points”,
stating the three primary considerations upon which the “Ten Points”
were based. On the same day, General Marshall and Admiral Stark
wrote a joint memorandum to the President requesting that no ulti-
matum be delivered to the Japanese as the Army and Navv were not
ready to precipitate an issue with Japan, and notified him of the agree-
ment reached with the British and the [46] Dutch for recip-
rocal action in the case either one of them was attacked.
The proof indicates that the Marshall-Stark memorandum of the
27th to the President did not reach him until after the meeting with
the Japanese Ambassador on the 27th or possibly on the 28th of No-
vember. Whether or not the Secretary or State, Mr. Hull, now dis-
claims that this document of the 26th was an ultimatum, Ambassador
Grew testifies that the Japanese so regarded it. (R. 4208, 4215, 4221,
4222.) They so acted upon it and Mr. Hull likewise so acted because
he so informed the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, on the morning of
November 27. The latter testified, based on his diary of contempora-
neous events, thus :
The first thing In the morning I called up Hull to find out what his final
decision had been with the Japanese — whether he had handed them the new
proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested
yesterday, he bad broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken
the whole matter off. As he put it, “I have washed my hands of it, and It Is now
in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy."
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
43
General Russell. Mr. Secretary, I don’t like to disturb you, but I have become
a little confused on dates, about this telephone call. Was that on the 26th of
Mr. Stimson. This was the 27th.
General Russell. 27th.
Mr. Stimson. The day after the 26th.
General Russell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stimson. The 26th was the day he told me he was in doubt whether he
would go on with it.
General Russell. Yes.
Mr. Stimson. Or whether he would break it off ; and on the morning of the 27th,
by telephone, he told me that he decided to break it off.
I then called up the President and talked with him about it. (R. 4052-4053) .
On November 29 Secretary Hull said to the British Ambassador,
The matter will now go to the officials of the [^7] Army and Navy.
He warned that the J apanese action would probably be
a desperate gamble and require the utmost boldness and risk.
His predictions were uncanny. (White Papers, pp. 144-145). On
November 29, Ambassador Grew relates that there had just reached
Japan news that the President had made a proposition to settle Japa-
nese grievances by giving her substantially most of what she wanted, 21
and on December 1 Grew reported Japan cold to the proposals, a fact
Secretary Hull had found on the 26th when he handed the President’s
Ten Points to the Japanese Ambassador. On the same day, December
1, his diary shows that he had a conversation with a Japanese friend
apparently high in that government, Grew saying
everything was over and that I would soon be leaving Japan.
On December 6 an address of Tojo was read for the Diet different
from all others heretofore delivered by him, the tone of which clearly
indicated Japanese intentions. The following day, on Sunday morn-
ing, the Pearl Harbor attack occurred.
I 8. The Hawaiian Population Problem: Sabotage Com-
plex . — The conditions in Hawaii and the state of the public mind in
Hawaii were considered apparently by the War Department to be
primary factors to be taken into consideration in the carrying out of
the military mission of the defense of the islands and defense of the
fleet. As elsewhere indicated in War Department communications,
this was a fact; and the responsible commanders in Hawaii in the
Army also gave great weight to the state of the Hawaiian situation
on the civil side.
It is significant that it had been the national policy of the United
States to exclude Japanese nationals from the United States and its
territories, both for self-protection and to protect American labor
against cheap foreign labor of the yellow races. Yet in Hawaii, our
fleet base and one of our most important defense outposts, we per-
mitted the introduction into the population of the islands of Japanese,
to the extent of 30% of the total population or 160, 000. 22
71 “Ten Years in Japan *’ by Ambassador Grew.
“There are three classes of Japanese population : (a) old aliens known as Issei, about
37,500; (b) Hawaiian-born Japanese who are sent back to the mainland of Japan for
education known as Kibel, about 2,599; and (c) Hawaiian-born Japanese and Hawaiian-
educated known as Nisei, composing the balance of 160,000. 95% of the Japanese children
attended the Japanese language schools. Under Japanese Law no Japanese is released
from Japanese citizenship until he goes through a formal procedure securing his release
from that citizenship. Most Japanese in the Islands have not secured such a release and
they therefore have dual citizenship in the United States and Japan. Approximately
50,000 Japanese attended the Shinto temples of which there were 55. Around these
temples were centered the teachings of Japanese culture, patriotism, and family fealty.
44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Many were Japanese of dual citizenship who, although
born in the United States, had not yet taken the steps made available
by Japan to become released from their Japanese citizenship. These
Japanese laborers and artisans were comparatively economical in
terms of performance, useful both in agricultural pursuits and as
artisans, were highly prized by the great commercial interests in sugar
cane, pineapples, shipping, and other interests of the Islands; ana it
was the urgent desire of these commercial interests apparently both
to enjoy the protection and profits from the basing of the fleet in
Hawaii and also to have no disturbance of such labor or to be led into
anv situation that would disturb these profitable labor relations.
This policy of encouraging the Japanese and permitting them to
become dominant in the affairs of the Islands has even gone so far as
to permit the Japanese to become important political factors with
membership in both the Senate and the House of Hawaii, and to domi-
nate, by way of majority, the Island governing councils in some of the
islands of the Hawaiian Group. (R. 2941.)
Sabotage was a critical consideration by the local Army authorities.
But up to December 7 there had been not a single instance of sabotage.
On December 7 a number of illegal radio stations interfered with the
radio operations of the Army. No other specific instance of sabotage
or alien enemy action had been reported either by the War Department
of Hawaii or by G-2 or the F. B. I. in Hawaii.
Additionally, the placing of the Army upon alert by War Depart-
ment order to General Herron, by which his troops moved [50]
into the field in battle positions with live ammunition in June 1940,
had no effect upon the civilian population or their anxieties. Subse-
quent frequent alerts and maneuvers which were constantly going on,
including Short’s Alert Number 1 as to sabotage, had had no effect
upon the civil population. All activities of the Army in disturbing
the local populace paled by comparison with the contents of the local
newspapers and their reports of the war news and the progressively
increasing threats of Japanese action. Indeed, approximately a week
before the attack at Pearl Harbor, a local newspaper in Hawaii car-
ried a complete prediction of this attack on the following Sunday.
(Exhibits 19-19a.)
The foregoing statement of fact as to background should be con-
sidered in connection with the communication of the War Depart-
ment warnings as to sabotage, the action of General Short in placing
the Department under the Number 1 Alert against sabotage on No-
vember 27, and the claimed reasons for not taking other defensive
measures, because of the reluctance to disturb both the civilian popu-
lation and the alien population of Hawaii.
The effect of such an atmosphere upon the policies and actions of
the responsible commanders and their resulting state of mind is an
important factor for consideration. As part of this state of mind,
it was generally considered that Japan would never dare attack;
and certainly, in the early stages of a war, she would not dare risk the
major portion of her carriers for the launching of such an attack.
(E. 3919-3920.) See also Chapter I, “Gentlemen of Japan" by B. S. Haven, Ziff-Davis
Publishing Co.; “Feudal Hawaii; Paradise, Ltd." by Stanley High, Readers Digest, June
1943, pp. 19-23 ; and: “Are the Japs Hopeless?" by George Horne, Saturday Evening Post.
September 9, 1944.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 45
The probabilities were strongly against such a bold and possibly
suicidal move by Japan.
[51] The state of mind engendered by the sabotage issue and
the presence of the large Japanese population built up a sabotage con-
sciousness in the responsible authorities as a more likely course of
J apanese action than what was regarded as the more remote military
operation of a direct air attack. This background is important to
consider in evaluating the decisions arrived at by the Army com-
mander and the actions taken by his associates.
The existence of this state oi public opinion had its effect upon the
evaluation by the Army of the Japanese capabilities. Likewise, it
was supplemented by the American attitude that Japan would not
dare attack the United States in what was regarded as its home terri-
tory in the Islands, in the presence of the fleet, which was consid-
ered an asset and not, in reality, a liability.
Senator Hill of the Hawaiian Senate testified (R. 2939-2940) as to
the protests of local commercial interests to General Emmons when
he proposed to take action in removing the dangerous Japanese from
the sugar plantations after the Pearl Harbor attack. He said the
political pressure brought to bear by these interests was sufficient to
bring about a cancellation of this effort of General Emmons. It was
significant of the propaganda pressure on the subject of doing noth-
ing to offend the Japanese in the Islands and to let them alone so
they could work for these Island industries and agriculture, which
must have been imposed heavily upon General Short. The constant
application of such pressure for a period of nearly a year upon Gen-
eral Short doubtless had a material effect upon his mind and upon
his anxiety about the Japanese population, [5£] about which
he could do nothing. This was particularly reflected in his refusal
to have legal action taken against those who failed to register as
aliens. (R. 3255-3256.)
It was well known in Honolulu to both the F. B. I. and G-2 of the
Army that there were certain Japanese activities that were inimical to
the best interests of the United States in the Hawaiian Islands. A
Japanese combines in his Shinto religion, centering about the Shinto
temples, three things : patriotism, religion, and family fealty. Those
three things compose his entire emotional, political, and family life.
The Shinto priests and the large number, 55, of Shinto temples in the
Islands were the focal point of Japanese propaganda, patriotism, and
disloyalty to the United States. This was all well known and could
have been cured promptly by closing the temples and arresting the
priests, as was done after December 7. Then there were the Shinto,
societies, and particularly the Black Dragon Society. The Japanese*
are well known as great organizers and they had countless organiza-
tions, many of which,, were of potential subversive character. The*
Japanese ran , their own Japanese-language newspapers which pro-
moted the same national spirit.* They had Japanese-language schools
iq which they taught Japanese customs, family fealty, religion, and
pfitriptism to Japanese children one hour each day after their regular
education in the American schools. Here again our national policy,
due to freedom of the press and freedom of religion and of education,
B emitted these people to. jeopardize the defense of Hawaii. After
ecember 7 the Japanese newspapers were put under strict control
79716— 46-— Ex. 157— —4.;
46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and used by the United States for propaganda agencies to control
the [55] Japanese population, and the Shinto temples were
closed.
9. Hawaiian Press. — The state of mind and the state of inf onnation
in the Hawaiian Islands leading up to Pearl Harbor, and particularly
before it, is not better illustrated than the articles appearing in the
Honolulu Advertiser and the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. A mere recita-
tion of these headlines would seem to have been sufficient to have
warned General Short and his subordinate officers of the critical inter-
national situation.
The newspaper headlines in question read as follows : “U. S. Waits
Japan Reply” (29 Nov 41 — Honolulu Star-Bulletin) ; “Japanese May
Strike Over Weekend”; “Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready For
Battle” (30 Nov 41 — Honolulu Advertiser) ; “Hull, Kurusu In Crucial
Meeting Today” (1 Dec 41 — Honolulu Advertiser ); “U. S. Army
Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows”;
“Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension”; “War Fears Grow in
Philippines” (1 Dec 41 — Honolulu Star-Bulletin) ; “Japan Called Still
Hopeful of Making Peace with U. S.”; “Japan Gives Two Weeks More
to Negotiations” (2 Dec 41 — Honolulu, Advertiser) ; “Huge Pincer
Attack on U. S. By Japan, France Predicted” (3 Dec 41 — Honolulu
Advertiser) ; “Japan Spurns U. S. Program” (4 Dec 41 — Honolulu
Star-Bulletin)' “Pacific Zero Hour Near ; Japan Answers U. S. Today”
(4 Dec 41 — Honolulu Advertiser) ; “Singapore on War Footing”;
“New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo”; “Civilians Urged to Leave
Manila” (6 Dec 41 — Honolulu Star-Bulletin) ; “America Expected to
Reject Japan’s Reply on Indo-China” ; “Japanese Navy MovingSouth” ;
“Detailed Plans Completed for M-Day Setup” (6 Dec 41 — Honolulu
Advertiser) ; “F. D. R. Will Send Message [5^] to Emperor
on War Crisis” (7 Dec 41 — Honolulu Advertiser) .** 24
10. Summary. — We have learned a great deal about psychological
warfare since this nation went to war. Looking backwards, it is pos-
sible to see that the psychological phases of the preparatory period
for war leading up to the conflict with Japan had an immense effect
upon the state of mind of our own public, officials and commanders;
and upon what they did or did not do, prior to December 7. The de-
ception of Japan and its actions based upon that deception in combi-
nation with our own failures to take precautions against the attack
played no small part in the disaster of December 7th.
Our complacent nation appeared to be sure, in view of its wealth
and industrial strength and its prestige and leadership, that no one
would presume to attack it.
This national pride and vanity and sense of false security, so prev-
alent on the mainland, undoubtedly had its influence in Hawaii.
With the foregoing background it is possible to understand more
accurately and judge the following story of Pearl Harbor from early
January 1941 until the attack and shortly thereafter.
83 Complete excerpts from the newspapers during this period will be found In Exhibits
19 and 19A.
34 The editors of both papers were called and examined as witnesses. They testified
that these headlines resulted from deductions based on current trends in International
relations gleaned from news dispatches. No other factual data was available to them.
(R. 3107-3108, 3109-3170)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
47
[i] Chapter III. The Story of Pearl Harbor
A. GENERAL
1. Introduction: Scope of the Chapter and its Purpose
Chronological story of the events, documents, and actions culminating in the
PeArl Harbor disaster; statement of the facts and circumstances; two primary
periods, from January through September and from October through December.
2. Geographical
Hawaii and outposts ; reason for location of naval and military establishments
in the Islands.
3. Mission of Army in Hawaii
Joint tasks, Army tasks ; Navy tasks.
4. Condition of the Hawaiian Department at the Time of Short's Assumption of
Comamnd and Just Prior Thereto
Report of the Navy on weaknesses of Army Pearl Harbor defenses concurred
in by the Army ; action of the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of War.
5. Organization of the Navy at Pearl Harbor
Organization of the Navy complex, duties of Admiral Kimmel ; duties of
Admiral Bloch ; duties of Admiral Bellinger ; problem of Short in dealing with
this complex organization.
B. EVENTS FROM JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1941
1. Selection of General Short
Selection by General Marshall ; instructions and basis of his action ; corre-
spondence between the Chief of Staff and Commanding General Hawaiian De-
partment as to plans, policies, and status of defense in Hawaii.
2. Short's Staff
Selection of Colonel Phillips and his training for Chief of Staff, qualifications
of Phillips ; Short’s relationship with his senior officers.
3. Short's Actions in Building Defense Installations and Adding Equipment
Short diligent in his demands for equipment, defense construction, and per-
sonnel ; status of defenses summarized as of December 7, 1941.
[//] 4 . Short's Reorganization of Divisions
Reorganization of the Hawaiian Division into triangular divisions, unusually
heavy fire power in the divisions.
5. Short's Relationship With the Navy
Efforts to carry out Chief of Staff’s direction as to cooperation ; resulting agree-
ments with the Navy generally considered and their effect.
6. Abandonment of Herron's Field Order #1: Adoption of Triple Alert System:
Sabotage Issue
Standard Operating Procedure of July 14 and November 5, 1941; the three
alert system ; the distribution of Standard Operating Procedure ; the effect of the
three alerts; the composition of the Japanese population in Hawaii and the
sabotage issue; views on sabotage by the Japanese in the Islands from local
leaders in Hawaii.
7. Navy Long Distance Reconnaissance
Short’s assumptions as to the Navy’s conducting long distance reconnaissance
by air and water ; Navy’s acceptance of the responsibility for long distance recon-
naissance; the long distance reconnaissance essence of defense of Oahu; failure
to take steps to implement the agreement by the Navy to do long distance recon-
naissance; effect of the failure to have long distance reconnaissance; relationship
of Army’s close-in reconnaissance ; place of the Aircraft Warning Service in the
reconnaissance system ; the radio interceptor system ; the failure of the recon-
naissance arrangements.
48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
8. Agreements Between Army and Wavy
War plans, Joint Action of the Army-Navy 1935; Rainbow War Plan; Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier ; category of defense
D; Joint Air Agreement; Short’s problem in dealing with Klmmel, Bloch, or
Bellinger to fix responsibility of the Navy under the agreements ; failure to imple-
ment the agreements; failure to put the agreements into operation; uncertaipty
.as to when the agreements would go into operation; unity of command issue;
agreements go into effect upon actual emergency too late without previous prac-
tice and organization of staff; training explanation as reason [///] for
not putting agreements into effect ; complete absence of ability to implement the
agreement between the Navy and the Army.
2. Estimate of the Situation
Estimate pursuant to the Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941; operating
plans by Bellinger and Martin April 9, 1941; joint estimate of the situation;
Short’s responsibilities under the estimate of the situation ; concurrence by the
Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of War, Admiral Richardson, Admiral Kimmel,
General Herron, and General Short in air attack the primary danger; Chief
of Staffs repeated warnings that air superiority against air attack matter of
first priority ; responsibility of Short to provide defense to the primary threat of
air attack.
C. CRITICAL PERIOD OCTOBER 1 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941
1. Vital Messages
Short’s action in taking Air Force personnel and putting them on military police
duty ; Chief of Staffs objections supporting the Air Force ; Navy message October
16, warning Japanese relations deteriorating ; War Department radio of October
18, 1941 Japanese deteriorating relationships, November 24, 1941 radio Chief of
Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet doubtful outcome of nego-
tiations with Japan and warning surprise attack possibility ; November 26, 1941
War Department radio instructing Short special photo mission Jaluits ; November
27, 1941 Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet “war
warning” ; November 27, 1941 Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, negotiations with Japan terminated practical purposes; instructing
action to be taken; November 27, 1941 G-2 War Department to G-2 Hawaiian
Department possible hostilities may begin ; Short’s selection of Alert Number 1
and reply to War Department advising such selection November 27, 1941 ; knowl-
edge of the War Department of his decision;, significant Navy messages of De-
cember 3, 4, and 6, 1941.
2. Analysis of the Situation From November 24 to November 27
War Council action on the 25 November 1941 ; War Council and Secretary of
State action with the Japanese on November 26, 1941 ; absence of the Chief of
Staff from Washington from evening of the 26th to the 28th ; draft of message
of 27th by Chief of Staff on 26th ; counter proposals handed by the Secretary of
State to Japanese. Ambasadors 26 November 1941; construction of the counter*
proposals by the Japanese and their action ; the Marshall-Stark memorandum.
8. The Drafting of the Message #47% of the 27th
Meeting with the Secretary of War to modify the message to be sent General’
Short ; authorship, pf various parts of the message identified ; Short’s position
as to thq, ppsijtion vitb, reference to long distance reconnaissance ; Short’s claim:
qf amjbimiity ip, the message considered ; Gerow’s recollection of the conferences
qf tjhe 2^th; communication of the contents of the message by Short to his prin-
cipal commanders ; tjhe question of secrecy and method of transmission considered..
4 . Analysis, of the November 27, 1247 Message
Parts pf the message considered in light of Short’s responsibilities and knowl-
edge ; message considered in connection with estimate of the situation ; message*
considered ifi connection with the alert to be adopted; message considered ins
connection with the communication of its contents in view of restrictions on Short.
&, Messages 28th November to 8th December , Inclusive
Gr-2 message November 28, 1941 #484 ; War Department message November 28,.
Ij9$l #482 ; Short’s reply to #482 on 28 November, 1941 ; December 3, 1941 Navy
message on destruction of codes; Navy message of December 4, 1941 on codes;
Navy message December 6, 1941 on codes ; Short’s position as to reception of this
ipf^rmattom
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
49
6. December 7, 1941 Message
Its method of sending, status of communication ; what happened in transmis-
sion ; other means of communication available.
7. Failure of Navy To Advise Short of Enemy Submarine in Pearl Harbor on
Morning December 7, 1941
Submarine reported sunk by the Navy about 7 : 15 a. m. ; no report made to
Short.
8. Failure of Aircraft Warning Service To Advise of Approaching Planes , Decem-
ber 7, 1941
Status of aircraft warning system, detection of the approaching planes ; efforts
of the mobile station to communicate the information to higher authority ; LL
Tyler’s disposal of the matter.
9. Navy Failure To Advise Short of Suspected Naval Concentration in the Jaluits
Loss of radio contact 25th af November to December 1.
10. Navy Account of the Japanese Task Force That Attacked Pearl Harbor:
Sources of Information to Japanese
Origin of information of the attacking forces ; history of the attacking forces
and the dates of its movement ; intelligence sources to the Japanese as to the dis-
position ; activities of the Japanese consulate; maps of tjie Japanese based upon
intelligence information; Japanese information of the disposition from Alert
Number 1.
11. Information not Given Short
Jaluit task force; information on negotiations with Japanese; no disapproval
of his selection of sabotage alert number 1 ; additional information available in
Washington.
D. STATUS OF THE PRINCIPAL HAWAIIAN DEFENSES IN 1941 AND THEIR 8TATE OF READI-
NESS ON DECEMBER 6, 1941 OB THE REASONS FOB THEHfe LACK OF READINESS
1. Aircraft Warning Service and Interceptor Command '
Service operative prior to December 7, 1941 ; operations of the service on Decem-
ber 7, 1941 ; nature of technical difficulties ; state of training of the personnel ;
probable effectiveness of Interception. [VI] Necessity for immediate use
not appreciated in Hawaii by senior commanders ; doubtless whether would have
been used by Department commander even if in perfect condition.
2. Status of the Aircraft Warning Service on December 7th
System operative for month prior to December 7 ; Department commander would
not turn operations over to Air Force and take it away from the Signal Corps ;
mobile radio stations and information center in a reasonably operative condition
prior to December 7; lacked full manpower to operate this service; Department
commander bolding on to it using it as training stations instead of operating
station ; cooperation of the Navy, permanent construction did not hold up putting
the aircraft warning service into operation ; Short’s action in putting the aircraft
warning service on a partial operating basis insufficient ; relationship with the
interceptor command and the information center.
S. Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Defenses
Composition of the force ; relationship to the interceptor command ; status of
the mobile antiaircraft and its ammunition ; mobile batteries seldom placed in
combat position prior to December 7.
4 . Ammunition Issue: ShorVs and the Oi dncmce Department 1 s responsibility
Short refused to permit the timely issuance of antiaireraft or artillery am-
munition; small arms ammunition issued to divisions; insufficient small arms
ammunition issued to Air Force to meet the attack-
5. Status of Aircraft Defenses
Deficiency in aircraft spare parts, etc.; efforts of General Martin to secure
equipment ; relative status of Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska in equipment ; prior-
ities on airfield construction ; . use . of Hawaii as a training ground by the Jh\r
Corps.
50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[VII] E. STATUS OF DEFENSES ON SUNDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 7TH, 1941
1. Army Aircraft
Under Alert Number 1 aircraft was substantially grounded and assembled wing
to wing ; Navy had no PBY’s in the air that morning.
2. Naval Long Distance Reconnaissance
Navy had insufficient means of conducting adequate long distance reconnais-
sance by air; Navy reconnaissance by air was confined to observation of ma-
neuver areas for the fleet with particular reference to submarines ; Navy’s fleet
maneuvers were for the purpose of training and such aircraft reconnaissance was
primarily antisubmarine.
8. Aircraft Warning Service
Service working from 4 a. m. to 7 a. ni. on December 7, 1941 ; one station con-
tinued in operation beyond 7 o’clock for the training of Elliott ; interceptor com-
mand was operating daily but no formal orders had gone out from Short.
4 . Antiaircraft defenses
Mobile guns had seldom gone into battle position ; ammunition was not issued
to mobile guns ; it took up to six hours to draw and distribute the ammunition.
5. Summary
F. THE ATTACK ON DECEMBER 7, 1941
1. Japanese Intelligence
Japanese submarines in the harbor prior to Pearl Harbor attack; completeness
of Japanese maps; completeness of Japanese information as shown by the maps.
2 . Nature and Composition of the Attacking Force
, Strength of the attacking force; planning done by the attacking force; the
submarine phase of the attack ; the planning phase of the attack.
G. TIME ELEMENT IN THE EXPECTED ATTACK, THE EFFECT OF USING HAWAII AS A TRAIN-
ING GROUND IN ADDITION TO ITS BEING A COMBAT OUTPOST
1. Attack a Surprise
Chief of StafT, Navy and Army witnesses all admit the attack was a surprise ;
accuracy of Japanese estimate of the situation ; the Japanese gamble.
[VIII] 2. Time Element — The Important Factor in All Estimates
Estimate of the attack by Air Force ; error in the estimate was in the time it
would occur which led to unexpected results.
8. Expected Time to Continue Training
Error in estimate of the time of the attack brought decision to continue train-
ing; Hawaiian forces disposed for training at the time of attack; personnel or-
ganized for training rather than combat at time of attack.
4. Shorts ’ Trust in Navy to Give Him Timely Notice: Time Element Again
Short’s relationship with the Navy ; Short’s belief that naval forces were doing
long-distance reconnaissance; Short’s belief that the Navy planes were doing
long-distance reconnaissance; Short’s belief that the Navy was not withholding
any evidence from him ; Short’s policy of not pressing for information from the
Navy.
H. WHAT WAS DONE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ATTACK?
1. Reason for Analysis of Action Taken After 7 December 1941
To determine how effectively General Short was able to use the materiel, per-
sonnel and facilities after the attack which he had before the attack ; and to de-
termine what Washington supplied Hawaii after the attack which it could have
supplied before.
2. Hawaii and Washington Action
Troop dispositions and troop increases; increased activation of all engineer-
ing ; increased equipment in the air sent from the mainland ; activation of the
interceptor command; dispositions of the antiaircraft artillery and coast artil-
lery; condition of readiness of the Interceptor command and aircraft warning
service; reorganization of the District Engineer’s Office and delegation of au-
thority by the Corps of Engineers; treatment of the civilian Japanese popula-
tion ; lack of check on the Hawaiian situation by Washington.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
51
I. SUMMABY
[55] Chapter III. The Story of Pearl Harbor
a. general
1. Introduction: Scope Of The Chapter And Its Purpose . — This
is a running story of the principal events, documents, and actions taken
leading up to Pearl Harbor. We accompany this story with a discus-
sion of the pro’s and con’s of each situation in order that all arguments
for and against every explanation and the circumstances surrounding
every set of facts may be clearly understood and evaluated. Against
such a background, all claims, arguments, facts and explanations can
be considered. We believe tnis chronological history of the entire
transaction will make our succeeding conclusions clearly stand forth.
After setting forth some general considerations in this chapter, we
direct attention to the two primary periods, from January through
September and from October through December. As will be noted
elsewhere this is a logical chronological division. In the latter part
of the year 1941 there seemed to be a change of understanding, appre-
ciation, and apprehension of forthcoming events on the part of those
in Hawaii. In reading this chronological history this should be ob-
served because it is an important factor in what was done or not
done in Hawaii.
2. Geographical . — The Territory of Hawaii comprises an island
group of which the Island of Oahu is the primary element. Oahu
contains Pearl Harbor, located on its southern rim. Pearl Harbor
is the base for the Pacific Fleet, and was also the headquarters during
1941 of the Commander-in-Chief of the [55] Pacific Fleet and
Headquarters of the 14th Naval District, which had naval jurisdiction
over the Hawaiian Islands and our other island possessions in the
Pacific including Midway and Wake but not the Philippines. Oahu
was also the location of one of the largest troop concentrations in the
national defense system of the United States while other national
defense elements are located on the adjacent islands.
It is important to emphasize that Hawaii was an outpost in the
American Defense system. In view of that fact, certain fundamental
requirements of action resulted which were incumbent upon the com-
mander of the Hawaiian Department to follow. Hawaii is both an
outpost for defense and offense, and is one of the primary bastions of
our national defense system. In priority of importance it is rated on
a par with the Panama Canal.
The primary mission of the Army was the defense of Hawaii and
particularly of Pearl Harbor and the fleet there, when in residence ;
and the fleet sea and air base at all times. Aside from the necessity
of preventing these islands from falling into the hands of other nations
as a springboard for an attack upon the United States, the foregoing
primary mission was that incumbent upon General Short at the time
of the Pearl Harbor disaster.
The whole reason for having this outpost was that it should be on
the alert to repel attack and to furnish the springboard from which
attacks could be launched upon our enemies. For this reason this
*)2 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
outpost was implemented with the major portion of the fleet and
very substantial Army installations in order that the mainland might
rest securely [57] and be protected. There is no other funda-
mental reason for the great concentration of naval and military
power on the Island of Oahu and associate islands. The very loca-
tion of the Hawaiian Islands, approximately 2,000 miles from our
Pacific Coast, makes it an admirable location for naval, air and ground
forces for it gives, by reason of its position, a scope and flexibility of
attack and defense, sufficiently remote from the Pacific Coast to insure
the maximum latitude of action against our enemies and the maximum
protection of the mainland of the United States.
3. Mission Of Army In Hawaii. — The Army in Hawaii had a mis-
sion and a duty to perform. As stated in the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan this was :
a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to con-
trol and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
b. AKMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces,
and against hostile sympathizers, to support the Naval forces.
c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect ship-
ping therein, to support the Army Forces.
The Army’s mission was primarily that of protecting Hawaii, be-
cause it was the sea and air base for the fleet; and, when the fleet was
in the harbor, it was there to render such protection as it could to the
fleet. The protection of the Islands, other than for these purposes,
was secondary and only necessary to the extent of making it possible
for the Army to execute its primaiy mission. It should be observed
that the very fact of the fleet being in the harbor increased the respon-
sibilities of the Army, because of the dual facts [55] that the
fleet when in the harbor was not in a position to support the Army
forces either by reconnaissance or by the protection incident to its
being at sea in waters adjacent to the islands, and when in the harbor
itself needed protection for its ships that were temporarily immo-
bilized and particularly vulnerable to air attack.
4. Condition Of The Hawaiian Department At The Time Of Short's
Assumption Of Command And Just Prior Thereto. — With tne above
mission in mind, the condition of the Hawaiian Department just prior
to the assumption of command by General Short and Admiral Kimmel
is a matter of interest. Admiral Richardson was the Senior naval
officer in command of the fleet, and General Herron the senior Army
officer in command of the Hawaiian Department. These officers
jointly reviewed the situation as to the Army. As a result Admiral
Richardson addressed a letter on the 25th of January, 1941, as to the
status of the Army’s deficiencies for the defense of Hawaii, which was
sent to the Secretary of the Navy. (R. 1802.) The Secretary of the
Navy, in turn, wrote to the Secretary of War, and called his attention,
to the serious conditions existing. 2 ®
Admiral Kimmel summed up the situation in his testimony :
He was u astounded at the then existing weaknesses ” of the Pearl
Harbor defenses , 28 and collaborated with his [55] predecessor
in the preparation of a letter dated 25 January 1941 to the Chief of
Naval Operations. This letter pointed out:
M See p. 99 in this chapter for a discussion of this correspondence.
*• Italic by the Board.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 53
(a) The critical inadequacy of A. A. guns available for the defense of Pearl
Harbor, necessitating constant manning of Ship's A. A. guns while in port
(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land based aircraft
necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of
Fleet planes for local patrols.
(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District
etc.
(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore. (Roberts Rec. 544.)
He communicated this information to General Short. (R. 1768.)
It is therefore apparent from the considered investigations by
Richardson and Herron, which conditions were concurred in by Short,
that the lack of adequate defense equipment and what was needed
to bring it up to a satisfactory status, were clearly known to both the
Army and the Navy in Hawaii and to the War and Navy Departments.
Short, therefore, came to the command on the 5th day of February,
1941, with a clear and unmistakable recognition by all concerned of
the condition of the Department of which he had assumed command.
General Herron, who preceded General Short, had been directed on
June 17, Wifi, by Washington, to institute an alert. (R. 213.) This
alert lasted six weeks. (R. 214r-215.) After it was suspended at the
end of six weeks it was reinstated for a period. The alert was an
all-out alert with complete dispersion of forces into combat positions
and with full equipment and ammunition.
[60] General Herron testified that there was no disturbance
of the civilian population by the use of this all-out alert which was
instituted under conditions similar to those which later prevailed for
General Short’s alert.
When asked as to the Alerts 1, 2, and 3 of Short, he disposed of
these alerts with the following language :
General Herron. That was a refinement that the training men put over on
General Short when he came out there. I told him I would not do any such
thing. There was only one kind of alert, and that was a total alert, and then
I would do it in accordance with the situation. But the training men liked
refinements, and they recommended three kinds because the Navy had three
kinds. But they did not get to the real point of the thing. The Navy has three
kinds, but the all-out alert is number one, always. Now they ease up into two
and three; but these young men did not know that, and when Short came out
they put over the three and got them reversed, so that Short went into the Num-
ber 1, which was sabotage. It did not seem to him a very important change, I
don't suppose, and it turned out to be vital. It was too much of a refinement.
(R. 226-227.)
In this connection, General Herron made a significant observation
on the responsibility of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department.
General Grunibt. I have one more question on alerts. The fact that you
received a directive from the War Department to alert the command : Did that
leave the impression in your mind that if anything serious happened in the
future the War Department would direct you to go on the alert, or leave it
up to your judgment?
General Herron. I always felt that I was entirely responsible out there and I
had better protect the Island. (R. 228.)
5. Organization of The, Navy At Pearl Harbor . — Before proceeding
to a consideration of the Army’s problems and the action taken
by the Army in preparing the defenses of Hawaii, it is necessary to
understand the organization of the Navy with whom General Short
was to deal extensively and with, whick he was to [61] enter
54 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
into various agreements and understandings, which have a material
bearing upon which was done or was not done.
To an Army man the organization of the Navy at Hawaii appeared
to be quite complex. Admiral Kimmel was Commander-in-Chief of
the United States Fleet and Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
Admiral Bloch was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.
Admiral Bloch’s duties consisted of the following :
a . Commandant of the 14th Naval District, reporting directly to
the Navy Department; the 14th Naval District was a decentralized
Navy Department for local affairs, dealing with administrative matters
such as plans, buildings, work of the Navy Yard, repairing ships
and the like, and providing for the Fleet oil, docks, water protection
and such services as minesweeping, antisubmarine patrol, and the like.
b. An officer of the Fleet, reporting to Admiral Kimmel, and acting
as a subordinate of Admiral Kimmel ; his duties related to the prepara-
tions for the offensive and defensive actions in time of war and to
purely military matters.
c. Adminstrative control over Admiral Bellinger, Commander of
the Base Defense Air Force.
d. Commander of Task Force No. 4 in control of the naval installa-
tions at the outlying island bases, such as Midway. Wake, Guam, etc.
It will be noted from the foregoing that Admiral Bloch dealt directly
with the Navy Department on certain phases of [62] his work.
He was primarily charged as the Naval Defense Commander of the
naval installations on shore. He was also a Task Commander under
Admiral Kimmel. He was the responsible commander over the shore-
based naval air forces ; which were charged with the mission of naval
long-distance reconnaissance.
Additionally, Bloch, in his capacity as a Defense Commander, had
administrative control over Admiral Bellinger, the Naval Air Officer,
who was responsible for cooperation in the air with the Army, but he
had no power of disciplinary control over Admiral Bellinger, who was
under Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Bellinger’s duties, in turn, were as follows:
a. Commander, Hawaiian Base Patrol Wings, and Commander,
Patrol Wing 2. Included in the larger command were the patrol
squadrons and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings 1 and 2.
b . Commander, Task Force 9. This comprised Patrol Wings 1
and 2, plus other units as assigned by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
FleetJ for conduct of Pacific operations.
c. Commander, Fleet Air Detachment Pearl Harbor. The responsi-
bilities of this function included administrative authority in local mat-
ters over all Fleet aircraft actually based ashore.
d. Liaison with Commandant, 14th Naval District, for aviation
development within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra,
and Johnston Islands.
e. Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. In connection with
the above five major duties, Admiral Bellinger operated under the fol-
lowing senior officers:
[68] (1) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who as Fleet
Commander for patrol wings was based at San Diego.
(2) Commanaer, Scouting Force, the 4th Command of which
Patrol Wings 1 and 2 were a part.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
55
(3) Directly under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in his
capacity as Commander, Task Force 9.
(4) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as
Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.
(5) Commanders of Fleet Task Forces 1, 2, and 3 of patrol planes
assigned to those forces for specific operations.
To summarize, Admiral Bellinger indicated that he held six posi-
tions in Honolulu on December 7, 1941, namely —
(1) Commander, Base Patrol Wing.
(2) Commander, Patrol Wing 2.
(3^ Commander, Task Force 9.
(4) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor.
(5) Liaison Commander with the 14th Naval District.
(6) Commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force.
In these various capacities he was responsible to the —
(1) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force.
(2) Commander, Scouting Force 1 and 2.
(3) Commander-in-Chiei^ Pacific Fleet, for his duties in con-
nection with Task Force 9.
[64] (4) Commander of the 14th Naval District, for his
duties in connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force.
(5) Commander-in-Chief, the Pacific Fleet, for his duties with
respect to Patrol Wings 1, 2, and 3.
In Admiral Bloch’s testimony he testified that he (Bloch) wore
three hats. He was in command of the 14th Naval District, in which
capacity he reported direct to the Navy Department. In another ca-
pacity, as an officer of the Fleet, he was directly under the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. And again under the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, in another capacity, with respect to the Joint Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan, as Naval Defense Commander.
As may be realized, in this organization in which there were two
§ overning heads, Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, with whom General
hort had to do business, and their respective staffs with whom Short’s
staff had to deal, as well as the many-titled Admiral Bellinger with
whom General Martin dealt, the problem of cooperation was made
somewhat difficult.
By way of contrast, the Navy only had to deal with General Short
as the sole responsible commander over all activities, both ground and
air. General Martin was in command of the Army Air Forces and
presented a single air commander with whom the I^avv had to deal;
and Martin w r as under the direct command of Short. When the agree-
ments and methods of operation arrived at between the Army and
Navy are examined hereinafter, these relationships will become im-
portant in understanding what was done and what was not done and
some of the reasons for the failure of the competent defense of Hawaii.
[ 66 ] B. EVENTS FROM JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1941
1. Selection of General Short . — General Short was selected for his
high post of command by General Marshall. Upon being notified of
this selection, he was called to Washington to confer with General
Marshall, to receive special written instructions from him and to con-
fer with the sections of the General Staff and particularly the War
56 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Plans Division. The purpose of this visit and these conferences was
to equip him with the latest and most up-to-date information and in-
structions as to the responsibilities of his new command.
Thereafter, General Short proceeded to Hawaii, arriving there on
the fifth day of February, 1941. He assumed command on February
7, 1941. Both Short ana Herron concur that the latter fully advised
Short of the problems and conditions with which he was confronted.
At the time of General Short taking over command, there existed
certain basic documents constituting fundamental instructions for his
guidance in the conduct of the command, such as the Joint Army and
Navy Plan of 1935. This was modified by the subsequent agreements
between Short and Kimmel, Bloch and Short, and Bellinger and
Martin.
Coincident with the assumption of command by General Short on
February 7, 1941, a letter was written on that date by General Marshall
to General Short comprising a full presentation of the problems con-
fronting General Short in his new command. The letter was based
upon a conversation with Admiral Stark, then Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, and said in part :
[G6] Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the
deficiencies of Army materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred
specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns . . .
What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel
throughout the Army and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other
command in the Army. The fullest protection for the fleet is the rather, than a
major consideration for us, there can be little question about that ; but the Navy
itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it
difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. . . .
You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that
is humanly possible to build up the Army's defenses of the naval overseas installa-
tions, but we cannot perform a miracle. . . .
. . . However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that
our first concern is to protect the Fleet.
My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is
done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing
defenses will discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk
of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine,
constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat
in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.
Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to
protect the base and the naval concentration and that purpose should be made
clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yesterday,
for example, in a matter of tremendous importance that old Army and Navy fueds,
engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments
on both sides, still persist in confusing issues on National defense. We must
be completely impersonal in these matters, as least so far as our own nerves and
irritations are concerned. . . .” (R. 14-17.)
Thus General Short was provided by his chief with both sound ad-
vice and an admirable set of clear-cut signposts to guide him. Such
being the measure of his instructions, it is interesting to observe in what
particulars he complied with [67] them or varied from them
and the reasons for nis actions. In conformity with the instructions as
to the Navy, General Short proceeded to establish cordial and coopera-
tive relationships, the exact nature of which is discussed elsewnere.
By the 19th of February he “had made a pretty thorough inspection
or survey” (R. 321), and on that date wrote a letter to the Chief
of Staff as to things that required immediate attention, which were :
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
57
As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following
are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary
changes :
(1) Cooperation with the Navy.
(2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and
servicing of aircraft. t
(3) Improvement of the Antiaircraft defense.
(4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.
(5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.
(6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improve-
ment in roads and trails.
(7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communi-
cation centers.
(8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops.
The interim from February 19 to December 7 is replete with the
efforts of Short to secure approvals and money for improving the
defenses of Hawaii. It is also replete with various instances of his
being turned down by the War Department, particularly because
of lack of money in connection with permanent installations.
Undue weight should not be given, however, to the aspects of the
equipment, as General Marshall said in his letter of February 7th,
Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army,
and the fundamental question to be considered is : What did Short do
with what he had to meet the attack?
[6#] As elsewhere stated, he was granted his request for the con-
struction of many types of installations, including the important air-
craft warning system. (See the discussion of supply of equipment
and construction, and also the delays in construction.) (P. 256.)
Again on March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General Short as
to the air situation in clear, unmistakable language:
I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory
system or coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority.
(R. 19.)
On March 6, General Short wrote General Marshall, with particular
reference to Aircraft Warning System and the delays in its construc-
tion, and delays in sites due to the Department of Interior delays :
One of the first projects which I investigated In this department was the Air-
craft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the defense of these islands.
At the present time the maximum distance an approaching airplane can be de-
tected is about five miles. The radio detector equipment of the Aircraft Warn-
ing Service increases this distance to one hundred and twenty miles, and in these
islands, the use of this equipment is the only way by which the detection dis-
tance can be increased. With the present international situation it seems to me
that if this equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now here.
The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At present with the fleet in
Hawaiian waters, there is no adequate warning service. * * * I believe that
this matter is sufliciently important to be brought to the attention of the Secre-
tary of War to see if permission can not be obtained from the Secretary of the
Interior to construct the Haleakala installation without the necessity of submit-
ting detaUed plans for consideration by the National Park Service.
Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet
is so dependent upon the [ 69 ] early completion of this Aircraft Warn-
ing Service that I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once.
This project was very thoroughly studied by a board of officers in this department
who made several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic
decisions as to locations, types of stations, and general plans have been approved
by the War Department, \ strongly recommend that this project be decentralized .
58 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details
to expedite its completion.
On March 13, General Marshall wrote General Short:
The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local
naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your De-
partment, is most gratifying. * * *
The several letters which you have submitted to The Adjutant General request-
ing personnel, materiel and funds are being processed. To avoid delay in initiat-
ing projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including $3,000,000 in the
estimates now being prepared.
Or March 15 ; General Marshall again wrote General Short as to the
Aircraft Warning Service, showing the delays due to the necessity of
getting approvals from the Department of Interior regarding matters
pertaining to its National Park Service :
The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establish-
ment of the aircraft warning service stations in the Hawaiian Department. How-
ever, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those cases
where facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department of
the Interior. The National Park Service officials are willing to give us the tem-
porary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose, but
they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary build-
ing plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also very
definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such
places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance of
the reservation.
I have given these matters my personal attention, and have conferred with
officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12,
1341, outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time.
[70] On March 15 General Short wrote General Marshall a
letter showing full appreciation of the necessity for the dispersion and
the protection of aircraft. Among other things he said :
On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would
suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19th some work has
been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, but
in no case have arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes
In the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked
for money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes must
necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on account of their limited cruising
radius. (R. 21-22.)
In this letter he also discussed at length the question of anti-aircraft
defense.
On March 28, 1941, General Marshall replied to this letter as follows :
Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional
field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at exist-
ing airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have submitted sufficient
details to support the defense of the anticipated expenditures, funds for those
purposes will be included in estimates.
On April 14, General Short again wrote General Marshall and
amongst other things reported progress, as follows :
Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making
in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following agreements made
with them :
1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth
Naval District. Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.
2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and
Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement.
3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army
the provisions of the joint agreement.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
59
I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral [71] Bloch very
cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the
Army and Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as
the situation requires.
We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air
force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that
in the near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming
convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command. (R.
26-27.)
On May 2, 1941, Short wired General Marshall as to the sums of
money needed for the construction of airports and other defense
projects totaling over $27,000,000. General Short followed this up
with a letter on May 2 to General Marshall in further explanation of
his radiogram forwarding supporting data.
On May 5, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short acknowl-
edging the receipt of these estimates and supporting data, saying:
The matter of locating strongpoints at various points throughout the Island
looks sound to me, and authority to go ahead on the leasing of land parcels was
radioed on April 22nd. War Plans and the Air Corps are still looking into the
matter of the additional airdrome on Oahu, and I expect to have an answer for
you in a short time.
*******
It is most gratifying to have you say that everything is going along extremely
well and do not hesitate to write at any time. (R. 28.)
On May 29, 1941, General Short furnished General Marshall a com-
plete report on current maneuvers, the plans for the organization of
the ground and the construction of field fortifications, and the plans
for repelling a serious attack, and reporting his theory of the defense
of Hawaii, saying :
\7 2] My theory of the defense of Hawaii is based upon the following:
1. Complete organization of the ground at all important points.
2. Holding of the most important field fortification lightly.
3. Holding of large mobile reserves centrally located with sufficient motor
transportation to move all reserves at once if necessary.
4. Detailed plans for the employment of reserves with complete reconnaissance
and reserves actually rehearsed in carrying out of the plans.
5. All troops to be highly trained in delaying action and counter-attack.
On July 7 The Adjutant General sent General Short the following
wire:
For your information stop Deduction from information from numerous sources
is that the Japanese government has determined upon its future policy which is
supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups stop This
policy is present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action
against the maritime provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison'has
been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will
win a decisive victory in European Russia stop Opinion is that Jap activity in
the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval
comma army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the
British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out stop The Neutrality Pact with
Russia may be abrogated stop They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic
ports to be west of Panama Canal by first of August stop Movement of Jap
shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are
being requisitioned end.
This wire contained notation by the Chief of Staff of July 7, 1941.
Chi July 11, 1941, General Short asked the location of a new airfield
on the Island of Oahu.
On July 25, 1941, General Short reported to General [73]
Marshall the Joint Air Arrangements of the Army, Navy, and ex-
60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
change of facilities such as airfields. On July 25, 1941, a very sig-
nificant message was sent by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval
Operations as a joint dispatch to General Short warning him of the
application of economic sanctions against Japan on July 26, particu-
larly saying:
Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff do not anticipate
Immediate hostile reaction by Japanese through the use of military means, but
you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate pre-
cautionary measures against any possible eventualities.
On August 19, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short as to
the establishment of an airfield base for the 15th Pursuit Group and
his reasons for so doing. This brings to conclusion the communica-
tions between the Chief of Staff and General Short to October 1, 1941.
2. Shorts Staff . — Short brought one, Colonel Phillips to Hawaii
with the view to making him his Chief of Staff, and to train him for
that assignment he placed him successively in various sections of his
General Staff. On November 1 Colonel Phillips was made Chief of
Staff. Evidence indicates that Phillips failed to measure up to that
most responsible and important assignment — the “alter ego” of the
Commanding General ; that he was but a weak echo of his Commander
and failed to furnish him, as his principal adviser, with vigorous and
candid advice of high professional character and with a competent
vision and knowledge or what was taking place or might take place.
His administration of the staff, as we view it, was weak [ 74 ]
and reflected itself in the work of the several General Staff sections
and in the output thereof as a whole. While the various Assistant
Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the results are more
important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of requisite
harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that
their testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General
Short.
Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far too
weak for a position of such importance. 27 Short’s selection of Phillips
appears to nave been a mistake. An examination of Phillips’ testi-
mony as to his conception of his duty and what he did and failed to
do in aiding Short to competent decisions in critical situations, is
sufficient evidence of the matter. (R. 1134-1144.) In justice to Phil-
lips it should be pointed out that while he was Chief of Staff he never
was present at important Navy conferences, (R. 393-394, 534), and
that information of important and vital events came to him second-
handed.
Although Short did not insulate himself from his staff, he had
Phillips conduct most of the staff conferences and apparently rarely
dealt directly with his principal staff officers. He delegated to his
staff little more than mere routine duties. His direct relationship
with his G-2 seemed particularly inadequate in view of the then exist-
ing tense situation. (R. 393, 519, 520, 521.) Although he frequently
visited and consulted with his principal subordinate commanaers he
held no periodic conferences, and his second [75] in command,
General Burgin, was not taken into his confidence as to existing con-
ditions nor was his advice sought. (R. 2625.)
W R. 265, 1408-1409, 1946, 1977-1978, 2625-2626.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
61
3. Short's Actions In Building Defense Installations And Adding
Equipment. — There is no question that Short made many demands
for equipment, defense construction, and personnel. He was active
and diligent in this matter. Except as to aircraft and antiaircraft,
his command appears to have been well supplied. In many instances,
long delays were incurred in the approval of defense construction and
making funds available therefor and some of the recommended de-
fense construction was disapproved by the War Department.
4. Short's Reorganization of Divisions.— Short converted the square
division, known as the Hawaiian Division, into two triangular divi-
sions and equipped them with unusually heavy fire power in both
artillery and machine guns as a basis for future expansion in time
of war.
General Maxwell Murray, commanding the 25th Division, testified :
General Gbunebt. And in your division you bad what artillery?
General Mubut. I bad tbe Eighth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Field Artillery,
but it is not generally known tbat we bad practically doubled tbe gun strength
of the brigade before tbe 75-mm. gun batteries ; tbe Eighth and tbe Thirteenth
were 75-mm. gun regiments, and each of those batteries bad eight guns to the
battery instead of four. Tbe Eleventh was the 155-howitzer regiment, but they
were in addition manning two batteries of 155 guns, and some 240-mm. howitzers.
The 75 regiments both bad 240-mm. howitzers assigned to them, too. ( R. 3076-77. )
[76] 4. Short's Relationship With The Navy. — Turning from
Short’s efforts to build up the physical installations and equipment of
Hawaii and his staff, and the successful conversion of his single square
division into two triangular divisions on which his staff seemed pri-
marily engaged, we come to his actions with the Navy. Acting upon
General Marshall’s instructions and admonitions of February 7, 1941,
which seemed to greatly impress him, Short succeeded in establishing
an amiable relationship with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch and
Admiral Bellinger.
As stated hereinafter, he entered into a series of agreements with
the Navy. Suffice it to say that these agreements, while admirable in
concept and in many particulars equally admirable in the proposed
plan of administration, under the handicap of joint action by cooper-
ation instead of unity of command, were of quite limited effectiveness
because neither the Army nor the Navy had sufficient means to prop-
erly implement them.
The agreements were difficult of execution. To make them effec-
tive would have taken skilled professional officers of both services,
guided by a well organized composite staff, and practiced in opera-
tional tests.
The agreements themselves were not to go into effect until either a
period of strained relations occurred, or M-Day was declared, or in
the actual event of war. Neither the Army nor Navy seemed to appre-
ciate this defect.
Short apparently mistook the conduct of “war by contract” for a
conduct of “war by command”.
Even without the full means of putting these agreements physically
into effect, had the equipment and materiel available been utilized,
had there been in existence a [77] detailed plan of operation
of the $aff and lower echelons, and had sound judgment been exer-
cised in the selection of the alert, the disaster of Pearl Harbor un-
79710 — *6— Ex. 157 5
62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
doubtedly would have been materially mitigated, if not wholly
avoided.
(For a full discussiop of the agreements see p. 88 to p. 97.)
6. Abandonment ofHei'ron's Field Order #2.' Adoption of Triple-
Alert System: Sabotage Issue . — A further step ; and one of great im-
port, taken by Short was the study that he initiated through his staff
with a view to abandoning the Field Order No. 1, in vogue under the
regime of General Herron, and substituting his temporary Standard
Operating Procedure, which was published tentatively on July 14,
1941. The final draft of this vital document came out on November
5, 1941 (R. 283), and provided for three types of alerts, which are
defined by Short as follows:
Our Alert No. 1 was a defense against sabotage, espionage, and subversive
activities without any threats from the outside.
Alert No. 2 included all these sabotage measures in No. 1, and, in addition,
defense against air attacks and surface and submarine attacks.
Alert No. S was a defense against an all-out attack where everybody moved
to their battle stations and carried out their duties as if there was a possible
attempt at landing in sight (R. 283.)
Short says that he sent ten copies to the Navy. (R. 395, 400.) He
says he sent a copy to Washington. (R. 431.) Alert No. 1 was purely
antisabotage. Its effect when executed was to concentrate the planes
in groups, wing-tip to wing-tip, where they were vulnerable from the
air but less vulnerable from sabotage on the ground. He said he did
this because of [75] his deficiency of personnel in protecting
his planes against sabotage. If they haa been put in dispersed posi-
tions about the fields within bunkers, they would have been less vul-
nerable to wholesale destruction from the air. This alert concentrated
equipment and personnel and in effect set up almost perfect conditions
for a successful enemy air attack.
Alerts Number 2 and Number 3, on the contrary, constituted wide
dispersion of men and equipment in battle positions, with ammunition
at the guns and troops and planes in positions of readiness for action
and maximum protection. Under Alert Number 1, the earliest time
in which planes were planned to get off the ground was four hours,
while under Alerts Number 2 and Number 3 available aircraft is ready
and can take to the air in from seven to eight minutes. Likewise, in
connection with putting into action the antiaircraft guns and other
similar establishments, the contrast between Alert Number 1 and Alerts
Numbers 2 and 3 was the difference between minutes and hours.
As the entire attack upon Pearl Harbor did not extend beyond ap-
proximately three hours, it is obvious that the selection of the correct
alert was vital. Historically, and by way of precedent, Short had
before him the action of General Herron in the preceding year of an
all-out alert under Filed Order No. 1 of Herron by which complete
dispersal of planes and troops and guns was effected, with ammunition
at the guns. The record shows (Colonel Capron and other witnesses —
R. 1398, 2025, 2720, 2728, 2772-2773, 3090-3097) that there was no
disturbance of the civilian population as a result of the action by
Herron. This is significant, in view [ 7.9] of the fact, as will
later appear, that General Short gives that explanation as one of his
primary reasons for the selection of Alert Number 1,- because he might
alarm the population. (R. 427-428, 532-533.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
63
It should be kept in mind that the civilian population was accus-
tomed to the continued movements of the Army and Navy in their
frequent maneuvers and practice operations. Much of the civilian
population in this instance was living practically in the midst of one
of the greatest military and naval installations anywhere, so that their
state of mind would be far different from that of people on the main-
land unaccustomed to such sights. Then, too, the newspapers ofttimes
contained much more exciting news, threats and disturbing events,
than anything that an alert could stir up, either by the Army or Navy
or both. The explanation therefore lacks both substance and credi-
bility.
At this point the question of sabotage which led to the selection
and implementation of Alert No. 1 should be examined. No single
instance of sabotage occurred while Short was in command up to
December 7. It was true that there were 35,000 aliens of Japanese
origin and there was a total of 160,000 or about 37% of the population
of Japanese origin or affiliations (K. 289), but in no case was there
any instance of misbehavior, despite a very exhaustive investigation
being made constantly by the F. B. I. and by G-2, as well as by Naval
Intelligence.
We have investigated the state of mind and the information as to
the actions of the Japanese population in an endeavor to understand
why it was that General Short adopted his anti-sabotage alert on No-
vember 27 in the face of the [30] increasing international ten-
sion, and of his own estimate and that of the Navy that an air attack
was the most dangerous form of attack likely to be encountered. We
therefore resorted to the testimony of a great variety of witnesses in
all walks of life in Honolulu, resilient there during 1941, and inquired
of their feelings and views and the whole situation as to the Japanese
population.
We could find no substantial evidence of any fear by these witnesses,
including some of the best-informed leaders in the civil life of the
Islands, that the Japanese would commit acts of sabotage. Their
knowledge was based upon long residence in the Islands and experi-
ence with the Japanese. Governor Poindexter, newspaper editors like
Raymond S. Coll, of the Honolulu Advertiser , United States District
Attorney Angus Taylor, Shivers, head of the F. B. I., General Wells,
executive vice-president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association,
and Walter Francis Dillingham, president of the Oahu Railway and
Land Company and owner or director of many other enterprises in the
Islands, concurred with many other witnesses such as ranch owners,
government officials, leaders in business, that the risk of sabotage, so
Tong as the Army and Navy were in a predominant position, before
an actual landing and show of success by the Japanese, was a relatively
minor matter. However, the Army was sabotage-minded. There
appeared to be no substantial basis for this fear other than speculation
as to what a large body of citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry
might do in case of stress.
[oil 7. Navy Long-Distance Reconnaissance . — He assumed that
the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance, and in this he
was joined bv a large group of ranking subordinates, but an inquiry by
him, if it had been made, would have soon revealed the fact that his as-
64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sumption that the task forces went out for conducting reconnaissance
at long distance was not true. Such reconnaissance as they were con-
ducting was only incident to the maneuvers of the task forces of the
fleet, who were operating for training purposes and were looking for
Japanese submarines so as not to interfere with their training opera-
tions. The Navy was submarine- and training-minded. (R. 1527,
1600, 1725, 1773, 1802.)
It should have been apparent upon examination of the facts by him
that any such operations of the task forces were not only intermittent
and limited in scope but they could not possibly cover the entire 360
degrees around the Island. A further understanding by him of the
actual facts would have disclosed very promptly, as it did to his air
force subordinates, that the Navy did not have any means for such
long-distance reconnaissance, nor did the Navy get from the Army
any such assistance, even though under the agreements the Army on
call was to supply a substantial portion of the long-range aircraft for
this purpose. In fact, the Army had at the time of Pearl Harbor avail-
able for this purpose only six planes capable of this work.
The Navy acceptance of responsibility for long-distance recon-
naissance is set forth in pargraph 18 (i) of the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan, which provides :
[82] 18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
shall provide for :
**•**••
i. Distant reconnaissance. (R. 1745.)
The purpose of long-distance reconnaissance, which the Navy as-
sumed m its agreements with the Army, was to discover hostile naval
forces and particularly carriers before they could launch an attack.
The area of search extended two to six hundred miles from the shore.
It was assumed by Short that the presence of task forces of the Navy
at sea insured such reconnaissance being conducted. Long-distance
reconnaissance was obviously the very heart of the defense of Oahu
because upon its results would depend not only the opportunity to
destroy the carriers and carrier-borne planes of the Japanese but
also put the forces on Oahu on the alert for an effective reception of
the attack if it got through. But, as elsewhere stated, this long-dis-
tance reconnaissance was not being conducted by the Navy and such
air reconnaissance as was being conducted was for the purpose of
clearing the area of submarines where the fleet was in training.
The inshore reconnaissance by the Army, up to twenty miles from
shore, was substantially for the same purpose.
The record showed it was the well-considered estimate of the Army
and Navy commanders and their staffs that carriers and their sup-
porting craft would attempt to approach Pearl Harbor, arriving m
position at dark preceding the dawn of the day on which the attack
was to be made. (R. 106.) Under the protection of darkness 300
additional miles could be covered so that at dawn the attack could
be launched within [&?] approximately 300 miles from shore.
This is apparently substantially what actually did happen. (Roberts
Record 556-F.)
The conception and estimate of the situation was correct; steps
taken to meet it were either absent completely or so defective as to
amount to little. The Navy had available for long-distance recon-
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
65
naissance, from November 27 to December 7, 1941, 50 PBY’s and the
Army had six heavy bombers while at least 270 planes would have
been required as a minimum for conducting such a reconnaissance
if a 360-degree area around Oahu was to be covered. (R. 1762, 1766.)
It is significant that in the joint Army-Navy plan of 1935 distant
reconnaissance was made a mission of the Army Dut Short and Bloch
agreed early in 1941, in the joint plan for the defense of the Hawaiian
frontier and for the employment of the Army-Navy Air Forces, to
place the responsibility for distant reconnaissance on the Navy, leav-
ing to the Armv reconnaissance only to about 20 miles from shore.
This is due to the fact that almost all of the planes suitable for dis-
tant reconnaissance were naval. This Joint Coastal Frontier De-
fense Plan was O. KJd by Kimmel and approved by the War
Department.
The result was that the critical band of sea around Hawaii (the
600- to 900-mile area) was not patrolled. Observations therein were
infrequent and incidental. Admiral Kimmel reached a decision that
the few planes available would be wholly ineffective for this purpose
and employed them otherwise. (R. 1763.)
Both Admiral Kimmel and Genreal Short were conversant with
these conditions. (R. 375, 1763, 4438-4439.) It was obvious, [54]
therefore, that a Japanese task force with carriers could launch an
attack upon Oahu with a reasonable certainty of success since its
discovery prior to such launching would have been purely accidental
and its chances of discovery remote.
An early alert by the Navy to the Army would have permitted of
a dispersion of its planes with the result that they could have been
aloft, ready to intercept the attack, and the damage done would have
been greatly lessened.
The remaining factor for reconnaissance and detection was in the
Aircraft Warning System, which was a responsibility of the Army.* **
The Army had put into operation in the fall of 1941, on a training
basis, which was operating for all practical purposes, a number of
mobile radar sets and an aircraft information center. That it was
in operating condition, even with the state of training of the per-
sonnel that then existed in late November and early December 1941
was amply proven by the successful operation of the system during
previous tests and exercises and of the station that discovered the
attacking Japanese force 132 miles from the Island and the correct
interpretation by the two enlisted men operating the station, who duly
reported the presence of a strange force but were told by an inex-
perienced and only partially trained Air Force lieutenant to “forget
it”. This was at 0702 on December 7, 1941.
If this information had been transmitted to the Air Force and to
the Navy the latter would have had the anti-aircraft weapons on its
ships in action, since only three to five minutes were required for that
purpose, the Army anti-aircraft [55] system could have been
alerted and many of the Army planes dispersed and some could
have gotten off the ground.
The only other reconnaissance instrumentality available was that
being operated by the Navy, known as the Radio Intercept System.
* See p. 147 for complete story of construction difficulties of an aircraft warning system,
signal difficulties, and now the enemy fleet was discovered.
66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It was functioning officially in the latter part of 1941 and was con-
stantly supplying information of the greatest value to important
naval commanders, a part of which information was communicated
to General Short by Admiral Kimmel. (R. 1771-1772.)
The one notable and tragic *excepti on was the failure to advise
General Short that on or about November 25 a Japanese task force
was discovered in the Marshall Islands, in which force there were
reported as present two or three carriers, 15 to 20 submarines, and pos-
sibly other vessels. (R. 361.) About the first of December radio
contact was lost with this force as it apparently went into radio
silence, which was known to be by the Navy the third and last and
most dangerous phase of the movement of the enemy fleet. (R. 1654-
1655, 1662.) The loss of such contact of a .threatening fleet in the
year preceding was the occasion for a directive from Washington
for an all-out alert by which all troops went into the field with live
ammunition and remained there for six weeks.
So here again, as in the case of the Army radar system, there was
a failure of transmission of the information by the Navy to the
Army as the Army had failed to transmits its radar information on
the morning of December 7th to the Navy. Such a Japanese task
force in the Marshall Islands was 72 hours away from Pearl Harbor
and nearly a thousand miles closer to Pearl Harbor than the Japa-
nese fleet resident in Japan, from whence [<Stf] the main attack
was expected if it ever did arrive. (R. 106-107.)
After extensive testimony had been given before this Board on the
Jaluit task force and the fact that there was long belief that it was
from Jaluit that the attacking force had moved against Pearl Harbor,
there! was produced in Hawaii the more certain proof that this force
had assembled at Tankan Bay in northern Japan and had moved
from that point eastward and then southward for the attack, leaving
Tankan Bay on the 27th-28th of November 1941. If this proof be
accepted of the later naval witnesses as against the testimony of the
earlier naval witnesses, who seemed equally well informed, it does
not change the situation. The Navy failed to give to the Army a
very vital and important piece of information.
In conclusion, the last element in the tragic situation was the fail-
ure of the subordinate officers of the Navy to report to the Army the
presence in the outer harbor, on the early morning of December 7,
at about 0630, of a Japanese submarine which was sunk by naval
action (the destroyer “U. S. S. Ward” and a naval patrol plane)
about 0633 to 0645 hours, which would have indicated that something
was on the move and the whole naval and military establishments
should have been correspondingly alerted. The “Ward” reported
this action to the naval base watch officer at 0712 hours, who notified
the Naval Chief of Staff. The Army was not notified. (R. 536-
537; Roberts Record 1725.)
The situation as to this reconnaissance is best set forth in excerpts
in testimony from senior commanders. The [ 87 ] long-ais*
tance patrol of the Navy consisted of only tw T o or three PBY’s and
it was “nothing to amount to much.” (R. 1820.) General Martin
said:
I complained to Admiral Bellinger about the lack of patrolling that was being
done. “Well,” he said, “this is all that I have. This is all I can put up. v
(R. 1822 .)
REPORT OP ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
67
General Frank. But so far as there having been a reconnaissance for the
actual protection of Oahu, such continuous reconnaissance had not been done?
Admiral Bloch. That is correct ; and that was a matter subject to the orders
of the Commander-in-Cbief. I think that might as well be cleared. He would
be the man to order that, in my opinion. (R. 1527.)
As to Array reconnaissance. General Mollison testified that such
reconnaissance as was being conducted from Bellows Field did not
operate on Sundays, saying :
I’m sure it did not. It may have on this Sunday, but I doubt very much if
It did. (R. 812.)
So far as inshore patrol is concerned, he said that the Army Air
Forces did so little that it would amount to “a token payment only”.
(R. 824.) X
General Rudolph. On that particular Sunday morning I understood they
didn't have a boat out — an airplane, seaplane. (R. 1232.)
General Frank. But you understand that they were not out on that morning?
General Rudolph. So I was informed. (R. 1233.)
General Gbunert. Then, according to the instructions under which you were
functioning you had no responsibility for distant air reconnaissance?
Admiral Bloch. There was no distant air reconnaissance ordered in that
order. That is the only order that I know which was operative.
[88] General Grunebt. But actually was there some distant air reconnais-
sance being made from time to time or continuously?
Admiral Bloch. I do not know. I do not know whether there was or not.
That would not be under me. (R. 1484.)
With reference to distant reconnaissance, means of performing it
under the joint air agreement. Admiral Bloch testified :
So I had no implements to perform distant reconnaissance in the 14th Naval
District force. (R. 1484.)
General Grunebt. Do you know on the morning of the 7th of December
whether any such planes were in the air on any reconnaissance mission?
Admiral Bloch. I heard planes taking ofT. I do not know exactly what mis-
sions they were on, but there were planes in the air. (R. 1494.)
So now let us turn to the agreements upon which Short placed such
reliance for protection by Naval long-distance reconnaissance and
joint air action with the Navy.
8. Agreements Between Army and Navy . — The basic document
governing the relationship of the Army and Navy in the formulation
of defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands is contained in the docu-
ment entitled “War Plans ? Joint Action of the Army and Navy,
1935”. This was prepared in pursuance of the directive of the Rain-
bow War Plan. It covers the over-all policies of the functions and
agreements between the Army and Navy as to their relative responsi-
bilities in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal
Frontier.
The category of defense in this document which applied to Hawaii
was Category D. This category was defined as “Coastal Frontiers
That May Be Subject to Major Attack.” Under this [<89] cate-
gory the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with
means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval
operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of
defense will generally find application.
... In addition, antiaircraft defense of important areas outside of harbor
defenses should be organized; . . . Long-range air reconnaissance will be
provided. . . . (Page 39.)
68 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
And the purpose of coastal frontier defense was stated to be
Protecting our Military and Civil Installations and Facilities; . . . Insur-
ing the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which are vital to
military, Industrial and commercial operations.
It was also provided that there be furnished
a communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service
among the elements of the land defense with provision for the prompt exchange
of information or instructions with the Navy.
This was a responsibility of the Army.
Pursuant to tne foregoing plan, an agreement was entered into
entitled “Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.” (Pre-
pared by the CommandingGeneral, Hawaiian Department, and the
Commandant, 14th Naval District.) This agreement was signed by
Admiral Bloch and General Short and provided the fundamental I
plan for the defense of Hawaii.
The third agreement was that entitled “Joint Air Agreement”,
signed March 28, 1941. This document was prepared by Major
General Martin, U. S. Army Air Force, and Admiral Bellinger, as
Base Defense Air Force Commander, and signed by Admiral Bloch
and General Short. It provided for the combined air action as
follows :
[ 90 ] Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under
the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine
the Army Bombardment strength to participate in each mission, etc.
Defensive air operation over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be
executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense
Officer wm determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these mis- I
sions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of
fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practical. This j
force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for I
maintenance of the required alert status, until, due to a change in the tactical
situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to
Navy control. (Roberts Record 555.)
This Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941, signed by Bloch and
Short, was implemented by certain additional documents signed by
Bellinger and Martin as operating plans. The date of these operat-
ing plans was April 9, 1941. (Roberts Record 556a-0 Vol. 5.)
Under this agreement Admiral Bloch, not an air officer, was acting
on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief in signing the document, ana
there operated under him Admiral Bellinger, who had the command
of the planes, so far as the Navy could implement the Agreement, as
Commander of the Air Base Force. Bellinger, however, was under
the command of Admiral Kimmel, and Bloch, who was charged with
the responsibility for the operation orders and plans of operation for
the base defense air force, had no air force with which to implement
the Agreement. Bellinger had the job to do and such means as existed
to do it with was Fleet aviation. Bloch had supervisory control over
Bellinger, but the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kimmel, had to
approve the Agreement. (R. 1522.)
\ 91 ] Bloch was called upon to designate the condition of readi-
ness of the aircraft, but did not have control of the aircraft, the read-
iness of which he was to determine. The confusion inherent from
the Navy’s organization is best expressed in the following question :
General Gbunebt. Who would the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet,
hold responsible in case something went wrong? Would he hold you or Bellinger?
Admiral Bloch. I do not know. (R. 1522.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
69
This agreement was' the result of a report of a Joint Army and Navy
board dated October 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations
covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian
Islands. This report was signed by Major General Martin and
Admiral Bellinger. (R. 1581.)
Under such circumstances the Army had a difficult time in deter-
mining under which of the three shells (KimmeL, Bloch, or Bellinger)
rested the pea of performance and responsibility.
Plans which must wait to be put into practice and only become
operative when war strikes under all the unexpected and changing
conditions of an attack inevitably prove unsound in practice. The
basic difficulty of the Short-Blocn-Kimmel agreements was inherent
in all such agreements, as they constituted a vain paper attempt to
predict war procedure without having properly tested out the pro-
posed arrangements in training and by joint staff action to see if they
were practical measures.
The proof of the soundness of the plans is whether they work,
and the Short-Bloch-Kimmel agreements were never tested out far
enough to find out if their plans were sound in practice. There was
inadequate practice of them to enable [ 93 ] the respective or-
ganizations to acquire that automatic facility in their execution so
that the plans would be carried out effectively despite all the stresses,
strains and unexpected developments to personnel and equipment
that were incidents of a conflict. We desire to emphasize this syn-
thetic structure of agreements and plans based upon them. The fol-
lowing analysis of these agreements shows that :
There were two joint agreements. The first was known as the
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. It was based on the war plan
and the “Joint Action of the Army and Navy” of 1935. The second
a reement was the Joint Air Force Agreement signed by Admiral
och and General Short and based upon it as Appendix #7 was an
operating plan worked out by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger.
As Admiral Bloch said :
Ordinarily it would not be operative. (R 1478.)
He also testified :
The plan was never operative as a plan because the War and Navy Depart-
ments never ordered It to become operative, either in part or in whole. The
local commanders never mutually agreed to have it become operative in part
(R. 1474.)
And again he testified :
General Russell. So that respecting missions of the Army and Navy, accord-
ing to your construction of the agreement, reconnaissance missions were not
effective until December 7, 1&41?
Admiral Bloch. Under the circumstances that obtained, that is the way it
happened. 1 wiU say that I accepted the responsibility in that agreement for
distant reconnaissance for the Navy, and I did my utmost to implement my
responsibility by demanding patrol plans for that purpose, but I never had any ;
I never had one. (R. 1487.)
The agreements entered into between the Navy and the Army
[ 93 ] nad two basic defects. First, they did not become operative
until an emergency arose. The agreement said (paragraph 15 (c),
2 ) :
8ucb parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior
to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed
upon by local commanders. (R. 1584.)
70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The local commanders as testified to by Admiral Bellinger were
understood to be General Short and Admiral Bloch. These com-
manders apparently took no action to “mutually agree” to implement
parts of the plan and, evidently were going to let the agreements go
until an emergency arose, when they became operative automatically.
As Admiral Bellinger testified :
That could have been done at any time by the commandant of the 14th Naval
District, who was Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, If it was ap-
proved by and agreed upon by General Short. ( R. 1591. )
But it was not done. The selection of M-Day to initiate the put-
ting of the joint plan and agreements thereunder into effect accord-
ing to the terms of the agreement just quoted was a function of the
War and Navy Departments. They took no action to put it into
effect although a copy of this agreement was forwarded to the War
Department and presumably to the Navy Department. (R. 14¥4.)
The consequence was that not until the morning of December 7th
did the agreement become operative, when it was too late to have
gotten the benefit of the cooperative action that it implied, and the
training which would result from this close teamwork by the Army
and Navy. As Admiral Bellinger testified :
The Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, did not have the authority
to place that organization in the functioning status, except in case of an actual
emergency. (R. 1582.)
[94] This brings us to the second defect: unity of command. If
that had been put into effect as provided in paragraph 9 (b) of the
Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan this air agreement
would have become effective by reason of such unity of command. As
Admiral Bellinger again testified :
I was not satisfied with the setup under the estimate and directives concern-
ing the Naval Base Defense Air Force. I thought that it was necessary to have
a unity of command to make such an operation a success.
General Frank. You mean a unity of command before something happened?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
General Frank. Bather than when it happened?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes. (R. 1589.)
Under the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the unity
of command could be put into effect either by the President of the
United States or by joint agreements of the Secretary of War and
the Secretary of the Navy or when the commanders of Army and Navy
forces agreed that the situation required unity of command and who
was to exercise it. No one of these agencies took steps to effectuate
what all of the witnesses have concurred in stating was the principal
cause of difficulties on December 7, 1941, and the events leading up
to and causing those difficulties, that is, unity of command. (R. 1587-
1588.)
It is interesting to observe the reason why this air agreement was
not put into effect, in addition to lack of equipment to make it effective.
As Admiral Bellinger testified :
The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization, into a func-
tioning status [P5] would have necessitated the substantial cessation of
training activities in order to concentrate on defense. (R. 1582.)
Likewise General Short testified :
General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we should
do nothing that would interfere with the training or ferrying group. The respou-
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
71
slbility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us to get
the ships there and get them there without loss ; and we could not do it if we
started them out with untrained crews.
That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1, rather
than Alert No. 2 or No. 3. (R. 286.)
As I say, none of these fixed stations was in operation. We had gotten, along
in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we got them we started using
them right away ; and when this message of the 27th came along, I prescribed
that the Aircraft Warning Service would function those hours (4 : 00 to 7:00
A. M.). In addition to that, they had their normal training. They trained then
from 7 to 11, and they had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4.
(R. 208.)
By making it 4 hours (time for aircraft to get into the air) it gave the pos-
sibility to the men going ahead with recreation and athletics without being
worried about getting that alert. They could go right ahead with their normal
functions. They might have been out on a problem where it would take them
an hour to get back in. (R. 460.)
Alert No. 2 would have practically stopped the training of the Air Corps and
the Antiaircraft Corps. It would not have interfered seriously with the training
of the infantry divisions. (R. 528.)
The reason for not so doing is shown by Kimmel’s words :
We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had
received no orders to mobilize. (R. 1811.)
Admiral Kimmel observed that while the responsibility was on
the Commandant, 14th Naval District and himself, on behalf of the
Navy, for putting this plan into effect, yet it would have been necessary
to refer to Washington for a decision. When asked why this would
be so, he said :
[0d] It would have alarmed the population. It might have been consid-
ered by Japan an overt act. It would have tended to upset the Japanese-Ameri-
can relations, which we had been enjoined to maintain in status quo; and it
would have required, so far as the Navy is concerned, certain movements of the
fleet and certain action which should not have been taken without reference to
the Department. (R. 1756.)
Therefore it is apparent that the local commanders waited for
Washington and Washington took no action under the Joint Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, relying upon Hawaii to do so ; and
that in turn meant that the Martin-Bellinger Air Plan of Coopera-
tion, which depended upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan, did not go into operation.
The second reason why the air plan was ineffective was that Admiral
Bloch, Commandant of the 14th Naval District, as testified by Admiral
Kimmel, “had no planes assigned to him at this time.” (R. 1751) ; so
that he could do nothing to carry it out. As to the Army, Admiral
Kimmel pointed out :
There weren’t any general headquarters Army aircraft available in Hawaii,
aud we knew that there weren’t going to be any. (R. 1753. )
When asked why the Navy accepted the responsibility for distant
reconnaissance without any effective means of carrying it out, Admiral
Kimmel testified,
he accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance, because he couldn’t do
anything else and be sensible. (R. 1753. )
Admiral Bellinger confirms Admiral Kimmel’s statement on long-
distance reconnaissance means not being available. (R. 1595, 1606.)
Therefore, paragraph 18 in the air agreement providing the Navy
will furnish distant reconnaissance was without effect. (R. 1605-
72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1606.) Bloch had no planes and such planes as Bellinger had were
under command of Kimmel and were [97] being used for
other purposes in connection with reconnaissance with the fleet for
protecting maneuver areas against submarines.
For the dual reason that the instrumentalities were not available
and to the extent that any planes were available the use of them would
have interfered with training, and for the further reason that the
agreements were not to go into effect until an emergency, the Joint
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and the Martin-Bellinger
Air Agreement signed by Short and Bloch were ineffectual. The
Army and Navy agreed that when and if the time came that they had
to put the plan into effect, the documents could only show what the
working scheme would be. The inherent weakness in making such
plans was the fact of their not being operative in time to meet the
attack. Neither the local commanders nor Washington took steps
to make them operative as they could have done. (R. 1606-1607,
1609.) However, unity of command in Washington would have been
a condition precedent to unity of command in Hawaii.
9. Estimate of the Situation . — The best indication of what the
Army and Navy recognized as the primary danger to the defense
of Hawaii is found in the estimate of the situation in the implement-
ing, operating plans signed by Bellinger and Martin on April 9,
1941, in execution of the Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941.
This estimate was prophetic in its accuracy and called for vigorous
implementation to meet the worst the enemy could do, as estimated
in this document. The document says :
b. In the past Orange (Japan) has never preceded hostile action by a declara-
tion of war.
c. A successful, sudden raid against our [58] ships and naval installa-
tions on Oahu might prevent effective defensive action by our forces in the Western
Pacific for a long period.
d. It appears possibly that Orange (Japan) submarines and/or an Orange
fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from
oor Intelligence Service. . . . II (a) Orange might send into this area one
or more submarines, and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of car-
riers supported by fast cruisers. . . . Ill (b) It appears that the most
likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is
believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from
one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. . . .
(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would be delivered
as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it
might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow
to start . . . (Roberts Record 556-D-F.)
It is also significant that in this estimate of the situation it was
stated:
Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable
undiscovered surface force, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a
carrier. (Roberts Record 556-F.)
It will be recalled that a submarine appeared off the entrance to
Pearl Harbor and was sunk at about 6:45 a. m. on December 7th,
but was not reported by the Navy to the Army. Such a report would
have been a sure warning of an hour before the attack of what was
coming as recognized by paragraph 3 (d) of the Estimate of the Situ-
ation, forming a part of the Martin-Bellinger Plan,
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
73
In reviewing the situation as Short knew it in order to judge of the
information that he had upon which to premise a successful course
of action, it is necessary both to take into consideration the back-
ground in the first chapter and of the official communications and
official actions of those estimates \9ff] of the situation at the
time.
It will be recalled that Ambassador Grew had warned the State
Department on January 27th by wire of the possibility of an air
attack upon Pearl Harbor. This possibility had already been appar-
ently thoroughly considered by the War and Navy Departments, and
it had been concluded that that was the strongest danger to Hawaii.
In early January, Admiral Richardson, with the concurrence of Ad-
miral Kimmel and General Herron, had written at length to the Navy
Department on this subject, with particular reference to the weak-
nesses of the Army defenses against air attack. This letter and the
resulting correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy* and the
Secretary of War must be read in the light of the Joint Army and
Navy Defense Plan of 1935, which places upon the Army the follow-
ing mission :
ft. Army — Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and air forces and against
hostile sympathizers.
General Marshall testified, however, as follows :
We anticipated, beyond a doubt, Japanese movement in Indo-China and the
Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipated also an assault
on the Philippines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on
Hawaii ; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern
planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazard-
ous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack. (B. 9. )
As a result, Secretary of Navy Knox wrote to Secretary of War
Stimson on January 24, 1941, in part as follows :
My Deab Mr. Secretary : The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl
Harbor and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed
study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks.
This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the Increased gravity of the
situation with respect to Japan, and by reports [100] from abroad of
successful bombing and torpedo-plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war
eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be
initiated by a surprise attack on the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor.
In my opinion, the inherent possibility of a major disaster to the fleet or naval
base warrant taking every step as rapidly as can be done, that wiU increase the
joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character men-
tioned above.
The dangers envisioned in their order of importance and probability are con-
sidered to be :
(1) Air bombing attack.
(2) Air torpedo-plane attack. •
(3) Sabotage.
( 4 ) Submarine attack.
(5) Mining.
(6) Bombardment by gunfire.
Defense for all but the first two appears to have been provided for satis-
factorily.
It will be noted that an anxiety of Secretary Knox was as to air
attack and that he was satisfied that precautions as to sabotage were
sufficient by the Army. It will be recalled that Admiral Richardson’s
letter stimulating this letter of Secretary Knox was based on Richard-
son’s personal inspection and knowledge of the Army situation.
74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secretary Knox concludes his letter with the following recommen-
dations to the Army :
Assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft
artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii . . . that
the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readi-
ness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against
Pearl Harbor.
(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu
for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long
as the present uncertainty exists.
So this letter clearly outlined the considered judgment [i0i]
then existing that the most serious threat was an air attack and that
all means should be taken to iniplement against it.
On February 7, 1941, the Secretary of War replied to this letter of
the Secretary of the Navy under the subject “Air Defense of Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii,” and said :
In repty to your letter of January 24, 1941, regarding the possibility of sur-
prise attacks upon the fleet or naval base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express
complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and of the urgency of
our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort . . .
(6) With respect to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding
a copy of your letter and of this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities
in making those measures effective.
On the same day another communication w r as addressed to General
Short, and this time by General Marshall :
Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the defi-
ciencies of Navy materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred spe-
cifically to planes and to.antiaircraft guns.
The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid and by submarine,
constitute the real peril of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing
threat in the Hawaiian Islands, as long as we have air superiority.
And not satisfied with tliis first letter, General Marshall on March
5, 1941, again addressed General Short, saying : <
I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfac-
tory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first
priority.
And to that General Short replied on March 15, 1941, at length
with reference to the vulnerability of Hawaii to air attack and the
measures being taken to meet this situation. [108] He points
out that antisabotage measures and suppression of local disorders
could be handled by battalions of National Guard, which come from
the islands. The rest of the letter dealt with defenses against air
attacks. His estimate of the situation was :
The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability
of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack.
Short realized the necessity for the dispersion of planes, the use of
emergency fields on the outlying islands and the preparation of
bunkers to protect the dispersed planes, as he discusses such a problem
at length and its solution. (R. 21-25.)
On April 14, 1941, Short wrote the Chief of Staff sending him the
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and 14th
Naval District. Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure;
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
75
Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and
Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above
agreement, and Field Orders No. 1-NS (Naval Security) puttfhg into
effect for the Army the provisions of the Joint Agreement. (R. 26-27.)
He also stated that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and
himself felt all steps had been taken
which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together with
the unity of command as the situation requires. (R. 27.)”
This statement was in error at the time it was made, as the agree-
ments could not be implemented for lack of means to do so in any
material way and there was no unity of command, none [103\
proposed and none was ever put into effect under these agreements.
Open hostilities were necessary to make the agreement operative.
This communication was acknowledged by General Marshall on
May 5th.
This brings us to the estimate of the air situation thus transmitted
to the Chief of Staff on April 14th as indicating the best judgment in
estimating the situation bv General Martin and Admiral Bellinger
and approved by General Short and Admirals Kimmel and Bloch.
It is a familiar premise of military procedure in estimating a situa-
tion to select the moat dangerous and disastrous type of attack the
enemy may make and devote your primary efforts to meeting this most
serious of the attacks. (R. 1121, 2662.) In the present instance, it
was clearly recognized, not only in the foregoing correspondence, but
in this formal joint estimate by the Army and Navy of the situation,
that the most serious attack to he met hy the Army and Navy was an
air attack by Japan. Herewith is the following statement from that
estimate signed by the Army and Navy through General Martin and
Admiral Bellinger and approved by Kimmel, Short and Bloch. This
estimate is prophetic in its accuracy and uncanny in its analysis of
the enemy’s intention.
2. Assumptions:
*******
c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of
hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu where
they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or attack on Oahu.
* * * * * * *
[lOb] e. Our most likely enemy, Orange, can probably employ
a maximum of six carriers against Oahu.
*♦*♦♦**
<?.*** The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan
of action open to the enemy.
2. cl The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and
the action upon which we should base our plans of operation, is the
early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the
following time schedule.
(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the
day before attack.
(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the
day of the attack.
* Excerpts from letter dated April 14, 1941 (R. 27 i
76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. * * * The sole purpose of the existence of the military es-
tablishment on Oahu, ground, and air, is for the defense of Oahu as
an outlying naval base. * * *
It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the
strongest outlying naval base in the world and could, therefore,
withstand indefinitely attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based
on such convictions are inherently weak and tend to create a false
sense of security with the consequent unpreparedness for offensive
action.
[105] C. CRITICAL PERIODS OCTOBER 1 TO DECEMBER 7, 1041
1. Vital Messages. — In view of the foregoing, the estimate of the
situation showed that an all-out attack by air was the judgment of
the best military and naval minds in Hawaii. Under established
military doctrine, that called for preparation for this worst eventual-
ity. (R. 436-437) Short so admitted that this was the correct
procedure. (R 436-437)
The contrast between the written statements of many of the re-
sponsible actors in this matter prior to Pearl Harbor and after
Pearl Harbor, as to their estimate of an air attack by Japan on
Oahu, is startling.
The Secretary of the Navy wrote on January 24, 1941, to the
Secretary of War:
The dangers envisaged In their order of importance and probability are
considered to be:
(1) air bombing attack.
(2) air torpedo attack.
(3) sabotage. (Roberts Record, 1824-1825.)
However, when Secretary of the Navy arrived in Hawaii a few
days after December 7, following the Japanese attack, Admiral Pye
testified his (Secretary Knox) first remark was:
No one In Washington expected an attack — even Kelly Turner.
Admiral Kelly Turner was in the War Plans Division of the Navy
and was the most aggressive-minded of all. (R. 107(1)
General Marshall, in a letter to General Short on February 7, 1941,
said:
The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and
submarine constitute the real perils of the situation. (R. 17.)
[106] On October 7, 1944, General Marshall testified before j
this Board :
We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack upon Hawaii. (R. 9.)
It will be recalled that Admiral Bellinger and General Martin
were responsible for the Joint Estimate, particularly with reference t
to air, and that this was based upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Fron-
tier Defense Plan. In that estimate they put attack by air as the
primary threat against Hawaii.
Contrast what Admiral Bellinger said on this record:
If anyone knew the attack was coming, why, I assume they would have been
in a functioning status. (R. 1628.)
Contrast what General Martin said :
I didn’t see any more danger from attack than General Short did, that is
from a surprise attack with the information we had. (R. 1827. )
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
77
Admiral Kimmel said :
We had no reason to believe, from any intelligence we had, that the Japanese
were going to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor or even that any attack was
going to be made on Pearl Harbor. (R. 1771.)
The foregoing statement by Kimmel was in 1944 before this Board,
whereas the joint agreements he entered into with the Army and
the instructions from the Secretary of the Navy as well as his own
recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy show that an air at-
tack was the principal concern.
Likewise, Admiral Bloch, who signed the Joint Air Agreement
based on the air estimate of Bellinger and Martin, testified as follows :
General Frank. Was the attack a complete surprise to yon?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir. (R. 1518.)
General Short was the signer of the agreements specifying [107]
the air attack as a primary threat and he had received the Marshall
letter of February 7, 1941, and similar letters of General Marshall,
and had replied setting forth in letters that the air attack was his
primary concern.
Witness what General Short says on this record to the contrary :
General Grunuct. Was the attack of December 7 a complete surprise to you?
General Shout. It was. (R. 536.)
We must therefore conclude that the responsible authorities, the
Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Staff in Washington, down
to the Generals and Admirals in Hawaii, all expected an air attack
. before Pearl Harbor. As a general statement, when testifying after
the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it.
Apparently the only person who was not surprised was the Secre-
tary of War, Mr. Stimson, who testified :
Well, I was not surprised. (R. 4072.)
Short’s Standard Operating Procedure, which he had formulated
with his staff in July and finally put into complete form on November
5, 1941, (R. 333) had been sent to the Chief of Staff. (R. 431.)
General Marshall wrote General Short on October 10th that it had
just come to his attention and that upon an examination of the Stand-
ard Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department, dated July
14, containing those three alerts.
I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. (R. 20.1
He objected to the assignment to the Hawaiian Air Force of the
mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all [.108'] airfields
on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks, and with providing a
provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty. He thereby
clearly warned General Short that the air force should not be used for
antisabotage, for General Marshall further said in his letter :
This (the action of using the air force for antisabotage duty) seems Inconsistent
with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in view
of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been
provided. (R. 29.)
General Short replied on October 14, as follows :
The plan was to use them (Air Force personnel) for guarding certain essential
utilities. . . . However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has Just
passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 6
78 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Marshall again wrote General Short on the 28th of October,
and in it he clearly indicated to Short that he should change his alert
plan (of which there was no proof that he ever did) and only use the
Air Force for guard during the last stage when the Air Force as such
had been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. General Marshall
further indicated that no potential ground duty should be used as an
excuse for not continuing the specific Air Force training, saying:
I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the
assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostUe landing effected.
This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for
ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense
tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to their own
specific training requirements.
It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on
technical Air Corps training untU they have completed their expansion program
and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned.
(R. 30.)
[i0P] Here, again, General Marshall cautioned Short to use his
Air Force for its normal purposes and not upon antisabotage guard
duty and emphasizes that the use of the Air Force must be free and
unfettered.
On October 16 Short received the following Navy message :
The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the C.N.O. which I have been
directed to pass to you. Quote : “Japanese Cabinet resignation creates a grave
situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be anti-American and
extremely nationalistic. If the Konoye Cabinet remains it will operate under a
new mandate which will not include reapproachment with the United States.
Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since •
Britain and the United States are held responsible by Japan for her present situa-
tion there is also a possibility that Japan may attack those two powers. In view
of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory
deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative
action against Japan/* (R. 279.)
On October 18, 1941, a radiogram was sent by the War Department
to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, reading as fol-
lows:
Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your informa-
tion. Tension between the United States and Japan remain strained but no
abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent. (R. 4258.)
This message was dated October 18, 1941, according to the Gerow
statement, Exhibit 63, but in the copy of communications produced by
General Marshall, the same message was dated October 20, 1941, as
#266.
On October 28, General Marshall wrote General Short as to details
of the training of the air corps personnel.
On November 24, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, a message tnat Short thinks he saw,
reading as follows :
[ 110 J ’ There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome
of negotiations with J apan. This situation, coupled with statements
of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military
force is, in our opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction , including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possi-
bility . The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and
requests action. * * * inform senior Army officers in respective
areas utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already
tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. (R. 4258.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 79
On November 26, 1941, the following secret cablegram was sent to
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department :
It is desired foUowing instructions be given pilots of two R-24’s on special
photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline Group while simul-
taneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location
and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps, and naval vessels
including submarines XXX before they depart Honolulu insure that both
B-24’s are fully supplied with ammunition for guns. (E. 4259.)
On November 27 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, a message which was delivered by the
liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, to G-3 of General Short, which reads
as follows :
Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an
effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to
make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition
against either the Philippines. Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is
indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization
of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in prepara-
tion for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa and
Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against
sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform
naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.
(R. 1775.)
And on the same day the Chief of Staff sent the following radio
to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department :
[111] No. 472. “Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to
all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Govern-
ment might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpre-
dictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat
cannot, be avoided, the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This
policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are
directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem
necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to
alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should
hostilities occur, you will carry out task assigned in Rainbow Five as far as
they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information
to minimum essential officers.” (R. 280-281, 4259-4260.) 80
This completes the pattern of the communications and information
that was in Short’s possession when he made the fatal decision to
elect the antisabotage Alert No. 1 and not select either Alert No. '2
or No. 3 which would have constituted the defense against the most
serious attack that could be made upon him in view of the previous
estimate of the situation and warnings he had received from all quar-
ters of an air raid. 31
On the same day, November 27, 1944, but after his decision to select
Alert No. 1 and the sending of a reply to the message, Short received
from G—2, War Department, through his G-2, Hawaiian Department,
the following message :
Advise only the C. G. and the C. of S. It appears that the conference with
the Japanese has ended In an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage
probable . Also possibilities that hostilities may begin. (R. 4260.)
* A full discussion of the message follows.
” Significant naval messages from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-
Cnief Pacific Fleet, under dates of December 3, 4, and 6, 1941, relating to the destruction
or codas and secret documents by Japanese consulates and instructions regarding destruc-
tion of similar means of our* own evidently never reached General Short. (R. 424-425.)
80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[HZ'] Short was asked what were his reasons for his action. The
following colloquy is important:
General Fbank. I would like to devolop this thought for just a minute. This
is in consideration generally of military operations. In estimating the situation
with which a military commander is confronted, our teachings in the military
establishment generally have been along the lines of taking all information that
is available, evaluating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct?
General Short. Yes.
General Frank. That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our
War College teaching and our actual practice in the organization. Now, in com-
ing to a decision on military disposition and general practice in the Army, Army
teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare
for enemy action of what character?
General Short. The worst.
General Frank. The worst. Now, can you tell me why that was not done in
this instance?
General Short. Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not
believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have
explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps par-
ticularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at that time that
we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also
the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an
influence because when I reported action and there was no comment that my
action was too little or too much I was a hundred percent convinced that they
agreed with it. They had a lot more information than I had. (R. 436-437.)
******
General Frank. All right. Now, you have given considerable testimony about
how you arrived at your conclusion of the adequateness of Alert No. 1, and in
general may we say that you came to this conclusion as a result of your faith in
the effectiveness of naval operations and the influence of Naval opinion and to
a certain extent of the line of thought as a result of what was contained in
messages between the 16th of November and the 27th?
General Short. Yes, sir. And that was later confirmed by, may I add, actions
of the War Department in not replying to my message and stating they wanted
more, and in sending planes without any ammunition.
[713] General Frank. All right. Did you feel that the wording of mes-
sages coming in there to you indicated an effort toward a supervisory control?
General Short. I thought that it indicated very definitely two things : That they
wanted me to be extremely careful and not have an incident with the Japanese
population that would arouse Japan, and the other thing was not to violate ter-
ritorial laws in my eagerness to carry out defensive measures.
General Frank. The question has arisen in the minds of the Board as fb why,
when that air estimate anticipated just exactly what happened, steps were not
taken to meet it. I assume that the answer
General Short. You mean the estimate of the year — you mean the year before?
General Frank. No. The Martin-Bellinger estimate.
General Short. Oh.
General Frank. Of 1941.
General Short. Yes.
General Frank. I assume the answer is the answer that you gave to the ques-
tion asked two or three questions back.
General Short. Yes. (R. 471-472.)
General Short within an hour after receiving the message from the
Chief of Staff of November 27 ordered the No. 1 Alert, which con-
tinued up to the attack on December 7. ( R. 282.) His message in reply
to General Marshall was :
Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy. Reuard
four seventy two Nov. 27th. (R. 38, 286.)
The indorsements so appearing on this reply are as follows : In the
handwriting of the Secretary of War there appear the words “Noted
HLS”, written in pen; “Noted — Chief of Staff”, stamped by a rubber
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
81
stamp on the message without initials ; and a rubber stamp “Noted,
WPD” (in red ink) followed by pen initials “L.T.G.” (R. 38, 4287.)
[lib] An examination of the wire received from General
MacArthur, in response to a similar message sent to General Short, 32
shows the same indorsements, including “Noted— Chief of Staff,”
with a rubber stamp but no initials. However, this message has
written in General Marshall’s handwriting the words “To Secretary
of War, GCM.” This indorsement does not appear on the following
message that came from Short. (See General Marshall’s explanation
below.)
The message from Short to the Chief of Staff indicates that it was
the “Action Copy” as noted in pencil at its foot “OCS/18136-120.”
When questioned about this vital message, the Chief of Staff said :
General Russell. Subsequently General Short sent a reply to that message In
which he refers to the November 27 message from you over your signature by
number. That message of General Short reporting action merely states :
“Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD
four seven two twenty-seventh.”
The original of General Short’s report indicates that it was initialed by Sec-
retary Stimson and has a stamp “Noted — Chief of Staff,” and was initialed by
General Gerow.
The Board has been interested to know the procedure in your office as it relates
to stamping documents which do not bear your signature. Does that indicate
that you did or did not see those messages?
(115] General Mabshall. Well, I think if you look at the preceding message
from the Pihilippines you wiU find that same rubber stamp on there, “Noted —
Chief of Staff.”
General Russell. That is true.
General Mabshall. And you will find it at the top of the message. You will
find my initials.
General Russell. Yes ; I do see them.
General Mabshall. But not on the other one. I do not know about that
I do not know what the explanation is. I initial them all ; that is my practice.
One goes to the particular section that has the responsibiUty for working on it,
which in this case was the War Plans Division, now the Operations Division,
and then one comes to me. I initial it and then it goes out to the record. Where
I think the Secretary of War ought to see it, and if he is not in the distribution,
I check it to him. Where I think there is somebody else that should be notified,
I indicate on the face of my copy who else is to be informed of this. As a matter
of routine one agency is charged with the execution of the matter pertaining to
the message. But in this particular case I do not know. I have no recollection
at all.
General Russell. The fact that it reached the Secretary of War’s office and
was by him initialed — would that or not indicate that you had sent it up to him
or that it might have been sent up to him by someone else?
General Mabshall. In this connection I invite your attention to the fact that
this was filed behind a message from General MacArthur. I note that I did not
initial it. They evidently came in together.
General Russell If they were together you might or might not have seen
them?
General Mabshall I have no recollection at all. The presumption would be
that I had seen it. (R. 38-10.)
No one of these persons, or any of their subordinates, have any
record, either internally in the War Department or externally, of any
message to Short showing the slightest exception taken to his course of
action. It will be noted as to the Chief of Staff, that while he did not
* On November 27th the War Department sent messages similar to one sent to General
Short, to MacArthur In the Philippines, Andrews in Panama, and DeWitt on the West
Coast, each of which called for a report of measures taken. All replies except that from
Short indicated the taking of measures of greater security than those envisaged in the
Hawaiian Alert No. 1.
82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
initial the Short reply, he did initial the top message from General
[1161 MacArthur on the same subject, and apparently they both
went together to the Secretary of War, as they had come at substan-
tially the same time in answer to the same message from the Chief
of Staff. The inference from General Marshall’s testimony is that
possibly he only initialed the top one, but that is speculation, as he
said,
I do not know what the explanation is. (R. 39.)
2. Analysis of the Situation from November 2£ to November 27—
The vital message of November 27, #472, heretofore quoted as having
been sent by the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, can be understood and its proper place in this narrative
determined only when we know the events which led up to its being
sent; when we know by whom drafted and by what procedure the
drafting was accomplished ; and the circumstances under which it was
forwarded. Its relationship to surrounding circumstances and other
documents must also be understood before we proceed to analyze the
message and the meaning of each part of it. 38
[ii7] The War Council met on the 25th of November 1941.
Fortunately, we have the advantage of the contemporaneous diary of
the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who has pictured in his diary with
great clarity and precision the events as they transpired, which were
material to this issue. This diary reads :
At 9 :30 Knox and I met in Hull’s office for our meeting of three. HuU showed
us the proposal for a three months’ truce which he was going to lay before the
Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I
thought, as we read it, but I don’t think that there is any chance of the Japanese
accepting It because it was so drastic. . . . We were an hour andj a -half with
Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall. Then
at twelve o’clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half
past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There
the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the
event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as — perhaps next Monday,
for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the
question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem. (R.
4050-4051.)
This was the end of the discussions on the 25th of November, 1941
(R. 4050-4051), with the exception that when the Secretary of War
returned to his office, he found a G-2 message that a Japanese dxpe-
dition had started southward, south of Formosa; and he at once called
Mr. Hull and sent him copies of the report and a copy to the President.
On the following day, November 26, 1941, the diary continues:
Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his
mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day
(the 25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and to tell them
that he had no other proposition at all. (R. 4051-4052.1
n The Secretary of War has cleared some ambiguity in this record, and an ambiguity in the
White Papers by defining with precision the War Council. There were really three bodies
that were loosely referred to from time to time by this title. The true War Council was
that established under the National Defense Act of 1920, solely within the War Depart-
ment. The second body was that created by the Secretary of War, Mr Stimson, and the
Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, when they entered into their positions, by which they
gathered together at regular intervals with the Secretary of State, and sometimes with
General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The third group was that which joined the President
at fairly regular intervals, consisting of the President, the Secretary of State, Secretary
of War, Secretary of the Navy, and from time to time General Marshall and Admiral
Stark, and occasionally General Arnold. (R. 4041-4042-4043-4044, 4047-4048, 5-6.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 83
There is some proof that, before General Marshall left Washington
for North Carolina on maneuvers on the afternoon of [iiS] the
26th, he had drafted in the rough a proposed message to General Short
apprising him of the situation as it was developed. General Gerow,
Chief of the War Plans Division, testifies that he believes he discussed
such a draft with General Marshall. (R. 4244-4246.)
General Marshall was away on the 27th and returned on the 28th,
at which time he saw the complete draft of the message of the 27th
together with the report from General Gerow of the events during
the 27th which we are now about to relate. ( R. 36-37.)
Before the closing of the story of the 26tn, Mr. Stimson defines it
as:
The 26th was the day he (Hull) told me he was in doubt whether he would go
on with it. ( R. 4051-4052-4053. )
What the Secretary of State appears to have done was to have his
conference with the Japanese Ambassadors and to hand to them the
“Ten Points”. As Ambassador Grew testifies, the J apanese considered
these “Ten Points” to be an ultimatum. (R. 4221.) Whether or not
the Secretary of State considers now that this is not an ultimatum
(see his letter of September 28, 1943) , nevertheless, the Japanese did so
consider it and actea upon it as such by notifying the task force, as the
evidence shows was waiting at Tankan Bay, to start the movement
against Hawaii, and it did move out on the 27th-28th of November.
As well put by Ambassador Grew :
Naturally, they (the Japanese) had all their plans made for' years beforehand,
in the case of war with America. They were very foresighted in those respects,
and they had their plans drawn up probably right down to the last detail ; but
as for the moment at which the button was touched, I don’t myself know exactly
[ how long it would have taken their carriers to get from where they were to the
point at which [115] they attacked Pearl Harbor; but it has always
been my belief that it was about the time of the receipt of Mr . HulVs memorandum
of November 26 that the button was touched . (R. 4215)
On the morning of the 27th of November 1941, Mr. Stimson’s diary
reads :
The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull to find out what his final
decision had been with the Japanese — whether he had handed them the new
proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested
yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken
the whole matter off. As he put it, ‘T have washed my hands of it, and it is
now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy.”
Then the Secretary of War states :
| I then called up the President and talked with him about it.
He (Stimson) then approved the orders presented to him by General
Arnold to move two large planes over the Mandated Islands to take
i pictures. (R. 4053.)
The Secretary related that General Marshall “is down at the ma-
| neuvers today, and “Knox and Admiral Stark came over and con-
ferred with me and General Gerow.” At this point he says :
A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the Presi-
dent was examined, and the question of the need for further time was discussed.
(R. 4054.)
This is the memorandum asking the President not to precipitate
an ultimatum with the Japanese and to give the Army and Navy more
84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
time within which to prepare; but it was too late, as the die had been
cast by the Secretary of State in handing the “Ten Points” counter-
proposals to the Japanese on the previous day, which was, as the
Secretary of State remarked, “washing his hands of the matter”.
[120\ When Ambassador Grew so testified he apparently did
not know of the very complete evidence in this record of the move-
ment of tiie Japanese task force starting on the S7th-28th from Tankan
Bay to the attack. Mr. Hull’s statement on this subject is of interest :
I communicated on November 26 to the Japanese spokesmen — who were
urgently calling for a reply to their proposals of November 20 — what became
the last of this Government’s counter-proposals. ... It will thus be seen
that the document under reference did not constitute in any sense an ultima-
tum.” (Letter from Secretary of State to the Army Pearl Harbor Board,
September 28, 1944.)
3. The Drafting of the Message #472 of the 27th. — We now turn
to the drafting of the message of the 27th as related by the Secretary
of War, Mr. Stimson, and other witnesses. The first meeting was
between Mr. Stimson, General Bryden and General Gerow. (R. 4239-
4240.) A second meeting between Secretary Stimson, Secretary
Knox, Admiral Stark and General Gerow was held later in the day.
(R. 4240.) As the diary of Mr. Stimson says :
But the main question at this meeting was over tie message th|at we shall
send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal
for an alert; and now, on talking with the President this morning over the
telephone I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final
alert, namely, that* he should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him
how the situation was. (B. 4055.)
To continue with the diary :
So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him (Mr.
Stimson here verbally testified — “We were sending the messages to four people,
not only MacArthur, but Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska”. So Gerow and Stark
and I went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully,
finally got it into shape, and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull
I got the exact statement from him of what the situation was. (R. 4056.)
[121] The Secretary of War then stated :
The thing that I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with
correctness and accuracy what the situation was between the two governments,
and this part I got from Hull, as I said, by telephone, to be sure I was right.
(R. 4056.)
The two sentences which the Secretary of War apparently wrote in
the message of the 27th were these :
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come
back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile
action possible at any moment.* 4
The Secretary continues his testimony :
That was what I was interested in getting out at the time, because that had
been a decision which I had heard from the President, as I have just read, and
I had gotten the exact details of the situation between the State Department
and the envoys from Mr. Hull ; and, as I pointed out here, the purpose in my
mind, as I quote my talk with the President, was to send a final alert, namely,
u However, General Gerow (R. 4247) testified that he believed that the sentence
44 Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment" was
inserted by him or Colonel Bundy.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 85
that the man should be on the qui live for any attack, and telling him how the
situation was here. (R. 4066.)
The task that the Secretary of War was engaged upon was normally
that of the Chief of Staff. As Mr. Stimson said :
That was why I was in this matter. Marshall was away. I had had a
decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business
to do what I of course normally do ; to see that the message as sent was framed
In accordance with the facts. (R. 4057.)
The message to Hawaii now under consideration of the 27th has
endorsed upon it, “Shown to the Secretary of War”. (R. 4057.)
[1®?] The Secretary testified :
I went over very carefully the whole message. : . . And I saw it after it
was finally drawn, as shown by the memorandum there. (R. 4058.)
With reference to the other meeting that took place on the 27th in
the drafting of this message, #472, General Gerow’s testimony is that
at the meeting with the Secretary of War the first two sentences, re-
ported by the Secretary of War as being drafted by him, were sen-
tences which were softened by instructions or information furnished
by the Secretary of State in a conversation over the telephone with
the Secretary or War the morning of the 27th. (R. 4247.) General
Gerow testifies that the sentences so softened originally read
Negotlatons with Japan have been terminated. (R. 4270.)
The sentence,
Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any mo-
ment
was put in by General Gerow or Colonel Bundy. (R. 4247.)
The sentence,
If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that
Japan commit the first overt act,
was thus phrased because as Gerow said he testified before the Roberts
Commission :
We pointed out in the message the possible danger of attack and directed
reconnaissance and other necessary measures without fully carrying into effect
the provisions of this plan, which would have required hostile action against
Japan, and the President had definitely stated tbat he wanted Japan to commit
the first overt act. (R. 4251-4252.)
The next sentence :
This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course
of action that might Jeopardize your defense
was inserted by General Gerow or by Colonel Bundy. The [123~\
purpose of this language was to insure freedom of action to the Com-
manding General of the Hawaiian Department. (R. 4252.)
General Gerow said that there had been no discussion of the am-
biguity of the message or its apparent conflicting instructions as a
“Do-or-Don’t” message. (R. 4252.)
He said that nothing in the message told General Short about the
relations between the American Government and the Japanese Em-
C ire. (R. 4256.) The sole information passed on to General Short
y the War Department from October 20th to November 27th about
what the soldier calls “enemy information” was in this particular mes-
86 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I
sage. (R. 4263.) The only previous message that Short had had
of the international situation from the War Department was on Oc-
tober 20, which read : ” 36
[ 124 1 Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your
information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained
but no abrupt change In Japanese foreign policy appears imminent. (R. 4204.)
The sentence :
This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defense
was put in by the War Plans Division. ( R. 4271.)
With reference to the phrase,
You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem ,
necessary,
apparently at that time no investigation was made by the War De-
partment to ascertain just what means General Short had of conduct- !
ing the reconnaissance; but aside from this fault, the fact is that !
General Short did have some planes plus radar to conduct a degree
of reconnaissance. This the record shows he did not fully and gain- j
fully employ these means for this purpose. General Short was re- j
called at substantially the end of all tne testimony and questioned j
on this point. Short s position on this message was that the direc-
tion to him to conduct reconnaissance was a futile directive and that
it indicated to him that the man who wrote the message was entirely
unfamiliar with the fact,
that the Navy was responsible for long distance reconnaissance. I
He said this was |
In spite of the fact that the Chief of Stair had approved that plan that provided
for that, whoever wrote the message was not familiar with it, or it had slipped
his mind that it was the Navy and not the Army that was responsible. (R. 4436-
4437.;
He said when questioned as to why he did not call attention to this
matter in his reply to the War Department :
I think if the War Department had intended to abrogate that agreement*
they would have told me so.
[f£5] He said he based everything on the responsibility of the
Navy for long distance reconnaissance, because it had been approved
by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. (R. 4438.)
He could not explain why he failed to use his own reconnaissance
aircraft even though the agreement was not actually in effect at that
time or the War Department had overlooked the agreement because
he says, as elsewhere admitted, that the Army and Navy agreement
was not to go into effect until hostilities, or other equivalent, had
occurred. His reconnaissance planes were still under his control and
could have been used by him to carry out this direct order in this
message.
“However, General Gerow testified (K. 4258) that there was a Navy Department
message of November 24th which contained information of the Japanese situation and
Indicated possible Japanese aggressive action and which directed the Commander-In-Chief
Pacific Fleet to Inform General Short of its contents.
M Information gleaned by the Board indicates that G-2, War Department, on November
3, 1041, sent a letter to G-2, Hawaiian Department, in which was set forth the prophecv
of war between Japan and the United States in December 1941 or February 1942. as made
by a prominent Japanese.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
87
For instance, the following colloquy occurred :
62. General Gbunebt. Yon might clear up two additional points. First, we
will take up the point that you have brought out, there, that the War Depart-
ment had evidently overlooked the agreement that your command had with
the Navy, as to distant reconnaissance. Did you call the War Department’s
attention to the fact, when you were ordered to make reconnaissance, about
that agreement?
General Short. I did not, but I reported to them exactly what I was doing.
63. General Gbunebt. Then you considered your report the answer to that?
General Short. They called on me for a report If they had not called on
me for a report, I think the situation would have been quite different ;< but
they definitely told me to “report action taken,” which I did; and I heard
noting further from them.
64. General Grunert. We have had testimony before the Board, from a member
of the Navy, calling the Board’s attention to the fact that this Joint Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was not operative until an emergency arose, and
apparently the emergency, or the imminency of [126] such an emergency,
was not agreed to, locally, to make the provisions operative. With that under
standing, was it the Navy’s business to conduct long-distance reconnaissance,
prior to such an emergency?
General Short. If the emergency existed, it was their business ; if it did not
exist, there was no necessity.
65. General Grunert. Then, when do you Judge the emergency came about?
General Short. It very definitely came about, at 7 : 55 on the morning of the
7th. (R. 4438-4439.)
This is sufficient in itself to clearly demonstrate that Short was
not taking the action which he could and should have taken of
either more fully carrying out the order, or of specifically arid defi-
nitely reporting the complete circumstances of his inability to do so.
He did not call the attention of the War Department to wnat was an
apparent misunderstanding on its part. He was relying upon the
Navy reconnaissance without any reasonable energetic inquiry to as-
certain the correctness of his assumption that the Navy was conduct-
ing long distance reconnaissance. He has no adequate explanation
for not using the radar 24 hours a day (which was in full operation
Sunday prior to December 7) after getting the message of the 27th,
and which was used continuously after December 7. (K. 4441 4444 .)
For some time after December 7th the situation as to the dearth of
spare parts was the same as before December 7th.
The Secretary of War did not know the authorship of the part,
Report measures taken * * * Limit dissemination * * * to mini-
mum essential officers. (R. 4071.)
He said he knew it was there and he understood it.
There were two conferences with the Secretary of War, one [l£7]
at 9: 30 the morning of the 27th, and one later in the day. At the
first conference, the Secretary of War, General Bryden, Deputy Chief
of Staff, and General Gerow were there. At that time General Gerow
received instructions with reference to the preparation of the message.
He then consulted Admiral Stark. (R. 4239-4240.) The second
conference took place later with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and
Mr. Stimsori: (R. 4240.) General Bryden has testified that although
he was Deputy Chief of Staff, and Acting Chief of Staff in General
Marshall’s absence, he does not remember the message nor the con-
ference thereon. (R. 900.) While the Chief of Staff reviewed the
message of the 27th on the 28th, it is unforunate that during this
critical period he was off on maneuvers in North Carolina and missed
88 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the drafting of the message which was the composite work of a num-
ber of people, which may account for its contusing and conflicting
tenor. Possibly had he been present, the Marshall-Stark memoran-
dum might have reached the President in time to have influenced the
momentous decisions of November 26th.
It is equally obvious that the November 27th message was the only
message that attempted to translate the long and tempestuous course
of events terminating in the counter-proposals on the 26th of Novem-
ber to Japan.
No other picture of the situation was given to Short, except in this
message. It is apparent that the message of November 27 was entirely
inadequate to properly and adequately translate to Short’s mind the
background of events that had been taking place. While this does
not excuse Short, it does necessitate an assessment for the responsi-
bility on others.
[1281 The three principal Major Generals who were commanders
under Short have testified that they received substantially nothing
by way of information as to the international situation except what
they read in the newspapers. The fact that the newspapers were
urgent and belligerent in their tone was discounted by them, because
they were not receiving any confirmatory information from the War
Department through Short. Information that was of tremendous
value both as to content and substance, which the Secretary of State,
Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and other high officers of the War
Department had, was not transmitted to Short. The only summary of
this information was the brief and conflicting tone of the message of
November 27, which was but a faint echo of what had actually oc-
curred.
It is significant that the Japanese upon the termination of negotia-
tions by the counter- proposals of the 26tli, considered By them as an
ultimatum, were thereby in full possession of all the information,
which our ultra-secrecy policy did not permit of full transmission to
field commanders. The Japanese knew everything. The War and
Navy Departments transmitted to Short and Kimmel only so much
of what they knew as they judged necessary. 87
It is also significant that the Secretary of War had to go and call
Mr. Hull to get the information on what amounted to the practical
cessation of negotiations, which was the most vital thing that had oc-
curred in 1941. If it had not been for [1291 Mr. Stimson’s in-
itiative in calling the Secretary of State, it is uncertain as to when he
would have been advised of this most important event. As it turned
out, the delay of from ten to twelve hours in getting the information
was not material since the Japanese delayed striking until December
7th.
The effect of the counter-proposals of November 26th on the result-
ing responsibilities of the Army and Navy is indicated in Mr. Stim-
son’s quotation of Mr. Hull’s comment to him, as follows:
Now it is up to the Army and Navy to take care of the matter. I have washed
my hands of the Japanese.
97 Both General Marshall and Admiral Stark expressed themselves as of the opinion that
the warnings transmitted to Short and Kimmel were satfleient to properly alert their
respective commands.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
89
4. Analysis of the November 27, 1.911, Message . — The message of
November 27, 1941, from (he Chief of Staff to Commanding General,
.Hawaiian Department, consists of the following component parts:
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practicable purposes
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government may come back
and offer to continue. Japanese’ future action unpredictable but hostile action
possible at any moment.
Comment: This statement on Japanese information is inadequate.
It did not convey to Short the full import of the information con-
cerning the American -Japanese relations which was in the hands
of the War Department. It was misleading in that it stated that
there was a bare possibility of the resumption of negotiations, which
carried with it the implication that such resumption would influence
the Japanese-American relations, i. e., that war might not come. The
War Department was convinced then that war would come.
The statement that “Japanese future action unpredictable”
[130] was in conflict with the Navy message which the War De-
partment had directed be shown to Short, to the effect that the attack
would be in the Kra Peninsula and elsewhere in the Far East. Tt
did not convey to Short the fixed opinion of the War Department
General Staff as to the probable plan of Japanese operations.
A warning that “hostile action possible at any moment” indicated
the necessity of taking adequate measures to meet that situation.
This is particularly true in view of the Navy message of 16 October,
1941, which said that there was a possibility that Japan might attack.
There was also received from the Navy on November 27 a message
containing these words,
Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an
effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan Is expected to
make an aggressive move within the next few days.
The next statement in the Chief of Staff’s message to the Command-
i ng General, Hawaiian Department :
If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided comma the United
States desires that Japan commit the first overt act This policy should not
comma repent not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defense.
.(Comment : This instruction embodied our well known national
policy against initiating war. The responsibility for beginning the
war must be Japan’s. It gives Short tne right of defense, notwith-
standing the restriction, but creates an atmosphere of caution which
he must exercise in preparing for such defense.
The third portion of the message is this :
Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such recon-
naissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should
be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma alarm [/$/] tbe civilian
imputation or disclose intent. Report measures taken.
Comment : This was an order. Short could take such measures, in-
cluding reconnaissance, as he deemed necessary. What was available
to Short for reconnaissance and defensive action and the measures
taken by him are fully discussed elsewhere.
90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Here again we find the limitation that he must act cautiously.
However, the weight of evidence indicates that a higher form of
alert than that taken would not have alarmed the public.
Short did report within an hour the measures taken. (R. 286.)
Short’s answer to General Marshall’s radio said :
Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. Reuard four
seven two twenty seventh.
This in itself was sufficient to show that such steps were inadequate,
but as he did not say he was taking any other steps, the War Depart-
ment erroneously assumed that its responsible commander was alert
to sabotage and to liaison with the Navy and was taking the necessary
responsime other steps mentioned in the radio because he had been
warned in this radio of the 27th by General Marshall.
Having asked for a report of what he was doing, the War Depart-
ment placed itself in the position of sharing the responsibility if it
did not direct Short to take such measures as they considered adequate
to meet this serious threat. This is particjilarly true in view of the fact
that much material information relating to Japanese- American rela-
tions was in the War Department, which had not been made available
to Short.
The next and last portion of the message :
should hostilities occur, you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Number 5
as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret in-
formation to minimum essential officers.
Comment : (a) This was a clear recognition, and advice to Short, that
his basic war plan and all joint Army and Navy plans based upon
it was to be used and was a clear indication to him to adopt adequate
preparatory measures to insure the execution of Rainbow Number 5.
(b) As to the directive to
Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential
officers —
The War Department was security -conscious. The construction
which Short appears to have placed upon this language may have un-
duly limited the information which reached responsible subordinate
commanders. This part of the message left broad discretion in Short
as to the dissemination of the information contained in the message,
and had the personnel operating the Air Warning Service on the
morning of December 7th known of the absolute imminence of war
they doubtless would have interpreted the information obtained from
the radar station much differently.
It is of a piece with the other provisions of the instructions — not
to alarm the public, not to disclose intent, and to avoid commission
of the first overt act.
Comment on the message as a whole . — General Short, as the Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Department, was charged with the defense
of the Hawaiian Islands and as such had a fundamental duty to prop-
erly employ all available means at his disposal for that purpose in the
face of any threat, with or without notification of impending
hostilities.
[75J] Notwithstanding receipt of conflicting and qualifying
information, which undoubtedly had its effect on Snort’s mental con-
ception of the situation, the responsibility rested on him to take meas-
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
91
ures to meet the worst situation with which he might be confronted,
and such action on his part, as Commander on the spot, was mandatory
despite the fact that he was not kept fully advised by the War Depart-
ment of the critical situation and of the positive, immediate imminence
of war.
The same day G-2 of the War Department wired to G-2 Hawaiian
Department, which clearly indicated that both sabotage and hostilities
might begin and be concurrent. This message said :
Advise only the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff that it appears
that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Ac-
tions of sabotage and espionage probable. Also probable that hostilities may
begin.
This G-2 message nullifies all Short’s explanation that his mind
was put on sabotage because of the War Department’s emphasis on
this subject. The message shows that hostilities were just as possible
as sabotage. His decision to adopt Alert Number 1 came on tne 27th,
before receipt of any message having reference to sabotage. He had
two threats : he only took measures as to one. The third message, upon
which he particularly relies as to sabotage, which came on November
28 from the War Department (G-2), came after he had made his
decision to go to Alert Number 1. This last message again mentions
the critical situation as to sabotage activities. It does not in any way
change previous messages. Short should have known, as a trained
soldier^ that a G-2 message is informative and is of [I££] lesser
authority than a commanding message from the Chief of Staff.
When General Short was asked if he had known that negotiations
with Japan had practically ended when he received the message of
November 27th, he said :
I think it would have made me more conscious that war was practically
unavoidable ... If I knew it was immediately imminent . . . but if I had known
it was immediately imminent, then I should think I would have gone into Alert
Number 3 ... It would have looked to me definite that the war was almost
upon us. (R. 450.)
General Russell. General Short, did you know that on the 26th of November
the State Department handed to the Japanese representatives a memorandum
which G-2 of the War Department at least considered as an ultimatum to the
Japanese government?
General Short. I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so
afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came out.
General Russell. Did you know on the 27th of November, when you received
that message that the Secretary of State had in a meeting on the 25th of
November told the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and probably
the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Admiral Stark, that the State Department
had gone as far as it could in its negotiations with the Japanese and that the
security of the nation was then in the hands of the armed forces?
General Short. I did not.
General Russell. Did you know that in January of 1941 Ambassador Grew
made a report to the State Department or to the Secretary of State in which
he stated that there were rumors in Japan that in event of trouble with America
the Japs would attack Pearl Harbor?
General Short. At that time I was not in command ; but I have known of that
later, I think probably a year or so later. I do not think I knew anything about
it at that time. (R. 451.)
This concludes the status of affairs to the 27th. There still remained
the period from the 27th to the 6th of December, inclusive, during
which time messages and even letters could have been sent outlining
and completely delineating the entire [7<$5] situation to Short.
92 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Even a courier could have reached Honolulu in 36 hours from Wash-
ington. The War Department, although it had additional informa-
tion of a most positive character, left Short with this fragment of
information regarding the U. S.- Japanese negotiations contained in
the two sentences inserted in the message of the 27th by the Secretary
of War, and took no action either to investigate Short’s reply to the
message of November 27 to determine the steps being taken for defense,
or to assure that adequate defensive measures were being taken.
5. Messages 28th November To 6th December, Inclusive . — On
November 28th the War Department sent message No. 482 to Short,
reading as follows : 88
Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against
subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Depart-
ment (See paragraph 3 MID SC thirty dash forty-five) stop. Also desired that
you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protec-
tion of your establishments comma protection of your personnel against sub-
versive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop. This
does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop. Pro-
tective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoid-
ing unnecessary publicity and alarm. To insure speed of transmission identical
telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect
your responsibility under existing instructions.
[136] Short sent a reply to wire 482 of November 28th on the
same day which outlined at length the sabotage precautions he was
taking. The War Department copy of this wire, which is addressed
to the A. G. O., shows that a copy was sent to the Secretary of the
General Staff, but no other indorsements are on it showing it was read
or considered by anyone else. This wire reads :
Re your secret radio for eight two twenty eighth, fuU precautions are being
taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility
of War Dept paren paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five end paren
and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards
protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power
plants, telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this Hqrs by confidential
letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the
Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by Section sixty seven of the
organic act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the Com-
manders of Military and Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of
Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection etc.
Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially
made a formal written demand on this Hqrs to furnish and continue to furnish
such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless
violence in connection therewith, being committed against vital installations
and structures in the territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate
military protection is now being afforded vital civilian Installations. In this
connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu
on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordnance which permits the
Commanding General Hawaiian Dept to close, or restrict the use of and travel
upon, any highway within the city and county of Honolulu, whenever the Com-
manding General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense.
The authority thus given has not yet been exercised. Relations with FBI and all
other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual
cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters. Short.
It is to be noted that the official file does not show a copy of radio
#482, sent to Short by the War Department on [137] Novem-
ber 28th.
* A similar message, No. 484, was sent on the same day to the Commanding General
Hawaiian Air Force by General Arnold.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 93
On December 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the follow-
ing wire to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet :
On 3d December we have, “Op Nav informs” — this Is a paraphrase, yon
understand, sir. * * ♦ — “informs C In C Asiatic, CincPac, Combat 14-10
that highly reliable information has been received that instructions were sent
Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Wash-
ington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn
secret documents.” (Admiral Bloch, Vol. 13, Page 1513, APHB.) *
The story as to whether Short ever saw or received this message is
as follows : Admiral Kimmel visited Short December 2 and December
3, 1941. (R. 1513.) Short says : “I never saw that message” (R. 424) ,
referring to the 3 December message. He also denied seeing the mes-
sage from the Navy of December 4th and 6th hereinafter quoted.
(K. 424-425.) However, Short was advised by the F. B. I. that it had
tapped the telephone line of the Japanese Consuls’ cook and had found
the Consul was burning his papers. (R. 3204.) All other lines were
tapped by the Navy. (R. 3204.) Phillips testified Short was “in-
formed of it,” but nothing was done about it. (R. 1243.) Short
denies such G-2 information, saying: “I am sure he didn’t inform me.”
(R. 525.) Colonel Fielder says the matter was discussed by Colonel
Phillips at a staff conference, but nothing was done about it. Colonel
Bicknell, G-2, Hawaiian Department, confirmed Fielder. (R. 1413-
1414.)
[138] This record does not provide either a true copy or a para-
phrase copy of the message of December 4, 1941, or December 6 2 1941.
The information we have is no better than tnat contained m the
Roberts Report, which reads as follows :
the second of December 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential
documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were
necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was sent to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only) ; and the third of
December 6, 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation the naval com-
mands on the outlying Pacific islands might be authorized to destroy confidential
papers then or later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that those
essential to continued operations should be retained until the last moment.
(Roberts Report, page 8.)
These messages were received because Admiral Bloch testified that he
remembered them. (R. 1513-1514.)
Irrespective of any testimony on the subject the record shows that on
December 3, 1941, Short and Kimmel had a conference about a cable-
gram relative to the relief of marines on Wake and Midway. (R. 302,
394.)
There is a serious question raised why the War Department did not
give instructions to Short direct whicn would have put him on his
guard as to the tenseness of the situation.
On December 6 there was reported to the Chief of Staff, Phillips,
the message about the Japanese burning their papers, and he reported
it at a staff meeting on December 6. (R. 1414.)
6. December 7, 191^1 Message . — This brings us to the final message
from Washington. It was filed by the Chief of Staff at 12:18 p. m.
Washington time, December 7th, which was 6 : 48 a. m. Honolulu time.
Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts
to an ult imatum. [135] Also they are under orders to destroy their code
•This message also paraphrased by General Grunert, Vol. 4, Page 424. This same
message also paraphrased in Roberts Testimony, Vol. 0, Page 583, and Vol. 17, Page £-85.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 7
94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
machine immediately stop. Just what significance the hoar set may have we do
not know bat be on alert accordingly stop. Inform naval authorities of this
communication.
The story of the sending of this message, which, if it could have
been sent so as to have reached Short a few hours prior to the attack
might at least have greatly lessened the results of the attack, will be
set forth at length. It was sent by commercial radio, the R. C. A.
This is a commercial line. Early in the morning in Honolulu the
Hawaiian Department radio had had great difficulty in keeping in
communication with the War Department radio. It is significant that
the Hawaiian Department only had a small 10 k. g. set. It was not
a powerful set, like that of the Navy or the R. C. A. The Message
Center of the War Department, which is charged with the expeditious
handling of messages, decided to send this vital message by commercial
R. C. A. instead of War Department radio, because it could not get
through on its own net. Why this message was not sent by the Navy
radio, ?by F. B. I. radio, or by telephone, and why these means of
? >ossibly more rapid communication were not investigated, is not satis-
actoriiy explained. The explanation that “secrecy” was paramount
does not appear to apply to these means.
Shivers of the F. B. I. testified :
We had our own radio station ... I would say within — depending on the
length of the message ; a 20-word message could be probably gotten to Washington
by— could have gotten to the receiving station in Washington within a period of
twenty minutes . . . our channels were not jammed . . . We used a
frequency that was assigned to us by the F. C. C. . . . All of the stuff that
went out from here to — that went out over that radio, was coded. (R. 8221.)
[HO] General Gbunebt. Then any message, that Washington wanted to get
to you during that morning or just prior to the attack on that morning you think
could have gotten to you within the leeway of an hour?
Mr. Shivebs. The message could have been sent out within an hour, yes. Yes,
sir. (R. 3221.)
It is to be noted in this connection that not only was the F. B. I.
radio working between Washington and Honolulu on December 6-7,
but that testimony shows numerous telephone conversations were con-
ducted just after the attack, over the telephone between Washington
and Honolulu. ,
The story of the sending of this message in the War Department
is as follows :
[2^7] This message arrived in Honolulu at 7 : 33 a. m., Honolulu
time, December 7th. The attack struck 22 minutes later. The message
was hot actually delivered to the signal office of the Hawaiian De-
partment until 11 : 46 a. m., the attack having taken place at 7 : 55 a. m.
The message was decoded and delivered to The Adjutant General
at 2 : 58 p. m., 7 hours and 3 minutes after the attack.
The status of communications between Washington and Hawaii on
the morning of December 7th and for 24 hours previous to that time
was as follows : The Hawaiian Department had a scrambler telephone
connection direct with Washington by which you could ordinarily
get a message through from Washington to Hawaii in ten or fifteen
minutes. After the attack on December 7, Colonel Fielder (G-2)
himself talked to Washington twice on this phone and received a
call from Washington on the same phone: it took no more than an
hour as a maximum to get the call through despite the heavy traffic
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 95
to Hawaii by reason of the attack. (B. 2999.) Furthermore, a war
message could have demanded priority.
It is important to observe that only one means of communication was
selected by Washington. That decision violated all rules requiring
the use of multiple means of communication in an emergency. In
addition to the War Department telephone there also existed the
F. B. I. radio, which was assigned a special frequency between Wash-
ington and Hawaii and over which it only took twenty minutes to
send a coded message from Hawaii to Washington or vice versa.
Shivers of F. B. I. so testified. (B. 3222.) Short testified :
General Marshall stated that the reason he did not telephone was that It
took some time, that he had called the Philippines before he called Hawaii, and
there was a 1142 ] possibility of a leak which would embarrass the State
Department In other words. I think there was a feeling still at that time that
secrecy was more Important than' the time element in getting the Information to
ns as rapidly as possible. Whatever the reason was, we got that information
* seven hoars after the attack. (R. 810.)
Apparently, the War Department at that time did not envisage
an immediate attack, rather they thought more of a breaking of diplo-
matic relations, and if the idea of an attack at 1 : 00 p. m. E. S. T.
did enter their minds they thought of it as probably taking place in
the Far East and not in Hawaii. Hence secrecy was still of paramount
interest to them. We find no justification for a failure to send this
message bv multiple secret means either through the Navy radio or
F. B. I. radio or the scrambler telephone or all three.
The result was the message did not get through in time due to the
failure of the War Department to use the telephone as the Chief of
Staff used it to the Philippines (Short B. 310) or take steps to insure
that the message got through by multiple channels (by code over
naval or F. B. I. radio to Hawaii), if the War Department radio was
not working. He left Short without this additional most important
information. Short testified as follows:
If they bad used the scrambled phone and gotten it through In ten or fifteen
minutes we would probably have gotten more of the Import and a clearer Idea
of danger from that message and we would have had time to warm up the
planes and get them in the air to meet any attack. (R. 810.)
Colonel French, in charge of Traflic Operations Branch, Chief
Signal Office, in the War Department testified that on December 7,
1941, Colonel Bratton brought the message to the code room in the
handwriting of the Chief of Staff which ‘*1 had typed for clarity” in
a few minutes. Colonel Bratton read and authenticated it. The
message was given to the code clerk and transmission facilities
checked. It was decided to send [7^3] the message by com-
mercial means, choosing Western Union, as the fastest. He 6tated
that he personally took the message from the code room to the tele-
type operator and advised Colonel Bratton it would take 30 to 45
minutes to transmit message to destination. It left at 12 : 01 (E aste rn
Standard Time, 6:31 a. m. Honolulu time). The transmission to
Western Union was finished 12 : 17 p. m. Eastern Standard Time, or
7 : 33 a. m. Honolulu time. It took 45 minutes in transmission. The
message was actually delivered at 11:45 a. m. Honolulu time. The
messenger was diverted from his course during the bombing. (B.
96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel French had no knowledge of the type of communication the
F. B. I. used to Hawaii ; he never used the scrambler telephone and
sometimes he used the Navy to send messages, but did not inquire on
the morning of December 7, although the Navy has a more powerful
radio. (R. 203-204.)
7. Failure of Navy to Advise Short of Enemy Submarine in Pearl
Harbor on morning December 7, 1941 . — The second failure was by the
Navy Department, upon whom Short so trustingly relied. A two-
man submarine entered Pearl Harbor area at 6 : 30 a. m. Between
6 : 33 and 6 : 45 a. m. it was sunk by the Navy. This was reported at
7 : 12 a. m. by naval base officers to the Chief of Staff but the Navy
made no such report to Short. (R. 310-311; See Roberts Report
p. 15.) As Short said :
That would, under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was danger.
The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine attack. They con-
sidered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it was Admiral Bloch’s
duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away.
He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized
it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of [1441 it
and just failed to notify me; that he could see then, after the fact, that he had
been absolutely wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the
Information to me had not — at any rate, I did not get the information until after
the attack. (R.311.)
8. Failure of Aircraft "Warning Service to Advise of Approaching
Planes , Decernber 7, 1941. — The third event that might have saved the
day was the following :
The aircraft warning service had established mobile aircraft warn-
ing stations on the Island of Oahu, as elsewhere related in detail, and
had set up an Information Center to utilize the aircraft warning in-
formation, plot the course of any incoming planes and to advise the
responsible authorities. The organization was set up and operating
and was being utilized from 4 a. m. to 7 o’clock on the morning of
December 7th as a training method and had been so used for some time
past. The Navy was supposed to have detailed officers in the Infor-
mation Center to be trained as liaison officers, but had not yet gotten
around to it. In the Information Center that morning was a Lieu-
tenant Kermit A. Tyler, a pursuit officer of the Air Corps, whose tour
of duty thereat was until 8 o’clock. It was Tyler’s second tour of duty
at the Center and he was there for training and observation, but there
were no others on duty after 7 o’clock except the enlisted telephone
operator. He was the sole officer there between 7 and 8 o’clock that
morning, the rest of the personnel that had made the Center operative
from 4 : 00 to 7 : 00 a. m. had departed.
At one of the remote aircraft warning stations there were two
privates who had been on duty from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. One of them
was Private Lockard, who was skilled in operating the radar aircraft
detector, and a Private George E. Elliott, who was [146] the
plotting man to plot the information picked up on the radar. This
E lotter was anxious to learn how to operate the radar, and Private
(Ockard agreed to show him after the station was supposed to close
at 7 o’clock and while they were waiting for the truck to take them to
breakfast. He kept the radar open for further operation to instruct
his partner, Private Elliott. While Lockard was adjusting the ma-
chine to begin the instruction of Private Elliott, he observed on the
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
97
radar screen an unusual formation he had never seen in the machine.
He thought there was something wrong with it, as the indicator
showed such a large number of planes coming in that he was sure
that there was nothing like it in the air and there must be a machine
error. He continued to check, however, and finally concluded that
the machine was operating correctly and that there was a considerable
number of planes 132 miles away from the island approaching from a
direction 3 degrees east of north. The time was 7 : 02 a. m., December
7,1941.
In this record Private Elliott, now Sergeant Elliott, testified that
he plotted these planes and suggested to Lockard that they call up the
Information Center. After some debate between them, Lockard did
call the Information Center and reported to the switchboard operator.
The switchboard operator, an enlisted man who testified, was unable
to do anything about it, so he put Lieutenant Tyler on the phone.
Tylers answer proved to be a disastrous one. He said, in substance,
“Forget it.” Tyler’s position is indefensible in his action, for he says
that he was merely there for training and had no knowledge upon
which to base any action ; yet he assumed to give directions instead of
seeking someone competent to make a decision.
If that be a fact, and it seems to be true ? then he should [74#]
not have assumed to tell these two men, Private Lockard and Private
Elliott, to “forget it”, because he did not have the knowledge upon
which to premise any judgment. (R. 1102.) He should, in accordance
with customary practice, have then used initiative to take this matter
up with somebody who did know about it, in view of the fact that he
said he was there merely for training and had no competent knowledge
upon which to either tell the men to forget it or to take action upon it.
By this assumption of authority, he took responsibility and the conse-
quences of his action should be imposed upon him.
If Tyler had communicated this information, the losses might have
been very greatly lessened. As General Short testified :
If he had alerted the Interceptor Command there would have been time, if the
pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There would not
have been time to get them in the air . . . It would have made a great dif-
ference in the loss ... It would have been a question of split seconds instead
of minutes in getting into action. (R. 312-313.)
The attack actually took place at 7 : 55 a. m.
When the information that showed up on the oscilloscope was com-
municated, apparently Lieutenant Tyler had in his mind that a flight
of B-17s was coming from the mainland and he thought that they
might represent what was seen on the screen of the radar machine.
As a matter of fact, that probably had something to do with it, as they
did come in about this period and were attacked oy the Japanese, some
of them being destroyed.
9. Navy Failure to Advise Short of Suspected Naval Concentration
in the Jaluits . — About November 25, 1941, the Navy through its intel-
ligence sources in the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor and in
Washington had reports showing the presence in Jaluit in the
[7^7] Marshall Islands of the Japanese fleet composed of aircraft
carriers, submarines, and probably other vessels. Information of this
fleet ceased about December 1, 1941. As Jaluit was 1,500 miles closer
to Oahu than the mainland of Japan, the presence of such a strong
98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
force capable of attacking Hawaii was an important element of naval
information. This information was delivered to G-2 of the War De-
partment as testified to by General Miles. No information of this
threat to Hawaii was given to General Short by either the War or
Navy Departments in Washington nor the Navy in Hawaii. Short
and nis senior commanders testified that such information would have
materially altered their point of view and their actions.
Such information should have been delivered by the War Depart-
ment or the Navy for what it was- worth to permit Short to evaluate
it; this was not done.
The fact that the actual force which attacked Hawaii has now been
identified does not change the necessity for the foregoing action.
10. The Navy Account of the Japanese Task Force That Attacked
Pearl Harbor ; /Sources of Information to J apanese . — The following
account is based upon the testimony of Captain Layton, who has been
Fleet Combat Intelligence Officer, and was at the time of December
7th and shortly before Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.
He said that the task force which had been identified by the Navy
through numerous captured documents, orders, maps, and from inter-
viewing prisoners who were in a position to know personally the or-
ders and preparations for the attack, had the following history, ac-
cording to the Navy view of the correct £-74#] story : 40
Japan started training its task force in either July or August, 1941,
for the attack on Pearl Harbor. They were evidently trained with
S eat care and precision as disclosed by the maps which were found in
e planes which were shot down in the attack on Pearl Harbor and
in the two-man submarines. These papers and orders show meticu-
lous care in planning and timing, which would take very considerable
practice. Tne initial movement from Japan to the rendezvous at
Tankan Bay was about November 22nd, and they awaited word to act
before the force moved out on the 27th-28th of November, 1941."
The elements of the fleet for this task force consisted of Bix carriers,
two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and a destroyer
division. This is one of the most powerful task forces ever assembled
and after the date of [7^9] the attack upon Pearl Harbor, it
took part in a number of similar successful ana very disastrous at-
tacks in the Pacific southwest. The elements of this task force left
individually from the Japanese mainland and assembled at Tonkan
Bay in an uninhabited spot where they would be unobserved. The
assembly was completed and the task force departed on November
27th-28th, Eastern Longitude Time, which was apparently after the
* The Japanese striking force assembled in home waters during November and departed
from the Bungou Channel area in Japan about 22 November, proceeding to Tankan Bay
(sometimes called Hlttokapu Bay). This assembly had started between the 7th and 22nd
of November. Tankan Bay Is located at Etorofu Island in North Japan. It does not
appear on the ordinary maps or charts, but is shown in a map of the Japanese Empire in
a Japanese encyclopedia under the title ’’Hlttokapu Bay." The task force arrived in this
bay approximately November 25th. The entire force departed on the 27th-28th of No-
vember (see footnote 2), taking a northerly route south of the Aleutians directly to the
east (to avoid being sighted by shipping) and then headed for a position to the north of
Oahu, arriving there on the early morning of the 8th of December (Japanese time) or
the 7th of December (Hawaiian time). The date of departure of November 27th-28th,
according to the numerous documents and prisoners interviewed who had intimate knowl-
edge of this matter and who independently picked the Bame date, is confirmed beyond
doubt according to Admiral McMorris and Captain Layton. This force consisted of sis
aircraft carriers, two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and some
destroyers sb well as submarines.
41 Japanese time and date must be taken into consideration because our December 7th
at Honolulu is Japanese December 8th. The time difference between Tokyo and Hawaii
is 4% hours, the time difference between Washington and Tokyo is 10 hours.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
99
date that the counter-proposals (considered bv the Japanese as an
ultimatum) were delivered by the President of the United States to
Japan through Secretary Hull on November 26, 1941. It is signifi-
cant that the attack of the Japanese task force aircraft upon the Army
and Navy planes parked together wing-to-wing as protection against
sabotage (Alert #1) must nave been as a result of knowledge of that
fact ? in view of their carefully rehearsed and scheduled attack for-
mations in which they ran down the aprons, setting the planes on fire
with incendiary ammunition : it is equally significant that it was well
known in the island that Alert #1 was put into effect November 27th
and therefore can be assumed to have been communicated to Japan,
and that advantage of such information was apparently taken by
reason of the nature of the attack and the way it was conducted.
It is also significant, a map having been found upon the pilot of a
shot-down Japanese attacking plane, and another map having been
found upon one of the crew in a two-man submarine, that there had
been entered on these maps, which were old Geodetic Survey maps of
the Pearl Harbor area, the location of the hangars that had been built
on Hickam Field and of those that were yet to be built. Five of these
hangars had been built. Earlier 1936 maps issued by the Hawaiian
Department [ 160 ] or by the Air Force, showing Hickam Field,
showed five of these hangars in full lines and three in dotted lines as
being hangars yet to be built. The Japanese are well known as precise
copyists. It is apparent that when they made the maps found on the
aviator and the submarine crew members they had knowledge later
than 1936 of construction either that had been constructed or was
to be constructed, because they entered on such maps the additional
three hangars in full lines.
The task force proceeded in radio silence due east to a point sub-
stantially due north of Oahu and thence proceeded southward under
forced draft to a' point between 300 and 250 miles from Oahu, from
which the flight took off. The two-man submarines were carried
on top of the mother submarines and released adjacent to the harhor.
Captain Layton further testified that the orders that were captured
and those that they had knowledge of did exist, as reported by captured
prisoners, show that the attacking forces were to destroy without a
trace any third power’s vessels including Japanese and Russian within
600 miles of the destination of the task force; to capture and maintain
in radi o silence any such vessels including J apanese and Russian within
600 miles of the destination of the task force, but if such vessels had
sent any radio communications to destroy them. (R. 3048) This is
a good evidence of Japanese character, being unwilling to trust their
own people and to sink them without mercy because they happened
to be operating by accident in this vacant sea where no vessels normally
operate.
This task force was very powerful in the air, having a total of
approximately 424 planes ; ( R. 3048 ) of this number about 300 actually
attacked Pearl Harbor. (R. 3053.) The pilots 1 161 ] were of
the highest quality and training that have ever been encountered in
this war with the Japanese, with the exception of the Battle of Midway
where, four of these same carriers were engaged and were sunk. (R.
3046.) The maximum total number of airplanes on carriers that the
United States could muster on December 7tn, on the carriers “Lexing-
ton” and “Enterprise”, was approximately 180 planes. (R. 3049.)
100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Layton testified that our Navy in Pearl Harbor would have
been unable to have brought the Japanese task force under gunfire be-
cause our battleships were too slow and the remainder of our force
would probably have suffered severe damage if not defeat on the high
seas by reason of the great superiority in the air before our superior
gunfire could have been brought to bear. The only possible hope of
overcoming such a Japanese force would be in weather that pre-
vented flight of their planes so that the United States force would have
superiority of gunfire, irrespective of Japanese superiority of air
power.
He stated that no word of this task force was received in any way,
from any source, by the Navy. The attack was wholly unexpected, and
if it had been expected the probability of the United States’ winning
in any engagement of this task force was not a bright one. He stated
that this task force represented a substantial per cent of the entire
Japanese Navy. It provided alone on the Jap carriers 424 aircraft
against a possible ISO which we might have mustered if we had had our
own two carriers available to operate against them. (R. 3048-3049.1
The information upon which the story of the attack is based has been
revealed so far as coming from several sources. [152] First, the
Otto Kuehn trial revealed his complete disclosure of the fleet disposi-
tions and locations in Pearl Harbor in the period December 1 to De-
cember 6, and a code delivered with the information, so that communi-
cation of the information to Japanese offshore submarines adjacent
to Oahu could be used. The same information was delivered by the
Japanese Consul direct to the homeland.
Otto Kuehn and his co-conspirators, Japanese of the Japanese Con-
sulate in Honolulu, had conspired to send information as to the units of
the fleet in Pearl Harbor and their exact positions in the harbor. This
information the Japanese Consul communicated principally by com-
mercial lines to Japan. Additionally Kuehn provided a code indicat-
ing what units were in the harbor and what were out and means of
signaling consisting of symbols on the sails of his sailboat, radio signals
over a short-wave transmitter, lights in his house, and fires in his yard,
all in order to signal to Japanese submarines offshore. The period
during which the signals were to be given was December 1 to 6. If
such information has been available to our armed forces it would have
clearly indicated the attack. The messages taken from the Japanese
Consulate on the subject show clearly what was done and the inten-
tion of the Japanese. If authority had existed to tap these lines, this
information would have been available to both the Army and Navy.
Kuehn was tried by a military commission after signed confessions of
his actions and sentenced to death. This was later commuted to im-
prisonment for fifty years. It is significant that Kuehn was a German
agent and had for a long time been living on funds forwarded to him
from Japan and had conducted his espionage with impunity until
after Pearl Harbor, right [153] under the nose of the Army,
the F. B. I., and naval Intelligence.
As Shivers, head of the F. B. I. in the islands, said :
If we bad been able to get tbe messages that were sent to Japan by the Japa-
nese Consul, we would have known, or we could have reasonably assumed, that
the attack would come, somewhere, on December 7 ; because, If you recall, this
system of signals that was devised by Otto Kuehn for the Japanese Consul gen-
eral simply included the period from December 1 to December 6. (R. 3218.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
101
Shivers testified that the reason why the information being sent over
the commercial lines to Japan, other than telephone, was not secured
was that while he had the approval of the Attorney General to tap the
telephone wires and to intercept telephone conversations, yet they could
not get the information out of the cable offices. He testified :
Colonel Toulmin. I would like to ask him one question. What other means
of communication did the Japanese Consul have with the homeland other than
a telephone connection?
Mr. Shivebs. He had commercial communication system.
Colonel Toulmin. Did you have any opportunity of tapping the commercial
lines or of securing any information off the commercial lines?
Mr. Shivebs. Off of the lines themselves?
Colonel TOulmin. Yes.
Mr. Shivers. No, sir.
Colonel Toulmin. So that he did have a free, undisturbed communication over
those lines?
Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. (R. 3223.)
It was later discovered, when the torn messages of the Japanese Con-
sul were reconstructed after they had been taken on December 7th, that
many vital messages were being sent by the Japanese Consul, who was
keeping Japan advised of the entire military and naval situation and
every move we made in Hawaii.
Another example of this Japanese activity is the telephone
message on December 5th from the house of Dr. Mori by a woman
newspaper reporter, ostensibly to her newspaper in Japan, an ap-
parently meaningless and therefore highly suspicious message. It
was this message that was tapped from the telephone by the F. B. I.,
translated, and delivered to Military Intelligence and submitted by it
to General Short at six o’clock on December 6th. (R. 1417-1419,
2993.) As Short was unable to decipher the meaning, he did noth-
ing about it and went on to a party. (R. 1420.) The attack followed
in the morning.
In this same connection, the story of the spying activities of the
German, von Osten, is in point. (R. 2442-2443, 3003.) The tele-
phone lines of the Japanese Consulate were tapped by the Navy with
the exception of one telephone line to the cook’s quarters, which was
overlooked, and this was tapped by the F. B. I. (R. 3204.)
The last and one of the most significant actions of the Japanese was
the apparent actual entry of their submarines into Pearl Harbor a
few days prior to December 7th, their circulation in the harbor, by
which they secured and presumably transmited complete information
as to out fleet movements and dispositions.
The story of the bold Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor prior to
the attack on December 7th is even more astounding as to the complete
freedom with which Japan operated in getting intelligence out of
Hawaii. Shivers of the F. B. I. produced maps 1 and 2, which were
copies of maps captured from the Japanese two-man submarines that
came into Pearl Harbor on December 7th. The F. B. I., in endeavor-
ing to reconstruct the [755] intelligence operations of any
agent who may have been operating in Hawaii prior to the attack,
secured these maps from Naval Intelligence. (R. 3210.) Maps 1
and 2 have a legend translating all of the Japanese characters and
writing appearing on the maps. Shivers said :
An examination of the map indicated to me rather definitely that there had
been Japanese submarines in Pearl Harbor immediately before the attack.
(R. 3210.)
102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now, on tbis map Is various Information rotating to the installations at Hickam
Field, Pearl Harbor, and areas adjacent to both places. (B. 3211.)
There appeared on the map a code in Japanese which was translated
by the F. B. I. and shows that it was intended for use by the sub-
marine commanders in communicating with the Japanese task force
enroute to Hawaii. It contains such messages as ‘indication strong
that enemy fleet will put out to sea,” or “enemy fleet put out to sea
from or through;” in other words, describing the presence, size, com-
position^ and movement of the fleet. (B. 3212.)
As this map shows the complete timed movement in and out of
the harbor of the submarine and this information had been prepared
partly written in Japanese, it is obvious that the Japanese must have
been in the harbor a few days before the attack and evidently were
moving into and out of the harbor at will. The data on the chart shows
the submarine was so well advised that it went in at about 0410 when
the submarine net was open to permit the garbage scow to leave
the harbor, and stayed in the harbor until about 0000 and then left
by the same route. The map shows the location of our battleships and
other naval vessels observed by the submarine. (B. 3212-3213.)
As the ships actually in the harbor on December 7th were somewhat
different from those shown on the map, it is conclusive proof [156]
that this submarine was in the harbor and probably advising die fleet
of Japan as to our dispositions prior to December 7th. (B. 3210-
3213.)
The real action that should have been feared from the Japanese
was not <men sabotage, but espionage. It is obvious that the reason
why the Japanese aliens did not commit sabotage was that they did
not want to stimulate American activity to stop their espionage and
intern them. That was the last thing they intended to do ; and Short
appears to have completely misapprehended the situation, the psychol-
ogy and intentions of the enemy, by putting into effect his sabotage
alert.
Undoubtedly the information of the alert, the placing of planes
wing-to-wing, etc., as well as the disposition of the fleet was reported
by Kuehn through the Japanese Consul, were all known to the Jap-
anese task force proceeding toward Hawaii That will explain why
they were able to conduct such precise bombing and machine-gunning.
The bomb pattern on Hickam Field and the machine-gunning of that
field, as well as other fields, show that the attack was concentrated
on tne hangars, marked on the Japanese maps, and upon the ramps
where the planes were parked wing to wing. There was no attack
of any consequence upon the landing strips.
From the foregoing it appears that there were a large number of
events taking place bearing on the attack; and that a clue to such
events and the Japanese actions was in part available to Short and
in part not available to him. Both the War Department and the
Navy failed to inform him of many vital matters,- and our govern -
inental restrictions as to intercepting the communications of toe Jap-
anese Consul prevented him from getting still additional information.
[157] If General Short had any doubt on the subject of his
authority, be had ample opportunity from November 27th to December
6th to inquire of higher authority and make his position and his actions
certain of support and approval. This he did not do.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
103 nT
11. Information Not Given Short . — In judging the actions of Gen-"
eral Short and whether he carried out his responsibilities, there must
be taken into account information that he was not told either by the
War Department or by the Navy. Briefly summarized, the funda-
mental pieces of information were the following :
1. The presence of the task force in the Marshall Islands at
Jaluit from November 27th to November 80th and the disappear-
ance of that force. Neither the War Department nor the Navy
Department saw fit to advise Short of this important piece of
information.
2. The fact that the Chief of Staff with the Chief of Naval
Operations had jointly asked (on November 27th) the President
not to force the issue with the Japanese at this time. (R. 9.)
3. The delivery on the 26th of November to the Japanese Am-
bassadors by the Secretary of State of the counter-proposals ; and
the immediate reaction of the Japanese rejecting in effect these
counter-proposals which they considered an ultimatum and indi-
cating that it was the end of negotiations.
4. Short not kept advised of the communications from Grew
reporting the progressive deterioration of the relationship with
the Japanese.
[158 \ 5. No reaction from the War Department to Short as
to whether his report of November 27th as to “measures taken”,
i. e., a sabotage alert and liaison with the Navy, were satisfac-
tory or inadequate in view of the information possessed by the
War Department.
6. The following information not furnished also existed in the
War Department:
Information from informers, agents and other sources as
to the activities of our potential enemv and its intentions in
the negotiations between the United States and Japan was
in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in
November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a rea-
sonably complete knowledge of the Japanese plans and in-
tentions, and were in a position to know their potential moves
against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in
possession of essential facts as to the enemy’s intentions and
proposals.
This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in
November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the neces-
sity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate
day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to pre-
pare for the eventualities of war.
The messages actually sent to Hawaii by the Army and Navy gave
only a small fraction of this information. It would have been pos-
sible to have sent safely, information ample for the purpose of orient-
ing the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives for an all-out
alert.
Under the circumstances, where information has a vital [159]
bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and cannot
be disclosed to them, it would appear incumbent upon the War De-
partment then to assume the responsibility for specific directives to
such commanders.
104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Short got neither form of assistance after November 28th from the
War Department, his immediate supervising agency. It is believed
that the disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been lessened to the
extent that its defenses were available and used on December 7 if
E roperly alterted in time. The failure to alert these defenses in time
y directive from the War Department, based upon all information
available to it, is one for which it is responsible. The War Department
had an abundance of vital information that indicated an immediate
break with Japan. All it had to do was either get it to Short or give
him a directive based upon it. Short was not fully sensitive to the
real seriousness of the situation, although the War Department
thought he was. It is believed that knowledge of the information
available in the War Department would have made him so.
General discussion of the information herein referred to follows :
The records show almost daily information on the plans of the
Japanese Government. In addition to that cited above and in con-
junction therewith the War Department was in possession of in-
formation late in November and early in December from which it
made deductions that Japan would shortly commence an aggressive
war in the South Pacific; that every effort would be made to reach
an agreement with the United States Government which would result
in eliminating the American people as a contestant in the war to
come; and that failing to reach the agreement the [260] Jap-
anese Government would attack both Britain and the United States.
This information enabled the War Department to fix the probable
time of war with Japan with a degree of certainty.
In the first days of December this information grew more critical
and indicative of the approaching war. Officers in relatively minor
positions who were charged with the responsibility of receiving and
evaluating such information were so deeply impressed with its sig-
nificance and the growing tenseness of our relations with Japan, which
pointed only to war and war almost immediately, that such officers
approached the Chief of the War Plans Division (General Gerow)
and the Secretary of the General Staff (Colonel Smith) for the ex-
press purpose of having sent to the department commanders a true
picture of the war atmosphere which, at that time, pervaded the
War Department and which was uppermost in the thinking of these
officers in close contact with it. The efforts of these subordinate offi-
cers to have such information sent to the field were unsuccessful.
They were told that field commanders had been sufficiently informed.
The Secretary of the General Staff declined to discuss the matter when
told of the decisions of the War Plans Division.
Two officers then on duty in the War Department are mentioned
for their interest and aggressiveness in attempting to have something
done. They are Colonel R. S. Bratton and Colonel Otis K. Stadler.
The following handling of information reaching the War Depart-
ment in the evening of December 6 and early Sunday morning De-
cember 7 is cited as illustrative of the apparent lack of appreciation
by those in high places in the War Department of the seriousness
of this information which was so [262] • clearly outlining the
trends that were hastening us into war with Japan.
At approximately 10 : 00 o’clock p. m. on December 6, 1941, and
more than 15 hours before the attack at Pearl Harbor, G-2 delivered
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 105
to the office of the War Plans Division and to the office of the Chief
of Staff of the Army information which indicated very emphatically
that war with Japan was a certainty and that the beginning of such
war was in the immediate future. The officers to whom this informa-
tion was delivered were told of its importance and impressed with
the necessity of getting it into the hands of those who could act, the
Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of the War Plans Division.
On the following morning December 7 at about 8:30 a. m. other
information reached the office of G-2, vital in its nature and indicating
an almost immediate break in relations between the United States
and Japan. Colonel Bratton, Chief, Far Eastern Section, G-2, at-
tempted to reach the Chief of Staff of the Army in order that he
might be informed of the receipt of this message. He discovered
that the. General was horseback riding. Finally and at approxi-
mately 11 : 25 a. m. the Chief of Staff reached his office and received
this information. General Miles, then G-2 of the War Department,
appeared at about the same time. A conference was held between
these two officers and General Gerow of the War Plans Division who
himself had come to the Office of the Chief of Staff. Those hours
when Bratton was attempting to reach someone who could take
action in matters of this importance and the passing without effec-
tive action having been taken prevented this critical information from
reaching GeneralShort in time to be of value to him.
[162] About noon a message was hastily dispatched to overseas
department commanders including Short in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment. This message which has been discussed elsewhere in this re-
port, came into Short’s possession after the attack had been completed.
D. Status of the Principal Hawaiian Defenses in 1941 and Their
State of Readiness on December 6, 1941, or the Reason for Their
Lack of Readiness
1. Aircraft 'Warning Service and Interceptor Command . — The Air-
craft Warning Service on the morning of December 7, 1941, was in
operative condition for all practical purposes. It had an information
center and five mobile stations. It was sufficiently operative to success-
fully pick up the Japanese force 132 miles from Oahu. This was done
by Private Lockard and Private Elliott, respectively radar operator
and plotter, and reported by these privates on their own initiative to
the information center, where the Sergeant in charge of the switch-
board received the information and relayed it to Lieutenant Tyler,
who was a pursuit officer of the Air Corps on temporary duty for
training. Tne stations had been used from 0400 to 0700 hours each
morning for the training personnel, and the personnel was reasonably
trained by that time, with the exception of certain liaison officers who
were still getting their training, like Lieutenant Tyler. If the radar
system ana information center had been fully manned, as it could
have been and as it was immediately upon the disaster at Pearl
Harbor and thereafter without further physical additions, it could
have been successfully operated on December 7th.
The Air Warning Service had been operating on tactical exercises
and maneuvers prior to December 7th for some weeks.
[163] On December 7, 1941 this service could have been a great
asset to the defense of the islands had the Command and Staff under*
106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
stood its value and capabilities and had taken more interest in imple-
menting the temporary setup instead of awaiting completion of the
permanent installations.
The only mechanical difficulty that was being experienced was in
connection with the stand-by motor generator sets, which were to be
used to supplement commercial power in case the latter failed. There
had been some minor difficulty with the pumps on the motor generator
set for the internal combustion engines, but that was not of serious
character.
The story of the delay in installing both the temporary, mobile sets
and the permanent sets is as f ollows :
Army personnel had been receiving radar instructions on Navy
surface snips and had gone to sea with the ships and had had the
benefit of such practical training. Unfortunately the Navy, had not
detailed its liaison officers to the Information Center, and in that it
failed. There also had not been brought about, due to the failure
on the part of General Short and Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, a com-
plete integration into a single system of Army and Navy defense
including radar and particularly the Army, Navy and Marine fighters
which were to pass to the jurisdiction of the Army to form a composi-
tive interceptor command, so that the three elements of the system
would be working — the aircraft warning service, the interceptor com-
mand, and the antiaircraft artillery.
The only reason that the aircraft warning service as not on a full
operating basis on the morning of December 7th was due to the type of
alert put into effect but otherwise it should have been in full effect.
It was a fully operating [2dj] service and did so operate
shortly after the attack.
Major Bergquist and Major Tindal had been sent to the Interceptor
School at Mitchell Field in the early summer of 1941. At that time
the AWS was new to the U. S. Army and its organization and devel-
opment had just started in the United States. For the system to be
operative required a considerable amount of highly technical electrical
and radar equipment, the supply and manufacture of which was
critical.
The whole AWS project was new, novel, and somewhat revolu-
tionary in practice. It took time to get the equipment through War
Department priorities, and it took time to teach and train operating
personnel, and to indoctrinate the whole Army as well as the public
to its operation and value. This process had been going on since May
and June, 1941.
Testimony before the Board has indicated that neither the Army,
Navy, nor civilian population of the United States or Hawaii antici-
pated the necessity for immediate use of this service. There was,
however, a small group directly in charge of the AWS development in
Hawaii, including Major Bergquist, Major Tindal, Major Tetley, and
Major Powell, all of the Army, and Lieutenant Taylor of the Navy,
who were pusning the AWS project to the fullest extent that their
level of authority would permit. As a result of their efforts it is
believed that this service in the normal course of events would have
been established and in operation in another two or three weeks, which
in view of the lack of war-mindedness of the services would have been
to the great credit of this group.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
107
Since the No. 1 Alert was the decision due to the logic and judg-
ment of the Department Commander, it is very doubtful had the
AWS been 100 per cent completed that it would have heen
on a full-out operating basis on the 7th of December. General Short
has stated in the Roberts report testimony, Volume 14, page 1642, that
had he had the material and fully equipped radar stations he prob-
ably would have operated them iust as he did.
Nevertheless, had General Short’s judgment led him to have de-
cided to go to Alert 2 or S on November 27th, or at any time prior
to December 7th, the AWS could have functioned and the fighter
airplanes could have been ready for active defense within a period of
minutes. From the damage that was accomplished by the few fighters
that did get into the air from the Haliewa Airdrome it can be assumed
that the seventy or eighty fighters that could have been in the air
under a normally active alert system would have made the Jap at-
tack a much more costly venture. This paragraph, however, is
hypothesis.
2. Status of the Aircraft Warning Service on December 7th . —
The aircraft warning service consisting of the Information Center and
five mobile radar stations was in operation on the morning of December
7th and had been for several weeks prior to that date. The fact that
the Information Center was not in its permanent location and the
radar stations were not permanently built had no bearing upon the
operation and effectiveness of the aircraft warning system.
It was set up and the men were neing trained for, I would say, possibly a
month prior to the attack on December 7th-.
As testified by General Martin (B. 1825).
The difficulty of putting the AWS into full operation as a prac-
tical matter was the insistence of General Short that he retain con-
trol for training purposes whereas the best training would have been
to put the system into practical operation. [166\ Of this Gen-
eral Martin said :
The Department commander would not turn those (the operating stations)
over to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Forces until he ( Short) bad
completed the training under his Department Signal Officer. He refused to turn
them over unless he considered they were properly trained. So they were still
training under those conditions and had not been turned over to the Air Force
the morning of the attack on December 7th. (R. 1824.)
Here again is another example of the whole organisation of the
Army in Hawaii being held in a training status instead of acquiring
its training in or near combat positions, where it would have been
ready for any eventuality. As General Martin said :
They were capable of operating . . . the equipment used primarily in the
training of personnel to take over the operation of the control area. (R. 1824.)
General Martin is confirmed in this by Commander Taylor,
loaned bv the Navy for the purpose of getting this service into opera-
tion. Commander Taylor confirmed tne fact that :
On December 7th the plotters were reasonably well trained to watch and
able to do checking without any controller on the plane. The only source of
controllers we could find was to see the Squadron Commander of the Pursuit
Squadrons at Wheeler Field . . . We had no liaison people to man any of the
positions ... On December 7 all the communication lines were in; the radar
stations; the Deraz equipment was working satisfactorily enough to give air
warning and possibly to make Interceptions. The air-to-ground radio equipment
108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was not satisfactory for Interception work, bnt it was possible that enough
advance information could be given to pilots so that they could come back withont
being Intercepted. (B. 1082.)
However, the radio equipment that would have enabled control
through interception a reasonable distance offshore had been given
to the Ferry Command. This situation is treated elsewhere, but it
should be pointed out, to avoid confusion, that on and before Decem-
ber 7th the aircraft warning center was able to pick up incoming
planes and to give notification of that fact. It was not fully able to
perform its other function, [id7] which was supplementary to
the Information Center, that is, for full cooperation in conjunction
with an Interceptor Command to intercept the incoming planes in the
full sense of that arrangement.
So far advanced was the organization and apparatus that it would
have been fully complete witnin ten days to two weeks at the time
of the attack. As Commander Taylor said:
The only thing that was not carried through after this meeting (a conference
to wind up the details of organization) to bring the thing Into operation at the
end of wo weeks was the manpower to operate it (R. 1083.)
Taylor, in turn, is confirmed in this by one of the most energetic
officers who was working with Taylor in pressing this aircraft warning
system to conclusion, Colonel Bergquist, then a Major. He endeavored
to have 24-hour service by November 24th and stated that the. mobile
units could have stood it. There was some minor trouble with the
stand-by power gas engines, but this was of little importance and the
system could have run 24 hours a day. He had been running a school
since October known as the “Air Defense School” in which he was
training Army and Marine officers and as many pursuit officers of the
Air Corps as he could get. The delay was from the Signal Corps. As
Colonel Bergquist said :
I was continually barping to the Signal Corps people to get the stations up
and get them operating. (R. 1201.)
Despite the efforts of General Martin with Department Head-
quarters, very few results were secured in making the Signal Corps
let go their technical operation and allow the practical people who
were going to operate it go to work. This is described by Colonel
Bergquist, who said :
One of the big arguments was : we wanted to take over the radar stations and
get them set up and operating. The [168] Signal Corps said no, that was
their Job; they wanted to get them up and get them operating and then turn
them over to us for our operational control. The Department headquarters
decided In favor of the Signal Corps. (R. 1196.)
This delayed the ultimate completion of the system by a month.
(R. 1196.)
He stated that :
My opinion on that Is that they (the enlisted men) were fairly well trained
at that stage of the game. (R. 1197.)
This state of training is further described by him as follows :
Well, 1 think we bad had the sets operating in practice a sufficient length of
time so that the radar scope operators that we had were fairly well trained. We
had plotters and Information center personnel of the Signal Corps fairly well
trained. I was in the process of training what I called pursuit officers, which if
one of the positions on the board — on the control platform, that is — by running
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
109
a roster of the fighter pilots in the Interceptor Command in order to do two things :
to both train them to function as pursuit officers on the control board and to
acquaint them with the workings of the board in order to better carry out in-
structions that they received from the board on flying missions. The only con-
trollers that we had, we considered, that could operate, that were trained suffi-
ciently, were myself, Major Tindal — I mean Colonel Tindal; he was a Major
at that time — and I did have with me at that time Commander William E. G.
Taylor of the Navy. The other positions on the control platform, we did have an
antiaircraft liaison officer, and had conducted problems with them so that they
were in a fair state of training. We had not been able to get the Navy liaison
officers assigned, so there was no one trained in that. The same applies to the
bomber command liaison, the liaison officers with the Hawaiian Department
headquarters. ( R. 1191-1192. )
At this time the system had a maximum range of approximately 130
miles. (R. 1190.)
On November 24th there was a conference of interested Army and
Navy officers on this subject, and the consensus of opinion of these
experts among the younger officers who were actually getting this
Information Center into operation was expressed by Commander
Taylor :
[109] It was felt that the Information Center could be made to function
adequately within the next two weeks. (The conference was on November 24,
1941.) We found after that, after this, to qualify it, that that would be except
for the air-to-ground radio communications. We learned that we could not keep
contact with the fighter aircraft more than five miles offshore with the communi-
cation equipment we had at that time. (R. 1077.)
This confirms the testimony of others that the only thing lacking
was the IFF equipment on the planes to enable identification of the
planes in the air by ground personnel. Considerable equipment had
been withdrawn from the Interceptor Command and the Hawaiian
Air Force for this purpose for the use of the Ferry Command.
(R. 1079.)
As to the operatability of the aircraft warning service on the morning
of December 7th, Commander Taylor testifying said :
If we had had the Information Center completely manned there would have
been some method of identification. Anybody could have told what that (the
Japanese) flight was. (R. 1085.)
The Navy had not yet participated in the operation, although
Commander Taylor said they had been requested to do so about a
week before Pearl Harbor. (R. 1086.)
This brings us to the question of why General Short or his staff
did not take more vigorous action in putting this most important part
of the defenses into operation, particularly in view of the fact that
both the long-distance reconnaissance by the Navy and the inshore
reconnaissance by the Army were, for all practical purposes, non-
existent. Commander Taylor was asked, when he found these delays,
whether he had ever seen General Short, to which Taylor replied in
the negative by saying :
I saw his chief of staff. I saw his operations officer. We were very closely
tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff. (R. 1089.)
[170] We saw every chief of staff, but we found that somebody else was
always responsible. (R. 1088.)
Colonel Powell, Hawaiian Department Signal Officer, said repeated
efforts to get the Navy to cooperate by supplying naval officers to
complete the working of the service were fruitless. They were not
interested. (R. 3906.)
79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 8
110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It is significant that when Phillips, Short’s Chief of Staff, was
asked if Short had tried to expedite these matters he professed ig-
norance (R. 1143), but it. was Phillips^ as Chief of Staff to Short,
who Taylor and others said was principally responsible for acting
on Short’s behalf in this matter. (R. 1088.)
Colonel Powell testified that the construction of permanent instal-
lations did not hold up the placing of the Information Center and
the radar stations into operation because there was adequate equip-
ment for this purpose that was actually installed in temporary build-
ings for the Information Center and that radar mobile stations were
placed around the Island.
As a consequence the Information Center and the radar stations
were in operation some time prior to December 7th. The only reason
they were not operated continuously 24 hours a day was the desire
to conserve tubes, as they were short of tubes and other spare parte.
Two permanent radars, No. 271, were received on June 3, and a
third radar, No. 271-A, was also received on June 8. On August 1
six mobile radar stations were received and shortly thereafter put
into operation. They were complete and self-contained and only
needed to be placed at some appropriate elevation.
Colonel Powell testified that the entire service was oper- [171-
170] ative about the 1st of November, 1941. The installations for
the permanent radar and Informatioh Center were held up by the
Engineer construction and were not held up by any lack of informa-
tion or drawings or equipment of the Signal Corps.
Colonel Powell testified that the location of the centers was made
by a board from Washington. This board ordered the abandonment
or Kaala at 4,000 feet on the theory that while the range would be
extended to 150 miles from Hawaii yet there would be no detection
of planes within the 20-mile radius close to shore. This does not
sound logical because the great necessity was the locating of planes
at a maximum distance ttom Hawaii. The other stations lower
down were fully capable of picking up the close, inshore approach of
aircraft.
Colonel Powell added the significant statement that the Navy took
little interest in the radar system and
We were never able to get any liaison officer over from the Navy to take
part in the exercises or carry on the work. ( R. 3906. )
This is confirmed by the fact that Navy liaison officers never were
supplied for the Information Center although it had been in oper-
ation for some weeks prior to December 7 ana the Army had supplied
a number of officers to do trained. (R. 3906.)
General Short testified again as to the reason why he was interested
in keeping the aircraft warning service in training. He said :
We had gotten, along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we
got them we started using them right away; and when this message of the
27th came along, I prescribed that the aircraft warning service would function
those hours. In addition to that, they had their normal training. The;
trained then from 7 to 11, and they had maintenance work, work of that kind,
from 12 to 4.
[173] Now, It turned out that we were putting a little bit too great a
strain on this materiel, and later in the afternoon period we had three stations
working from 11 to 1, and three working from 1 to 4, so that there was a little
more chance for maintenance work and keeping them in shape. But that was
the situation, and the Interceptor Command was working with them. We were
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
111
trying to educate the Interceptor Command and the Aircraft Warning Service,
and using this training period aa an opportunity to give them work at what
we considered the most dangerous time of the day. The Navy had a liaison
officer functioning with this outfit (R. 298.)
Two explanations have been advanced as to the reason why the
aircraft warning service was not put into operation fully. The first
was that the signal equipment was not ready until very latej the
testimony of Colonel Powell, in charge of this matter for the Signal
Corps, plus what actually occurred as to its actually going into op-
eration for nearly a month before the permanent construction was
erected, is ample to overrule this objection. (R. 3896-8898.)
The second explanation was that there were serious delays in
construction. But such delays in permanent construction did not
delay the aircraft warning service because it was using temporary
housing for its Information Center, and its mobile radar stations
were operative without any permanent housing. (R. 3885.)
As to the Interceptor (jommand and the Information Center of
the aircraft warning service, General Burgin, Commanding General
of the antiaircraft artillery, said:
It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming
In. and immediately the Interceptor Command would take over. (R. 2004.)
He explained how the Interceptor Command had been working
during previous trials and exercises. While the Interceptor Com-
mand was not fully functioning due to the lack of IFF instruments
on the planes, yet there was ample AWS means for [i7^] de-
fense and interception that it could have used to a material degree
on the morning of December 7, 1941. The Interceptor Command
was just being set up, but the nucleus of its operation was there, and
it would have been an effective instrument had it been used when the
attack came. This was not done.
3. Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Defenses .— -General Burgin
commanded the Coast Artillery Command consisting of seacoast ar-
tillery plus all antiaircraft artillery in the Hawaiian Department.
He commanded the 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade composed of the
64th Regiment, 251st Regiment, and the 98th Regiment.
He testified that the Interceptor Command was being organized
on a temporary basis saying:
We had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where that particular
thing was stressed, and the antiaircraft was turned over to Interceptor Com-
mand * * * For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7,
we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA
would go out In the field and take their field positions. They would know
that the Navy was coming In, with carrier-based planes, and they would simu-
late an attack on the Island, and we put our guns out mainly along the road-
ways, sometimes In position, and practiced simulating fire against this simu-
lated attack made by the Navy. And we were out Just one week prior to
December 7 * * * On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on
December 7. The fleet was In the harbor.
And again he said, as to the Interceptor Command:
It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming
in, and immediately the interceptor command would take over. All that Is,
so far as turning It over to the Interceptor command, is that the interceptor
command tells you when to hold fire and when to resume fire. (R. 2002-
2004.)
112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This brought him to his opinion expressed in the record that if the
Interceptor Command had worked during the drills and exercises on
the morning of December 7, then it could nave worked for the attack.
He said in his opinion it would not [775] have made any
difference anyway,
because we didn’t have ammunition with our mobile antiaircraft. If they
had been out in the field without any ammunition, they would have been worse
off than they actually were. (R. 2604.)
He said of his antiaircraft batteries :
They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that
the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. (R. 2604.)
A reference to the next section will show that it was General
Short who supported the Ordnance Department in refusing to issue
this ammunition to troops when they went out for exercises in the
field.
Additionally, General Burgin found that he could not even put
his guns into final positions because of the conditions now described.
General Burgin pointed out one of the great handicaps to de-
velopment of field artillery positions was resistance from land owners
to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of
battery positions. He described the situation as follows :
General Russell. Is it true, therefore, General, that prior to December 7,
1941, so far as you can recall, you had never had all of your mobile batteries
in the positions which they were to occupy in the event of hostilities?
General Burgin. That is correct ; they had not all been in the actual position
they were to go in.
General Frank. Was that because of this opposition of the people who owned
the land?
General Burgin. Yes, and the fact that we had not yet gotten the leases all
fixed up, so that we could move into those positions for practice. (R. 2628.)
He also pointed out that if General Short had gone to Alert No. 3
there woula have been great opposition from important and influential
civilians on the island and particularly [ 176 ] those who com-
pose what is known as the Big Five.
As to this he said :
General Russell. Is there in your mind some thought that there would have
been developed a considerable opposition among the influential civilian popula-
tion here on the island toward the results of Alert Number 3?
General Burgin. I think there is no doubt about it, in the world.
General Russell. In other words, if General Short had ordered Alert Number
3 — and I am asking this question in the interest of clarity — if General Short had
ordered Alert Number 3 and thrown all of his people into readiness for immediate
combat, including the issuing of ammunition, it might, or, in your opinion, it
would have provoked opposition on the part of some of the responsible and
Influential civilian population here on the island?
General Burgin. I feel positive it would.
General Grunest. Even though he might have explained that to the influential
citisens, there would stiU have been opposition?
General Burgin. I don’t believe you could have explained it, at that time.
General Grunert. Who are some of those influential citizens that you think
might have voiced their objection?
General Burgin. Oh, my I
General Grunert. Is Dillingham one of them?
General Burgin. Mr. Dillingham, Mr. Walker.
General Frank. Which Walker?
General Burgin. I don’t know. He is a sugar man. General Wells. (R. 2629.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
113
He said amongst those people were the Hawaiian Sugar Planters
Association, and those having the land and crop interests in sugar,
pineapples, etc.
In this connection it should be noted that there is proof in this record
that one of the things that may have influenced Short in selecting Alert
Number 1 and not stirring up the Japanese population was the opposi-
tion that developed then ana [177] later from the large com-
mercial interests on the Island using Japanese labor, that they did not
want it disturbed and that they would be shut down in their business
if a substantial portion of it was either deported or interned. (R.
2654.)
As General Burgin testified, if the tables had been reversed and
Americans had been situated in J apan like the Japanese were in Hawaii
they would have been locked up before the war started and not after-
wards. (R. 2649.)
4. Ammunition Issue : Short's and, the Ordnance Department's Re-
sponsibility . — The Ordnance Department in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment in its misdirected effort to safeguard and maintain ammunition
in a serviceable condition objected to a full issue thereof to troops
except in an emergency. Such issues in an emergency entailed delays
which delayed troops in getting into position and action. (R. 2607.)
General Burgin, who commanded the antiaircraft artillery, stated
that he and General Murray, who commanded one of the infantry divi-
sions, personally went to the staff and to General Short, who turned
them down and refused to allow the issue of the ammunition for the
artillery and the infantry. Later there was some relaxation of the
issue of infantry ammunition. Colonel Weddington testified that on
the morning of December 7th he had insufficient ammunition, that
there was none for his rifles and ground machine guns, and that the
only extra supply of ammunition was belted ammunition for his
aircraft machine guns. (R. 3026-2027.)
The artillery ammunition situation is summed up by General Burdin
as follows :
[178] They were aU ready to go into action immediately, with the exception
that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along
the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to concrete, had the ammunition
nearby. I had Insisted on that with General Short in person and had gotten his
permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun
battery positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however,
boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammunition for the
mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which, you may know or
may not, is about a mile from Fort Shatter, up in the old volcano. The mobile
batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to that, the mobile
batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field positions. They
were not in field positions. (R. 2604-2605.)
He described the efforts of General Murray and himself to get the
Ordnance Department to release this ammunition and how he was
overruled by General Short’s staff and General Short himself, in the
following language :
General Burgin. Yes, sir, we did. I would like to answer that a little more
elaborately. You may recollect yourself the great difficulty in prying loose am-
munition from our storehouses and from the ordnance during peacetime. It
was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because In the
minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out,
gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The same was especially
114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the maga-
zines. We tried the ordnance people without results. General Max Murray
and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his
ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for the antiair-
craft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammu-
nition in plenty of time, that we would have warning before any attack ever
struck.
General Frank. Was that putting off made directly by the Commanding
General or by a staff department?
General Burgin. Both ; staff departments first, then the Commanding General
In person.
General Frank. Supported them?
[179] General Burgin. In his own office, to General Murray and to me.
General Frank. Well, what were the staff departments who opposed it?
General Burgin. The Gs ; G-Is, the Ordnance.
General Frank. And their reasons were?
General Burgin. Same old reason, that they didn’t want to issue any of the
clean ammunition, let it get out and get dirty, have to take it back in later on
and renovate it ; and, besides, we would get our ammunition In plenty of time
should any occasion arise. (R. 2607-2608.)
Apparently one of the reasons in General Short’s mind was sabo-
tage, if the ammunition was out with the guns. As General Burgin
testified :
As long as the ammunition could be left locked up in the magazines, it was
pretty safely guarded and could not be tampered with to any great extent.
(R. 2008.)
He testified that without ammunition for his guns it would take
from a few minutes to six hours before he could get his guns into
position and firing. He was never permitted to take live ammunition
on any of his practices and as 50% of the mobile guns were on private
land he had been unable to even place half of his guns in position, and
they were unable to take ammunition with them. (R. 2608-9-10. )
Therefore on the morning of December 7th he was caught in this
position with only ammunition adjacent his fixed gun batteries, but
half of his guns were without ammunition.
As General Burgin summed it up,
It was just Impossible to pry the ammunition loose from the Ordnance, the
G-4s, or from General Short himself. (R. 2612.)
General Maxwell Murray testified as to his difficulties in getting
ammunition for both his field artillery and his [750] infantry,
as follows :
General Grunebt. . . . First, I would like to talk to you about artillery
ammunition, and ask you this question : Why was not sufficient ammunition at
hand for the artillery, on December 7?
General Murray. There was sufficient artillery ammunition on hand, but it
had not been issued to troops.
General Grunebt. I mean ‘at hand,’ not 'on hand.’
General Murray. I was not authorized to draw the artillery ammunition from
the magazines. I requested authority from General Short to draw. artillery am-
munition and stack it; I suggested either in the gun parks or the division review-
field, in small stacks. The division review field, as you know, is a large area
immediately adjacent to the old artillery park, and had been planned as the
dispersal area for the artillery. (R. 3075-3076.)
General Grunebt. Now, we get hack to the ammunition. You say there was
no ammunition immediately available to you for quick action; is that right?
General Murray. So far as I can recall, we did not have a round of ammuni-
tion in the gun parks.
General Grunebt. And, in case you were turned out to go on an alert which
required ammunition, you would then have to draw it from Bomewhere?
KEPORT OP ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
115
General Mubray. We had to draw It
General GBUNEBrr. Where did it come from?
General Murray. We drew it directly ; the majority of it was drawn at Scho-
field Barracks, although the artillery units of the Eighth Field Artillery, which
came directly to the positions in Honolulu and Hickam Field, immediately adja-
cent to it were to draw ammunition b ± the AUatnanu Crater, which was down
here near Pearl Harbor. (R. 8080.)
General Murray had made arrangements to have separate entrances
to get the ammunition out of the storage houses, but even with that
effective arrangement, plus piling ammunition in the warehouses ac-
cording to unit, it would talce an hour at least to get the ammunition
so the guns could [2<W] go to the beaches to defend the island.
As General Murray said :
I was not satisfied, myself, with the status of our ammunition for either the
infantry or the artillery. (R. 3081.)
He had a limited amount of machine gun ammunition and rifle am-
munition. He had a large number of machine guns in each rifle com-
pany, extra guns, and
It was obviously impossible — most of our ammunition was not belted — it was
obviously impossible to get out the ammunition and belt it without serious delay.
(R. 3061.)
He had only two belt loading machines for each heavy weapon com-
pany, and it had taken three days to load up the belted ammunition on
a previous trial. (R. 3081.) After applying to General Short he had
bmn authorized to draw and belt machine-gun ammunition, draw the
necessary rifle ammunition, and store it in the parks. He was not
allowed to have mortar ammunition or high-explosive grenades inside
the barracks; that ordnance had to be left in the Ordnance Depot, as
was the artillery ammunition. He testified (R. 3081) that it was Gen-
eral Short who was personally supporting his ordnance officer and G-4
in following the peacetime practice of holding ammunition in depots
where it would take hours to get it out in the event of a raid.
He testified that his movement of ammunition into the barracks was
in violation of the standing orders of the post, but he had made
that movement of ammunition on the express authorization of Gen-
eral Short. (R. 3091.)
It is to be recalled tnat when the War Department ordered General
Herron, in 1940, into an alert in which he stayed for six weeks, he was
able to draw his ammunition immediately and [75#] take it
with him into the field.
The testimony of General Burgin as to his inability to get ammuni-
tion for use with his antiaircraft guns is borne ont by tne testimony
of Colonel Weddington of the Air Corps that when he was in command
of the Bellows Field base his efforts to get ammunition for his machine
guns and rifles were met by a response from the Ordnance Department,
on each request he made, that the ammunition was not available and
was not authorized and that this was by General Short’s order.
Lack of ammunition preparations was shown in the testimony of
Colonel Weddington, who was in command of Bellows Field prior
to and on December 7th. (R. 8026-3027.) He testified that it was the
custom for the ships (aircraft) that were at gunnery practice to be
parked on the ramp on Saturday afternoon, close to one another. The
guns were taken on the planes for cleaning, the planes were out of gas
116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and were not to be refueled until Sunday, and the gas was brought over
by truck from Honolulu and did not arrive until sometime later
in the day. He also indicated that many of the pilots were away over
the weekend.
It was in this condition that the attack was launched upon them and
they were unable to defend themselves. He said they had 30,000 rounds
of belted ammunition but no rifle ammunition for their guards and no
machine-gun ammunition. When the attack came they were also
without any 30-caliber machine-gun bullets. His repeated efforts to get
ammunition from the Ordnance Department met with the statement
that it was not available and not authorized, and its failure to be issued
was on General Short’s order.
[i&J] 5. Status of Aircraft Defenses . — The difficulties with sup-
ply of both aircraft and parts to maintain aircraft, due to the conai-
tions depicted in Chapter 2, Background, are no better illustrated than
in the case of aircraft. ' The failure previous to 1941 to provide ex-
tended aircraft programs and the necessity for revising designs to
meet modern combat conditions, as revealed by the European War,
joined together to put the War Department in a difficult situation with
respect to a sufficienty of aircraft.
On the deficiency of equipment in Hawaii, General Martin, Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Air Force, testified he had written
General Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force, personal letters as well
as sent official communications with reference to his obsolete aircraft,
the lack of spare parts for the modern craft that he had, and the
necessity for placing his aircraft in combat condition with adequate
weapons, et cetera. R. 1858-A, 1859, 1860, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1874
to 1889, inclusive.)
While correspondence shows a failure on the part of the Army Air
Forces to supply the correct equipment, adequate equipment, spare
parts, and enough of it to be effective, yet Hawaii was better off than
other commands. As General Marshall expressed it :
As to Hawaii, that had the largest troop concentration we possessed, it had the
maximum of materiel that we possessed, and we were accumulating the first
fighter planes, of the type that we possessed at that time, in the Hawaiian
garrison.
As to Panama : if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and materiel was
100, Panama was about 25 percent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and
Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible.
[18J^\ As elsewhere stated, on December 7, 1941, General Martin
had under his command 123 modem pursuit and bombardment planes,
15 observation planes, 2 transports, 5 observation amphibians, and 8
basic trainers. He had non-modem medium bombers to the number
of 39, 9 light bombers, and 62 non-modern pursuit ships.
General Martin testified :
When I took over from General Frank in the Hawaiian Islands we had, you
might say, no combat equipment. We had some P-20S, an old obsolete type of
fighter which we then called a pursuit airplane. We had some old observation
planes, some B-18 bombers which could never protect themselves in any combat
at all. They could be used for reconnaissance, but you would lose them as fast
as you sent them out, if they went into combat. They were always recognized as
not being a combat ship. In the spring of 1941 we received possibly 50 P-36&
They were obsolescent at the time they came over. A little later — as I remember
it, about May — we received some P-40 fighters. These ships were brought in on
carriers and flown off to the station after they arrived in Hawaii. About May
we received 21 B-17s that were ferried over by air. 9 of these, about the 5th
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
117
or 6th of September, were transferred to the Philippines by air. The 12 remain-
ing were ordered to proceed to the Philippines ; and upon our request that they
be delayed, that we could continue the training of combat crews for that type
of ship, as the two bombardment groups at Hickam Field would be equipped with
that type of airplane, they would go on the tail of some 60-odd airplanes that
were being transferred from the mainland to the Philippines. . . . The types
of ships which could have been used in combat, which is the P-40, B-17, and ten
A-20s, were always possibly 50 percent out of commission due to spare parts.
In the beginning of our production program all monies, as possible, were placed
into the producing of additional engines, and the spare parts requirements were
neglected at the time. Therefore the new airplanes coming out were deficient
to meet the requirements of spare parts. We had sent cablegrams and letters on
the subject of spare parts through proper channels to our supply agencies, and
they were not in a position to help us. I knew that, but I did want them to be
sure to realize how important it was to improve the spare-part situation as
rapidly as possible. If we had an accident in one of our ships we used what they
call cannibalism to rob it of certain spare parts to repair other ships. . . .
Therefore the training program had to be rather extensive for the fighters. We
were receiving men just out of the schools, who had not had advance training
at the time: that is, a limited advance training but not on any of the modern
equipment. So they were put through a demonstration of their ability to handle
the old, obsolescent P-26, then through the P-36 and on to the P-40, and consid-
erable progress was being made in training these men to take over the P-40
equipment . . . The bombers, as soon as we got B-17s, in I think it was
sometime in May, we had a few of our pilots that had flown the R-17s. They
started training others, and as I remember there were one or two officers re-
mained with the first flight of bombers that came over, and helped train other
additional crews. So they had to train the pilots to operate the ship, the co-pilots,
and all other members of the crew. We had no knowledge of repairing its
engines or any of its equipment. ... In other words, they had consumed
some of their own fat, so to speak, to meet the enlargement of the technically
school facility. We were getting but a few technical trained men. . . . There
were possibly 400 men in these schools, as I remember. (R. 1858- A to 1861.)
It is to be remembered that the record shows that the Japanese
carriers had over 400 modern aircraft which they brought against
the Island, so that the superiority was overwhelming.
Although General Short gave a high priority to airfield construc-
tion, there were many delays due in part to slowness in getting funds
and to the inefficiency of contractors under the supervision of the
District Engineer.
Some elements of the Air Force in Hawaii had been used during
1941 primarily as a training force for officers and men who were being
sent into the Philippines and into the outlying islands. The per-
sonnel of these elements, therefore, w r ere largely untrained or par-
tially trained personnel, as the more competent were constantly being
forwarded into what was then advance theaters where the danger was
deemed to be greater. Therefore, much of the Air Force was in a
training status primarily. This has been pictured elsewhere in this
report through the testimony of General Short, General Martin,
[/<§£] Colonel Mollison, and others.
The great effort in the latter part of 1941 was to get B-17s, of which
180 had been allotted to Hawaii. As there were only 109 B-l7s in the
entire Army (R. 154) it was obviously impossible to comply with this
request. General Marshall testified that he had sent General Arnold
to the West Coast to see what he could do to get these B-l7s to the
Philippines via Hawaii, and that they had been held up by contrary
winds and production delays for more than three or four weeks. (R.
167-168.) General Arnold testified as follows:
General Frank. Had anything held up B-17 production that in any way had
an effort on this situation?
118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Abnoux No ; we did not have the facilities to get the numbers that we
wanted. If you will remember, at that time in our endeavor to get R-17s we had
90 in January, and by June the 90 was up to 109, and by November it had only
gone up to 148. That was the total number of R-17s produced by the Boeing
Company. We just did not have the productive capacity to get the numbers
required. (R. 180.)
Due to this condition the planes had been flown out with their guns,
but without their ammunition, to save weight, a factor that was inter-
preted by Short as indicating that no attack was expected on Hawaii.
(R. 305.)
However, the impression in Washington, as testified to by General
Arnold, was that the Hawaiian Air Force was in good shape despite
its heavy training mission. He testified :
We were always of the belief that the Hawaiian Air Force was probably better
trained than any of our air forces. That Is the Impression we had here in
Washington as a result of our inspections and due to the fact that they were
always carrying out some form of mission simulating what they would do in
active combat (R, 179.)
[i£7] In order to develop this further, the following question
was put and answer gained :
General Feaotl What I was about to approach was this point which your
present answer seems to disclaim, namely, that because of the fact that they were
charged with training a lot of crews to fly B~17s from California to Honolulu
and then conduct a lot of transition training in Honolulu, and do certain training
work in preparation for transferring squadrons to the Philippines, that perhaps
they got themselves into a training state of mind rather than a war state of
mind.
General Arnold. I wrote to General Martin, as I said, from time to time, and
the establishment of a transition school in Hawaii was not done until we were
assured that they would get more effective results by carrying this transition on
in Hawaii than if it were done In the United States. In other words, we bad
no air force, as such, anywhere at that time. No matter where you had that
training, it was going to disrupt something. Where could we put that training
so it would interfere least with the creation of the small air force that we did
have? And It looked to us as If they could carry ou this transition In Hawaii
and interfere less with the training than anywhere else because we would have
the airplanes then available, in case of an emergency, where they would be most
needed. (R. 179-180.)
It will, therefore, be seen that the Hawaiian Air Force was handi-
capped by conducting a training program not only for itself but also
for other theaters of action ; its Slips were mainly obsolete, its modem
9hips were few, and there was a marked deficiency of spare parts, and
its airfield construction was lagging. Such was the status on Decem-
ber 7, 1941, of the Army Air Force installations.
[/<&?] E. STATUS OF DEFENSES ON SUNDAY MORNING,
DECEMBER 7, 1941
1. Army Aircraft . — On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, the
status of the island defenses was at the minimum.
As General Burgin testified :
A peculiar thing attaches to that For at least six weeks or two months prior
to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with tbe
Navy.
Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would
know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would
simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along tbe
roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating tire against this simu-
REPORT OF ARMT PEARL HARBOR BOARD 119
la ted attack made by tbe Navy. And we were ont just one week prior to
December 7.
General Frank. On Sunday f
General Bruton*. On Sunday but, by some stroke, we did not go out on Decem-
ber 7. The fleet was in the harbor. (R. 2006.)
On that morning, due to Alert #1, all planes, with some minor ex-
ceptions, were grouped together wing to wing. There were 80 pur-
suit planes in commission and 69 out of commission in various states
of repair. There were 39 bombers in commission and 33 out of com-
mission. Of the bombers in commission the only ones available for
a real mission were 6 flying fortresses and 10 A-20s. The old B-18s
were of minor value. There were a few fighter aircraft that morning
that were at a remote field, apparently unknown to the Japanese, where
a squadron was practicing snort landings. It was out of this group
that there came the brilliant performance of Major (then Lieutenant)
Welch, who courageously got his ship off the ground, together with his
wing man. Major Welch and his wing man shot down a number
of Japanese [189] aircraft.
The Navy had no PBYs in the air that morning, although they
usually had four to six for doing reconnaissance. Perhaps this is
explained by General Burgin’s testimony that while every Sunday
morning the antiaircraft artillery had an exercise with the Navy when
the Navy sent its carrier-based planes from ship to shore, and this
continued up to the Sunday before December 7th, the Navy planes
did not get into the air on this particular December 7th. (R. 2603.)
The fleet was also in the harbor that Sunday, the only vessels of
material character that were out being the carriers ENTERPRISE
and LEXINGTON. The ENTERPRISE, with the addition of
heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, was about 200 miles west
of Oahu. Task Force No. 12 was approximately 425 miles southeast
of Midway, with the carrier LEXINGTON (R. 4.44 14 5) ; therefore
there was not a single carrier in Pearl Harbor that morning.
(R. 540.)
2. Naval Long-Distance Reconnaissance . — The situation as to the
long-distance reconnaissance supposed to have been conducted by the
Navy is admirably and frankly explained by Admiral DeLany, who
was assistant chief of staff for operations on the staff of the Comman-
der-in-Chief , United States Fleet, during this period : Admiral DeLany
testified that there was absolutely no protection or screen thrown out
by the Navy on the morning of December 7th, and no attempt to
obtain information about the launching of an attack upon Oahu. He
further testified, “There were neither planes, pilots, nor other facili-
ties available to conduct and maintain such a [190] , continuous
reconnaissance” as would be necessary in order to maintain a 360-
degree reconnaissance around the island. They realized the danger
but there was nothing that could be done about it. (R. 1728.)
Admiral Bellinger, who was Commander of the Navy Base Defense
Air Force, Commander, Patrol Wing 2, and Commander, Task Force
9, said that on the morning of December 7th he had a total of 81 PBYs
in Patrol Wings 1 and 2, which included those at Midway, leaving a
total of 69 on Oahu, with 9 out of commission. The reoonnaissance
work that was being conducted normally each morning at sunrise was
merely to search the fleet operating areas for submarmes so that the
120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fleet could operate on exercises without molestation. He usually sent
out three to six planes u to guard against submarine attack.” He testi-
fied that the only patrolling being done as a defense against a surprise
attack was in the vicinity of Midway. (R. 1600.) He testified as fol-
lows:
General Frank. You had no instructions from anybody to conduct any search
against a force to protect you from a surprise attack?
Admiral Bellinger. We had had on specific occasions, when there was some
apparent reason for doing so. That instance had occurred for one or two differ-
ent sectors over the periods during the year. (R. 1601.)
Admiral Kimmel summarized the situation when he testified as
follows:
General Russell. You have testified, and it has been supported by a Une of
evidence here, that there was not available to the Army and Navy any means
for distant reconnaissance to ascertain the location of a Japanese task force.
Admiral Kimmel. That is correct (R. 1805.)
[ 191 ] General Grunebt. Were there any planes on distant reconnaissance
on that morning?
Admiral Bellinger. There were no planes on distant reconnaissance in the true
sense of the term “distant reconnaissance.” (R. 1620-1630.)
This failure to do distant reconnaissance cannot be excused for lack
of planes under Navy control because the Navy had 50 PBYs available.
The only excuse for not using them was, as stated by Admiral Kimmel :
We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had
received no orders to mobilize. (R. 1811.)
Admiral Bellinger testified that the relationship between the Navy
and the Army for the use of Army planes from the fighter group of
the Army was not in a functioning status. (R. 1622.) He had 33
scout bombers, 7 fighters, and 9 scouts available on the morning of
December 7th, but they were not being used. (R. 1623.) As witnesses
testified, they were accustomed to seeing PBYs go out each morning,
but on Sunday morning, December 7th, they did not go out. (See
General Rudolph’s and Colonel Brooks’ testimony, R. 993-994, 1232-
1234.)
3. Aircraft Warning System . — The radar aircraft warning system
had the information center completed and organized with five mobile
radar stations which were operating. They had been in operation
from four to seven o’clock each morning for training purposes but had
not gone into regular operation. It was because of their being in oper-
ation that Lockard and Elliott picked up the Japanese attack force
132 miles from Oahu, and this organization functioned continually
after the attack, so it can be assumed it was in operating condition.
(R. 439-440-441.) ( See Lockard in other testimony.)
[. 192 ] As General Short said :
I think that the men were not experts, but I think they were getting trained
to the point where they could do pretty well,
as of December 7, 1941. (R. 508.) They had three heavy radar sets
complete and six mobile sets complete. (R. 509.) The mobile sets
were operating. (R. 510.)
General Frank. . . . the AWS system was operated with mobile sets up to a
distance of about 130 miles. Is not that correct?
General Short. That is correct. (R. 512.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
121
The Interceptor Command “was actually operating,” according to
General Short, He said, “it was actually operating daily.” (R. 525.)
An order had not gone out to Burgin and Martin, but it was working.
4. Antiaircraft Defenses . — As to the antiaircraft, much of it had
never gone into position so far as mobile guns were concerned, and
none or the mobile guns was in position on the morning of December
7th. Ammunition had not been issued because the Ordnance Depart-
ment objected to havingit out convenient to the guns because it might
get dirty. As General Burgin said,
they didn’t want to issue any of the clean ammunition. . . . and, besides, we
would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise. (R. 2608.)
As it took about six hours to get the ammunition fully out, distrib-
uted, and broken open, the delay was a very difficult one. (R. 2608.)
As General Burgin again testified :
It was almost a matter of Impossibility to get your ammunition out because
in the minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at [198]
heart is goes out, gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The
same was especially true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammuni-
tion out of the magazines. We tried the ordnance people without results. Gen-
eral Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray
pled for his ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for
the antiaircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would
get our ammunition in plenty of time, that we would have warning before any
attack ever struck. (R. 2607.)
The two divisions were in their quarters so that it took them a num-
ber of hours to move out after the attack. One of the principal diffi-
culties was the necessity of drawing their ammunition, as elsewhere
discussed.
The status of the antiaircraft was this : The mobile guns had to secure
their ammunition from Aliamanu Crater, between two and three miles
from Fort Shafter. The fixed guns had their ammunition in boxes
adjacent to the guns. He had 60 mobile guns and 26 fixed guns and
the usual complement of 50-caliber and 30-caliber. He testified as
follows :
They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the
mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. (R. 2604.)
On the morning of December 7th he had not gone into operation
with the Navy as one previous Sundays. (R. 2603.) This was due
to the fleet being in the harbor on that Sunday, and for some reason
the Navy was not conducting its usual Sunday exercises with him.
(R. 2603.)
5. Summary . — Therefore, the situation on December 7th can be
summed up as follows: No distant reconnaissance was being con-
ducted by the Navy; the usual four or five PBYs were not out; the
antiaircraft artillery was not out on its usual Sunday maneuvers with
the fleet air arm; the naval carriers with their planes
were at a distance from Oahu on that Sunday ; the aircraft were on the
ground, were parked, both Army and Navy, closely adjacent to one
another; the fleet was in the harbor with the exception of Task Forces
9 and 12, which included some cruisers, destroyers, and the two carriers
LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE. Ammunition for the Army was,
with the exception of that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, in ordnance
122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
storehouses, and the two combat divisions as well as the antiaircraft
artillery were in their permanent quarters and not in battle positions.
Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of the anti-
sabotage alert No. 1. This made of them easy targets for an air attack.
In short, everything that was done made the situation perfect for an
air attack and the Japanese took full advantage of it.
\_196] F. THE ATTACK ON DECEMBER 7, 1941
1. Japanese Intelligence . — The details of the attack have been al-
ready adequately described. To have a competent understanding of
the attack and the perfection with which it was executed, we should
remember that the Japanese had had exceptional opportunities for
securing the very latest information from a wide variety of sources in
the islands as to the exact dispositions of the fleet and of our military
forces. The maps that were found upon Japanese aircraft that were
shot down or on Japanese aviators or upon Japanese submarine crew
men indicated a vast amount of meticulously accurate, up-to-date in-
formation. The fact that one or more submarines were in Pearl Har-
bor prior to December 7th and had circulated in the harbor and then
gone out again showed a knowledge of what was going on in Pearl
Harbor that was substantially complete.
It is interesting to contrast this activity of tht
gaining detailed information of our Fleet with the
to glean any information concerning the task force
Harbor from the time that it left Japanese home waters, about Novem-
ber 22, 1941, and left Tankan Bay about November 28, 1941, until the
attack took place.
For instance, the map found on a Japanese aviator brought down
at Fort Hamehameha on December 7th, Exhibit No. 22; Exhibits 23,
24, 25, and 26; and Exhibit No. 48, illustrate with what meticulous
detail the entire operation was worked out, based upon adequate and
complete intelligence by the Japanese. It is difficult to understand
this attack and its [75d] perfection without first studying
these maps. The Japanese came to the attack with full information
of our dispositions and defenses: we met the attack with absolutely
no information about the Japanese attacking force. The details of
the securing of this information are set forth elsewhere in this report
The Japanese realized that this was the foundation of their war and
thafperfection of execution would have a profound effect politically
upon their allies and upon the countries of the Far East in which
they intended to operate.
2. Nature and Composition of the Attacking Foroe . — The strength
of the attacking force has already been stated in this report, based
upon the extended testimony of Admiral McMorris and Captain
Dayton. It was one of the most powerful naval attacking forces ever
assembled up to that time, because of the large complement of car-
riers. Its aviators were of the highest quality of Japanese encoun-
tered during this war. After they were finally disposed of during
the later days of the present Pacific war, the testimony is to the effect
that no equal or superior Japanese aviators have been met.
Japan evidently brought to bear upon this attack the best brains,
the best equipment, and the finest intelligence, with the most expert
planning, which it had.
Japanese Navy in
failure of our Navy
that attacked Pearl
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
123
The first indication of the attack on the Island of Oahu was the
detection by the U. S. S. ANTARES of a suspicious object in the
prohibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6 : 30 a. m. This was found to be
a small two-man submarine, which was attacked and sunk by the
concerted action of the U. S. S. WARD and a naval patrol plane be-
tween 6:38 and 6:45 a. m. on December 7th. The WARD sent a
report of this action to the Naval Base [ 197 } watch officer
at 7 : 12 a. m., who immediately notified his chief of staff. A ready
destroyer was dispatched to investigate, but no alert warning was
issued based upon the report. This was one of the most important
of a succession of mistakes made during this fateful morning. The
Navy admits that it did not advise General Short as it should have
done.
A second small two-man submarine was sunk inside the harbor be-
tween 8:85 and 8:43 a. m., and a third one was grounded in the
Kaneohe Bay and was captured. There was a total altogether of
five such submarines equipped with two-man crews, one of which was
captured. The remaining nine crew members were Inlled, as confirmed
by a Japanese citation later given to these ten men raising them in
rank. (R. 3038.) These two-man submarines were launched from
mother submarines a short distance from the Island of Oahu.
While Pearl Harbor was provided with an antitorpedo net to pre-
vent the entrance of submarines and this net was kept closed during
the hours’ of darkness, being opened only when necessary for a vessel
to pass through the net, it was kept open continuously during day-
light hours, upon the assumption that the channel entrance destroyer,
toe net vessel, and other vessels in the neighborhood, would detect
any submarines. On the morning of December 7th, the net was opened
at 4 : 58 a. m. for the entrance of two minesweepers and was left open
until 8 : 40 a. m. when it was closed by order as a result of the attack.
The net was not damaged and it was fully functioning. Apparently
the submarine got into the harbor at 7 a. m. It will be recalled that
prior to December 7th one or more Japanese submarines had already
been in this harbor, passing [IS#] through the net when it
was opened at 4 a. m. to permit the garbage scow to go through.
The attacking planes from the six camerB of the attacking force
numbered approximately 424. (R. 3048.)
Of this number about 250 to 300 took part in the attack. They con-
sisted of fighting, bombing and torpedo planes that simultaneously
and successively attacked Pearl Harbor and the adjacent air bases
and airfields on Oahu, starting at about 7 : 55 a. m. The attack was
over by 11 a. m. On these fields the aircraft were carefully lined up,
wing to wing, tip to tip, in the most perfect target position for both
booming and machine-gun strafing. This is true both of the Army
and of the Navy. The PBYs of tne Navy were substantially all de-
stroyed, and a large number of the Army aircraft met a similar fate.
The landing strips were substantially without damage, possibly in-
dicating some subsequent intention on the part of the Japanese to
employ those landing strips.
Immediately upon the attack being known to General Short he
ordered Alert No. 3. This was executed with more than expected
promptness.
As already related, this force of attacking Japanese planes Wes’
detected about 132 miles north of Oahu. The Japanese force came
124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
over the island as follows : One force came from the north directly
across the island, over Schoefield Barracks, Wheeler Field, to Pearl
Harbor, attacking Wheeler Field and Pearl Harbor. Another force
came in from the east attacking Kaneohe Field, Bellows Field, and
Pearl Harbor, and a third force came in from the south attacking
Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor. The torpedo planes devoted their
[199] attention to the ships in the harbor. A study of the bomb
pattern of such places as Hickam Field shows that the attack was
concentrated upon the aprons where the planes were parked and upon
the hangars as well as upon the machine shops. All objectives were
entered and carefully identified W legends placed upon the U. S.
Geodetic Survey maps used by the Japanese.
It is significant as to maps secured by the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, that there is an abbreviation of a code which takes care
of every major contingency before, during and as a result of the at-
tack. Nothing was left to chance. It is particularly noted that the
information of construction was shown by the fact that as to Hickam
Field the legend indicated,
All concrete structures— or In the process of construction.
[200] O. TIME ELEMENT IN THE EXPECTED ATTACK; THE EFFECT OF
USING HAWAII A8 A TRAINING GROUND IN ADDITION TO ITS BEING A COM-
BAT OUTPOST
1. Attack a Surprise. — The Chief of Staff and all other witnesses,
including Kimmel and Short, have without exception stated that the
attack was a surprise. General Marshall testified that the Hawaiian
commanders indicated their views that an air attack was their very
serious concern. (R. 52.) Yet he also testified :
We did not, so far as I can recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii ; the reason
being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the de-
fenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japa-
nese to attempt such an attack. (R. 9.)
An analysis of the probabilities of success from the Japanese point
of view shows that the Japanese took an extraordinary chance, if the
facts as to their strength as we now know them are reasonably accu-
rate. In race track parlance, it was a “long-shot” and an extraordi-
nary risk because the consequences of failure to the Japanese might
have been greater than those to the United States in the event of suc-
cess. It was a bold and considered venture.
Japan knew with reasonable accuracy the movements and location
of our fleet. It knew weekend conditions in Hawaii with the fleet in
the harbor as well as we did. It apparently knew of our assumption
that Japan would not dare attack the United States and that if it did,
it would be in the remote islands of the Pacific, including the Philip-
pines. It accurately gauged our belief that Japan had its eyes turned
on Indo-China and the Dutch Indies and was proceeding southwardly
with its conquest.
Based upon this shrewd estimate of our national psychology and our
estimate of their intentions, Japan proceeded to the [201] ex-
ecution of the unexpected, the gain from which it estimated would
be of incalculable value. In the daring attack Japan was compensated
by the gain to her of immobilizing and substantially destroying the
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 125
Pacific Fleet, which was a major threat to Japan’s left flank in its
southward move. The value of such a result was tremendous.
It gave both safety and freedom of action to Japan; and the ability
to concentrate both on the Pacific Islands of the United States and
the Philippines. By that time Japan believed it would be so in-
trenched that dislodgment would be substantially impossible.
Japan used in this attack from four to six carriers out of the total
of eight available to its fleet. The failure of this mission, by the de-
struction of such carriers, would have been really fatal to its fleet,
at least for long months to come. Tfie daring, therefore, of this at-
tack was out of all proportion to its value because had it not been
successful and had its carriers been destroyed it would have been dis-
astrous to the Japanese Navy.
But in making this estimate of Japan’s risky action and its consid-
ered chances, we were doing so from the occidental point of view. We
were completely ignoring the oriental attitude, the Japanese cheap
price of life, and her willingness to conduct a suicide attempt without
any foundation of occidental reasoning in order to gain an extraordi-
nary advantage. Hull and Grew had warned of this psychology and
her penchant for unexpected, reckless, and suicidal moves.
This national urge to take a desperate chance of a military nature
has since then become ^veil-known. It was our failure to take into
consideration this extraordinary chance [202} taking charac-
teristic, due to the violent and uncivilized reasoning of the Japanese
mind, that would approve the making of such a long military and
naval chance for the satisfaction of the first blow, and a disastrous
one, that was so satisfactory to the oriental mind, which misled us.
2. Time Element — The Important Factor in Ail Estimates . — This
analysis is recited for the reason that apparently no one from the
Chief of Staff down considered at the time the attack was made that
any such attempt would be made.
This time element is important in understanding the state of mind
of the responsible authorities of the United States. The military esti-
mates of the situation from the War Department, the Navy Depart-
ment, and in Hawaii, clearly show a reasoned and correctly stated
analytical estimate of the situation. The missing link in our search
for the reason why steps were not taken to carry out the logic of the
military and psychological estimate of the situation seems to be in
this belief that there was ample time to prepare Hawaii. It was gen-
erally thought that Japan would not attempt this attack, if at all,
until some time later after it had made its attacks upon the Philippines
and intermediate islands. In that, the United States’ calculations
went far astray for lack of understanding of the long-chance type
of the military and naval minds of oriental Japan.
As a consequence a policy was followed that was disastrous to the
defense of Hawaii. They gambled upon having time for preparation
that did not exist.
3. Expected Time to Continue Training . — That assumption of time
for preparation resulted in using a portion of the Hawaiian Army
Air Force and the Navy as a training force for the train [203}
ing of green personnel followed by the removal of experienced person-
nel thereof, as they were trained, to other theaters. The Board, al-
79716—46 — EX. 167 9
126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
though it realizes the great need of organized air forces to serve as
training units and that the Hawaiian Air Force was one of the few
available, nevertheless it considers it a mistake to so utilize this out-
post which should have been on a purely combat basis and not subject
to the weakening process of a periodic turnover.
Let us look at the consequence of this. The Navy was either train-
ing ashore or constantly training at sea through its three task forces.
Those operations in the areas were not, as Short thought, for the
purpose of combat reconnaissance or defense duty, but they were
training maneuvers for the constant training of new personnel to
be used elsewhere.
The training problem, which had been frequently discussed with the
War Department and was well known by it, had assumed a position
of importance in Hawaii. This evidently strongly influenced Short’s
decision to adopt Alert No. 1.
He testified :
In addition to that, it was a question of training. Alerts Nos. 2 and 3 would
require so many men on duty. Alert No. 3 would take every man, practically,
so it would eliminate any training. Alert No. 2 would practically put every
man of the harbor defense, the antiaircraft, and the air on duties that would
prohibit training. The situation in the air with regard to training was quite
serious. We had been given the mission of ferrying B-17s to the Philippines.
We had already sent, I think, two groups, one of 9 and one of 12. We had also
sent some crews to San Francisco for the purpose of bringing them back to the
Philippine Islands. We had only 6 flying fortresses in commission to train
all of these crews. If you remember, at that time a flying fortress was relatively
new and you could not just pick up a pilot here and there say he could fly
a flying fortress. He had to be stepped up. We had a bunch of the old obsolete
B-18 bombers that were death traps if you put anybody in them to fight, but it
was one step in teaching a pilot how to handle larger ships. They were put on
those. They were put on A-20s [204] for a little time, and finally got
to the B-17s. With the limited number of ships we had it took time to train
these crews; not just the pilots. In addition to that we had to train the
bombardiers and the gunners so they could protect themselves from the Japanese
going over the Mandated Islands.
General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we should
do nothing that would interfere with the training or the ferrying group. The
responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us
to get the ships there and get them there without loss ; and we could not do it it
we started them out with untrained crews.
That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1 rather
than Alert No. 2 or No. 3. (R. 285-286.)
. . . We felt that we required all possible time for training in the Air Corps,
because we had to prepare these teams for ferrying to the Philippines. Just as
soon as we got a trained unit we lost it by transferring it to the Philippines.
(R. 390.)
And again he testified before the Roberts Commission :
Frankly, that is more nearly correct, that I was more serious about training
rather than expecting something to happen at the tima (Roberts Record 1622.)
(See page 531 of the Grunert Record.)
General Martin, Chief of the Hawaiian Air Force, testified even
more vigorously that the selection of Alert No. 1 was largely influenced
by their desire to keep on training.
General Frank. Was there any advantage to conducting Air Corps training
in any one of the three alerts? . . .
General Martin. There most certainly was, because we were hard pressed to
get the men properly trained to meet our requirements in the new organization.
General Frank. Could you do more technical training for the Air Force in No. 8
Alert, No. 2 Alert, or No. 1 Alert, or was there no difference?
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 127
General Mabtin. Of course there was a difference. There would be more under
Alert No. 1. (R. 1804-1865.)
Admiral Kimmel said :
The principal one that arises at once is the question of personnel, the necessity for
training personnel, from the fact that certainly the Navy was training personnel and
shipping them back to the States, that we were constantly getting new personnel.
That intensive training program was essential if we were not to have a fleet that
was utterly impotent. I have been informed, and I believe firmly, that [205]
the Army had Just as many troubles as we had, if not more. They brought pilots
out there that needed training, and they were depleting their trained airmen of all
ratings, and in the weeks immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the
primary effort for their Hawaiian Air Force, I think it is fair to say, was in ferry-
ng planes to the Asiatic station, and they very greatly depleted their stuff. (R.
1764-1765.)
It is therefore apparent that both services were placing great em-
phasis on training, possibly to the detriment of preparedness to meet
an attack.
4. Shorts Trust in Navy to Give Him Timely Notice . Time Ele-
ment Again . — Genera] Short accomplished what he set out to do, to
establish a cordial and friendly relationship with the Navy. His
instructions from the Chief of Staff to do this were not for the pur-
pose of social intercourse, but for more effectively accomplishing the
objective of a sound and complete detail working agreement with the
Navy to get results. He successfully accomplished fully only the
cordial relationship with his opposite numbers in the Navy, i. e., the
top rank of the Navy ; he did not accomplish fully the detailed working
relationship necessary for his own full information, the complete
execution of his own job and the performance of his mission. The
claim of a satisfactory relationship for practical purposes is not sub-
stantiated. General Short testified :
The one thing that that letter (General Marshall’s first letter of February 7th,
1941) emphasized to me, I think, more than anything else, was the necessity for
the closest cooperation with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter im-
pressed me more than anything else. ( R. 355. )
Apparently Short was afraid that if he went much beyond social
contacts and really got down to business with the Navy to get what he
had a right to know in order to do his job, he would give offense to the
Navy and lose the good will of the [ 206 ] Navy which he was
charged with securing. That is evidenced by his following statement :
I would say frankly that I imagine that as a Senior Admiral, Kimmel would
have resented it if I had tried to have him report every time a ship went in or out,
and as I say, our relations were such that he gave me without any hesitancy any
piece of information that he thought was of interest. (R. 363.)
He testified that he relied for reconnaissance upon the task forces
of the Navy, which employed carriers to search the ocean 300 miles
to each side, giving each task force 600 miles of reconnaissance area,
and with three forces that would have meant covering 1,800 miles.
(R. 284, 384.) Admiral Pye, commander of one of the three task
forces of the Pacific Fleet, testified that:
The schedule as arranged was that one task force was at sea practically all
the time, that is, one of the three task forces, leaving a period normally of about
eight days and about fourteen days in port. (R. 1036.)
Kimmel testified the task forces were in training and not out for
reconnaissance. (R. 1773, 1794-1795; Cf. Pye 1037, Burgin 2673.)
128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He said that this was well known and undoubtedly Short knew about
it. (R. 1771-1773; Cf. Short 359.) The Short and Kimmel testimony
is in conflict on this point.
Again, Short said he was dependent on the Navy, and particularly
the 14th Naval District, or the War Department for securing informa-
tion as to the movement of Japanese ships. (R. 291.) He said that
the combination of the continuous flow of information that the Navy
Department had as to the location of Jap ships and the Navy task
forces doing long-distance reconnaissance with their carrier-borne
planes, led him to the position that
It was a natural thing that I should accept the opinion of the Navy on that
particular subject. It seemed to be the best Informed opinion that there was
In the vicinity [207] (R. 300-301.)
It was for that reason that he accepted the Captain McMorris state-
ment, when visiting with Admiral Kimmel and his staff, that there
would be no Japanese attack in early December. (R. 299-301.)
He said he was further strengthened in his opinion, during the pe-
riod of the 27th of November to the 6th of December, that tne Navy
either knew
where the Japanese carriers were, or had enough Information that they were not
uneasy, and with the task forces that I knew they had out, that they felt they
could handle the situation. (R. 303.)
Short evidently believed that he was getting full information from
the Navy that was available to them. There does not seem to have
occurred anything that led him to think he was not being told all
the pertinent official naval information there was available. He relied
upon complete official interchange which was not in practice.
An examination of the facts showed that the naval forces were in-
sufficient for long-distance patrol, and General Short frankly con-
fesses this situation (R. 375) ; General Short further points out that
the Army had insufficient planes for reconnaissance. R. 377-378.)
Although General Short “looked on task forces as the best means of
reconnaissance” (R. 384), he did not know nor try to find out their
routes. (R. 359-360, 475.) Short could easily have learned that the
task forces conducted only incidental reconnaissance (R. 1773, 1794-
1795) and that the Navy was devoting itself to the submarine menace
in the areas in which they had their exercises. (R. 1040, 1757, 3041.)
Short knew that his inshore patrol was of limited value (R. 473);
that Admiral Bloch did not have the planes to carry out the agree-
ment (R. 375) ; and that all that Admiral Bellinger had was a limited
number of PBY reconnaissance planes (R. 456, 1598, 1810) ; that
Bloch had none (R. 1493, 1526, [£0<S] 1532, 1751) and the car-
rier-borne planes were normally used for antisubmarine reconnais-
sance. (R. 1039-1040.)
General Short’s knowledge of the situation at the time of these
events in 1941 is shown in the testimony of General Martin, who said :
I feel that our decision was Influenced to a certain extent by the fact that
the Navy was patrolling with task forces in waters of which we had no knowl-
edge. Now. as to what areas they were covering, we did not know, but it did
affect a decision as to the paramount danger coming from within rather than
from without. (R. 1856.)
General Martin said emphatically the fact that the Navy had task
forces out influenced Ms decision, saying:
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
129
... I had a feeling that the Navy was not properly equipped to conduct
a reconnaissance that would be completely satisfactory to me; . . . (R.
1878.)
This was despite the fact, as he said :
. . . we were not completely satisfied with the way this reconnaissance
was being done, because there wasn’t enough in the air, and your reconnaissance
from the air would extend over a larger territory in the limited amount of
time, and that was the thing I. was complaining to Admiral Bellinger about.
(R. 1857.)
As an indication that Short was not getting the information is his
own admission:
General Frank. Another thing : Do you now feel that the Navy withheld from
you certain information that they had available that would have been invaluable
to you?
General Short. I don’t believe that they purposely withheld anything from
me that they thought really concerned me.
General Frank. Don’t you think that that information about the naval task
force with carriers and submarines and battleships down in Jaluit would have
vitally affected you?
General Short. Yes, possibly.
General Grunert. Did the Navy understand your mission and your respon-
sibility sufficient to be able to be a good judge of what should be passed to you
or what shouldn’t be passed to you?
General Short. Oh, I think they did, definitely. (R. 409-410).
[209] He did not learn of the early visit on the morning of
December 7th of the Japanese submarine. He did not learn of it
until the 8th, when Admiral Kimmel himself told him about it.
(R. 364-365.) By his implicit trust in the Navy he let them not only
get the information but to evaluate it. In connection with the in-
formation about the Japanese submarine sunk by the Navy early
December 7th, he said this as to the Navy action :
They did not connect it (the submarine which was sunk by the Navy) with
the general raid, they thought it was separate. (R. 865.)
But the point is that Short should have been given this information
and have made his own evaluation. As he now testifies, if he had
known of this submarine information it
might have worked out to our very great advantage if they (the Navy) had
been handled differently. (R. 810.)
In this connection he said,
It was Admiral Bloch’s duty as Commander of the District to get that informa-
tion to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that
at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that
phase of it and just failed to notify me; that he (Bloch) could see then, after
the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong. . . . (R. 311.)
Again, he was not advised of the Japanese task force in the Mar-
shall, between the 25th and the 30th of November. (R. 361.) He
said he was not advised of the naval dispatch of December 3rd, 1941,
and never saw that message. That was the message that showed that
the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts were destroying certain
codes and ciphers, and burning certain documents. He said that he
did not receive the naval messages of December 3rd, December 4th,
and December 6th from [210] the Navy Department to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, regarding the destruction
of confidential documents.
130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He said :
General Gbunert. You had none of the information that was disclosed in
those three messages?
General Short. No, sir. (R. 425.)
He expressed his relationship with the Navy in this wise:
I felt that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, either one, would have defi-
nitely given me anything they thought had any bearing on my job ; that if they
were sure it was an absolutely inside naval proposition that did hot concern
me in any way they might not have given it (the information) to me. (R. 358.)
This situation was summed up as follows :
General Frank. The question as to whether or not you got the information
was placed upon a trust that you had that they would have given it to you?
General Short. Absolutely.
*******
General Frank. Do you feel that you were secure in that?
General Short. I do not know what other basis you could work on. I had no
right to demand that they give me all information they had. (R. 358.)
As to naval task forces on which he so thoroughly relied for recon-
naissance, he did not have any regular means of knowing where they
were or what they were doing,
except as we (Admirals Kimmel, Bloch and Bellinger) happened to talk about
in a personal kind of way. (R. 359.)
This brings us to the further observation that Short in dealing with
the Navy was trying to do the job himself (R. 1248-1249), which
resulted m that he neither got the information completely, accurately,
nor consistently, instead of delegating it to his trained staff officers
dealing with equally trained staff officers of the Navy so
a professional, systematic job could be done. He relied on confidence
and natural trust rather than certainty of information; and on per-
sonal visits and informal conferences instead of the definiteness of an
established organization smoothly operating to an effective end.
H. WHAT WAS DONE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ATTACK/
1. Reason For Analysis of Action Taken After 7 December 191^1 . —
The question of insufficient means with which to adequately defend
Oahu has been raised. General Short’s energy was admirable and
well directed towards improving the defense of Oahu. As a conse-
quence, we have examined the situation as to what he did before the
attack and what he did after the attack with what he had. The first
part of the examination has already been related in the previous
portions of the report. We now propose to examine two questions:
How effectively was Short able to use this very same material, person-
nel, and available facilities after the attack; and what did Washington
do after the attack in giving help to Hawaii that might have been done
before?
2. Hawaii and Washington Action . — Upon learning of the attack
General Short immediately ordered the Number 3 Alert. (R. 1118).
The 24th Division was in all battle positions by 1600 hours 7 Decem-
ber 1941. The 25th Division was in all battle positions by 1700
hours 7 December 1941. The Division Artillery drew its ammunition
and secured its issue of a unit of fire to take to beaches within one to
two hours. It is significant that the war garrison was increased by
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
131
Washington from 59,000 to 71,500 after December 7 to defend
Kaneohe Bay, “back door to the island,” and that increases in air
strength and in engineers for \% 12 ] aviation purposes were
f ran ted. (R. 325.) Harbor troops had ammunition “immediately at
and.” The antiaircraft had theirs sometime later. The first of the
sixteen surgical teams reported to the hospital at 0900. At noon there
was started evacuation of women and children from Hickam and
Wheeler Fields and harbor defense positions. The Ordnance Depot
went into two underground rooms. Slit trenches were then dug. (R.
316-317.)
The Department Engineer, under the Department Commander, was
put by Washington in complete control of building of field fortifica-
tions. The troops started on field fortifications. The slit trenches
were not completed on 8 December. (R. 321.) The outlying islands
were further garrisoned. (R. 332.) Orders were issued in connec-
tion with the defense against chemical air attack, air raid instructions
were issued, klaxon horns were distributed for the aircraft warning
service and old gas masks were exchanged for new. (R. 529-531.)
The Interceptor Command, inactive before December 7 and still in
the training stage (R. 1825), was activated 17 December. (R. 4136-
4137.) After December 7
the Navy took us over body and soul .... we did exactly as they ordered
us to. We were a part of their Naval Air Force, so to speak,
said General Rudolph. (R. 1223.) Washington gave unity of com-
mand. Directives came from the War and Navy Departments to
establish a joint operating center for a joint staff of Army and Navy.
This was done in tunnels in the Aliamanu Crater and put into use m
February 1942. (R. 1534.)
Daily reconnaissance was made after December 7, using Army
5-17s and Navy PBYs and “anything they had,” even the B-18s.
tfavy planes were sent from the mainland by Washington after
December 7; many B-17s came out almost immediately. Additional
3 B Ys were received and those damaged on December 7 were repaired.
21 $\ If the planes that were available by Washington after
December 7 had been available before December 7, distance reconnais-
sance could have been made, according to the testimony of Admiral
Bloch. (R. 1532-1534.) However, the necessity for the ferrying of
bombers to the Philippines ceased since they, too, were under attack.
The Interceptor Command was activated immediately after Decem-
ber^ (R. 2604.)
The status of the antiaircraft artillery and coast artillery was as
follows. After December 7 the ammunition was issued for use with
the guns in the field. (R 2605.) The skeleton crews were replaced
with full crews on the fixed coastal guns. (R. 2611.) Only 40 per
cent of the allowance of automatic weapons existed before December
7, which was rectified after that date. (R. 2613.) The whole com-
mand was put on a five-minute alert and old Alerts Number 1, 2, and
3 became obsolete, the men in camp after December 7 remaining right
at their guns. (R. 2639.) The radar and Interceptor Command
installations, formerly under the control of the Signal Corps, were
taken away from the Signal Corps immediately after December 7
and placed under the Interceptor Command. (R. 2644.)
132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The aircraft warning system was started full time on December 7 i
as it could have been weeks before, had the order been given. (R.
4133.) After December 7 the aircraft warning system personnel
continued to operate efficiently. They did so in conjunction with the
24-hour duty of the Interceptor Command. As Colonel Bergquist
said, in contrasting his efforts to get the aircraft warning service and
the Interceptor Command [%llf] cooperating before December
7, after December 7
I just had to snap my fingers and I got what I wanted. (R. 1205-1206.)
The AWS work moved much faster after December 7. (R. 1218.)
After December 7 the controversy between the Air Corps and the
Signal Corps, which contributed to the delay in the activation of the
Interceptor Command, disappeared. (R. 1216-1217.)
After December 7 the fighter planes were kept ready to take off
instantly (R. 3911) and the antiaircraft warning service was put on a
24-hour basis, as it could have been before, said Coloneil Powell, Sig-
nal Officer of the Hawaiian Department Corps. (R. 3913.) The air-
craft warning sets were in continuous operation after December 7
with three groups operating four hours each. (R. 1029.)
Tillman, an Engineer Corps civilian employee, testified that he as
a trouble shooter took charge of construction pertaining to the air-
craft warning service after Colonel Wyman was relieved because
progress was unsatisfactory. (R. 2135.) He found he was able to
complete certain construction projects at aircraft warning stations
by scouting around for parts. Prior to December 7 the crews on those
projects were not working because they said they had nothing to work
with. (R. 2149-2151.)
The most remarkable change between December 6 and December 7
was the change in construction activities under the District Engineer,
Colonel Wyman.
A new field was begun at Kahuku on December 7. Bunkers were
built at Hickam Fielcf* the field at Haliewa was expanded; construc-
tion of a new field at Kipapa was started ; a temporary field was put
on the Schofield golf course. The troops started on field fortifica-
tions. (R. 321.) Authority was requested to [215] build ten
airfields. Bombers were put on the outlying islands.
We were able to go ahead and do a lot without funds.
Barracks were built with WPA money. (R. 325.) A pool of lumber
was authorized for the Quartermaster. (R. 328.)
All the material and contractors with their machinery were taken
over and put to work. Priorities were established on jobs to get more
work accomplished, according to Benson, President of the Hawaiian
Contracting Company. (R. 3737.) A job at Wheeler Field had not
been completed for a long time, due to the delay of plans from the
Engineers. (R. 2542.) Barking Sands airport and Kokee radar
station jobs had been delayed for many weeks with the material on the
ground awaiting someone to act. The Hawaiian Constructors had
not put it up. After December 7 the witness Bartlett went to the
site, erected the tower in five days and had the station operating.
On December 7 the runways under construction at Bellows Field
were incomplete. On the Wednesday after December 7 the work
RESORT OR ARMS PEARL HARBOR BOARD 133
began on a 24'hour-ft-day basis. The second runway was completed
in seven days, that is, by the following Thursday, said Colonel Wed-
dington. base commander at Bellows Field. (R. 8026.) Afte r De-
cember 7 antiaircraft emplacements were constructed at BellowsField
When the attack struck, the planes were concentrated pvactically
wing to wing, but after the attack they were dispersed on the field,
50 to 7o feet apart [ R. 8014.)
The Corps of - Engineers also evidenced >m appreciation of the
eituafnm i v raising the contracting authority of f ile. District Engineer
from $$ 0,000 before December 7 to $5,000,000 after December 7. The
Corps of Engineers' red tape of sending [$JfJ all contracts
and ftt the Chief of Engineers was then eli-
minuted by Washington; testimony of Colonel Wyman, (R. 3435,
8874.) The Rdbfirt jB„ McKee CoihpMiy^ which had beep discawled
by Wyftian when he Went to the IsUn4& in the middle of 1940, was
'invited by loot after December 7 to jdm the Hawaiian ConsttteMirs.
(R, 24054240?.)
Slit trenches Had not been built until the day of Pearl Harbor (R.
1916), but tlrey were built extensively, together with air raid shelters,
lifter December 7, (R.; 838,)
After December 7 Admiral Pye testified the Nuvy kept its forces
nut of tfo harbor fairly continuously, except for the time necessary
th port to OV&rinltil ^ materiel and receive supplies. (R. 1045.)
We, thevefbre, find that after December 7 an active nod vigorous
employment' bfiwdUtiei, materiel »nd personnel was made, and f ull
support and supplies were, furnished by Washington some of which
might hove been dune before, December 7, ’The support from the
Was vastly ditferent after D«‘«;mber 7 than before, and
the record so rejects this coftdition. For msttatice, before December 7
fltd ’not- submit to General Short any strategical estimates but
after December 7 they siibrnitted such a statement weekly. After
December 7 the suspected ahefts were rounded dp and interned, the.
Japanese consul and his 300 agents weropnt out of business and all
necessary steps were taken to monitor both telephone unit radio com-
mufiicatjon, all of which' might lupte- been done without stimng up
the civilian population or the Japanese prior to December 7, 1941.**
[f/7] T. 8tm»IABV
The foregoing concludes the story of Pearl Harbor wit h the excep-
tion c»f the matter of the construction of the Hawaiian defenses and
the particular part of Col. Theodore Wyman. Jr., with respect to those
defenses. Col. Wyman's part in the Pearl Harbor disaster is r leated
iu Chapter V.
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134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HA&BOR ATTACK
In order to not disturb the continuity of the complete Pearl Harbor
story both at Hawaii and in Washington, the next succeeding Chapter
No. IV is devoted primarily to the responsibilities for the Pearl Harbor
disaster of those in Washington who had some part in the matter.
In this way Chapters III and IV, when read together, will give a
balanced and cohiplete picture of the principal events and actions
taken which contribute to the result of the attack on December 7, 1941.
[$/£] Chapter IV. Responsibilities in Washington
1. General
2 War Council
Three groups of conferees.
3. Secretary of State
Responsibility for dealing with the Japanese; no authority to commit the
United States to War; Indecision of the Secretary of State November 25-26;
advice to the Secretary of War of the action by the Secretary of State; action
by the Secretary of War on the 27th.
4 . War Department
Policy of War Department to avoid conflict ; policy as evidenced in the War
Department messages to prevent overt acts; no information to Short of the
Secretary of State’s counter proposals; confusion resulting from the Navy
messages of October 16 and 24; confusion from the messages of the 27th and
28th : how the Long message was delivered and what was done about it ; failure
to act promptly to notify Hawaii.
5. Conflict Between the Army and Navy Messages
The Army-Navy messages were conflicting; the Navy messages predominated
with warnings of a conflict : Army messages predominant to avoid overt acts.
6. Military Intelligence Division
Field of investigation ; necessity for a larger scope in the future ; intelligence
a national problem.
7. War Plans Division
Responsibility for Overseas Departments ; responsibility to see the War Plans
implemented; no action on Alert No. 1 ; Gerow’s failings; inadequate supervision.
8. Navy Department
Failure to carry out agreement with the Army for long-distance reconnais-
sance; failure to advise of enemy submarine sinking; failure to give Short
information of Jaluit task force.
9. Chief of Staff
Responsibility for organization and operation of War Department; failure to
delegate authority ; responsibility to keep General Short advised of international
situation ; delay in sending message on December 6 and 7 ; no action on Short’s
report of measures taken ; and lack of knowledge of conditions of readiness in
Hawaii November 8 to December 7, 1941.
10. Summary
[&/£] 1. General .— The preceding chapter has dealt primarily
with Hawaii and the actions of the responsible officers in the Hawai-
ian Department. It has to some degree and to a lesser extent, by rea-
son of the chronological sequence, dealt with what was done in
Washington both with respect to the internal activities in Washing-
ton and what Washington sent to Short. This chapter, therefore, will
be devoted primarily to the activities in Washington and only sec-
ondarily in Hawaii.
2. War Council. — The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, has dis-
cussed the activities of the group in the War Department known as
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
135
the War Council. He also described the group consisting of the
Secretary of State, Secretary of Navy, Secretary of War and the
Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy,
who were also called colloquially the “War Council”. The third
group was that which included the President, Secretary of State,
Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, usually the Chief of Staff and
the Chief of Naval Operations, and occasionally Commanding Gen-
eral, Air Force, General Arnold.
All three of these bodies yvere informal and constituted simply a
group of men exchanging ideas and attempting to determine policies
without regularity of record of what they did, as far as this Board
has been able to determine. It was a sort of clearing house for in-
formation, a gathering place for discussion of policies, so that each
of the independent actors in the scene would know what was going
on and would have information to guide him in making his own
decisions that were more or less independent, but at the same time
also somewhat dependent on the action of other members of the
group. *
[220] 3. Secretary of State . — The responsibility apparently as-
sumed by the Secretary of State (and we nave no other proof that
anyone else assumed the responsibility finally and definitely) was to
determine when the United States would reach the impasse with
Japan. It was the Secretary of State who was in charge of the
negotiations with the Japanese ; it was the Secretary of State who had
long and numerous conferences with the Japanese. He was the con-
tact man and the responsible negotiator.
He was doubtless aware of the fact that no action taken by him
should be tantamount to a declaration of war. That responsibility
rests with Congress. It is important to observe that the President
of the United States had been very careful, according to the testimony
of the Secretary of War, to be sure that the United States did nothing
that could be considered an overt act or an act of war against the
Japanese.
For, as Mr. Stimson testified in the phrasing of the message of
November 27, he was particularly concerned with so phrasing it so
as to carry out the President’s directive which was in accordance with
our constitutional method of doing business. Mr. Stimson said :
I bad bad a decision from tbe President on that subject, and I regarded it as my
business to do what I of course normally would do ; to see that tbe message as
sent was framed in accordance with the facts. (R. 4057.)
Mr. Stimson was referring to the status of the negotiations of the
previous day on November 26, when the Ten Points were handed by
Secretary Hull to the Japanese, and to the fact that the President, as
of the 27th of November, 1941, was still desirous that no overt act be
committed by [221] the United States.
With this clear understanding, let us see how these serious respon-
sibilities were discharged. In making this statement we are deeply
sympathetic with the state of mind, the irritation, the exasperation,
the chicanery, trickery and deception of the Japanese ambassadors
with whom the Secretary of State had so long and manfully strug-
gled. What he did was human, but the results are the things with
which we are concerned.
136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Undoubtedly the Secretary of State had been frequently advised
through the meetings of the War Council of the inadequate status of
the defenses of the United States. Our Army and Navy were not
ready for war, and undoubtedly the Secretary of State had been fully
advised of that fact. So serious was this situation that General
Marshall and Admiral Stark drafted a joint memorandum under
date of November 27 on this subject.
This memorandum was addressed directly to the President, accord-
ing to the testimony of General Marshal,!. It contained two things:
first, a statement that the most essential thing then from the United
Sates viewpoint was to gain time and to avoid precipitating military,
action so long as this could be done consistent with the National, Pol-
icy because of the fact that the Army and Navy were not ready for
war; and second, attention was called to the desirability of counter -
military action against Japan in event she engaged in specific acts of
aggression (described in the memorandum). The memorandum then
recommended among other things that ,
steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch -
for the [2221 issuance of warnings to the Japanese against taking such
aggressive action. (B. 9-10-11.) |
The situation was delicate.
Now let us turn back to Mr. Stimson’s testimony. The War Council
met with Mr. Hull on the 25th of November 1941. The tentative
U. S. proposals to the Japanese were so drastic and harsh that Mr.
Stimson testifies that when he read it his diary shows this was his
contemporaneous impression of it:
Hull showed me the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to I
lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our |
interests, I thought, secured it, but I don’t think that there is any chance of the
Japanese accepting It because it was so drastic.
Apparently the Secretary of War, in the light of his long experience
with the Japanese, with whom he dealt extensively when he was Secre-
tary of State to this government, was concerned at the situation, for
his diary continues :
We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department,
and I got hold of Marshall.
Thus the Secretary of War felt the situation that was to be precipi-
tated by the action of the Secretary of State, Hull, necessitated his
informing the Chief of Staff immediately of the threatened difficulty.
Next, the Secretary of War attended a meeting at the White House.
His diary describes it:
Then at 12 o’clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half
past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There' '
the President brought up the relationship with the Japanese. He brought up
the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as — perhaps next
Monday, for the Jape are notorious for making an attack without warning, and
the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem.
Apparently, at that time no decision was reached and the [£23] (
entire matter was left for further consideration.
On the following day, November 26, 1941, the Stimson diary con-
tinues:
Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he bad about made up h it
mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day (the
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 137
25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and tell them that ihe
had no other proposal at all.
Apparently on the 26th in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his
mind not to go through with the proposals shown the day before to
the Secretary of War containing the plan for the “Three Months’
Truce”.
Evidently the action “to kick the whole thing over” was accom-
plished by presenting to the Japanese the counter proposal of the “Ten
Points” which they took as an ultimatum.
It was the document that touched the button that started the war,
as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed it.
Again Mr. Stimson’s diary relates:
? 'hie 26th was the day he (Hull) told me he was in doubt whether he would go
on with it. (R. 4051-2-3.)
Apparently the Secretary of War was not advised by the Secretary
of State that he had handed this so-called ultimatum to the Japanese,
The diary of the Secretary of War and his actions indicate that to be
a fact.
Witness what it says as of the morning of the 27th of November
1941 :
The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his final deci-
sion had been with the Japanese— whether he had handed them the new proposal
which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday,
he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole
matter off. As he put it, “I have washed my hands of it, and it is now, in the
hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy.”
[#££] His diary continues :
I then called up the President and talked with him about it.
He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral
Stark, and with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing
General Marshall in his absence at maneuvers. He was concerned
with revising the draft radio of General Marshall, which became
radio #472. Also, as he says,
A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the
President was examined, and the question of need for further time was
discussed. (R. 4064.)
The advice from the Army and Navy to delay matters and get
more time for defense preparations and not precipitate the issue
evidently did not reach the President or the Secretary of State
in time to be considered before the memorandum of the 26th was
delivered to the Japanese. It seems well established that the send-
ing of this “Ten Point” memorandum by the Secretary of State
was used by the Japanese as the signal for starting the war by the
attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese attacking force departed
from Tankan Bay on the 27-28 November for its attack on Hawaii.
It also appears that the delivery of the 14-point reply of the Japanese
to this memorandum was contemporaneous with the attack.
4. War Department . — The intentions of the War Department not
to precipitate war, as far as the War Department was concerned, are
clear and unmistakable. The messages sent to the Hawaiian De-
partment show this to be a fact. The Navy apparently had the same
idea because many of their messages likewise so indicate the situation
138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and the Hawaiian Department was given the benefit of those
messages.
[825] To be concrete: the Navy message of October 16 con-
cluded with the sentence,
In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such
preparatory deployments as will not disclose previous intention nor con-
stitute provocative action against Japan. —
the message of November 24, from the Navy Department to Hawaii
said in conclusion :
Inform senior Army officers in respective areas utmost secrecy is necessary in
order not to complicate the already tense situation nor precipitate Japanese
action. —
the message of November 27, #472 from the Chief of Staff to General
Short says,
The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act . . .
these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil
population or disclose intent. —
the message from G-2 on the same day warns against an incident
with the Japanese population by saying,
Axis sabotage and espionage probable.
All this had an effect upon Short because his reply to the message
of the 27th was
Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.
In order to prevent an untoward action by Short the message of
the 27th as originally drafted started with the opening words,
“Negotiations with Japan have been terminated” (K. 4270) were
changed by the Secretary of War after consultation with the Secre-
tary of State to the softer caution contained in the Stimson-drafted
sentences :
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only the barest possibility that the Japanese government might come
back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable. Hostile
action possible at any moment.
Then followed the caution not to commit the first overt act.
[226] In continuing on beyond November 27th, was the message
from G-2 on November 28, #484, sent by General Arnold which was
devoted to sabotage and defensive measures. On the same day the
War Department sent message #482 to Short with similar tone and
tenor. Short replied to #482 on the 28th with a very long message
all dealing with sabotage and espionage. This ends the communica-
tions with Short by the Army until the final message of December 7
which arrived too late.
Short was never informed of the Secretary of State’s action in
delivering the “Ten Points” counter proposals. He testified he first
saw or heard of that document after the White Papers were published.
General Short said,
I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so afterwards, whenever
that State Department paper came out.
The message of November 27th did not convey to Short what it
was meant to convey by the people who drafted it. While confusing,
it contained information and instructions the significance of which
should have been appreciated by Short and his staff.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
139
The two Navy messages of October 16 and 24, both of which cau-
tioned against precipitation of an incident, could have added to Short’s
confusion in interpreting the message. ,
The impression that the avoidance of war was paramount was
heightened by the messages immediately following the one of the 27th.
In the first place, Short had no reaction from the War Department to
his reply that he was acting only to prevent sabotage and to keep
contact with the Navy. He felt confirmed in this action by the mes-
sage on the 27th, from G-2, saying,
Actions of sabotage and espionage probable.
[ 227 ] Immediately following that the next day were two addi-
tional messages dealing with sabotage and espionage.
From that time on, November 28, until the message that was received
after the attack, Short received no other word by courier, letter, radio,
or otherwise. The only claim that he received any additional informa-
tion was that he was told of messages of December 3, 4, and 6, about
the Japanese destroying their codes and the Navy being instructed
to destroy some of its codes. Short denies receiving this information.
These acts of omission and commission on the part of the War
Department undoubtedly played their part in the failure to put the
Hawaiian Department in a proper state of defense.
The record shows that from informers and other sources the War
Department had complete and detailed information of Japanese inten-
tions. Information of the evident Japanese intention to go to war
in the very near future was well known to the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary
of Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations. It was not a question
of fact; it was only a question of time. The next few days would
see the end of peace and the beginning of war.
If it be assumed that for any reason the information could not have
been given to the Hawaiian Department, then it was a responsibility
of the War Department to give orders to Short what to do, and to tell
him to go on an all-out alert instead of a sabotage alert.
As elsewhere related in detail, when vital information of December
6th reached G-2 of the War Department, not later than nine o’clock
the evening of December 6, it was placed in [ 228 ] the locked
S uch and delivered to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel
dell Smith, now Lt. Gen Smith, with a warning from Colonel
Brattoh ? Chief of Far Eastern Section of G-2, that it contained a
vitally important message. In fact the message implied war and
soon. Whatever was the reason of Colonel Bedell Smith for not con-
vening this message to General Marshall on the night of December
6th, it was an unfortunate one. And further, with the top War
Department officials fully aware of the critical nature of this situation,
standing operating procedure should have required delivery of this
vital information to General Marshall at once. He, himself, was
responsible for the organization and operation of his own immediate
office.
This information could have been sent to Short on the afternoon
(Honolulu time) of December 6. Additionally, this same information
was given to General Gerow’s Executive, Colonel Gailey. of the War
Plans Division, and there is no. evidence of action taken bv that
Division.. s
140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The responsibility of War Department is clearly defined and plain.
Action by it would have been sufficient further to have alerted the
Hawaiian Department. It was in possession of the information which
was the last clear chance to use the means available to meet an attack.
It had the background of the full development of the Japanese prepa-
ration for war and its probable date.
Again, the equally important and vital information of December
7th, the day of the attack, was in the possession of the War Depart-
ment at 0900 on the morning of December 7. Colonel Bratton made
an immediate effort to get the Chief of [229] Staff at that
hour. It was not until nearly three hours later that any action was
taken by the War Department, when time was of the greatest im-
portance.
Under the circumstances of the clear and explicit revelation of
Japanese intentions, arrangements should have been made for imme-
diate action to further warn Hawaii and not leave the situation to
be acted upon when the Chief of Staff could not immediately be
reached. The responsibility is the Chief of Staff’s for not providing
an arrangement by which another could act in so critical a situation
when he could not readily be reached.
Strange as it may appear, the War Department did not know the
actual state of readiness of Short’s command from November 27th
to December 7th, 1941, though this information was contained in
Short’s report of action taken on November 27tli.
5. Conflict between the Army and Navy Messages . — The practice
of having General Short secure through the Navy in Hawaii copies of
the naval messages tended towards confusion. We have taken occasion
to compare the messages of the Navy and the messages of the Army
delivered to General Short from October 16 to December 7. We find :
a. That they were conflicting.
5. That the Navy messages were predominant with warnings
of a conflict and the Army messages predominant with the idea of
avoiding a conflict and taking precautions against sabotage and
espionage.
Short naturally took his choice between the two types of [230]
messages and followed that of the War Department. Examination
of the Navy messages of October 16, 24, November 27, December 3, 4,
and 6, will show that their tenor was predominantly war. One Army
message of November 27 and two of November 28 predominated in
antisabotage warnings.
Furthermore, the Navy message of November 27 and the Army
message of November 27 from the Chief of Staff were conflicting: the
Navy message flatly stated,
This is a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilise
conditions in the Pacific have ended.
Now, contrast the opening sentences of the Army message which indi-
cates that negotiations may still continue, where it says :
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes. Only
barest possibility that the Japanese government might come back and offer to
continue.
The Navy message contained no warning to Hawaii to take precau-
tions against sabotage or overt acts, and no precautions as to the
civilian population. To the contrary, the Army message gave explicit
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 141
directions on this subject. This was followed on the same day by a
G-2 message, which said,
It appears that the conference of the Japanese had ended In an apparent
deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable.
The Navy war warning was further diluted in its effect upon Short
by the Amold-AG sabotage message on the 28th of November; and
tne additional G-2 message on sabotage on the 28th. These November
28 sabotage messages undoubtedly influenced Short to continue on
his sabotage alert.
Thereafter Short had only silence from Washington. Short was
given no further clarification of this conflict amongst the messages.
[231] There is no explanation why Short was not told of the
so-called ultimatum. It was known to the Japanese because it was
handed to them.
6. Military I intelligence Division . — Within the scope of its activities,
this division performed well. It gathered much valuable and vital
data. Through Colonel Bratton it insisted on the dissemination of
this information to Field Commanders.
There was a broad field for investigation, however, which was not
touched by it or any intelligence agency of the American Government,
either military or civil. In this field were the mandated islands, the
home land and the home waters of the Japanese empire, and the areas
in which the Japanese Navy and Army were operating.
In these fields, reliance was placed upon sources of information which
were inadequate. The Japanese Navy was lost to us for considerable
periods in those months prior to the outbreak of war. The task force
which made the attack on 7 December 1941, left home ports, assembled
at Tankan Bay, and notwithstanding that it was a relatively large
convoy, sailed for thousands of miles without being discovered. Part
of its aircraft was in flight for the targets at Pearl Harbor and on
Oahu before we knew of its existence. Its detection was primarily a
naval job, but obviously the army was intensely interested. Elsewhere
in this report, the mass of detailed information which the Japanese
had assembled relating to American activities has been discussed and
is not repeated here.
Discussing this subject before the Board, General Miles, G-2 in 1941,
testified as follows :
[M2] But to answer your question more succintly, I do not think any
Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or
attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going.
That was beyond our terms of efficiency. (R. 107. )
The disadvantages accruing from this situation could have been
calamitous. The Japanese armed forces knew everything about us.
We knew little about them. This was a problem of all our intelligence
agencies. This should not come to pass again. Our intelligence serv-
ice must be brought in line with the part which we are to play in world
affairs.
We must know as much about other major world powers as they
know about us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligent
planning by those charged with formulating our international policies
and providing for our security. Our intelligence service should be
second to none in its efficiency. It must not be inferred that this is the
exclusive function of the M. I. D. It is a national problem.
78716 — 10 — Bx. 157 10
142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In the past our intelligence service has suffered from lack of funds,
lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be
taken to correct all of these.
7. War Plans Division . — The War Plans Division, the supervising
agency for the War Department for Overseas Departments, was
charged with directing the preparation of and coordinating the war
plans for Hawaii. It had the responsibility and duty to insure the
implementing of such plans.
Aside from the letters and telegrams sent throughout 1941 to General
Short (and there were no letters from General Marshall to General
Short after the first of November 1941,) no action after November 1,
1941, appears to have been taken bv way of communications or in-
spections, or full report of [833] any sort, to reveal whether
General Short was doing anything, whether he was doing it correctly,
what his problems were, and what help could have been given him.
The War Plans Division took no action when Short put the
Alert Number "1 into operation and so reported. It took no steps to
stop the use of the Hawaiian Department as a training station ana put
it on a combat basis, such as an outpost should nave been, with
threatened war. It took no steps to find out if the Hawaiian defenses
were being implemented and built according to schedule and the right
priorities. It took no steps to put the control of the building of its
defenses on the Department Commander so that he could coordinate
the building of defenses with his other defense preparations.
General Gerow’s own testimony clearly pictures the lack of organiza-
tion and management of the War Plans Division of the Overseas
Departments, such as the Hawaiian Department. The War Plans
Division was responsible for the Overseas Department, said General
Gerow. (R. 4334-4335.) The War Plans Division was familiar with
the equipment situation in Hawaii, such as lack of parts for radar.
(B. 3425.) It was their duty to do all they could to correct the
deficiencies but there is no proof that any action was taken.
( R. 4325-4326. ) The War Plans Division was responsible for drafting
the operational messages to the Hawaiian Department. Gerow was
responsible for drafting the message of the 27th and managed the
drafting and final sending of that message. He admitted that he
failed to follow up to see if the message of the 27th was being carried
out and that was the War Plans Division’s responsibility.
[M£] He said :
Admiral Standmt. Then who would have been interested in following up that
message to see whether those Instructions were obeyed or not?
General Gebow. The War Plans Division, sir, should have been
Admiral Standley. War Plans Division.
General Gebow. Should have been responsible for following it up, sir.
Admiral Standley. That was not done then?
General Gerow. No, sir, it was not.
*******
Admiral Standley. Then those instructions went by the board; nobody fol-
lowed them up, then?
General Gebow. That is correct, sir; that is, between the 27th and the 7th.
(Roberts Report 1857-1858.)
And he again admitted that he made an error in not realizing that
the reply of Short, which referred to Message No. 472 by number,
referred to that message. He thought it referred to a G-2 message.
(Roberts Report 1857-1868.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
143
He also testified as follows :
General Gbunebt. Without such coordination, there was liable to be confusion
and misunderstanding as to the intent of each one of the messages. Was that
the War Plans Division? Was it the Chief of Staff?
General Gebow. It was done, usually, General, I believe by a matter of getting
concurrences between the various divisions of the General Staff, on something
that was going to be sent out. (R. 4336.)
• ••••••
General Gebow. The coordination of concurrences, and then most of these
important messages, I believe, went through the Secretary of the General Staff.
General Gbunebt. Then it appears to be the Secretary of the General Staff?
General Gebow. No.
[235] General Gbunebt. It appears you do not know just who does it,
do you?
General Gebow. Well, no, sir. (R. 4337.)
He testified that it was not his particular duty in 1941 to coordinate
all messages of the War Department that went to our overseas pos-
sessions. (R. 4338.)
Therefore the War Plans Division under General Gerow failed as
follows :
а. General Gerow failed to take action on Short’s reply show-
ing that he was taking precautions against sabotage only. He
again failed to take action in that he assumed liaison with the
Navy meant Short was taking the correct steps. The documents
in tne War Plans Division snow that the Navy’s responsibilities
did not start until war was imminent or had taken place and that
some formal action by Washington or the Hawaiian Department
putting the agreements into effect was necessary.
б. He was responsible for drafting the confusing message of
November 27.
c. He took no steps to deliver to Short additional available in-
formation. As Gerow testified as to Short’s reactions to the
message of the 27th :
No one knows wbat he would have done had he been in that position and
not having perhaps all infortnation we had here. (R. 1851.)
d. He did not check on the Hawaiian Department’s activities to
determine its state of readiness from November 28 through De-
cember 7. (R. 4306.)
[236] e. He relied upon the message of November 27 to give
Short all the information he needed for full preparation for war,
but did not check to find out if that was a fact. (R. 4266.)
f. The joint air estimate of General Martin and Admiral Bell-
inger under the joint agreement of General Short and Admiral
Bloch as approved by Admiral Kimmel, stated that air attack was
the prime tnreat against Hawaii ; and when General Gerow was
advised in a conference with the Secretary of War and the report
t© the Secretary of War from the Secretary of State, in addition
to the intelligence information with which he was provided as
to the status of the international situation, it was incumbent up-
on him to do two things which he failed to do :
(1) To correct Short’s mistake in going to Alert Number 1 in-
stead of to Alerts Number 2 or 3 ; ana
(2) To direct immediately the activation of the Joint Hawai-
ian Coastal Defense Plan to put the Army, in conjunction with
144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Navy, on a complete war footing, ready for any eventuality.
8. Navy Department . — The Navy Department undertook by a signed
agreement to provide long-distance reconnaissance in Hawaii. It
assumed this responsibility admittedly without means of carrying it
out in Hawaii.
The Navy in Hawaii failed to advise Short of the sinking of enemy
submarines in the outer harbor between six and seven [837 J
a. m. the morning of December 7. The Navv failed to advise Short of
the Jaluit task force so that he could evaluate the information for
himself.
9. Chief of Staff . — The responsibility for the conditions in the
military component of the War Department as depicted in this chap-
ter rests with the Chief of Staff.
At about this time, November 25-December 7, 1941, there seemed to
have been in the War Department a firm conviction that war was
imminent but also there seems to have been the conviction that it would
start in the Southwest Pacific and evidently nobody had any belief
that Hawaii was immediately in danger. There was the belief both in
Hawaii and in Washington that war was on our doorstep but not on
Hawaii’s doorstep. This resulted in the main consideration being
given to General MacArthur and the Philippine Islands and the re-
sulting second consideration during this critical time to Hawaii. The
unfortunate thing was that the Japanese “crossed us up” with a daring
surprise attack. When the famous November 27 message was being
prepared, consideration first was given to send it only to MacArthur
ana then it was decided to include Panama, Hawaii and the Western
Defense Command. This shows the trend.
As a result of the message of November 27 Short ordered only a
sabotage alert and so reported to the War Department as of the same
day. The import of Short’s reply was little noticed in the War De-
partment by either General Marshall or General Gerow. Just as
General Short failed to interpret the full seriousness of the November
27 message, likewise the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the War Plans
Division failed to [&?<?] interpret the limited defense that
Short’s reply indicated in the face of known impending war.
There was failure of understanding at both ends of the line. The
Washington officials had full knowledge of impending events, which
full knowledge was not available to Short.
A cardinal principle in good management is the necessity to “fol-
low up” on directions. The War Department had nine days in which
to check up on the state of defense in Hawaii, which it did not do.
Repeatedly, since General Short took command in Hawaii in Feb-
ruary 1941, General Marshall during this peacetime had written to
him at length, advising him on details of operating and here, late in
November, with war expected almost daily, he communicated none of
those personal messages containing needed inside information. .
The evidence indicates that the manner in which authority to act
was delegated or not delegated had its influence on this situation.
The Chief of Staff had three deputies, Generals Bryden, Arnold, and
Moore. None of these three was given the secret information concern-
ing the known Jap intentions. When General Marshall went away on
November 27 he had, prior to departure, prepared a first draft of the
November 27 message. It was the Secretary of War who initially fol-
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
145
lowed through on it on November 27. Then it was given to Gerow to
complete. Complete authority to act in General Marshall’s absence
does not seem to have been given to any one subordinate. Had there
been an officer either with authority or with courage to act on the
information that was in the War Department on the evening of De-
cember 6, and had he sent a message to Short, \239~\ Hawaii
should have been fully alerted.
As has been repeated so many times, there was positive evidence in
the War Department that it was only a matter of days before war
would ensue and the War Department had notice that Hawaii was
on only a sabotage alert, inadequate for full warfare. Had a full war
message, unadulterated, been dispatched or had direct orders for a full,
all-out alert been sent, Hawaii could have been ready to have met the
attack with wliat it had. What resulted was failure at both ends of
the line. Responsibility laid both in Washington and in Hawaii.
Hawaiian responsibility has been treated in Chapter III.
To summarize: insofar as the Chief of Staff is related to these
events there are specific things which appear in the record with which
he was personally concerned. The following are of this nature:
a. Failure to advise his Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Bryden, Arnold,
and Moore, of the critical situation in the Pacific so that they
might act intelligently for him in his absence.
b. Failure to keep General Short fully informed as to the in-
ternational situation and the probable outbreak of war at any time.
c. The delay in getting to General Short the important in v
formation reaching Washington on the evening of December 6
and the morning of December 7.
d. Noting without taking action the sabotage message of Short
which presumptively was on his desk on the morning of Novem-
ber 28, 1941.
e. His admitted lack of knowledge of the condition of readiness
of the Hawaiian Command during the period of
November 8 to December 7, 1941.
The Board is impressed with the absolute necessity of considering
the conduct of all responsible officers in the light of the situation as
it existed in November and early December, 1941.
It was a case of intelligent men arriving at the best decision possible
with all the facts that were before them. This is the basis for suc-
cessful procedure in either military or civil affairs. In both of these
fields occasional mistakes are made notwithstanding that such prin-
ciples are followed. Such was the case at Pearl Harbor.
This recital is in explanation, not justification. The thinking in
the War Department and the Hawaiian Department was faulty in
that it emphasized probabilities to the exclusion of capabilities.
10. Summary . — In summarizing the “Responsibilities in Washing-
ton” it appears that the issue between the United States and Japan
was precipitated before the Army and Navy could prepare them-
selves to follow through on the consequences thereof and that coordi-
nation and cooperation between the State, War and Navy Depart-
ments lacked effectiveness, at least in this respect.
As to the War Department’s responsibilities there was —
a. A lack of organization for war.
146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. A lack of adequate procedure under which to advise the
Hawaiian Department ana to control its actions.
c. A lack of instructions to the Hawaiian Department based
upon full knowledge of its actions [&£Z] and full knowl-
edge of the international situation.
a. Failures on November 26-27, November 28, during the period
from November 28 to December 7, and on December 6 and 7, to
take adequate and prompt action on vital information then at
hand.
These responsibilities in no way mitigate those of General Short as
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. However, they
do add others to the list of those responsible.
[i 24 #] Chapter V. Wyman and Construction Delays in Hawaii
A. PRE-PEARL HABBOB ASSOCIATIONS OF WYMAN AND KOHL: SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION
1 . Relationship of Wyman and, Rohl in Los Angeles
2. Hawaiian Actions of Wyman and Rohl
Wyman’s actions in Hawaii with other contractors ; the initiation of the secret
defense construction In Hawaii in November, 1940; Wyman’s selection of con-
tractors for the task ; the difficulty of Kohl’s alien status ; Wyman’s efforts to
get the naturalization of Rohl ; the yacht VEGA.
3. RohVs Associations
Kohl’s origin and German affiliations ; Kohl’s association with Werner Plack ;
Rohl’s perjury ; Wyman’s association with Rohl and Kohl’s citizenship considered.
4 . Subsequent Relations — Wyman and Rohl
The Rohl -Wyman association and the reason for selection of the Hawaiian
Constructors.
5. Delays in Construction
Wyman's inefficient administration and management; typical delays listed.
6. Directive of November 24, 1941
Relationship between contractors and the Corps of Engineers disregarded by
Wyman; Kohl's continued relationship with Wyman; Kohl’s conduct in the
Islands and removal.
7. Responsibility of the Corps of Engineers
Lack of supervision by the District Engineer and the Chief of Engineers;
inspections made by the Inspector General on the complaint of civilians in Con-
gress ; inspections made by direction of Secretary of War.
B. OVERT ACTS
1. False Official Statement by Wyman as to His Knowledge of RohVs Alien
Status
2. Refusal to Accept Low Bidder on Hawaiian Contracts — Wyman Preferred
His Friends
3. Irregular Purchase of Machinery by Wyman From the Hawaiian Constructors
and His Associates
c. summary
[243] A. PRE-PEARL HARBOR ASSOCIATIONS OF WYMAN AND ROHL:
8COPE OF INVESTIGATION
1. Relationship of Wyman and Rohl in Los Angeles .— The in-
vestigation represented by the following summary and by the more
detailed report attached hereto on Colonel Wyman (Appendix — )
is the result of the direction of the Acting Secretary of War, the Hon-
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
147
orable Robert P. Patterson, to investigate the conduct of Colonel
Theodore Wyman, Jr. as District Engineer in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment as his activities had affected Pearl Harbor. We have found it
necessary to consider Colonel Wyman’s activities and those of his con-
tractor associates prior to his advent in the Hawaiian Islands, because
some of them were initiated prior to the departure of Colonel Wyman
for the Islands; We found it was necessary to consider the acts for a
time after December 7, 1941, as many of them were the fruits of the
things done and mistakes made that were initiated before December 7
and the full effect and importance of which would not be appre-
ciated unless the subsequent events after December 7, 1941, were
recorded.
In making this summary report we have divided it into two parts :
the first part is a running story of Colonel Wyman’s activities on the
mainland with Hans Wilhelm Rohl and the associated contractors
involved in this matter, and the results upon the Pearl Harbor opera-
tions by reason of such associations ; the second part is an explanation
of typical acts of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. which represent many
other matters of similar nature which can be found in his conduct. In
no sense has this board attempted to draw any complete specifications
or charges, but we have confined ourselves to findings of fact.
[ 244 ] The record shows that Wyman, as a Captain going to duty
as a District Engineer at Los Angeles, was an able and steady officer,
devoted to his professional duties and to the government’s interest,
with a forceful disposition.
While at Los Angeles he fell into the company of Hans Wilhelm
Rohl, German alien, who was in a contracting firm that became the
successful bidder on a contract to build a breakwater at Los Angeles.
This contract was under the administration and jurisdiction of Wy-
man (R. 3359, 3378).
Kohl’s methods of doing business and his personal life were at that
time apparently the antithesis of Wyman’s. Rohl was a man-about-
town in Los Angeles and had become increasingly prominent in the
night life and social activities of Los Angeles and Hollywood. His
personal habits in connection with extreme drinking and with “party
girls” of the community, his extravagant methods of living and his
disregard of the domestic and social proprieties of a responsible per-
son increased as the years went by, but they were already well devel-
oped at the time of his initial associations with Wyman, who was
introduced by him into new and more extravagant methods of living.
Rohl evidently introduced Wyman, or at least influenced him to join
in extravagant and disgraceful parties as Rohl’s house guest in Los
Angeles hotels, and in heavy drinking over considerable periods.
Trips on Rohl’s yacht were expensive and lavish. 43 [ 245 ] This
association involved pleasure trips on Rohl’s yacht, membership in a
large number of clubs and a scale of riotous living, drunkenness and
both private and public misconduct by Wyman and Rohl together.
** Colonel Hunt in his Inspector General’s Report found : “These yacht trips, as described
by Colonel Wyman, were for the greater part essentially business trips, primarily to inspect
the quarries above referred to. Actually, there existed no necessity for conducting the
business of Inspecting quarrying activities on Catalina Island in this manner, since there
were available to the District Engineer adequate Government-owned vessels. These trips
must therefore be classed as pleasure trips at Mr. Kohl’s expense, official business being
an Incidental consideration. . . . It Is therefore apparent that Colonel Wyman was
on close and intimate social relations with Mr. Rohl during the period when, as the
148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Thus was born an intimate association, characterized by improper
conduct, and it continued over a considerable period into and through
the Pearl Harbor events. Rohl, at that earlier time, had distin-
guished himself by his lack of domestic propriety ; he was the father
of four illegitimate children by what he called a common-law wife,
later discarded. (R. 2223, 2441, 4113.) In 1938, Wyman also di-
vorced his wife of 30 years standing and shortly thereafter acquired
another wife. This Kohl association continued actively up until
Wyman was ordered to Honolulu as the Hawaiian District Engineer. 44
It also continued in Hawaii. 45
2. Hawaiian Actions of Wyman and Rohl . — Wyman reported to
Hawaii in July 1940 (R. 3371). In the Islands there were not only a
large number of able and competent resident contractors but also one
of the leading contracting firms in the United States, which had
opened up an office in Honolulu and which had been building millions
of dollars worth of construction for the Army and Navy. This was
an organization of great 'wealth, high integrity and unquestioned
ability and a successful government contractor for a long period of
years. They were just concluding some of their contracts when Wy-
man arrived (R. 2399-2400).
When the contract began to develop for the defenses of Hawaii in
November 1940, apparently the general outline of the project was well
known and fully considered by Wyman and the [&J7] Ha-
waiian Department. They kneyv generally what they wanted to do.
although the details of the plans probably had not been fully worked
out by the time of the actual execution of the contract hereinafter
mentioned as having been entered into by the Corps of Engineers
with the Hawaiian Constructors. Generally, it was desired to have
built as a part of the Hawaiian defenses the following : a war reserve
storage system for gasoline, aircraft warning service, and improved
Government's representative, he administered extensive work for which Mr. Rohl was the
contractor.
“The yacht trips and house parties given by Mr. Rohl and attended by Colonel Wyman
were expensive and lavish. Intoxicating liquors were habitually served, with no limitation
except the guest’s capacity to imbibe. Colonel Wyman, claiming an ability to hold his
liquor, imbibed freely. It is not in evidence, however, that his acceptance of Mr. Rohl’s
entertainment was in any Bense necessary to that desirable degree of acquaintance between
the Corps of Engineers and the construction industry which may be considered necessary
to their mutual interests. These contacts were essentially, if not entirely, social and
personal affairs, which by their frequency and character tended strongly to bring discredit
upon the Corps of Engineers and to give rise to just such allegations as the ones now in
question.’*
44 Colonel Hunt in his Inspector General’s report found : “A very careful study of all
facts and circumstances brought to light in the course of this investigation leads to the
following conclusions :
“During the years 1936-1939, Colonel Wyman, as District Engineer. Los Angeles, main-
tained a close personal friendship, as distinguished from a business friendship, with Mr.
Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which was inappropriate on the part of a United States Army officer
administering costly works on whicn the said Mr. Rohl was engaged as contractor. This
relationship extended so far beyond the need for ordinary cordial business relation as to
give rise to such presumptions of impropriety as formed, in part, the basis of this investi-
gation. In maintaining that relationship, Colonel Wyman was not sufficiently mindful of
that unquestionable reputation for integrity and impartiality which it was the duty of
a man in his position to cultivate at all times.
“The flattery of Colonel Wyman personally and professionally, which was bestowed
upon him by his wealthy associate, Mr. Rohl, evoked in Colonel Wyman so complete a
confidence in the former as to lead him to an unwise acceptance of Mr. Rohl’s judgment
and advice during their subsequent association in Hawaii. He thereby relinquished to
some extent that independence of Judgment required of an officer in charge of the Gov-
ernment’s Interest, as indicated In his too ready acceptance of Mr. Kohl’s recommendations
relating to equipment purchases and appraisals.” (R. 749-750.)
45 Colonel Hunt also reported : “d. Various witnesses testified to having seen Colonel
Wyman with Mr. Rohl at various semi-public functions, when both men Indulged freely
in Intoxicating beverages. So far as could be ascertained most of those Instances were
prior to the attack of 7 December. No witness was found who could testify to drunkenness
on Colonel Wyman’s part.” (R. 2114.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 149
or new airfields . . . There were in all about 148 major projects. 4 *
(R. 3432, 3570-3572.)
When it came time to place the contract and negotiate, the Corps of
Engineers decided upon a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. Wyman
stated that only certain Los Angeles contractors were interested in this
work. This is contrary to the evidence. The McKee Company, then
doing millions of dollars of work in [##?] the Islands, and a
number of Island contractors with full equipment and a fine record of
performance were anxious and willing to bid on the job. (R. 2416-
2418.) Wyman’s reason for selecting his friends is without founda-
tion and the net result condemns his choice.
Wyman now proceeded to secure contractors for this task in this
manner. By virtue of using a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee type of contract he
was able to award the work to contractors comprising his old friends
and immediately excluded all others from consideration, both in the
Hawaiian Islands and the United States. 47 (R. 3632, 3722.1 He
turned to his old Los Angeles alien friend Rohl, who was president of
the firm of Rohl-Connolly (and half owner), and their associate com-
panies, the Callahan Company and the Gunther & Shirley Company
(R. 2240, 2295, 2319). These companies much later, when they found
them selves in difficulty in performing the work, took
into partnership certain of the local Hawaiian contractors in a sub-
ordinate position. (R. 3727, 3750-51.) These several contractors
formed what was known as the Hawaiian Constructors. The chair-
man of the executive committee and the principal executive steering
the organization of Hawaiian Constructors at the outset and the signer
of the contract was Mr. Paul Grafe (R. 2299-2301, 2345). Grafe was
Vice-president of the Callahan Company.
* Colonel Hunt in his Inspector General’s Report found : “As to whether this relation-
ship influenced Colonel Wyman to find a place for the Rohl-Connolly Company in the
Hawaiian Constructors, contractor for work ultimately totaling about $10o,000,000 in
Hawaii and the South Pacific, there is no conclusive evidence. Colonel Wyman became
District Engineer in Hawaii in June 1940. In November of that year, funds became avail-
able for road, railroad, fortifications, and allied work to the estimated cost of about
$1,097,673. Details of this work were not available. Colonel Wyman testified that he
proposed to perform the work by hired labor, since a proper basis for contracting the
work was lacking. Due to a marked propensity on the part of Colonel Wyman to conduct
busineaB orally to the exclusion of written records where possible, other references to
which will be made in this report, no positive proof of this claim was developed. It was
determined by inquiry among contractors in Honolulu that at about the time mentioned
by Colonel Wyman, they had been requested to indicate what equipment they bad avail-
able for rental. Neither Mr. Phillip C. Chew, Chief Clerk of Colonel Wyman's office nor
other membere thereof could confirm the statement that Colonel Wyman proposed doing
the work by hired labor, nor could anything be found in the files which would confirm it.
However, there is no .reason to doubt that such was Colonel Wyman’s original Intention.
The idea of performing work by contract appears to have reached Colonel Wyman through
the office of the South Pacific Engineer Division and the then Division Engineer at San
Prancisco, California, Brigadier General (then Colonel) Warren T. Hannum, CR. On
6 November 1940, General Hannum in a letter to the District Engineer, Honolulu, sug-
gested a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract due to the probable difficulties of conducting
the work on a fixed price basis while large Navy works in Hawaii were being performed
on the fee basis. (Exhibit C.) There followed some telephone conversations between
Colonel Wyman and General Hannum. records of which were not kept, and about the
middle of December 1940, negotiations were started In the San Francisco office, which
ultimately resulted in the signing of Contract “-414-Eng-602. That contract originally
contemplating a job totaling $1,097,673 and a fixed fee of $52,220, value of work to be
performed thereunder approached *100.000.000 and the fee approximated $1,000,000."
n Rohl-Connolly Company, the W. E. Callahan Company and the Gunther A Shirley
Company who became co-adventurers as the Hawaiian Constructors. Colonel Hunt’s re-
port reads: “Colonel Wyman testified that he had tried to interest local contractors in
taking on the work originally proposed, and that they showed no interest. That statement
was not confirmed by inquiry among those contractors, seven of whom were questioned
In the matter, all of them denying havine been given a chance to take on any part of the
work. These contractors were then seeking new work, and the bringing in of an outside
contractor without giving them a chance to participate, created a considerable natural
resentment on their part ”
150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
There was a federal statute that prevented an alien from having any
interest in or the management of a secret national defense contract. 48
This brought about the disclosure to Wyman that Rohl was a Ger-
man alien, that he was born in Lubeck, Germany, in 1886, that he had
entered the United States as an alien, that he had never acquired citi-
zenship, although he had applied for it, but had not consummated the
transaction. This story is elsewhere \250'\ related. 40
When the contract was about to be placed in Washington, Wyman
went to Washington and lived in the same hotel and same hotel room
with one of the prospective contractors, Mr. Connolly of the Rohl-
Connolly Company and he was later joined by Mr. Grafe of the Calla-
han Company (R. 2197, 2294r-95, 3398-99, 3542). There was no deal-
ing at this time at arms’ length by Wyman, the government agent,
and his friends. These contractors who appeared to be already pre-
determined were to get this cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. At that
time the contract was estimated to be worth a million dollars but which
later was extended to an approximate gross business of a hundred and
thirty million dollars.
The alien status of Rohl put the parties in a difficult situation. 50
Rohl was then eliminated as president of the Rohl-Connolly Company
by a paper change without change of substance or interest (R. 2160-61) .
Later action was taken by the Acting Chief of Engineers to write a
letter to the Department of Justice, Immigration Bureau, on Wyman’s
urging General Kingman, requesting that Rohl’s application for citi-
zenship be expedited. Then followed efforts with government agen-
cies, stimulated by Wyman, concluded by a hearing before Federal
Judge O’Connor in Los Angeles, resulting in Rohl’s acquiring citizen-
ship. The complete story of Rohl’s alien status and the efforts to get
[25 1] him naturalized appears elsewhere.
4S The statute reads :
“National Defense
“Chapter 440-3d Session
“(Public — No. 071 — 76th Congress)
“(H. R. 9822)
“AN ACT to expedite national defense, and for other purposes
“Sec. 11. (a) No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, con-
fidential or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access to the plans
or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials,
unless the written consent of the. head of the Government department concerned has first
been obtained, and any person who willfully violates or through negligence permits the
violation of the provision of this subsection shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both.
“(b) Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Govern-
ment contracts by willful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes such willful
misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
“(c) For the purpose of this section, the term ‘person’ shall be construed to include an
individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other business enterprise.
“Approved, June 28, 1940.” (R. 4109-4110.)
49 See p. 262 of this report.
M Colonel Hunt reported : “His own testimony and that of other witnesses in this respect
indicates that Colonel Wyman maintained a totally unnecessary, and in the circumstances,
an undesirable social familiarity with the active head or an organization whose prime
business it was to profit from work under his supervision. If there is reasonable doubt
that this relationship was with a man whose non-citizenship at the commencement of the
contract was known to him, there is no doubt whatever that it was with a man who at the
time of this relationship in Hawaii, had been proven to Colonel Wyman to have concealed
the fact of his alien status. The least that can be said of that relationship is that it
displayed a callousness on Colonel Wyamn’s part, not only toward the character of his
associate, but toward the possible consequence of its public display.”
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
151
On 22 January 1941 Wyman wrote a vigorous letter to assist this
citizenship matter, indicating that Rohl was absolutely essential to
the successful operation of the contract by Hawaiian Constructors.
(R. 3529-3531, 4187-4188.) With Wyman’s help Rohl was natural-
ized and proceded to Hawaii, so that he could participate actively
in the contract.
Wyman, during his tour in the Hawaiian Islands is shown by this
record to have been continuing his acquired habit of drinking. 51 Wy-
man and Rohl lived in adjoining rooms in the Pleasanton Hotel, which
had been taken over by the contractors at government expense (R.
1297-8, 36 4 4- 4 6). They negotiated a charter of Rohl’s yacht, the
VEGA, which was in the name of Mrs. Rohl. (R. 2203.) It came
to the Islands with a cargo of liquor in a government convoy, which
was delivered to Rohl. (R. 2266-67, 3403.) The vessel was never used
for its intended purpose as a survey ship (R. 1311) .
The record shows that there were many delays, confusions, ineffi-
cient in administration, and lack of correct administrative relation-
ship Between the contractors and the government agent. The District
Engineer failed to secure results in the prompt construction of the
defense projects under this contract. 52 Grave administrative ineffi-
ciencies had arisen in the District Engineer’s office (R. 2118, 3570-
3571).
The drinking 53 by Rohl during duty hours in the day as [252]
well as night after December 7 was so frequent, excessive, and such a
detriment to the business of both the government and the contractors
that, upon the request of Wyman’s successor, General Lyman, Rohl
was requested to leave the Islands and cease further connection with
the Hawaiian Constructors (R. 2534-35, 2544). This request was
concurred in by Rohl’s two associates on the executive committee of
which Rohl was chairman (R. 2546).
3. RokPs Associations . — There is testimony in the record of sub-
stantial character that the impression that Rohl made a large sum of
money on his first large contract, the Los Angeles breakwater, was not]
well founded, yet his expenditures have been habitually for manyj
years those of a wealthy man (R. 2445, 2449) . Rohl made at least one
visit to Germany (R. 3996).
There is some evidence in the record to show the following about*
one, Werner Plack and his associations with Rohl. Plack was ani
employee of the German Consulate in Los Angeles, working under
M R. 748, 777. 1173-1174, 1283-1285, 2114, 2408-1409.
“R. 512, 513, 1261-62, 1331, 1334, 1342, 2063, 2366, 2503-05, 2530, 3018, 3431-32,
3439-43, 3699, 3703, 3770-71, 3837-39, 3886, 3901, 3905.
* Major Meurlott, in the G-2 Department of the Hawaiian Department and G-2 at the
time he testified said :
“Major Clausen. Major Meurlott, I show you a memorandum entitled ‘Memorandum
for the flies’ dated July 22, 1942, to the effect that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was such a
drunkard that he was even incompetent to be a subversive influence. Did you make this?
“Major Meurlott. Yes, I wrote that.'’ (R. 3925.)
(Copy of memorandum) “7/22/42.
“Memo for flies.
“Decision made to bring this case to a close without the formality of a Cl-Rl report.
Subject is claimed by Colonel Mollison to be a confirmed drunkard, and, inferentially, to
be incompetent as a subversice influence for that reason. Irresponsibility rather than
subversion appears to characterize the irregularities in his activities, as brought to the
attention of this office.
“Case closed.
“/ 8/ T. M. Meurlott.
“Gapt. M. I ”
152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Doctor Gyssling, the German Consul. (R. 2387, 2429, 2442.) Rohl
and Plack appeared publicly together in prominent night spots in Los
Angeles and were apparently on intimate and friendly terms, as identi-
fied by a number of witnesses, (R. 1167-1168, 2387-2388, 2390). In
1940 Plack left the United [£SS] States under suspicion of
being a German agent. The FBI made an exhaustive examination of
his baggage before permitting him to depart with Fritz Weidemann,
the Consul General at San Francisco, who left for Germany via Japan,
taking Plack with him (R. 2519-2520). Weidemann stayed in the
Far East as Chief of the Far Eastern Espionage and Sabotage Unit
for Germany, while Werner Plack went on to Berlin and was placed
by the German government in a position of high responsibility in the
German Foreign Office (R. 2389). Flannery, Columbia Radio news
commentator, who was then the Columbia correspondent in Berlin,
and author of the book “Assignment to Berlin”, testified in this record
that he was personally well acquainted with Plack in Germany, having
dealt with him repeatedly in the German Foreign Office from the
period of early January 1941 to 29 September 1941 because Plack cen-
sored Flannery’s writings. While dealing with Werner Plack he
found that he was high in the Nazi councils in connection with radio
and other propaganda to the United States, in which he was regarded
by the German government as a specialist. Flannery said he did
brilliant work, in that he put on the broadcasts of Wodehouse, who was
popular in the United States as a writer, the Broadcast of Count von
Luckner, who was likewise popular, and had arranged for other simi-
lar personalities to improve the quality of German Droadcasts so that
Nazi propaganda would be listened to (R. 2521). Evidently the
entertainment that Werner Plack offered to friends in the Los Angeles
area while posing as a wine salesman, during which period he associ-
ated with Rohl, was for propaganda purposes for the Nazis.
(R. 2522.)
Rohl flatly denied under oath before this board that he [&&41
even knew Werner Plack (R. 2252-2253). The following witnesses
in this record testified as to his open association with Werner Plack
in Los Angeles over a considerable period: Willard Bruce Pine (R.
2387-88, 2390), R. E. Combs (R. 2429, 2442), and Fulton Lewis, Jr.
(R. 1167-1168).
The conditions surrounding Rohl, his long record of contact with
pro-Nazi and German organization and associationsj his repeated
violations of the Federal laws as to his entry into this country, his
long neglect to become a citizen, his open association with the German,
agent Plack, were widely known (R. 2430-2434). It was Wyman who
was responsible for bringing this man and his organization into
Hawaii for work on defense contracts (R. 2430-2434).
Rohl’s testimony before this board contained conflicting statements
either with thoroughly proven facts and documents or with his own
previous testimony. (The records were open for investigation and
nave been for years (R. 2430). Rohl swore falsely on his income tax
statements that he was a United States citizen (K. 2380, 2441). He
made a false statement when he was placed on his own ship’s manifest
at Honolulu as an American citizen born in Iola, Kansas (R. 2380—
2441).
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
153
Wyman as a commissioned officer of the United States Army openly
and indiscreetly associated with Rohl and this association continued
over a period of several years.
4. Subsequent relations — ' Wyman and Rohl . — Wyman had gone to
the Pacific islands to become District Engineer at Hawaii in July
1940 (R. 3371). A great defense contract program in Hawaii was
being initiated. Wyman had only one consideration in placing these
contracts : to get his friend Rohl as the con- [ 256 ] tractor. To
do that he exerted great efforts not only to have the contract placed
with the group of affiliated companies of which Rohl’s company was
one but he also exerted himself to the utmost to permit Rohl in person
to participate in the contract openly by getting him his citizenship.
His written communications, his telephone calls and the pressure he
brought to bear in Washington testify to his urgent desire for the
accomplishment of this object. His first excuse was that these were
the only competent contractors, and secondly that only Rohl was the
essential man who could get results, because the representatives of
the contractors on the ground, both the Hawaiian contractors and the
mainland contractors, were not expediting the work (R. 768, 3481,
3527).
The record shows that Rohl did go to Hawaii, and that his con-
tribution consisted primarily in adaing to the disorganization, con-
fusion and delays which were already inherent in utilizing the loose
association of miscellaneous contractors from the mainland and the
Hawaiian Islands under the co-adventurer’s agreement which ter-
minated in the formation of the Hawaiian Contractors (R. 2179-81).
This loose confederation of contractors, dominated by Rohl, who be-
came the chairman of the executive committee of the group, was poorly
organized and was the attempt to conduct an enormous operation
through committee management, which was fallacious in principle
and unsatisfactory in action (R 1182-84, 2527-28, 2544, 3771-72).
Here Rohl resumed his drunken conduct. The record is replete with
testimony of his drinking. 54 General Emmons’ demand [256]
for the relief of Colonel Wyman, and General Lyman’s demand for
Wyman’s relief got results from the Chief of Engineers (R. 1302,
1307-08) . It also resulted in the sending of Rohl back to the mainland
at the request of Colonel Lyman (R. 2555).
5. Delays in Construction . — It is difficult at. this late date, within
the limited time that this board has had, to make a thorough examina-
tion into all of the ramifications of delays in construction due to Wy-
man’s administration as District Engineer. Suffice it to say, the testi-
mony shows 55 that the organization of Colonel Wyman was bad in its
administration, that it was mismanaged, that the engineering work
was slow, defective and erratic, and the instructions to the contractors
were repeatedly changed, resulting in delays at a time when it re-
quired the best type of supervisory organization to meet the difficulties
of priorities, the machinery and the personnel. Wyman’s conduct in
discarding responsible contractors, such as the McKee Company, and
others, of whom there were several available in the Hawaiian Islands,
"R. 767. 1488-84. 2114. 2526. 2544. 2555, 2574. 2575, 8288, 8296, 8299, 3648, 3925.
*R. 2092-2129 and reports of Colonel Luther B. Row, Inspector General, Hawaiian
Department: R. 2094-99 and reports of Colonel Hunt. Inspector General's Office. Wash-
ington, D. C., who made a special investigation : R. 747-752. Also R. 2458, 2465, 2478,
2486-87, 2494, 250$, 2530, 3602, 3625-3626, 8635, 3670, 8671.
154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and on the mainland, and insisting on limiting the contracts to his
friends and intimate associates, can bear but one meaning, namely,
that he was not conducting himself as an impartial agent of the United
States Government or as a responsible representative and officer of
the Corps of Engineers. 6 *
Typical delays resulting from this association, aside from the greatly
increased expense to the government, were as follows :
[257] (a) Only about 25 out of every 90 employees brought to
Hawaii by the Hawaiian Constructors, were good or experienced work-
ers (B. 3670-3671) ; (b) “a great deal of waste and unnecessary expend-
iture of time and funds” (E. 2123) ; (c) frequent changes in super-
visory personnel (E. 3590) ; (d) very slow in getting organized,
finally taking four to six weeks to get started after the Under Secretary
of War approved the contract negotiated 20 December 1940 (E. 36021 ;
(e) inefficiency, poor organization, and lax planning (E. 3625-3626) ;
(f) the fact that Eohl, their key man, was frequently drunk during
working hours and “not particularly inclined to push the work”
(E. 3635) ; (g) a strike by workers against supervision by Japanese
employees (B. 2490) ; (h) bickering and appealing of disputes with
the contracting officer, the aloofness of Colonel Wyman from the
personnel (E. 2498-2502) ; (i) failure to use material as soon as it
arrived (E. 2511) ; (j) lack of promptness in handling the payroll
(E. 2465) ; and, (k) poor morale of employees (E. 2530).
6. Directive of November 24, 194-1 . — General Bobbins sent a direc-
tive on the above date to the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman, laying
down one of the most fundamental of all directives for an Engineer
office, that is, the relationship between the Corps of Engineers and
the contractors. This document was clear and precise that the con-
tractor’s responsibility must not be undertaken by the Corps of En-
gineers.
This directive was honored only in the breach by Colonel Wyman.
His organization increasingly assumed, through its inspectors and
others, duties of management which were those of the contractor. It
even undertook to pay the employees and to [255] feed many
of them, which were duties of the contractor (E. 2465-2466, 2551).
In other words, Wyman intervened to the extent of relieving con-
tractors of some of their duties thereby adding to the confusion of his
office and to an already difficult situation, which resulted in further
delays, changes and gross waste. These things occurred both before
and after Pearl Harbor.
The testimony shows that in taking over the paying of employees
from the contractor after Pearl Harbor, in continuing this same policy,
that weeks would go by without paying the employees, resulting in a
E oor state of mind ana low morale. This condition was aggravated
y the fact that the food was bad or insufficient, except where tne Army
had charge of the messes (B. 2095, 2465-2466, 2529-2530, 2536-2538,
2554).
All of these things lead us to the belief that instead of having a pro-
fessional Army organization on behalf of the Corps of Engineers
that would exert its professional skill in engineering and administra-
tion to see that the contractors did their duty promptly, the entire
organization of Wyman was disorganized, the relationships with the
“ R. 762-68, 764, 2408. 2416-2420, 3627-3629, 8722, 3726, 8761, 8764.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 155
contractors were confused and improper, and that a large number of
delays occurred (R. 1268, 3425) .
This cost-plus-a-fixed-fee arrangement resulted in a profit to the
Hawaiian constructors of about $1,060,000 (R. 3732-33).
Rohl’s presence in the Islands, according to the testimony of all the
impartial witnesses, was a detriment in several ways : In the first place,
he rendered little assistance in getting the job done on behalf of the
contractors, and his own associates on the executive committee of the
contractors [269] welcomed his being sent back to the mainland
by General Lyman (R. 2525-28, 2533, 2564). His periodic drunken
condition interfered with his making decisions or fully attending to
business. (R. 2544, 2555). Wyman’s contention that Rohl could aid
the contract finds no substance in fact in this record, but there are many
witnesses to the contrary.” Rohl’s presence on the Island brought
Wyman back into his old association. The record also shows that
large extra profits were made by the contractors in unloading worth-
less machinery upon the government.” In these transactions we find
little evidence of concern by Colonel Wyman for the interests of the
United States (R. 778, 1343, 2477, 2576).
7. The Responsibility of the Corps of Engineers . — This board feels
impelled to direct attention to the lack of supervision and the correction
of these conditions which were impeding some of the most important
projects for the defense of the United States. There is no showing
that General Hannum, the Division Engineer, conducted any investi-
gation or had any organization to do so, to see that Colonel Wyman,
while under his jurisdiction, was doing his work and conducting him-
self honorably and correctly as an Army officer and as a citizen cnarged
with government responsibilities.
We find substantially no supervision, a weak control and a lack
of inspection, which would have revealed at an early date the con-
ditions and should have resulted in their remedy. [260] Colonel
Wyman was given an unrestricted and free hand without adequate
control, inspection or check. These conclusions are supported in the
findings of Colonel Hunt in his elaborate report on behalf of the In-
spector General’s Department. This came about due to the complaints
from Civilians directed to Congress and the action of Congressmen in
calling this to the attention of the War Department. The Secretary
of War in a letter in February or March of 1941 to the Hawaiian De-
5 ailment directed inspections of construction activities. Under the
irection of Colonel Row there was a continuous series of investiga-
tions made throughout 1941 as to Colonel Wyman’s conduct and the
actions of the contractors (R. 2100-2101) .
It is.pertinent to observe that there were several investigations of
the activities of Colonel Wyman, including one by Colonel Hunt and
two by Colonel Row. Each of these severely criticized him. Letters
were written by Colonel Lyman to the Chief of Engineers asking for
Wyman’s relief from duty and a letter was received by G-2 from the
American legation in Canada as a result of a complaint by the Ca-
nadians as to Wyman’s conduct. Yet in no one instance do we find
evidence of disciplinary action in his case on the part of the Chief
of Engineers or the War Department.
" R. 767, 2476, 2526-2527, 2544, 2574-2575, 3635.
■ B. 751, 757-769, 2140-2143, 2147, 2168, 2164.
156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
We find as a fact that there were delays in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment construction as follows :
(a) Delays due to red tape in approval of plans and specifications
and choice of location for underground gasoline storage and radar sta-
tions (R. 3429-32, 3439-43, 3449-3454, 3459-60) ;
(b) Delays due to lack of adequate priorities (R. 3426-8, 3439-43,
3459-3460, 3566-67) ;
(c) Delays due to lack of experienced clerical personnel [&>/]
(R. 3415-17);
(d) Delays due to shortage of materials and transportation facili-
ties (R. 3417) ;
(e) Delays due to necessary importing of labor from the United
States (R. 3500) ;
( f ) Delays due to changes in plans (R. 3515-17) ;
(g) Delays due to the inaccessibility of General Short, when
Colonel Wyman found it necessary to consult him, and had to consult
the Chief of Staff and Colonel Lyman (with whom he “clashed”) (B.
3515-3516) ;
(h) Other unavoidable delays, which always occur on any job of
such magnitude (R. 3425) ;
(i) Delays due to poor organization and administration of the office
of the District Engineer ; ana
(j) Delays due to poor supervision by the contractors, headed by
Rohl.
General Short states as follows :
( a ) The plan for radar stations at high altitudes necessarily resulted
in delays, as cable had to be procured to draw material up Mt. Kaala
(R. 297-298);
(b) “The priority proposition was very complicated”; priorities
could not be readily obtained in Hawaii (R. 328) ; and
(c) Local suppliers ran out of materials and could not replace their
stock (R. 328).
The contractors state as follows :
Rohl testified that the delays were due to lack of material and men,
beyond the control of the Hawaiian Constructors (R. 2280).
Robert McKee testified many delays occurred, due to [262]
inefficiency of Hawaiian Constructors (R. 2407-2409).
Woolley stated that if contractors had been allowed to operate
normally, without interference and directives from Washington, then
operation would have been accelerated (R. 3770).
Benson testified that Short switched men and materials on jobs,
causing delay (R. 3738) .
Therefore all of the witnesses called who had any material, knowl-
edge or responsibility in the Hawaiian Department, no matter what
their interest, concur that in some cases conditions could have been
improved or eliminated by proper inspection and prompt and agres-
sive action. This action was not taken.
This board has found numerous items of proof and evidence of
Colonel Wyman’s misconduct. The complete story so far as the
record has now been developed will be found in the appendix attached
to this report.
However, as illustrative of the situation as revealed by countless
witnesses and records before this board, before the House Military
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
157
Affairs Committee, and the Tenney Committee, as to the conduct of
Colonel Wyman, we select the following overt acts for brief attention :
I. False official statement by Wyman as to his knowledge of
Kohl’s alien status.
II. Refusal to accept low bidder on Hawaiian Contracts. Wy-
man preferred his friends.
III. Irregular purchases of machinery by Wyman from the
Hawaiian Contractors and associates.
/. False Official Statement by Wyman as to Ids Knowledge of
RohVs Alien Status
Wyman stated in his testimony that in June 1941 he first learned
that Rohl was an alien and that he received this infor- [063]
mation from Grafe (R. 350&-04). This testimony "is similar to that
which was given to the Inspector General, Colonel John A. Hunt, IG,
by Wyman (R. 3503-3505). Wyman testified:
282. General Frank. When did you first learn that Rohl was an alien?
Colonel Wyman. I first learned that Rohl was an alien from Mr. Grafe in
June, 1941, when Mr. Grafe informed me that Rohl was an alien, and I imme-
diately sat down without delay and wrote a letter to the Chief of Engineers, an-
nouncing that I had been informed by Mr. Grafe of the Hawaiian Constructors
that Mr. Rohl was an alien, also that Mr Rohl had applied for citizenship. I
do not recollect what else in the letter, 1 have forgotten, but I sent that through
channels. It went to the Division Engineer, thence to the Chief of Engineers.
That was in June, I am certain — the date of the letter is whatever the date of
that letter is, that is the date that Grafe told me that Rohl was an alien.
283. General Frank. Did you meet John Martin in Washington while you were
negotiating that contract?
Colonel Wyman. Well, I remember a person came there while I was in Grafe’s
room whose name was John Martin, a lawyer. He talked with — well, the group
there, and I remember he stated that he was engaged on the claims of a contractor
who, due to changes by orders, what we call change orders, had accumulated a
lot of claims on the Pensylvania turnpike, and he discussed in some detail in
my hearing the arguments for and against the claims of the contractor. He
was there for a little while and then he departed. That was the only occasion
1 think I have ever seen Mr. John Martin.
284. General Frank. You did not know that Martin told Grafe in Washington
that Rohl was an alien?
Colonel Wyman. No, I did not know that. I did not know whether he did
or not. I do not know.
285. General Frank. Don’t you think it was rather queer, when there was
some question about a defense contract being in the hands of an alien, that they
should not have told you about it?
Colonel Wyman. I do not know. If they told me about I would merely have
told the Chief of Engineers right on the spot.
286. General Gbunebt. What was the occasion of Grafe informing you of Rohl’s
status as an alien ; what brought it up?
Colonel Wyman. You see, there was an act of Congress came out about em-
ploying aliens on defense work, and [2<4] we wrote letters to everybody
inquiring whether *or not they had any aliens in their employ, and it came up
as a result of that inquiry.
287. General Gbunixt. This was the date you wrote the letter?
Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir, that he informed me that he was an alien.
288. General Gbunertt. Was this the time the War Department put this out?
Colonel Wyman. Oh, no. I put the inquiry out some time before that. I don’t
know. That is a matter of record. The records show the date. You see, at
this time Mr. Rohl was in the United States. He never had been in Honolulu
as far as I know, he had never taken any part in the contract.
General Frank. In these telephone conversations where you were discussing
work on the Hawaiian Islands with Rohl, the Hawaiian Islands airdromes were
defense contracts, were they not?
Colonel Wyman. Yes, but he was a citizen when I talked to him. That was
after he became a citizen. You see, he came to Honolulu after he became a
79716— 46— Ex. 157 11
158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
citizen. Then he immediately went back to the United States to get plant and
men to go to Canton and Christmas Islands, and he went back to the United
States and got plant from his job at Highgate Dam, brought it to Los Angeles,
rehabilitated it, put it in good shape. He got men and organized them into gangs,
superintendents, and put some aboard the transport LUNDINGTON. It was
during that period that I recall talking to him about the plant for the Canton
and Christmas Islands.
These statements on this record and to the Inspector General were
wrong in two particulars: (a) as to date, and (b) as to origin of the
information.
The proof to show that Wyman was untruthful in the two particu-
lars is the following :
Testimony of Cmonel Lewis J. Claterbos, 80 Fort Belvoir, Virginia,
who servea under Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., Los [£66]
Angeles, California, from August 1935 to July 1937, shows Wyman
admitted to Claterbos on December 4, 1941, in Honolulu that liefore
the basic contract was signed Wyman casually remarked to Rohl,
“You’re a citizen, aren’t you, Bill?”; and Rohl replied that he was
not (R. 4098).
The foregoing testimony is confirmed by a report of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation made by Agent Don C. Bird at Richmond,
Virginia, on July 3, 1944, who mterviewed Claterbos and obtained
among other things the foregoing information (R. 4096 Exhibit 70).
Hans Wilhelm Rohl testified before the California State Legisla-
ture Joint Fact Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, Feb-
ruary 27 ; 1943, that before the basic contract was signed he told the
then Major Wyman that he was an alien (Tenney Testimony, 3807).
He testified,
On this particular contract, contract 602, being a secret contract, of course,
I told him — I had to teU him. ( Tenney Transcript, 3808. )
The time that this information was given to Colonel Wyman was
fixed as being prior to the award of the contract; in this respect,
the Tenney Transcript indicates the following testimony :
Question : When you first obtained the contracts for the construction of mili-
tary installations did you tell Major Wyman that you were an alien?
Answer: I did on the Hawaiian Constructors. (Tenney Transcript, 3807.)
Mr. Rohl testified that he was familiar with the provisions of the
law regarding such contracts. He testified further before we took
this contract the War Department was told (Tenney Transcript,
3809).
From a letter in testimony from James A. Dillon, Immigra [£66]
tion Inspector, Honolulu, T. H. (see Immigration file) it is shown
that Wyman knew of Rohl’s alien citizenship and that Rohl knew that
Wyman had been interviewed in Honolulu by Mr. Dillon, who advfsed
him at that time, February 1941, of Rohl’s alien status (R. 4193).
Rohl also knew that Wyman had been interviewed by Mr. Dillon
and had been informed of Rohl’s alien status as indicated by Rohl’s
testimony in the file of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
(R. 4117). 60
M Colonel Claterbos testified that he was and still Is a friend of Wyman's. His testi-
mony can be weighed in that light.
60 Portion of examination of Mr. Rohl by Inspector Ellis, Immigration and Naturalisa-
tion Service, May 22, 1941. (R. 4110.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
159
It should be borne in mind that Wyman testified that he had no
written communications with Rohl, but that he had had telephone con-
versations. Kohl admitted charges of the House Interim Report true
as to calls (K. 2234). Hence it is an inescapable conclusion that
Wyman informed Rohl by telephone from Honolulu that Mr. Dillon
had interviewed Wyman at Honolulu. Furthermore, no conclusion
with regard to the letter of January 22, 1941 from Wyman to Rohl
can be reached other than that this letter similarly was furnished by
Wyman to Rohl with the express and sole purpose of assisting Rohl
in obtaining his naturalization.
In this regard the testimony of Wyman was to the effect that he
took no action whatsoever when Rohl failed to comply with the order
contained in the letter. The letter of 22 January was furnished for
the sole purpose of initiating and expediting the getting of Kohl’s
citizenship as a special case. It was a fraud in that it inferred to the
uninformed who read the letter that such was not its purpose, and that
the writer did not know that Rohl w r as an alien, whereas he aid know,
and the letter was written for the purpose of this “speed-up,” while
[267] not committing Wyman to public knowledge of Rohl’s alien
status. (R. 2056-2058, 3972-3974).
Dillon, Honolulu Naturalization Examiner, received a letter from
Los Angeles, under date of February 20, 1941, which came to him
through the District Director, at Honolulu of the Immigration Serv-
ice, which reads as follows :
Di8tbict Director,
Honolulu, T . H.:
One Hans (or John) William Rohl, a native and citizen of Germany, is an
applicant for United States citizenship in this District, and through his attorney
has presented a photostatic copy of a letter addressed to him by Colonel Theodore
Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, Post Office Box 2240, Honolulu, T. H.
A copy of the photostat referred to is enclosed, from which it appears that
Mr. Rohl’s presence in Honolulu is desired in connection with secret contract
#W-414-eng-602. In connection with our investigation concerning the appli-
cant’s qualification for citizenship, and In order that appropriate recommenda-
tion may be made to the court with reference to the matter, please ascertain
whether Mr. Rohl at any time representing himself to Colonel Wyman, Jr., as a
citizen of the United States.
A reply by airmail at your earliest convenience wUl be very much appreciated.
/s/ William A. Carmichael,
District Director ,
Los Angeles District. (R. 4187-4188.)
As a result of this he interviewed Colonel Wyman a few days after
February 20, 1941. (R. 4189.) He identified himself to Colonel Wy-
man by his identification card to the Department of Justice, indicating
that he was a Naturalization Examiner from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. He showed him the letter of February 20,
1941 and discussed the matter of Rohl’s alien status from ten to thirty
minutes with him. (R. 4190.) As a result, the letter was referred
back, as it shows on its face, to the District Director at Los Angeles in
reply to the letter of February 20, 1941. (This is under date of March
1, 1941.) (R. 4192.) In that letter of March 1, it was written as
[268] follows, representing his conversation :
160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U. S. Department or Justice,
Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Honolulu , Hawaii, March i, 19}1.
Air mail. 605/Rohl
District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Honolulu , T. H.:
Los Angeles File B-23-1876, HANS WILLIAM ROHL, Feb. 20, 1941.
In accordance with the directions contained in the above captioned letter, I
called on Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, United States Army,
for information regarding subject alien and particularly whether the alien appli*
cant had ever in any manner represented or assumed himself to be a citizen of the
United States.
Colonel WVman in substance stated that he first became acquainted with the
alien in California some time ago. That the Rohl-Connolly Company, with
which the alien is associated, had done construction work for the Department of
the Interior in the Indian country as well as projects on the Colorado River.
During the construction of a breakwater in the California area, Colonel Wyman
came in contact more or less with Mr. Rohl. During those business relations in
California Colonel Wyman, assumed without any basis therefor, that Mr. Rohl
was a citizen of the United States. He knew from hearsay that Rohl was born
in Germany and that his father had been a professor of engineering in a German
university. Colonel Wyman stated the applicant gathered about him in his
organization only high-grade men. That the quality of his work was excellent
Contracts were always faithfully carried out. That Mr. Rohl was a man of
integrity. His outstanding social diversion was yachting.
As a result of the national defense efforts, the Rohl-Connolly Company, W. E.
Callahan Company and another group, organized the Hawaiian Constructors,
Ltd., to procure construction contracts in Hawaii. It was in connection with
one of these projects that Colonel Wyman wrote his letter of January 22, 1941,
to Mr. Rohl. To summarize in a word. Colonel Wyman said the alien never
represented himself to be a citizen of the United States and if there was any
misunderstanding in that regard it was due to the assumption of such citizen-
ship by the Colonel himself.
(seal) /s/ Jas. P. Dillon,
U. 8. Naturalization Examiner.
Respectfully referred to District Director.
[2£9] Los Angeles District
(stamp) MAR 1 1941
(Signed) W. G. Strengh,
District Director , Honolulu District.
(Stamped on face of letter) RECEIVED MAR 11 1941. (R. 4193-4194.)
*******
General Frank. Mr. Dillon, are you positive that in your conversation with
Colonel Wyman you made him understand positively that Mr. Rohl was an alien?
Mr. Dillon. Very definitely, yes.
General Frank. There is no question about that in your mind?
Mr. Dtllon. None at all.
Colonel Toulmin. What did Colonel Wyman say, when you told him that?
Did he express surprise, or was it something he apparently already knew?
Mr. Dillon. No. From reading my report in the anteroom before I came into
the hearing. Colonel Wyman appeared to be under the apprehension that Rohl
was a citizen of the United States.
Major Clausen. That is what he told you?
Mr. Dillon. Yes. (R. 4195.)
And witness the letter of Kohl’s attorney, Cannon, to the Secretary
of Commerce :
Theodore Wyman, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers, War Depart-
ment, in charge of all the above-mentioned defense work in Hawaii, has requested
Mr. Rohl and the War Department to have Mr. Rohl give his personal service in
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
161
connection with the emergency defense work in Hawaii, and as early as Jan-
uary 1941 and at numerous times since that date Colonel Wyman has tendered
Mr. Rohl transportation via clipper or boat to the Islands and has stated to Mr.
Rohl over interocean telephone that he will personally obtain special permission,
because of Mr. Rohl’s alien status, to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this secret
contract. (R. 2229).
Rohl says Wyman knew he was an alien before the contract was
signed in December 1940 :
126. General Frank. Just while we are on this subject, I would like to ask
some questions about these telephone [ 270 ] conversations that you had
with Colonel Wyman, he in Honolulu, and you in Los Angeles. Do you mean to
say that never, in any of those telephone conversations, did you ever bring up
the question with him about your alien status?
Mr. Rohl. I don’t believe I did, General. I took it for granted that he was told
that, in Washington.
127. Major Clausen. What did you base that on?
Mr. Rohl. Well, that’s what I would like to explain.
John Martin was back in Washington on other matters, not on my business,
or Rohl-Connolly business, Hawaiian Constructors’ business. He was back on
some other business.
128. General Frank. Having to do with your firm?
Mr. Rohl. No, sir — with other contractors ; no one involved in Hawaiian Con-
structors, and by accident he met Paul Grafe and Tom Connolly and told them
not to sign the contract, until he talked to them further ; so John Martin called
me, in Los Angeles, from Washington, and told me the nature of the contract,
and I gave him permission — not permission, but told him to tell Mr. Grafe and
Mr. Connolly my alien status; which he did.
129. General Frank. Who was responsible, in trying to get the group of con-
tractors interested in this Hawaiian project? Was it, or was it not, Colonel
Wyman?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
130. General Frank. It was Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Rohl He was interested in getting a group of contractors.
131. General Frank. Including the Rohl-Connolly Company, the Callahan Com-
pany, and the Gunther & Shirley Company?
Mr. Rohl Yes, sir.
132. General Frank. Now, Colonel Wyman, Mr. Connolly, and Mr. Grafe were
in Washington together, in a group, discussing this contract, were they not?
Mr. Rohl Yes, sir.
133. General Frank. And a hitch that came up in consummating the contract
was your alien status, is that correct?
Mr. Rohl. General, by that do you mean — now, I have no knowledge of my
own whether Mr.
[ 271 ] 134. General Frank. Well, I will put it in different words. Maybe
the words “consummating” bothers you. You and they felt that you could not
participate in the contract because it was a defense project and you were an
alien?
Mr. Rohl That’s right.
135. General Frank. That is correct, isn’t it?
Mr. Rohl That’s correct.
136. General Frank. Therefore, there was some question, considerable ques-
tion, as to whether or not the Rohl-Connolly Company could participate in this
project?
Mr. Rohl No, General.
137. General Frank. There was, until you get out of it?
Mr. Rohl There was no question about Rohl-Connolly Co.
138. General Frank. To whom were these letters being written, and with
whom was this conversation by Wyman, in the United States. It was with you.
wasn’t it?
Mr. Rohl General, you mean the letter from the Hawaiian Islands?
139. General Frank. Yes, the letter was to you?
Mr. Rohl Direct.
140. General Frank. Rohl, by name?
Mr. Rohl Yes, sir.
162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
141. General Frank. And the telephone conversations by Wyman were with
you, Rohl, by name?
Mr. Rohl. That’s right.
142. General Frank. You were the person that he was interested in getting
over there; is that not correct?
Mr. Rohl. That is correct.
143. General Frank. Yes. You were the person that he wanted on the job,
as stated in the letter that was written to expedite your naturalization, that
is correct, isn’t it?
Mr. Rohl. That is correct.
144. General Frank. Therefore, you were the man who was concerned, and
whose alien status threw a monkey-wrench into the smooth operating of getting
this contract through, [272] in Washington, because unless you pulled
out, the Rohl-Connolly Company could not participate in the project ; that is cor-
rect, isn’t it?
Mr. Rohl. General, by that do you mean, unless I pulled out
145. General Frank. As an official.
Mr. Rohl. As an active manager?
146. General Frank. Yes. That was correct, wasn’t it?
Mr. Rohl. That is correct.
147. General Frank. Therefore, there was some complication because of your
personal status as an alien, wasn’t there?
Mr. Rohl. No, General.
148. General Frank. Well, you just said so.
Mr. Rohl. Well, I never had any intention of going to the Hawaiian Islands
and managing that contract.
149. General Frank. Nevertheless, Colonel Wyman in his conversation and in
his letters was rather insistent on having you there, was he not?
Mr. Rohl. That’s right.
150. General Frank. Now, since your alien status was the one thing that
interfered with this thing, since your alien status was the one point that had
to be cleared up in Washington, since your alien status was the one thing that
blocked your going to Honolulu, and sineei Wyman, on the other side, was so
insistent on having you come there, do you mean to say that Wyman was never
told about it?
Mr. Rohl. Oh , Wyman teas told about it. (R. 2239-2240-2241-224 2.)
Thomas B. Shoemaker, Deputy Commissioner, Legal Branch, Phila-
delphia, testified that he was in the Los Angeles office when the letter
of January 22, 1941, was brought in, shortly after that day, to the
Los Angeles office of the Immigration Bureau, as the basis for ex-
pediting Kohl’s citizenship. It is on the basis of that and General
Kingman’s letter 61 and the [273] activities of four lawyers, the
Martin brothers, Cannon, and Galloway, former assistant attoniey
general of the United States, that Kohl’s application for citizenship
was expedited. 82 He testified that the report of the inspector on May
24, 1941 in Los Angeles recommending that a warrant for Kohl’s ar-
rest be issued and he be deported for illegal entry into the United
States was outweighed by the efforts of Colonel Wyman, as a certificate
(from an Army officer that the alien was needed on a national defense
contract would counterbalance the alien’s past actions.
He said the result of all these efforts was to expedite Kohl’s citi-
zenship, which was granted in September 1941. At that time there
was also on the statute books the present statute that an alien enemy
would have an entirely different status of naturalization than Rohl
81 Also letter or wire from Wyman to Borne Immigration and Naturalization official stat-
ing that Rohl wus an alien and requesting that his application for citizenship be
expedited which communication could not be found in the flies of the Immigration and
Naturalization Bureau. (R. 2453-2454).
82 See testimony of Benjamin L. Stilphen, lawyer-expediter for the Chief of Engineers.
(R. 1540.1
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
163
enjoyed, as we were not yet at war with Germany, and that was one of
the real reasons, in addition to Wyman’s solicitude for the Hawaiian
contract, that Rohl was pressing so hard with four lawyers to get
naturalized. The fee for a lawyer acting in this capacity is fixed
by statute at $25. It is obvious that these four lawyers were not in the
class of such payment of fees. Shoemaker testified it was unnecessary
to have a lawyer for any man to become naturalized if it was justified.
(R. 4 790.) 63
In confirmation of the foregoing is the letter of Rohl’s attorney,
Cannon, who was handling his trouble with his alien [07^]
status which had resulted in Rohl being fined $25,000 for holding in
his name as an alien vessel over 75 feet in length. This letter reads:
Theodore Wyman, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers, War Department,
in charge of all the above-mentioned defense work in Hawaii, has requested Mr.
Rohl and the War Department to have Mr. Rohl give his personal service* in
connection with the emergency defense work in Hawaii, and as early as Janu-
ary 1941 and at numerous times since that date Colonel Wyman has tendered
Mr. Rohl transportation via clipper or boat to the Island and has stated to Mr.
Rohl over interocean telephone that he will personally obtain special permission
because of Mr. Rohl’s alien status, to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this secret
contract. (R. 2229.)
Rohl testified that Wyman knew he was an alien before the contract
of Hawaiian Constructors was signed in December, 1940. Witness
the following :
160. General Frank. Now, since your alien status was the one thing that inter-
fered with this thing, since your alien status was the one point that had to be
cleared up in Washington, since your alien status was the one thing that blocked
your going to Honolulu, and since Wyman, on the other side, was so insistent on
having you come there, do you mean to say that Wyman was never told about
it?
Mr. Rohl. Oh, Wyman was told about it. (R. 2242.)
This is the same testimony that Rohl gave before the Tenney Com-
mittee in February 1943 (p. 3807) :
“Q. When you first obtained the contracts for the construction of military instal-
lation (construction), did you tell Major Wyman that you were an alien?
“A. I did, on the Hawaiian Constructors.
“Q. But you didn’t, on any other projects?
“A. We don’t have it. There are no restrictions. I mean, on a government
contract you are not questioned as to whether you are a citizen or not, but on
this particular contract, contract 602, being a secret contract, of course, I told
him. I had to tell him.” (R. 2243.)
The foregoing testimony is significant in connection with what hap-
pened at Washington thereafter when Grafe, Connolly and Wyman
were jointly working to get from the Corps of Engineers [276 ]
the contract for Wyman’s friends, Rohl-Connolly Company, the Cal-
lahan Company, and the Gunther & Shirley Company :
General Frank. Just while we are on this subject, I would like to ask some
questions about these telephone conversations that you had with Colonel Wyman,
he in Honolulu, and you in Los Angeles. Do you mean to say that never, in any
of those telephone conversations, did you ever bring up the question with him
about your alien status?
Mr. Rohl. I don’t believe I did, General. I took it for granted that he was
told that, In Washington.
Major Clausen. What did you base that on?
Mr. Rohl. Well, that’s what I would like to explain.
" See also Barber (K. 3972-8974), Combs (R. 2428).
164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
John Martin was back in Washington on other matters, not on my business,
or Rohl-Connolly business, Hawaiian Constructors’ business. He was back on
some other business.
General Frank. Having to do with your firm?
Mr. Kohl. No, sir — with other contractors ; no one involved in Hawaiian Con-
structors, and by accident he met Paul Grafe and Tom Connolly and told them
not to sign the contract, until the talked to them further; so John Martin called
me, in Los Angeles, from Washington, and told me the nature of the contract,
and I gave him permission — not permission, but told him to tell Mr. Grafe and
Mr. Connolly my alien status ; which he did.
General Frank. Who was responsible, in trying to get the group of contractors
interested in this Hawaiian project? Was it, or was it not, Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Kohl. Yes.
General Frank. It was Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Rohl. He was interested in getting a group of contractors.
General Frank. Including the Rohl-Connolly Company, the Callahan Com'
pany, and the Gunther & Shirley Company?
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.
General Frank. Now, Colonel Wyman, Mr. Connolly, and Mr. Grafe were in
Washington together, in a group, discussing this contract, were they not?
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.
General Frank. And a hitch that came up in consum- [£7d] mating the
contract was your alien status, is that correct?
Mr. Rohl. General, by that do you mean — now, I have no knowledge of my
own whether Mr.
General Frank. Well, I will put it in different words. Maybe the word “con-
summating” bothers you. You and they felt that you could not participate in the
contract because it was a defense project and you were an alien?
Mr. Rohl. That’s right. (R. 2230-2240.)
Wyman was in Washington, as his testimony shows, and, as he
admits, with Connolly of the Rohl-Connolly Company and Paul Grafe
of the Callahan Company. It was on this trip they were occupying
the same rooms together at the Hotel Carlton. It was then that the
citizenship question came up which stopped the whole thing.
The letter of January 22, 1941, 64 was written by Wyman to Mr. Rohl,
Rohl-Connolly Company. This letter created an inference of lack
of knowledge of Rohl’s alien status by Wyman. Wyman stated before
this board that at that time he did not know that Rohl was an alien.
That was a false official statement. This letter was obviously written
to furnish a basis of getting Rohl to Hawaii and to use any reply
to it or action initiated by his letter as a means of pressing the govern-
ment to expedite Rohl’s naturalization.
The testimony of Connolly and Grafe as to their Washington trip
and the holdup due to this alien citizenship matter of Rohl is signifi-
cant. (R. 2162-2170, 2189-2199, 2290-2318.) [277] The fact
that Rohl changed his position as president in December 1940 before
the contract was signed, in the light of Connolly’s testimony of the
reason therefor, because of Rohl’s alien status, again confirms that these
co-conspirators well knew that there would be no contract unless Rohl
was camouflaged in the background until they could get him admitted
to citizenship. (R. 2160-2161, 2167-2168.)
It is further significant that when Rohl was confronted with his
testimony in February, 1943 to the same effect that he had previously
given before this board he began then to see the impact of his ad-
missions and endeavored to get out by claiming some error in the
Tenney records. (R. 2243-2245.)
94 This letter shows Rohl was addressed as a part of the Rohl-Connolly Company, the
letter refers to “secret contracts No. W-414-Eng-602 with the Hawaiian Constructor*”
and “as you are actively interested in this venture” etc. (R. 3o30.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
165
Again before the Tenney Committee, before whom he admitted
having given testimony as before this board (R. 2246-2247) he testi-
fied as follows : after having read to him the statute against an alien
having anything to do with a secret defense contract he testified before
the Tenney Committee,
Absolutely. Now, as a matter of fact, before we took this contract, the War
Department was told.
So here again we have proof that he knew perfectly well that Colonel
Wyman was fully advised because when questioned he said
Now, whether Mr. Grafe of Mr. Connolly or Mr. Matin told Colonql Wyman,
or any one in the Engineer Department that, Idon’t know. I simply took that
for granted. (R. 2247.)
It is obvious that Rohl was not the type of man, on a matter of
this vital importance, holding up a contract that ultimately amounted
to $100,000,000, that he would take anything for granted unless he
was certain it was so; and one of the things of wnich he was very
certain and to which he repeatedly testi- [1178] fied was that
Wyman did know he was an alien before Wyman went to Washington
to negotiate the contract.
Rohl testified, as a matter of fact, that his alien status was not a
secret, saying
There was no reason at all for dodging that point. I mean, it was a fact I
didn't keep it a secret ( R. 2258. )
In attempting to protect his co-conspirators, it will be noted in
Rohl’s testimony that from time to time, after fully and frankly
testifying as to one set of facts and having done so at other times to
the same effect, when he was cornered he would try to change his
testimony, not once but many times. Under such circumstances the
truth proDably is that testimony of Rohl’s which was the natural
and logical testimony that he did tell Wyman when they were nego-
tiating the contract, because he knew, as did Wyman, that that was a
fatality they would have to overcome or there would be no Hawaiian
Constructors, including the Rohl-Connolly Company.
II. Refusal to Accept Low Bidder on Hawaiian Contracts: Wyman
Preferring His Friends
After Colonel Wyman arrived in the Islands following the forma-
tion of the Hawaiian Constructors he asked for bids on construction
work involving rock excavation, furnishing of rock excavation, fur-
nishing of rock and similar heavy construction. The bids were asked
for on two bases, a bid on each individual job and a bid on the total
job. The Hawaiian Constructors were one of the bidders and estab-
lished local contractors with going organizations and equipment and
quarries were the other bidders. These local contractors were all
organizations of long standing in the Islands, who had constructed
some of the largest installations in the Is- [279] lands for both
Army and Navy and were fully competent to do the work.
When the bids were opened publicly, a local contracting firm, Clarke-
Halawa Rock Company, headed by Mr. Chester R. Clark, was the
low bidder. Despite the fact that as a matter of law the District
Engineer, Colonel Wyman, was required to place the bid with the low
bidder and thereby save the government a sum estimated as $300,000
by Mr. Clark, the low bidder.
166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
But this action of Colonel Wyman’s was not the end of this trans-
action. The bids stipulated that, the work must be completed within
90 days from the acceptance of the bid. Upon the expiration of the
90 days from the date of the bid by Colonel Wyman to Hawaiian
Constructors, the latter had not fulfilled the terms of bid and had not
proceeded with the contract, thus losing the government three months’
time, where time was vital and was so stipulated in the invitation to
bid and in the proposals by the contractors. Thereupon Mr. Clark
wrote to Colonel Wyman and asked that the award be revoked and the
bids reopened and again Colonel Wyman refused to desert his “friends,”
the Hawaiian Constructors.
In the very beginning Mr. Clark wrote and called upon Colonel
Wyman, as had been his custom with other district engineers for whom
he had worked satisfactorily. He was told that Colonel Wyman had
other plans and did not want anything to do with him. (R. 3627,
3633. ) He thus shut off direct dealings with local contractors as a part
of his, Wyman’s, plan as shown by the facts before this board, to deal
exclusively with the Hawaiian Constructors headed by his friend,
Rohl, and thus violated all dictates of good business, the best interests
of the government, and action that would have expedited [280]
the contract through contractors who had going organizations, resi-
dent in the Island, with ample equipment, quarries, men on the ground,
working and with no need to be imported. (R. 3627-3628.)
It is worth quoting the testimony of Mr. Clark on this subject:
when the bids were opened on the 12th of May, 1941, a group of contractors,
local contractors, were the low bidders as individuals, on Individual airfields,
but the organization headed by Mr. Rohl, Gunther-Shlrley and I think by Mr.
Grafe, were the ones that had — and also a bid by McKee and Company — were high
on the total for all the airfields. Adding up the individual bids we were several
hundred thousand dollars low and when I consulted with Colonel Wyman in
regard to the saving to the government he informed me that all of the local
bids were being thrown out and the contract would be awarded to the Rohl-
Connolly organization. We thought that quite unfair at the time and wrote two
letters to the Engineers in protest, and both of them were Ignored. (R. 3627.)
He testified that the bids were publicly opened. He was present at
the opening of the bids in the usual manner. He then testified :
Had we been awarded these contracts, my own organisation on the Molokai
and the Aiioria on the Hawaiian one, and the Hawaiian Constructors on the
Mauai field, all of us would have those fields completed within the year 1941.
He further said :
That was the idea, to get the fields in usable condition, and the bids specified
that they should be within use within a hundred days.
Accordingly, Mr. Clarke said :
I wrote a letter to- the United States Engineers on the 100th day, asking them
what was being done, and the letter was ignored, because we felt that we had
a right to protest, owing to the fact that the Jobs were being unduly hampered
and not started. (R. 3628.)
He stated that his bids were $300,000 less than the bids of Hawaiian
Constructors. (?• 3629.)
The services of his organization were used later by the Hawaiian
Constructors as sub-contractors and suppliers of [281] rock
and material from the quarries of Clark’s company, the Clarke-Halawa
Rock Co. Mr. Clarke’s record of construction work he had performed
in the Island is impressive. (R. 3630-3632.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
167
Mr. Clarke testified as to repeated news of and discourtesy and ar-
rogant treatment by Colonel Wyman, in entire contrast to all previous
District Engineers. (R. 3633-3634.)
He also testified to the constantly drunken condition of Rohl as soon
as he got to the Islands and his lack of any help to the work in the
Islands. (R. 3634-3636.)
Clarke’s experience was not the only one. Mr. Robert E. McKee,
general contractor, was in the Islands at this time and had been for
several years, constructing Hickam Field and other large government
installations. His organization is one of the largest in the country,
having completed enormous contracts with the Federal Government
in the United States and abroad. He is one of the leading contractors
in the United States and heads a firm of great wealth and nigh reputa-
tion for integrity and compliance with its contracts. The story of
how McKee’s organization was summarily discarded by Wyman is
best told in Mr. McKee’s words. It is to be noted that McKee had a
going organization fully equipped with able men and equipment ready
to do business whereas the Hawaiian Constructors were mainland
people who had not operated in the Islands and had to import such
second- or third-grade men as they could recruit and they were with-
out complete equipment which all agree, including Colonel Wyman,
were two primary factors in delaying the work of the Hawaiian Con-
structors, l. e., the lack of men and Tack of equipment and materials.
[£88] Here you have some of the reasons for the great delay in
getting the work done on these secret defense contracts under Wyman’s
direction. He refused to take the existing organizations, fully
equipped with men and equipment, and went to great trouble to as-
semble his friends whom he had dealt with in Los Angeles (The Rohl-
Connolly Company, The Callahan Company, and the Gunther-Shirley
Company) into a new organization and have them start from scratch
to assemble men, who were then very scarce, and equipment, that was
even scarcer, and get them into Hawaii and try to get started.
It was not until sometime later that any local contractors were
taken into the “party” of Wyman’s with his favorite contractors. Let
it be remembered that the primary excuse given by Wyman for the
Hawaiian Constructors was that he had to get somebody whom he
knew would be able and efficient to do the job and who was equipped
to do it and that he could not trust anybody else. This board finds
that such excuses were not founded in fact.
After he began to find that the Hawaiian Constructors were not
producing ana the work was extremely slow because of the defective
organization of the Hawaiian Constructors, their lack of men who
were skilled and competent, their lack of machinery, etc., Hawaiian
Constructors then invited in two local contracting concerns, Hawaiian
Contracting, Inc., headed by Bensen, and the Woolley Company,
headed by Woolley.
III. Irregular Purchases Of Machinery By Wyman From The Ha-
waiian Contractors and Associates
The next chapter on the “side profits” of Hawaiian Constructors,
was the following transaction :
[£8S] Wyman knew that he was going to be relieved on the 15th
of March. On the morning of the 12th of March he directed his
168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
second-in-command, Colonel Robinson, to have their official Corps of
Engineers appraiser, a civilian named Parker, appraise the machinery
of the Rohl-Connolly Company which had been shipped b> the latter
from Los Angeles some three months before destined for Christmas
Island but not being able to unload there it was returned to the U. S.,
additional renovation work on it was done, and it then was shipped
to Hawaii. Parker was instructed to bring back his appraisal by that
night. He was given the price of $166,000 which the Rohl-Connolly
Company wanted for this equipment with a list of the machinery and
the price wanted. Parker took with him a representative of the
Hawaiian Constructors and by great effort he traveled over the Island
on the 12th to visit various parts of the Island where the equipment
was located.
He found some of the machinery was in bad condition, that some of
its defects had been repaired and then painted over, and some of the
repairs were of such character that they were unsatisfactory. (R.
3794.) Parker was an experienced appraiser before he came to the
Corps of Engineers and knew Island values.
He completed his appraisal at eight o’clock the night of the 12th
and delivered it to Colonel Robinson. His appraisal was $131,000.
(R. 3783, 3808.) The latter expressed his disagreement with the ap-
praisal value and the following day called Parker into a meeting with
the Hawaiian Constructors, at which were present Rohl, Woolley, Ben-
son and Middleton. (R. 3784.) Parker was placed at a table with
these men by himself while Robinson went off and left him. Rohl
and Middleton of Hawaiian I £ 84 ] Constructors did the talk-
ing. (R. 3790.) He was then subjected to great pressure to have him
change his appraisal, which he refused to do. The testimony of Parker
on this score is significant :
They had papers there of figures showing that they had spent so much money
fixing up these trucks and the shovels and so forth, and I said, “Well, I still con-
sider that my appraisal Is fair, and even though you fixed it up”, I said, “It was
a poor job, because there’s cracks in the pumps, all the shovels are not running
and the trucks arc broken down right now, and,” I said, “They did a very good
job of painting over all these defects.” (R. 3785.)
Thereafter Robinson developed, under Wyman’s direction in cooper-
ation with Hawaiian Constructors, that rental should have been paid
on this equipment; and that, if such rental had been paid, the price
would have been what the Rohl-Connolly Company wanted, as the
rental plus the appraisal of Parker would nave amounted to that sum
or slightly more.
The basic contract provided, for the rental of equipment through
written transactions duly approved by the Secretary of War. There
is no scrap of paper found by us showing this was done. As showing
how unfounded such rental was, it is to be observed that the purchase
price was one thing and the rental was another and so recognized by
the contract. (R. 3810.)
In the purchase of equipment outright, rental should not have been
combined with the purchase price of the equipment, because the
voucher for the purchase must certify that the bill is “correct and just”.
In this case the voucher was issued for $166,000 whereas Robinson
admits that the appraised value was 26% less. (R. 3811.) The
voucher for $166,000 was therefore in error as the actual value of the
machinery was only $131,000 according to Robinson’s own story. The
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 169
balance of the $166,000 was rental which the contract required be han-
dled in an entirely [ 286 ] different way.
This 26% of the total value for rental as approved by Wyman and
Robinson was the government possession of the equipment for two or
three months. (R. 3814.)
The equipment was second-hand to begin with when they loaded it
on the to the government transport “Luddington” at Los Angeles. No
appraisal was made of it at that time as could have been easily done.
(R. 3610.) It was then finally brought to Hawaii and apparently was
used to some extent during this period of two to three months.
As to this matter we find the report of the Inspector General, Colo-
net Hunt, significant. He said (p. 15, par. “e”) :
It appears to be reasonably certain that the equipment in question had been in
actual use for various lengths of time during January, February, and part of
March at the time of purchase, although use records are not available and ap-
parently were not maintained. There was no record of any rental agreement
relating to any of this equipment. It is quite possible that assuming the fairness
of Mr. Parker’s appraisal on 12 March, the equipment had a substantially higher
value when delivered to the site of use or at point of shipment. It does not,
however, appear that a depreciation of a approximately $35,000 in value, or
about 26% could have occurred in that period. No suitable basis was available
upon which to reconstruct a fair value to apply to the equipment as of the date
of delivery. Mr. Rohl’s efforts to sway the appraiser’s judgment by reference
to rentals due, seems an obvious effort to distort the facts in his own favor. All
trace of the retained voucher and supporting papers was missing. No memoranda
or other papers were found in connection with Colonel Wyman’s letter directing
the purchase at Mr. Kohl’s figures. In the absence of Justifying evidence or
testimony, the conclusion seems inescapable that Colonel Wyman was unduly
swayed, contrary to the Government’s interests, by an unwarranted acceptance of
these representations of Mr. Kohl in the face of conflicting recommendations.
(R. 3827-3828.)
There is no document that could be found by this board, despite its
efforts to do so, and the demand of the Corps of Engineers and of
Robinson to produce any document of this nature, in conformance with
the contract, allowing rental. [ 286 ] (R. 3815-3816.) To allow
rental under the guise of the sales price of the equipment by Rohl-
Connolly Company to the government was irregular. This was well
known by Wyman and Robinson when they conducted and consum-
mated this transaction. Robinson testifies that he did this under
Wyman’s direction and with Wyman’s full knowledge. (R. 3824-
3825-3826.)
The reason for the great haste in making this transaction was given
by Colonel Robinson. He said that Colonel Wyman was relieved as of
the 15th and he wanted to close up this “loose end.” (R. 3827.)
The claimed rental appears exorbitant, even if legally paid, be-
cause under the circumstances 26% for two to three months use for
second-hand equipment was obviously high.
The Board believes that the plan to pay rental and include this
amount in the purchase price of the equipment was an afterthought.
It was not in contemplation of the parties, at die time of the agree-
ment, to have the equipment delivered to the government. In Wyman’s
prepared statement, delivered under oath, he said :
It was decided in October 1941 that the equipment in question was needed on
Christmas and Canton Islands in connection with the construction work being
done there by Hawaiian Constructors under contract No. l-414-eng-602. It was
discovered that the Kohl Connolly Co. had the needed equipment available at a
project it had just completed in Arizona, at Highgate Dam, Parker, Arizona.
170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Government could either rent or buy this equipment Since it was to be
shipped to these remote islands, it was agreed that the equipment should be bought
by the Government. (R. 3412-13.)
In view of this agreement to buy, it would have been more equitable
and resulted in the better protection of the government’s interests
had a fair value for the equipment at the time of delivery in earlv
December, 1941, at Los Angeles, been determined and paid. Sucn
value could have been [287] established on Marcn 12th very
easily, as the equipment had been used little prior to that time.
The procedure to establish the right of Rohl-Connolly to collect
rentals and the methods used in assessing the rental values all appear
to be very irregular.
The second incident of the purchase of machinery that was against
government interest was that involving the Hawaiian Contracting
Company. This incident was the subject of inspections by the In-
spector General, Colonel Hunt and by Colonel Nurse (R. 3999), the
official bottleneck buster.
Here follows the story of the second purchase of equipment by the
Corps of Engineers in Hawaii.
The testimony of Colonel Nurse on this subject is significant to the
effect that he inspected this equipment, which was purchased by
Colonel Wyman for $156,411 from the Hawaiian Contracting Com-
pany. 85 He, (Nurse) found that since the date of the purchase much
of it apparently was never used because it was worthless or obsolete.
Some of it had never been moved from the original yard in which it
was at the time of the appraisal and this despite the fact that during
this entire period there was the greatest demand for this type of equip-
ment. Colonel Nurse produced nis contemporaneous reports as to this
situation and we quote from his testimony as follows :
Colonel Nurse. In 1943, in one of our investigations, we became aware that
there was considerable equipment stored in the Hawaiian Contractors' yard that
belonged to the Government and never had been removed ... (R. 3999.)
Colonel Nurse then read from the report that he had made, as
follows :
[23S7] — “found stored in the yard of the Hawaiian Contracting Company,
a large amount of construction equipment and tools which had been acquired
by the U. S. E. D. on 15 March 1942 for $147,611.00. A good deal of this equip-
ment is apparently in unserviceable condition, though it is felt that much of it
could be put back in service or parts stripped for repair of other equipment.
Some few items on the original purchase order had been removed and receiving
reports are being checked to determine if it was received by the U. S. E. D.
The list of equipment remaining includes such items as: automobiles, draglines,
buckets, bulldozers, compressors, cranes, drill machines, finishers, graders, ham-
mers (pile driving), hoists, mixers, pumps, road rollers, scrapers, shovels, spread-
ers, tractors, trucks, trailers, and also three lighting outfits (new). Apparently
the fact that these belonged to the Government was overlooked until the curi-
osity of a B. B. was aroused through having done some snooping. This informa-
tion, together with a list of equipment has been turned over to Captain Spencer,
who will take immediate action in removing it to his Base Yard.” . . .
General Frank. Do you have reason to believe or to know that after that
equipment had been bought it had never been removed from the yard?
Colonel Nurse. Well, I saw it, a great deal of it, myself, and the grass and
the weeds were grown up around it so that you couldn’t — some of it was hard
to find. They just had to go out there and dig it out, send men in there to cut
the weeds and grass in order to get some of it out where they could move
it . . .
* Note the difference from Hawaiian Contractor!
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 171
General Frank. Well, were they extremely short of equipment over there, so
that they normally were in need of it and would have used it?
Colonel Nurse. Yes, but a big portion of this equipment was unserviceable,
and I was led to believe that it was remaining in this yard for repair at such
time as the Hawaiian Constructors could get around to do the work, but the
superintendent there of the Hawaiian Constructors told me that the U. S. E. D.
had turned in so much other equipment for repair that he just was bogged down ;
he never had been able to get at the repair of this equipment that was pur-
chased from them. (R. 4000-4002.)
Please contrast this finding of failure to use with Colonel Robinson’s
statement that they bought the equipment from Benson and the Ha-
waiian Contracting Company as a member of the Hawaiian Con-
structors because of the urgent need for the equipment. The facts
completely refute his statement and a reasonable investigation of the
records of the Corps of Engineers, [289] such as Nurse’s
report, would have prevented him from making such a statement.
For instance :
General Russell. Based on that list which you saw representing the items
of equipment purchased and the list which you compiled of the unused part
of those items, it is now your testimony that the greater part of this property
was never used by the Government?
Colonel Nurse. That is my opinion, yes, sir, that is it was not used, with the
exception of a few items which were unserviceable. Two lighting outfits were
brand-new, never had been taken out of the box, but outside of that I think
all the rest of the equipment in the yard, with the exception of a crane they
had there that couldn’t very well be moved, was unserviceable, and it was held,
a good deal of it, with the idea of repairing it, although much of it was antiquated
equipment there that — well, there were mule-drawn dump wagons and things
of that sort that we never would use in this day and age. . .
Colonel Toulmin. As a matter of fact, Colonel, it was a bunch of junk, wasn’t
it?
Colonel Nurse. That that remained in the yard, with the exception of a
few items.
Colonel Toulmin. With the exception of the two lighting outfits and the one
crane, it was a bunch of junk, wasn’t it?
Colonel Nurse. I would tell you that was pretty nearly true.
Colonel Toulmin. Wasn’t there a demand for good equipment in the Islands?
Colonel Nurse. Yes, sir.
Colonel Toulmin. And anybody who bought that as a bunch of junk wouldn’t
be getting anything he could use, would he?
Colonel Nurse. Some of it could be repaired, and I think they had requisitioned
parts for the repair of some of the items.
Colonel Toulmin. That had never been done, had it?
Colonel Nurse. They hadn’t received parts up to the time I made my investi-
gation.
General Frank. And this was a year after it was bought ?
Colonel Nurse. Yes, sir.
Colonel Toulmin. And in the interim of that year [290] there was a
great demand for machinery, wasn’t there?
Colonel Nurse. There was. (R. 4006-4007.)
A statement of this transaction is clearly set off in the report of the
Inspector General, Colonel Hunt. He says :
The procedure was to base payment upon an appraisal to be made by a Mr.
Bruce Gentry, representing the Hawaiian Constructors; a Mr. H. J. Roblee, em-
ployee of the Edward R. Bacon Company of Honolulu and a third man represent-
ing the owner. In the case of the equipment purchase now in question, the
third party was Mr. Edward Ross, employee of the Hawaiian Contracting Com-
pany. These three appraised the equipment in question, placing an upper value
of $156,150 upon it. This appraisal was substantially the amount named in a
letter addressed by Mr. Rohl to the District Engineer dated 9 January, 1942.
In this case, the Government was not properly represented. Mr. Roblee, ostensibly
the Government’s representative, owed his livelihood to the Edward It. Bacon
172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Company, of which the Hawaiian Contracting Company was a substantial cus-
tomer in equipment purchases, his interests relating to those of his employer and
its substantial customer. Mr. Gentry was a contractor employee and Mr. Boss
obviously served the interests of the vendor.
Page 14, paragraph “c” :
The items hauled to salvage, unused, totaling $9,100, were examined by the in-
vestigating officer. These items were so far obsolete as to warrant the descrip-
tion “archaic”. Some of the Watson wagons (hand operated, bottom dump
wooden wagons) were arranged for animal draft, while others had been equipped
with trailer tongues. All had been robbed of metal parts before the purchase,
some were badly rotted and others were termite eaten beyond any possible use-
fulness. Scrapers, scarifiers and like items were incomplete, badly rusted and of
doubtful useability, even in an extremity. Other items accepted and taken Into
possession of the District Engineer subsequent to 1 July 1942 aggregated another
$20,511. These last items were useable, but their acquisition was totally unneces-
sary, suitable like items having been available in sufficient quantity prior to
acceptance by the District Engineer’s forces.
Page 15, paragraph “d” :
This transaction was directed by Colonel Wyman on 13 March 1942, and
payment was effected in the same manner as in the case of the Rohl-Connolly
equipment (paragraph 7). The files yielded no correspondence in the matter
other than that mentioned herein. In the course of Major Lumsden’s inquiry,
it developed that the District Engineer’s appraiser had undertaken an appraisal
of some items of this equipment, had been denied access to it on [291] the
first attempt, and had later been permitted to examine it with the result that
on the items inspected, values were recommended which were in substantial
agreement with those later used, in the actual purchases. Nothing further was
done at that time, however, and when the purchase was finally directed, this
appraisal was ignored and the new one made as indicated above.” (R. 3828-
3829-3830.)
When Colonel Robinson was asked why worthless equipment was
bought along with equipment that was usable from the Hawaiian Con-
tracting Company, he said that the contractor refused to sell the good
without the worthless (R. 3614—3616), so the government bought
worthless property and the usual government certificate was issued
as the basis for the voucher certifying the bill was “correct and just”.
The purpose of the certificate is to prevent matters of this character
from occuring.
Henry P. Benson, who headed the Hawaiian Contracting Com-
pany, took the position that he would not sell the good eouipment to
the government which it needed without taking the junk on his hands.
The following is probably explanatory of the holdup of the govern-
ment that Colonel Robinson and Colonel Wyman permitted.
Colonel Toulmin. And playing fair, so-called, with the contractor at the gov-
ernment’s expense by taking the junk off his hands, because he wouldn’t sell you
the good equipment without the junk; isn’t that it? That what you testified to.
Colonel Robinson. Well, your wording is different than mine, sir, but it’s all
right. . . .
Colonel Toulmin. Well, then do you want us to understand that all the equip-
ment you bought was good equipment?
Colonel Robinson. No, sir. I have testified to the condition of the equipment
Colonel Toulmin. Some of it was good and some was worthless or substantially
worthless; is that right?
[292] Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir.
Colonel Toulmin. All right. Benson told you that he wouldn’t let you have the
good equipment unless you took the other stuff that wasn’t so good or was worth-
less with it; that is right isn’t it?
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. (R. 3615-3616.)
In this connection it is to be noted that Colonel Robinson said:
“We desperately needed equipment.” (R. 3616.) Contrast that
Statement of “desperately needed equipment”, for which the price of
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
173
$156,411 was paid, with the fact that it turned out to be either un-
necessary because suitable items had been available in sufficient quanti-
ties at that time to the Corps of Engineers, or “items were so far
obsolete as to warrant the description ‘archaic’ (R. 3829-3830.)
The evidence before the Board lacks definiteness as to the exact value
of the property purchased from the Hawaiian Contracting Company.
The Board believes, however, that the evidence indicates that the price
paid was very excessive and fails to establish a valid reason for paying
any sum for worthless equipment. This matter should be further
investigated.
c. SUMMARY
Colonel Wyman’s conduct in the Hawaiian Islands resulted in many
delays in the completion of essential defenses. His association with
Hans Wilhelm Rohl, German alien, and an interested member of the
Hawaiian Constructors, was improper in a government agent. The
award of the contract to the Hawaiian Constructors was favoritism on
the part of Wyman and resulted in selecting an organization that
was put together for the purpose of the Hawaiian contracts and was
not equipped with personnel, mechanical equipment or organization
to promptly and effectively do the work ; and the result was that delays
occurred. Additionally, there were contractors, resident in [ 293 ]
the Islands, and contractors from the mainland working in the Islands,
who had organizations, equipment, personnel, and the facilities for do-
ing the same work more promptly. These men and their organizations
excluded arbitrarily by Colonel Wyman.
We find that Wyman committed the following overt acts amongst
many others :
(1) Knowingly made a false official statement as to his knowledge
of Kohl’s alien status.
(2) Wyman refused to accept the low bidder on a Hawaiian con-
tract and gave the bid to the high bidder, which exceeded the low
bidder by a large sum.
(3) Wyman made irregular purchases of equipment from the Ha-
waiian Constructors and their associate companies and directed pay-
ment incorrectly certifying the bills as “correct and just.”
[ 294 ] Chapter VI. Conclusions
INDEX
1. Explanations
1. Scope.
2. Estimates upon which action was based.
3. Relationship of Commanders in Hawaii.
4. Interchange of information — State and War Departments.
//. Grouping of Conclusions
1. Pearl Harbor Attack.
a. Attack a surprise,
ft. Two primary causes,
c. Responsibilities.
1. Secretary of State.
I 2. Chief of Staff.
8. War Plans Division.
4. Hawaiian Department
70716— 46— ®x. 167 13
174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
II. Grouping of Conclusions — Continued
2. Operations of Engineers in Hawaii.
a. No evidence of intent to delay construction.
b. Engineer peacetime operations.
o. Field Organization of Corps of Engineers — Inspections.
d. Hawaiian Constructors.
e. District Engineer — Colonel Wyman.
1. A pen picture.
2. Associations.
3. Inefficiencies.
4. Neglects.
5. False statements.
6. Failure to protect U. S. interests.
[005] Chapter VI. Conclusions
I. EXPLANATIONS
As a prelude to the citation of conclusions the following is perti-
nent :
1. Scope
Attention is called to the fact that the record developed by the inves-
tigation of this Board contains a great amount of evidence, both oral
and documentary, relating to incidents and issues about which no
conclusions are drawn. Evidence was introduced on these so that
anything which might have had a bearing on the Pearl Harbor dis-
aster would be fully explored. The Board considered that its mission
implied the revealing of all pertinent facts to the end that charges
of concealment would be fully met. In formulating its conclusions
the Board has selected for treatment only those things which it con-
siders material for a clear understanding of the events which collec-
tively caused the Pearl Harbor disaster. The full report of the Board
discusses and analyzes the testimony in its entirety and must be read
for a clear understanding of the history of the Pearl Harbor attack.
#. Estimates upon which action was hosed
The responsible officers in the War Department and in the Hawaiian
Department, without exception, so far as this Board has been able to
determine, estimated the situation incorrectly. They were influenced
in this estimate by facts which then seemea to impel the conclusion
that initially the impending war would be confined to the land and
seas lying south of the Japanese homeland, as forces of the Japanese
Army and Navy were concentrating and [896] moving in that
direction. British and Dutch forces were being organized and made
ready to move in opposition. The Philippine Islands which were
in this theater constituted a threat to the flank of the Japanese forces
if the United States should enter the war. Supplies and reinforce-
ments were being rushed to the Philippines. There was complete ig-
norance of the existence of the task force which attacked Pearl Harbor.
Intelligent officers in high places made the estimate and reached the
conclusions in the light of these known facts. They followed a sane
line of reasoning. These statements are in explanation, not justifica-
tion.
The estimate was in error. The procedure in arriving at it was
faulty ? because it emphasized Japanese probabilities to the exclusion
of their capabilities. Nevertheless, the thinking of these officers was
colored and dominated by this estimate and their acts were similarly
influenced.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
175
3. Relationship of Commanders in Hawaii
The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel and
Admiral Bloch, the commanders of the Army and Navy forces in
Hawaii, were very cordial. They were making earnest and honest
efforts to implement the plans which would result in the two services
operating as a unit in an emergency. These highly desirable ends had
not been accomplished at the tune of the Pearl Harbor attack.
4. Interchange of information — State and War Departments
The Board was impressed with the apparent complete interchange
of information between the State Department and the War Depart-
ment. As a result the War Department was kept in close touch with
international developments ana the State Department knew of the
Army’s progress and its preparations for war.
[897] II. GROUPING OF CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions group themselves logically in two divisions: the
Pearl Harbor attack, and operations of the Engineers in Hawaii. We
shall consider these in the order stated.
1. Pearl Harbor Attack
a. The attack on the Territory of Hawaii was a surprise to all con-
cerned : the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian Depart-
ment It was daring, well-conceived and well-executed, and it caught
tie defending forces practically unprepared to meet it or to minimize
its destructiveness.
b. The extent of the Pearl Harbor disaster was due primarily to two
causes :
1. The failure of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment adequately to alert his command for war, and
2. The failure of the War Department, with knowledge of the type
of alert taken by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
to direct him to take an adequate alert, and the failure to Keep him
adequately informed as to the developments of the United States-
Japanese negotiations, which in turn might have caused him to change
from the inadequate alert to an adequate one.
c. We turn now to responsibilities:
1. The Secretary of State — the Honorable Cordell Hull. The ac-
tion of the Secretary of State in delivering the counter-proposals of
November 26, 1941, was used by the Japanese as the signal to begin
the war by the attack [898] on Pearl Harbor. To the extent
that it hastened such attack it was in conflict with the efforts of the
War and Navy Departments to gain time for preparations for war.
However, war with Japan was inevitable and imminent because of
irreconcilable disagreements between the Japanese Empire and the
American Government.
2. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall,
failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following
particulars :
(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation
which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for
176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little.
(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently
he failed to realize the import of General Short’s reply of November
27th, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood
and misconstrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not
adequately alerted his command for war.
(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and
the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicat-
ing an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample
time to have accomplished this.
[%99] (d) .To investigate and determine the state of readiness
of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7,
1941, despite the impending threat of war. .
3. Chief of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff,
Major General Leonard T. Gerow, failed in his duties in the following
particulars :
(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department ade-
quately informed on the impending war situation by making available
to him the substance of the data Deing delivered to the War Plans
Division by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De-
partment on November 27, 1944, a clear, concise directive ; on the con-
trary he approved the message of November 27, 1941, (472) which
contained the confusing statements.
(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short’s reply
to the November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war,
and he failed to take corrective action.
(d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint
plans and agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the
functioning of the two services in the manner contemplated.
[300] 4. Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department,
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, failed in his duties in the fol-
lowing particulars :
(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face
of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The
information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was
sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government
and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily
expected. This required that he guard against surprise to the extent
possible and make ready his command so that it might be employed
to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that the
enemy might launch.
(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral
commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th
Naval District for implementing the joint Armv and Navy plans and
agreements then in existence which provided for joint action by the
two services. One of the methods by which they might have become
operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible com-
manders.
(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance re-
connaissance being conducted by the Navy.
(d) To replace inefficient staff officers.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
177
[SOI] 2. Operations of Engineers in Ha/waii
a. The Board found no evidence to indicate that the lack of prog-
ress in construction activities in Hawaii and the delays connected
therewith, were due to enemy agents, or to persons connected with
such activities who, by intent, influenced the existing lack of progress
and the delay that ensued.
b. The peacetime organization and conduct of the Corps of Engi-
neers’ construction activities, together with the red tape involved m
staff procedure, priorities, and procurement, were such as made delay
practically inevitable.
c. Chief of Engineers.
1. In the field the organization of divisions and districts of the
Corps of Engineers, under the Washington office, was a very loose
one, without sufficient supervision and inspection. This resulted in
the improper conduct of Colonel Wyman in Los Angeles going with-
out official detection and in his operations as District Engineer in
Honolulu being inefficient.
2. Reports of inspections of Colonel Wyman’s activities by Colonel
John Hunt of the War Department Inspector General’s Office and
by Colonel Lathe B. Row of the Hawaiian Department Inspector
General’s Office, included adverse findings, some of which called for
disciplinary measures, yet no corrective or disciplinary action seems
to have been taken by the Chief of Engineers.
d. The Hawaiian Constructors had a loose and inefficient organiza-
tion ; was poorly managed ; lacked means with which to successfully
prosecute the work; and generally were incapable of doing a first-
rate job, which resulted in lack of progress and delays.
[SOS] e. The District Engineer, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
CE, the contracting officer :
1. Was very aggressive and efficient in the execution of isolated jobs
within his capabilities. He did not appreciate the magnitude of the
task in Hawaii and lacked the capacity to measure up to its require-
ments. His manner was brusque, abrupt and objectionable, and re-
sulted in discord and inefficiency in his administration.
2. In his associations with one Hans Wilhelm Rohl ? a member of the
Rohl-Connolly Contracting Company of the Hawaiian Constructors,
he conducted himself in a highly indiscreet manner.
3. He was most inefficient in the handling of his office and in admin-
istrative matters, which indirectly caused delays.
4. He was negligent in his duties relating to the contract, in that he
failed :
(&) To properly investigate the loyalty of Rohl.
(b) To adequately investigate the availability of qualified con-
tractors before the award or the basic contract and the supple-
mental agreements thereto.
(c) To properly supervise the performance of the work by the
contractors.
(d) To inform his higher headquarters of delays and deficien-
cies of the contractors.
(e) To take appropriate action to overcome [SOS] the
delays and correct the deficiencies of the contractors.
5. He made false statements under oath to the Board.
178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. He failed to protect the interests of the United States in the
purchase of equipment for the Government from the Hawaiian Con-
structors and their associates.
[30J£\ Chapter VII. Recommendations
Recommendations: NONE.
George Grunert,
Lieut. General , U. S. Army ,
President.
Henry D. Russell,
Major General , U. S. Army ,
Member.
Walter H. Frank,
Major General, U. S. Army ,
Member.
Friday, 20 October 191th.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
179
[ 1 ] Appendix No. 1
Supplemental Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board on Phases Mentioned in
House Military Affairs Report Which Relate to the Pearl Harbor
Disaster
1. Scope and extent of inquiry by Army Pearl Harbor Board 2
2. Findings of fact
a. Construction work contemplated and need for speed in construc-
tion 3
b. Duties of the District Engineer, the Division Engineer, and the
Chief of Engineers relating to the award of the contract 5
c. Investigation of possible contractors 5
d. Award of basic contract to Hawaiiian Constructors 9
e. Award of supplemental contracts to Hawaiian Constructor 9
f. Times fixed for completion of work 10
g. Required manner of performance and right of Government to
terminate contract 10
h. Access of Rohl to classified information 10
i. Performance of Hawaiian Constructors 13
j. Administration of contract and supervision of work by District
Engineer 20
k. Conduct of certain witnesses before Board 42
3. Acknowledgments 77
Supplemental Report op Army Pearl Harbor Board on
hases Mentioned in House Military Affairs Report Which
Relate to the Pearl Harbor Disaster
1. Scope and extent of inquiry of Army Pearl Harbor Board
The Secretary of War, by orders dated 12 and 22 July 1944 copies
of which are hereto attached and marked Exhibits “A” and “B”, as-
signed the following missions to the Army Pearl Harbor Board in
connection with the House Military Affairs Committee Report dated
14 June 1944:
Ascertain the facts and make appropriate recommendations to the
Secretary of War concerning all matters mentioned in the Congres-
sional Committee Report which relate to the Pearl Harbor disaster.
These phases involve primarily alleged delays and deficiencies in the
construction of defense projects in Hawaii and alleged derelictions
of the District Engineer, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., C. E.
It is the understanding of the Board that the remainder of the
matters mentioned in the Congressional Committee Report, other than
the Pearl Harbor matters, will be investigated in accordance with the
order of the Sacretary of War dated 12 July 1944.
2. Findings of fact
The following facts have been found by the Board after careful
consideration of the evidence and due deliberation. These findings
are based upon the sworn testimony of many witnesses heard by the
Board at Washington, San Francisco, and in Hawaii and the study
of numerous authenticated documents. Specific references are made
in some instances to the transcript, the exhibits, and other appropriate
iso CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.
sources of reliable informa- [5] tion. The evidence so indi*
cated is not exclusive, however, of other proof which was adduced be-
fore the Board.
a . Construction work contemplated and need for speed in construc-
tion — The original work contemplated in the fall of 1940 for defense
projects in Hawaii, as later expressed in the basic contract dated
20 December 1940 (Exhibit No. 46), comprised the following cate-
gories :
A. Ammunition storage magazines on the Island of Oahu complete with service
roads, railroad spur tracks and appurtenances * * *.
B. Aircraft warning service stations on the Islands of Oahu, Hawaii, Maui and
Kauai, involving certain installations, including buildings, roads, trails, cable-
ways, haulage ways as directed by the Contracting Officer.
C. Railway trackage on the Island of Oahu at certain locations to be desig-
nated, in accordance with detailed instructions to be issued from time to time by
the Contracting Officer * * •.
D. Fortification structures for use in connection with fixed fortifications at
locations to be determined by the Contracting Officer.
E. An addition to radio station WTJ in accordance with detailed instructions
to be issued by the Contracting Officer.
Speed in completing this construction program was made of the
essence in the contract. The increasing tempo of the world war, the
sympathetic attitude which we had evidenced toward the victims of
the aggressor nations, and the probability that we would be “next on
the list’ 5 , all pointed to the need for strengthening our Pacific outposts
in the shortest possible time.
The Secretary of WaT was personally
taking up very vigorously * * * a long series of steps that were connected
with use of radar in picking up attacks from the air. (R, Ml v 35, p
4064.)
Indicative of this interest was a letter dated 7 February 1941 from
the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, which stated in
part :
War Department,
Washington , February 7, 19il.
Subject : Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise
attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express
complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our
making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian
Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues
to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the
importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.
*******
4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has
been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. AU arrangements for
installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry
develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made
at an earlier date.
*******
(Exhibit No. 22, Robert’s Comm. Report.)
Hence, the contract provided :
The Contractor shall, in the shortest possible time, furnish the labor, materials,
tools, machinery, equipment, facilities, supplies not furnished by the Government,
and services, and do aU things necessary for the completion of the following work.
(Article II, 1.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
181
It is estimated • * * that the work herein contracted for will be ready
for utilization by the Government within six (6) months from the date of this
contract (P. 4.)
[5] b. Duties of the District Engineer , the Division Engineer ,
and the Chief of Engineers relating to the award of the contract . —
The District Engineer and Contracting Officer on this work in the
Hawaiian Islands during the time in question was Colonel Theodore
Wyman, Jr., CE. In accordance with policies established by the
Under Secretary of War to award contracts impartially and to local
contractors if possible, Colonel Wyman was charged with the duties
of ascertaining and recommending the availability of competent con-
tractors in Hawaii to undertake this construction; and, if none were
there available, of ascertaining and recommending the availability of
such contractors in the United States. (R, v. 6, p. 600, 640, 642, 644,
646 j R, v. 18, p 2032.) He was also charged with the duty of investi-
gating the loyalty and background of the contemplated contractors.
(R, v. 6, p. 599, 648, 650, 651, 658 ; R, v. 18, p. 2037.) It was the duty of
the Division Engineer and the Chief of Engineers to review and
supervise the performance of these duties by the District Engineer.
(R, v. 6, p 636, 643 ; R, v. 18, p 2037, 2065. )
c. Investigation of possible contractors . —
Col. Wyman did not conduct an adequate investigation to determine
whether any contractors were available in Hawaii. He failed to com-
municate with such local contractors as would have been able to per-
form the work well and with speed and dispatch. R, v. 29, p. 3388 ;
v. 30, p. 3626 et seq., 3721 et seq; 3750 et seq; v. 21, p. 2402, 2403, 2418
et seq ; v. 24, p. 2764 et seq ; p. 61-63 Report of Col. John A. Hunt, IG.)
Col. Wyman also failed to conduct an adequate investigation to
determine the availability of competent contractors [5] on
the mainland. He merely came to the mainland; and, within the
period of a very few days, interviewed several contractors in Cali-
fornia went, to Washington, D. C. and concluded negotiations with
representatives of a joint venture comprising the Rohl-Connolly Co.,
Gunther-Shirley Co., and the W. E. Callahan Construction Company.
It is clear that Col. Wyman showed favoritism toward the persons who
comprised this joint venture. He did not even inform otner possible
mainland contractors that the job contemplated by the basic contract
would later be expanded, which was something he knew at the time.
(R, v 18, p 2051 et seq ; v 29, p 3537, 3588 ; p 61-63 Report of Col. John
A. Hunt,IG.)
Although the contract covered secret defense projects of the most
crucial importance to our military outpost in Hawaii, Col. Wyman
failed also to investigate the loyalty and background of the persons
comprising the joint venture. (T, v 6, p 600; v 29, p 3579.) A mere
cursory investigation would have revealed that Hans Wilhelm Rohl,
the guiding spirit of the Rohl-Connolly Co., was then a German alien
of doubtful loyalty and with a most dubious background. He first
entered the United States as a German alien on 23 October 1913.
At that time he was admitted for permanent residence. Later, he
left and returned to the United States on about twelve occasions with-
out disclosing his alien status, thus violating immigration laws then
in existence. He also falsely represented himself as a United States
citizen on Federal income tax returns and to a Federal income tax
182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
investigator and on a ship’s manifest. From 1934 to 1940 he directed
the affairs of the Rohl-Connolly Co. as its President and a stockholder.
This firm, by reason of his alien [7] status, owned and operat-
ed a number of ships in violation of the law. For these latter viola-
tions the Rohl-Connolly Company paid a fine of $25,000 on 4 Septem-
ber 1941 in lieu of a statutory penalty forfeiture of the ships. (Ex-
hibit No. 6 ; v 10, p 1161 se seq ; v 20, p 2222 et seq ; v 21, p 2375 et seq ;
v 22, p 2427 et seq ; v 33, p 3972 et seq ; v 34, p 4015 et seq ; v 35, p 4103
et seq ; v 37, p 4338 et seq, 4366 et seq. )
Rohl, as of the time his firm was awarded the secret Hawaiian con-
tract, had a record of having been investigated by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Office of Naval Intelligence for alleged sub-
versive activities. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had even
received information in July 1940 that Rohl may have been a German
agent during the first World War. This disclosure was prompted by
knowledge of the informant that Rohl had been granted large Army
contracts in the vicinity of Los Angeles. The Office of Naval Intel-
ligence was informed in October 1940 that Rohl was an alleged danger-
ous German alien. Col. Wyman could have obtained this information
merely making use of the telephone.
An excerpt from a Naval Intelligence Service Report on Hans
Wilhelm Rohl, dated 5 March 1941 (K, v. 34, p. 4032) states that the
inspector:
*. * * believes subject to have been dishonest in his actions and that his
actions Indicate possible subversive activity.
(R, v. 19, p. 2200 et seq. ; v. 34, p. 4027, 4030.)
The favoritism which Col. Wyman exhibited toward Rohl stemmed
from an unwholesome and inappropriate relationship that had long
existed between them. Their friendship began in 1935 when CoL
Wyman was assigned as District Engineer at Los [5] Angeles.
Col. Wyman so mixed his business and social activities with Rohl that
it is clear these improper activities acutely affected the discharge of his
dutieSj to the detriment of the Government. He accepted from Rohl
excessive entertainment in and out of business hours. There was
much joint drinking, carousing, and indulgence in off-color activities.
This questionable relationship increased in tempo and grew more
intimate and indiscreet as time went on. Several large Army con-
tracts were awarded to Rohl’s firm on the recommendation of Col.
Wyman. He sought to explain this relationship on the ground that
he reciprocated the entertainment. Clearly, however, such an ex-
planation from an Army officer does not excuse, but only aggravates the
original wrong.
This questionable personal and business relationship also involved
at times Paul Grafe of the W. E. Callahan Construction Co. (Exhibit
No. 6; R., v. 10, p. 1161 et seq; v. 21, p. 2375 et seq., 2398 et seq; v. 22,
p. 2427 et seq ; v. 23, p. 2580-A et seq ; v. 29 p 3477 ; v. 33, p. 3957 et seq ;
v. 34, p. 4022 et seq ; v. 35, p. 4095 et seq.)
It is significant that the Chief of Engineers, Major General Eugene
Reybold, frankly testified concerning Col. Wyman in his business
transactions :
He is the most indiscreet man that I ever knew. * * * In what he does on
the side he evidently is very, very indiscreet (R., v. 6, p. 611.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
183
Col. Robert J. Fleming, CE, also testified :
There has been a lot of discussion in the engineers, sir, for years, on the fact
that a lot of people have always believed Colonel Wyman was a little bit too
familiar with the contractors. ( R. v. 11, p. 1289. )
[9] d. Award of basic contract to Hawaiian Constructors . — As
previously stated, Col. Wyman came from Hawaii to California and
spent but a few days ascertaining the availability there of contractors
for the Hawaiian projects. He then went to Washington, D. C., and
recommended to the Chief of Engineers that the Rohl-Connolly Co.,
W. E. Callahan Construction Co., and Gunther and Shirley Co. be
awarded the basic contract. In pursuance of this recommendation the
secret cost-plus-fixed-fee contract No. W-414-Eng-602 was executed
with these firms on 20 December 1940. This contract called for work
estimated to cost $1,097,673 at a fee of $52,220. (R., v. 6, p. 639 et seq;
v. 18, p. 2032 et seq ; v. 29, p. 3388, 3487 et seq ; v. 20, p. 2288 et seq.)
e . Award af supplemental contracts to Hawaiian Constructors . —
Supplemental agreements to the basic contract were later awarded the
Hwaiian Constructors, mainly on the recommendations of Col.
Wyman. These were 52 in number. Finally, the estimated cost of
the work was expanded to about $112,031,375, and the fee eventually
received by the Hawaiian Constructors was thereby increased to
$1,060,000. In view of this fee which “ballooned” from $52,220 to
$1,060,000, it is interesting to read the following sworn testimony given
by Rohl on 22 May 1941 to an Inspector of the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service :
Question. Have you anything further that you wish to state?
Answer. I would like to say that the defense contract we have in Honolulu, is
not a money making venture. We were requested to take that contract and they
especially wanted me in on it because I have done a lot of work for Colonel
Wyman, and he believes that I am able. We considered it our duty to take that
contract. We are [ 10 ] donating our services, that is why I am anxious
to expedite this investigation in my casa (R., v. 35, p. 4117.)
These supplements covered secret defense projects of the same general
type as that contemplated by the basic contract. (Exhibit No. 6 ; R.,
v. 31, p. 3797.)
/. T imes fixed for completion of work . — At the request of the Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Department, Col. Wyman, as the con-
tracting officer, issued various job orders to the contractor to proceed
with phases of the work. Summaries of some of these job orders are
in evidence. (Exhibits 4 to 4-N ; R. v. 7, p. 778 et seq.) An examina-
tion of the summaries will show that the facilities for the aircraft
warning services, the ammunition storage magazines, the fire control
stations, the underground gasoline storage tanks, and the other vital
defense projects were supposed to have been completed long prior to
7 December 1941.
g. Required manner of performance and right of Government to
terminate contract . — The basic contract (Exhibit No. 46) provides in
Article 1, 4, that :
The work shaU be executed in the best and most workmanlike manner by
qualified, careful, and efficient workers, in strict conformity with the best stand-
ard practices.
184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The contract further provides in Article VI, 1, that :
Should the Contractor at anytime refuse, neglect, or fail to prosecute the work
with promptness and diligence, or default in the performance of any of the
agreements herein contained, or should conditions arise which make it advisable
or necessary in the interest of the Government to cease work under this contract,
the Government may terminate this contract by a notice in writing from the
Contracting Officer to the Contractor.
h . Access of Rohl to classified information . — [11] Col. Wyman
informed Rohl in conferences at Los Angeles and San Francisco, in
negotiations looking toward an award of the contract, that extensive
defense work was to be done in the Hawaiian Islands. (R., v. 20, p.
2244, 2249 et seq.; v. 29, p. 3394.) An alien with a background of
alleged subversive acitivities was thus informed that a program of
highly secret defense work was to be undertaken in Hawaii. Not only
did Col. Wyman have a responsibility as the Contracting Officer ana
the District Engineer to conduct an investigation which would have
disclosed Rohl’s alien background, but he had a clear duty under the
provisions of AR 380-5, 10 June 1939, not to disclose to a German
alien such as Rohl, information classified as Secret and information
that defensive work was to be undertaken in the Hawaiian Islands.
The Chief of Engineers testified :
General Frank. What if any rules or regulations did Colonel Wyman violate
in event that he, having been informed that Rohl was an alien, discussed with
him details of a secret defense project contract?
General Reybold. What did he violate?
General Frank. Yes.
General Reybold. I would say, the rules of good judgment and common sense.
General Frank. Is there any written regulation or specific document that cov-
ers that?
General Reybold. AR 380-5, to safeguard mUitary information, certainly cov-
ers it.
General Gbunert. When was that published?
General Reybold. June 10, 1939. (R. v. 6, p. 607.)
The evidence indicates Col. Wyman knew, before the basic contract
was signed, that Rohl was a German alien. A friend of Col. Wyman
testified that Col. Wyman had so admitted to him. [12] (R., v.
35, p. 4095, et seq.) Col. Wyman admitted to the Inspector General
that he “knew that Mr. Rohl was born in Germany, had come to the
United States on or about the year 1912 and had been in the United
States since.” tP. 63 Report of Col. John A. Hunt, IGD.) Rohl
testified before tne California State Legislature’s Joint Fact Finding
Committee on Un-American activities that he had informed Col.
Wyman that he was an alien. He stated, “I told him — I had to tell
him.” (P. 3807, 3808, Exhibit No. 7.) Rohl said he gave Col.
Wyman this information because he, (Rohl), knew the law which
prohibited an alien from having access to secret defense projects.
(See WD Cir. No. 120, 1940.)
Furthermore, an official of the Bureau of Immigration and Natural-
ization informed Col. Wyman on or before 1 March 1941 that Rohl was
an alien applicant for citizenship. (R., v. 36, p. 4186.) This in-
formation was given Col. Wyman because officials of the Bureau con-
sidered the employment of such an alien on such secret defense work
very “peculiar.” (R., v. 18, p. 4018-4019.) Despite this notice, Col.
Wyman arranged for Rohrs firm to be awarded additional contracts
for secret work. (Exhibit No. 6; v. 18, p. 2048 et seq; v. 29, p. 3501,
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
185
3509, 3533, 3539, 3558, 3559.) Colonel Wyman testified that he was
not informed until June 1941 that Rohl was a German alien. But
even if this were so, then at that time at least Col. Wyman knew the
Government had been victimized by the most crass deception. For.
by their own admissions Thomas E. Connolly of the Rohl-Connolly
Co., and Paul Grafe of the W. E. Callahan Construction Co. and Gun-
ther and Shirley Co., were informed in December 1940, before the con-
tract was signed, that Rohl was a German alien. This caused a com-
plete reorganization because the contract was [13] secret. Mr.
Connolly said the information was a shock and Mr. Grafe stated it
was “a bombshell.” Furthermore, both Mr. Connolly and Mr. Grafe
met Mr. Martin, attorney for the Rohl-Connolly Co., in Washington
during the conferences preceding the execution of the contract. Mr.
Martin stated to Mr. Connolly that he “was in Washington in the in-
terests of acquiring citizenship or furthering citizenship applications
for Mr. H. W. Ronl.” Col. Wyman also was in Washington during
this period and roomed and met with these associates of Rohl. (R.,
v. 19, p. 2158 ; v. 2, p. 2288 ; Exhibit No. 6. )
Thus, if Col. Wyman was not advised until June 1941, he did noth-
ingabout the deception but continued nevertheless to grant contracts
to Kohl and his associates and later gave Rohl full access to the secret
plans and work.
The fact from a security standpoint is that details of secret defense
plans for the Hawaiian Islands actually were disseminated to the
aggressor nations who later became our enemies. (R. 31, p. 3797
et seq; 3799 et seq.) Rohl was also shown to have been acquainted
with one Werner Plack, a German agent (R., v. 22, p. 2375 et seq ; 2517.)
i. Performance by Hawaiian Constructors . — It is clearly established
that from the very inception of the construction work in Hawaii
and Hawaiian Constructors failed and neglected to prosecute the work
with promptness or diligence and defaulted in the performance of the
agreements. Paul Grafe, with whom Col. Wyman had been intimate
in Los Angeles, was the representative in Hawaii of the three firms
comprising the Hawaiian Constructors until Rohl arrived and assumed
charge in September 1941. Undue delays of the contractors became
not- [Ilf] orious. Impartial observations of the way in which
the contractors conducted their affairs indicated that they were most
inefficient. Projects were not completed on time and were not pros-
ecuted in the manner required by the contract.
A well know contractor in Hawaii of some 15 years experience
had observed the work of the Hawaiian Constructors and testified
that it lagged badly and that Rohl was incapable of speeding up
the work on account of his condition. He testified that the Hawaiian
Constructors, in comparison with other contractors, were most inef-
ficient. (R., v. 20, p. 2264 et seq., v. 30, p. 3623, et seq.) He cited
several examples of delays which arose through neglect of the Hawai-
ian Constructors after they were awarded contracts. For example,
the Hawaiian Constructors were awarded a competitive contract,
although they were not low bidders, for two airfields on Hawaii,
one airfield on Mauai, and one airfield on Molokai. The Govern-
ment would have saved about $300,000 if the contract had been granted
to the lowest bidders. Moreover, view from a military standpoint,
the low bidders possibly could have had the airfields completed by
186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
7 December 1941, whereas the Hawaiian Constructors had only just
started the construction as of that date. (R., v. 30, p. 3628.)
Lt. Col. J. J. Kestly, C. E. classified the work done by the Hawaiian
Constructors as third rate and testified that “the progress is what
I am saying was poor.” (R., v. 30, p. 3668.)
Mr. Henry P. Benson, President of the Hawaiian Contracting Co.
which later became a part of the Hawaiian Constructors, testified
that the local contractors could have handled the work more ex-
peditiously and more economically than did the Hawaiian Construc-
tors. (R. v. 30, p. 3724.)
[75] Mr. Walter F. Dillingham, one of the stock holders of the
Hawaiian Contracting Co., testified that after the work had com-
menced under the Hawaiian Constructors he stated to Mr. Benson,
“It’s an awful mess.” (R., v. 24, p. 2758.) Following the execution
of the basic contract and in the year 1941 the persons comprising the
joint venture sold a 20% interest therein to Mr. Ralph E. Woolley, a
local contractor, for the sum of $65,000. (R., v. 30, p. 3750.)
Later in the year 1941 the persons then comprising tne joint venture
commenced negotiations which were consummated in the early part
of the year 1942 whereby a 20% interest in the joint venture was
sold to the Hawaiian Contracting Co. for the sum of $100,000. (R.,
v. 30, p. 3727.) During this period the work covered by the con-
tract and the supplemental agreements was increased to over
$ 100 , 000 , 000 .
In passing it may be noted from the record that a joint venture
of this kind has been criticized as successfully preventing competition
and creating a monopoly to the disadvantage of the Government.
(R., v. 21, p. 2404, 2414.)
The Inspector General, Hawaiian Department, produced many in-
spection reports from the official files which showed irregularities and
deficiencies of long standing in the performance of the Hawaiian
Constructors. (R., v. 28, p. 3226.)
Mr. A. Sisson, civilian employee of the U. S. Engineering Depart-
ment testified regarding the work of the Hawaiian Constructors
from his observations as an Area Engineer. He testified “All of the
work here at the time was badly handled,” * * * “It wasn’t
handled in an efficient manner.” (R., v. 28, p. 3266. 3268.)
[75] He further stated, regarding the Hawaiian Constructors,
“I think their main fault was the inefficiency, sort of a don’t care a
darn what the costs are,” and that if the contractors were efficient
builders “they surely must have sent this ‘scrub team’ over here to
do it” and that “I have thought that there was a laxity, or I would
say that the Hawaiian Constructors or members of the Hawaiian
Constructors have gipped the Government to a considerable extent
in the renting of the equipment.” (R., v. 28, p. 3280, 3281.)
The former General Superintendent for the Hawaiian Construc-
tors, Mr. H. J. King, testified from his observations that the character
of the work which had been done was “very poor.” (R., v. 23,
p. 2529.) He referred to many examples of undue delays. (R., v.
23, p. 2531 et seq.) To use the vernacular of an affidavit he made,
“The work that had been accomplished under the supervision of Col.
Wyman prior to December 7, 1941, was pretty lousy.” (R., v. 23,
p. 2529.) The basis for this opinion was his observations of what
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
187
had been done under Col. Wyman and the conditions of Col. Wyman’s
operations. (R., v. 23, p. 2546.) He gave as his reasons for these
inefficiencies the “lack of organization, lack of knowledge, lack of
experience,” and “lack of supervision” from the top all the way
down. (R., v. 23, p. 2537.) He further stated that the system of
the contract and the supervision by the Corps of Engineers was bad
but that the connection of Rohl with that system aggravated an
already bad situation. (R., v. 23, p. 2558.)
Another former employee of the Hawaiian Constructors, Mr. Rea
B. Wickiser, testified that the grades for the runways at the Hilo
Airfield were changed nine times during the course of [771
construction. He stated that before the Pearl Harbor attack he nad
been employed by the Territory Airport Constructors and that their
work was being capably performed on a fixed contract basis and that
the inefficient conditions arose when the work was given to the Ha-
waiian Constructors after the attack. (R. v. 22, p. 2458, 2465.)
Mr. Robert E. McKee, general contractor of many years experience
testified on the basis of what he knew concerning a contract which
his organization had with the Hawaiian Constructors. He stated
that “the organization (Hawaiian Constructors) wasn’t very effi-
cient” * * * “they were not operating a very efficient organiza-
tion.” He further testified as to undue delays. (R., v. 21, p. 2407
et seq.) He stated that the basic reason for this inefficiency was
lack oi supervision; (R. v. 21, p. 24191 and mentioned that before
Pearl Harbor he had tried unsuccessfully to get contracts for some
of the airfields and that if these contracts had been awarded to con-
tractors other than the Hawaiian Constructors the work would have
been performed in a more efficient manner and at a considerable
saving to the Government. (R., v. 21, p. 2411, 2418.)
George F. Bartlett, a Principal Engineer with the United States
Engineering Department testified as follows concerning the Hawaiian
Constructors :
General Frank. In your observation of the operation of the contractors did
you observe anything that indicated that was any intent on the part of the
contractors to delay the work? Was there anything that showed intent to
delay the work?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, that would be an opinion. My opinion is yes, there
was an intent, but I couldn’t definitely put my finger on anything right now.
General Frank. What led you to your opinion that [18] there was
intent?
Mr. Babtuxtt. Well, we would want certain things done at a certain time, and
it would be resented on the part of the contractor. If I gave them a definite
order that such and such a thing would have to be done at a certain time to make
the work proceed in an orderly way, why, they would quite often find some sub-
terfuge for not doing it, apparently, and we did not get along very well. There
was considerable bickering on the job, but we made them to a certain extent
expedite the work.
(R. v 22, p 2497, 2498.)
An employee in the Operations Office United States Engineering
Department, testified that he had been called in as a sort of trouble
shooter on the AWS construction because the work was lagging. He
found that the reason for these undue delays was “the superintendent
didn’t pay much attention to these AWS constructions” referring to
the superintendents of the Hawaiian Constructors. (R. v 19, p 2137.)
He stated that “there was quite a complaint from the Signal Corps
that we were not making any progress.” (R. v 19, p 2138.)
188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Major General F. L. Martin, Commanding General of the Army
Air Forces in Hawaii at the time of the attack, testified on this point
also:
I complained with reference to the time that was required to get these perma-
nent stations for the RDF installation ; but as I remember those stations were
being constructed under the supervision of Col. Wyman rather than Colonel Ly-
man, who was the Division Engineer. Now, as to who actually had charge of
the construction, I will not be positive, but it is my impression at the present
time that Colonel Lyman — at least, he was pushing it at the time, trying to
unravel the knots that were preventing progress. (R. v. 17, p. 1891.)
Admiral Kimmel testified that General Short wrote him in August
1941 that the Army would have the radar in operation very shortly.
(R. v 16, p 1785.)
Colonel Robert J. Fleming ? CE, who was assigned to the Hawaiian
Department during the time in question testified that [ 19 ] the
association of Rohl and Colonel Wyman was ‘‘unhealthy” and that as
far as the Hawaiian Constructors were concerned “I think there were
indications of an awful lot of inefficiency in the setup.” (R. v. 11,
p. 1294.) He also testified that in his opinion, “If somebody with
ability as an engineer had been District Engineer and could have been
quick to find out what the military side of the picture had been, I think
some of the things might have been speeded up a little bit.” (R. v. 11,
P. 1342.) As one specific example of undue delay, he cited the build-
ing of an elaborate road to a permanent AWS site, which road was far
in excess of what was actually needed. (R. v. 11, p. 1328.) He also
referred to the hot feud which had existed between Col. Wyman and
Gen. Lyman of the Hawaiian Department and said “it would certainly
prolong discussions.” (R. v. 11, p. 1278.) He also stated that Paul
Grafe, who was the directing head of the Hawaiian Constructors be-
fore the arrival of Rohl and who dominated the situation before Rohl
assumed charge in September 1941, was a negative character so far as
getting work done. (R. v. 11, p. 1325.)
A table set forth on pages 39 and 40 of the Report of the House Com-
mittee on Military Affairs, which was substantially verified by a wit-
ness before the Board, indicates the striking contrast between the
estimated contract completion date of June 1941, the required comple-
tion dates of the job orders, and the actual state of completion of the
work as of 7 December 1941. (R. v. 7, p. 778, 789 ; Exhibit No. 5.)
Some of these delays may be attributed to conditions which should
be expected ; such as lack of personnel, materials, and priorities. But
the conclusion is clear that in the majority of cases the contractors
were largely at fault.
[20] j . Administration of contract and supervision of work by
District Engineers . — It was the duty of the Contracting Officer ana
District Engineer, Col. Wyman, to administer the contract and ex-
ercise general supervision over the performance of the contractors
and to prod them or terminate the contract, if necessary, so that the
work would be completed in the required time and manner. (R. v. 6,
p. 596, 656.)
Instances abound in the record of maladministration and neglect by
Col. Wyman. Following are a few examples of the more gross
derelictions.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 189
.f
The District Engineer continued in Hawaii the improper relations
that had existed between him and Rohl in Los Angeles.
A former civilian employee of the United States Engineering De-
partment testified concerning many instances of drunkenness on the
part of Col. Wyman which she had observed from her close associa-
tion with him in the office of the District Engineer. (R. v. 23, p.
2568 et seq.)
Col. Robert J. Fleming, CE, also testified that Col. Wyman’s addic-
tion to excess drinking when he was assigned to the Third Engineers
at Schofield Barracks, prior to Ins assignment as District Engineer,
grew so pronounced that his superior finally forced him to take the
pledge. (R. v. 11, p. 1284.) Col. Fleming stated that Col. Wyman’s
superior, Col. Lyman, “had enough on him (Col. Wyman) that he just
about had to.” As to Col. Wyman’s general characteristics, he testi-
fied that Col. Wyman “was about the most impossible person person-
ally that we had in the Engineers; that he was just one of those people
who made everybody mad at him being always — he was just a bull
in a china [21] shop.” (R. v. 11, p. 1282.) This unsatis-
factory state of affiairs was brought to the attention of Gen. Short
(R. v. 11, p. 1282), since the feud between Col. Wyman and Col.
Lyman “got very bad, sir, oh, around the first of November, 1941.”
(R. v. 11, p. 1283.) On one occasion he observed Col. Wyman drink
to excess at a party given by some Air Corps Generals about Jan-
uary 1942 and that he made “some very regrettable statements.” (R.,
v. 11, p. 1286.)
Concerning the relationship between Rohl and Col. Wyman in
Hawaii, he testified (R., v. 11, p. 1290) :
General Feank. What was It after the war?
Colonel Fleming. After the war — well, I think after the war a lot of people
thought that they were together too much of the time.
General Feank. Were they drinking?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
General Frank. To excess?
Colonel Fleming. I don’t know, sir. I never saw them.
General Feank. What were the reports circulating about that drinking?
Colonel Fleming. Oh, there were all sorts of reports circulated about it, sir,
but I think everybody in the Territory was mad at Colonel Wyman, about that
time.
General Frank. Everybody was what?
Colonel Fleming. Was mad at Colonel Wyman.
He further testified, “I had had personal knowledge that in my
opinion Col. Wyman associated too much with contractors.” (R., v.
11, p. 1307.1
Col. Latne B. Row, former Inspector General for the Hawaiian
Department, testified concerning many derogatory reports which his
i office made of Col. Wyman’s activities, and that while Col. Wyman
repeatedly promised that corrective action would [22] be
taken, such in fact was never done. (R., v. 19, p. 2093.)
He further pointed out that compared with the Construction Quart-
ermaster, the work of the Hawaiian Constructors under the direction
of the District Engineer was distinctly inferior. (R., v. 19, p. 2126.)
These opinions were based upon a series of construction inspections
7971« — 4ft— Ex. 157 18
190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
f,
which were made by his office pursuant to directions of the Secretary
of War. (R., v. 19. p. 2129.) This direction was as follows :
AG 600.12 EJ/as
(2-13-41) M-IG
February 17, 1941.
Inspection of Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Construction Projects.
Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department ,
Fort Shatter , T. H.
1. Reference is made to letters from this office of November 20, 1940 (AG
333.1 (10-31-40) M-Sec. GS-M) : of January 6 1941 (AG 600.12 (l-2-41)M-IG) ;
and of January 15, 1941 (AG 333.1 (1-4-41) M-Sec GS-M), subject Assignment of
Inspections of Constructing Quartermaster, Fiscal Year 1941.
2. A national defense construction project on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract is
being undertaken in the Hawaiian Department under the supervision of the Dis-
trict Engineer, Honolulu District, the inspection of which is a responsibility of
the Commandng General, Hawaiian Department, under the provisions of the
letters cited above.
3. The Chief of Engineers has been directed to notify you of the specific loca-
tions where military construction on coet-plus-a-fixed-fee basis is being under-
taken in your Department, and of any additional locations where projects of the
same type may be undertaken in your Department in the future. There will be
furnished to you for the use of your Inspector General the instructions issued
or to be issued by the Chief of Engineers for the administration of projects being
constructed under his supervision by cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts.
4. Inclosed for the information of your Inspector General, is a copy of “Manual
for Field Auditors on Cost-Plus-A-Fixed Fee Contracts*’ issued by The Quarter-
master General for the use of Constructing Quartermasters on Quartermaster
construction projects, together with a copy of a Guide utilized by officers of the
Office of The Inspector General in inspecting such projects.
By order of the Secretary of War :
[23] John B. Coolet,
Adjutant General .
2 Incls.
Incl. #1 — Manual for Field Auditors.
Incl. #2 — Inspection Guide.
The former Inspector General testified concerning the Hawaiian
Constructors, “I was definitely of the opinion that there was a great
deal of waste and unnecessary expenditure of time and funds.” (R.,
v. 19, p. 2123.)
Concerning certain of these deficiencies, Mr. King stated (R., v. 23,
p. 2535) :
General Frank. Who was responsible for that?
Mr. King. Well, it was certainly the Engineer Corps, no one else. They were
doing it. They w r ere keeping the time. They were signing the pay checks.
In this regard, since the Engineers were doing work which should
have been done by the contractors, attention is invited to the following
letter :
Office of the Chief of Engineers,
Washington, November 24, 1941.
Subject : Conduct of Work under Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contracts.
To. Division and District Engineers :
1. When work is to be done under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract, the Govern-
ment exercises great care to select a contractor of outstanding ability and ex-
perience and pays him a fee for the use of his organization. It is expected that
the contractor will be allowed to exercise the organizing and directive ability
which he demonstrated prior to his selection by the War Dedaptrment. It is also
to be understood that the contractor has a vital interest in the preservation of
his reputation for performing work in a skillful and economical manner. If
the Government forces assume any of the functions of the contractor in directing
191
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
<V
the work, in procurement, and in planning operations, the United States will
not only be paying for services which are not fully rendered, but there will be
an increase in Government costs due to duplication of functions.
2. It is realized that the many checks and approvals required when Govern-
ment funds are being expended under cost-plus- [24] a-flxed-fee contracts
tend to make Contracting Officers and Project Engineers assume responsibilities
with regard to the conduct of work which they would not think of doing under
a competitive bid form of contract. This tendency must be guarded against.
The Government’s representative must, of course, prevent the waste or improper
use of funds, see to it that the contractor maintains required progress, and that
he builds according to the plans and specifications. However, it is believed
these functions can be exercified without infringing upon the proper responsibili-
ties of the contractor.
3. It is directed that in the future each cost-plus-a-fixed fee contractor submit
to the District Engineer on the temth and twenty-fifth day of each month a brief
report setting forth his views as to progress being made, difficulties encountered,
anticipated difficulties, and recommendations for improving conduct of the work.
This report will be submitted through the Project Engineer who will, by indorse-
ment thereon, make such comments as are pertinent and then forward it within
twenty-four hours to the District Engineer. The District Engineer will, without
delay, forward thej report to this office through the Division Engineer. It is ex-
pected that in this manner the contractor will be enabled to express his opinions
freely on matters which affect his work and a record of the conduct of the work
will be secured for future reference. Contractors will be encouraged to render
frank reports and every effort will be made to insure that this system of reports
does not develop into a useless routine.
Thomas M. Robins,
/S/ Thomas M. Robins,
Brigadier General ,
Assistant to the Chief of Engineers.
41/2733.
Chester R. Clarke, owner and operator of the Clarke-Halawa Rock
Co., testified that in April 1941 he and other local contractors were
low bidders by several hundred thousand dollars on a proposal to
construct airfields on the Islands of Hawaii, Mauai, and Molakai.
But the Hawaiian Constructors nevertheless were given the jobs.
They did not start or complete the work within the specified time
limit. For this reason, the airfields were not completed by 7 De-
cember 1941, but would have been completed had the local contractors
been given the contract. His firm had had considerable experience in
this type of work. He attempted without success to get work on
Bellows Field but this also was given to the Hawaiian Constructors.
He had observed [25] that the work of the Hawaiian Construc-
tors lagged badly and that Rohl, on account of his condition, was not
capable of speeding up the work. Efforts of this contractor to do
some of this work was unavailing. (R., v. 30, p. 3623 et seq.)
He also testified that Rohl used a technique of getting people en-
meshed in his wrong-doings and thus made them subservient to his
desires. (R v 30, p 3634.)
The Hawaiian Constructors were inefficient but Col. Wyman failed
to prod them into an adequate performance or to terminate the con-
tract. Col. Wyman, in face of all the evidence, even claimed before
the Board that the Hawaiian Constructors were not negligent. (R v
29,p 3425.)
Col. Wyman permitted the Hawaiian Constructors to continue in
performance of the contract although Rohl, its directing head, who
was ip charge since about September 1941, was frequently drunk. This
condition seriously delayed the work and reflected the unstable state
192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION EEAHL HARBOR ATTACK
of affairs which permeated the whole organization of the Hawaiian
Constructors. Rohl’s drunkenness and general inattention to duties
became such a sore subject with the Army and the other members of
the joint venture that finally he was ordered home in June 1942.
It is significant that before Rohl went to the Hawaiian Islands on
this work he asked the Division Engineer, Brigadier General Warren
T. Hannum, to assist him in getting transportation. General Hannum
testified (R. v 18, p 2080) :
I didn't like his appearance at the time.
Major Clausen. What was \\ rong with it?
General Hannum. Well, he didn’t appear to be absolutely sober.
Major Clausen. And what did you do about it?
[26] General Hannum. I assumed that he had been out to the club, or some-
where, and has just come in to see me. and that it was just a temporary matter.
Major Clausen. What did you do about it, Sir?
General Hannum. I did nothing further about it
An officer testified that while assigned to G-2, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, he conducted an investigation as a result of which he reached
the conclusion that Rohl was such a drunkard he was even incompetent
to be a subversive influence. (R, v 32* p 3925) .
Mr Arthur T. Short, manager of the Pleasanton Hotel stated that
Col. Wyman and Rohl were always together and had quarters in the
hotel. Speaking of these auarters he said “they had more parties up
there, dancing and drunks.” (R, v 30, p 3648.)
Miss Helen Schlesinger, a civilian girl employee of the United States
Engineering Department, testified concerning the drunkenness of
Rohl and that she observed his drunken condition on one occasion espe-
cially when she responded to a call from Col. Bernard C. Robinson,
C. E., to come down to the Pleasanton Hotel at about 9 p. m. to get out
some contract documents. (R, v 28, p 3287 et seq.)
Mr. Dillingham, previously referred to as a stock holder in the
Hawaiian Contracting Co. which became a member of the Hawaiian
Constructors, testified that he didn’t like Rohl and had suspicions as
to his sobriety. (R, v 24, p 2761.)
Mr. King testified that Rohl was a play boy, was “playing pretty
hard” * * * “he just wasn’t paying very much attention to busi-
ness, I know that” and that he never saw him when Rohl wasn’t more
or less drunk. (R, v 23, p 2525, 2526.) He testified further that Rohl
originally was Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Hawaiian
Constructors and that his supervision [% 7 ] was generally inef-
fective because of his use of liquor. (R, v 23, p 2544.) He stated,
concerning Rohl that “insofar as the work was concerned, rather than
his being of value, he was more of a detriment.” (R, v 23, p 2534.)
He pointed out that in addition to drinking so hard, Rohl would inter-
fere with the work. For example, Rohl would commit higher author-
ity in the military to actions without going through channels. (R,
v 23, p 2555.)
Mr. Ray B. Wickiser also testified to the general interference and
disruption which Rohl caused with the work. (R, v 22, p 2476.)
Col. Row testified that Rohl evaded attempts to obtain statements
from him concerning his derelictions. (R, v 19, p 2107.)
Col. Wyman favored the inefficient Hawaiian Constructors to the
exclusion of the more competent local contractors in subcontracting
work. Reference is made to the previously cited testimony.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
193
Col. Wyman shoved through government purchases of equipment
from the Hawaiian Contracting Co. and the Rohl-Connolly Co. at
excessive prices and without proper regard for the interests of the
Government. For the details reference is made to excerpts from the
report of Col. John A. Hunt, IGD, which are hereafter set forth, and
to testimony before the Board. (R, v. 31, p 3775 et seq; R, v 19, p
2134 ; et seq ; R, v 7, p 745 ; R, v 33, p 3996 et seq, R, v 30, p 3588, et seq ;
v 32, p 3803 et seq.)
Despite these conditions and delays by the contractors the Board
was advised by the present District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H. (1st
Ind., 10 Aug 44) :
There is no record in this office of any formal com- [28] plaints regis-
tered by the Government concerning delays of the contractor during 1941.
Mr. Clarke testified that Rohl “did not seem particularly inclined to
push the work here” * * * “He made Hawaii one round of good
times for Mr. Rohl. There isn’t any doubt of that.”
Mr. King who had been acquainted with Col. Wyman's activities in
Los Angeles testified :
Major Clausen. The General has brought out that point. Did you know prior
to Pearl Harbor, from hearsay and general knowledge, anything concerning
Colonel Wyman?
Mr. King. Yes, I did.
Major Clausen. And what was that concerning his proclivities for playboy ing
or drinking?
Mr. King. Well, the general impression around Los Angeles where Colonel
Wyman was stationed was that he was pretty much of a playboy too.
Major Clausen. And what about his drinking?
Mr. King. Well, that was generally understood, that he was a pretty hard
drinker. (R, v 23, p 2526, 2527.)
Reference is also made to the previously mentioned testimony con-
cerning the activities and excess drinking of Col. Wyman at Los
Angeles.
Col. Wyman failed to inform higher authority of the delays and
deficiencies of the contractors. (R. v 6, p 589, 600, 602, 618, 655.)
Attention is invited to possible effects of these delays and defi-
ciencies of the contractors. Exhibit No. 5 in evidence indicates gen-
erally the state of completion of certain of the more vital defense
projects as of 7 Dec 41. (R, v 7, p 789.) Ini addition to a lack of
facilities for the AWS permanent stations, the ammunition storage
magazines, the fire control station and the underground gasoline
storage tanks, there was a dearth of [ 29 ] airfields on the
Island of Oahu and the adjoining islands. Since this subject is one
of primary importance, and in order that no unwarranted conclu-
sions may be reached, the following quotations from the testimony
are set forth:
Major General Roger B. Colton, Chief of the Engineering and
Technical Service, Signal Corps, testified:
General Frank. Can you tell us what were the number and location of the
permanent aircraft warning stations contemplated for the Hawaiian Islands to
complete a phase of Contract No. W-414-Eng-602?
General Colton. The number and location of permanent aircraft warning
stations originally contemplated for the Hawaiian Islands were three 271 and
271-A fixed stations and five SCRr-270 mobile stations. The three fixed stations
271 and 271-A were planned to be located at Kaala, Kokee, and Haleakala.
Three of the five mobile stations were planned to be located at Nuuana Pali,
Manawahua, and Mauna Loa. The other two mobile stations were designated as
194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
roving stations. There is no record of the Corps of Engineers’ contract W-414-
Engineering-602 in the files of the Chief Signal Officer, and I have no familiarity
With it. (R.v. 6, p.671, 672.)
General Frank. What equipment was to be furnished by the Signal Corps?
General Colton. The equipment to be furnished by the Signal Corps was
three fixed stations 271 delivered complete with shelter, except for the concrete
foundation of the shelter, and also five mobile radar stations 270 to be de-
livered complete and ready for operation. (R. v. 6, p. 672.)
General Frank. How did such priority compare with similar equipment fur-
nished at about the same time to installations in the Philippines and Panama?
General Colton. Under the priority furnished by the War Department under
date of March 10, as I have already stated, Hawaii was scheduled to get the
third, fourth, and fifth sets; Panama was scheduled to get the first and second
sets. (R. v. 6, p. 675.)
General Frank. When was the Hawaiian radar equipment actually delivered
to the quartermaster for shipment?
General Colton. The Hawaiian radar equipment was delivered as follows,
to the Quartermaster, for shipment: All components of one 271-A were turned
over by the Signal Corps to the Quartermaster Corps for shipment by 26 May
1941. All components of two SCR-271s were turned over to [SO] the
Quartermaster Corps for shipment by 26 June 1941. Foundation plans were
furnished in advance of the above dates.
The five mobile stations, SCR-270, were delivered to the Quartermaster Corps
for shipment on 22 July 1941, together with one additional mobile station, which
had in the meantime been authorized by the War Department for the Hawaiian
Department. I would like to say in this connection it should be noted that
three additional fixed stations for Hawaii were authorized by the War Depart-
ment 28 May 1941, for inclusion by the Chief Signal Officer, in a supplemental
estimate for fiscal year 1942. (R., v. 6, p. 675, 676.)
General Frank. Now, when these were delivered, you say they included “all
components.” Does that mean that that included the towers?
General Colton. Yes, sir; that included the towers.
General Frank. Did it include the generator sets?
General Colton. It included generator sets.
General Frank. What about extra tubes?
General Colton. It included the eftra tubes. Of course, they were not con-
templated. It was not contemplated that tubes were to be furnished for the
entire life, but snare tubes were furnished. (R.. v. 6, p. 676, 677.)
General Frank. Was the equipment ready for installation when delivered?
General Colton. The equipment was ready for installation when delivered.
May I go back a moment, General? You asked me only about the fixed stations,
previously? You haven’t asked me as to the readiness of the mobile station.
General Frank. Will you state as to the readiness?
General Colton. The previous testimony related to the fixed stations. The
mobile stations were delivered complete and ready for operation. (R., v. 6,
p. 677.)
General Frank. And you have already testified that three fixed sets were
turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment, one in May and two in June
of 1941, and five mobile sets were turned over to the Quartermaster for ship-
ment the 22nd of July 1941 ; is that correct? Six. That is right?
General Colton. Yes, sir ; except that one additional mobile station was also
turned over on the 22nd of July, making the total of six. (R., v. 6, p. 681.)
General Frank. No.
[3/] When was the equipment for the information center furnished?
General Colton. There was no standardized filter or information center
arranged for equipment. Such equipment was furnished on requisition against
project funds.
I want to change the emphasis of that statement. I say, such equipment
was furnished on requisition against project funds. I mean to say that that
was the plan set up for it, that it was intended to be requisitioned by the local
authorities against project funds.
In this connection, however, I would like to make reference to a document
that I have here which indicates that lnformatioh centers were in operation
prior to the 14th of November, 1941.
General Frank. Therefore they were equipped with the necessary equipment
and in operation in November 1941?
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
195
y -*
General Colton. Yes, sir ; and I may say tb*£ I have at one time or another
seen pictures of the installation, but I have no information as to exact dates.
(R., v. 6, p. 686, 687.)
The following testimony was given by Col. C. A. Powell, Signal
Officer of the Hawaiian Department during the fall of 1941 :
General Frank. On December 7, what was the situation with respect to the
installation of the information center?
Colonel Powell. The installation of the information center was by means of
a temporary structure which I had built with my own soldiers in what we
now call the “Signal Corps Area.” It was a temporary structure, and it was
operative.
General Frank. Had they had exercises prior to December 7?
Colonel Powell. They had, sir.
General Frank. And it had operated successfully?
Colonel Frank. Yes, sir.
General Frank. And what was the situation with respect to the permanent
radar sets? Had they arrived in the island?
Colonel Powell. They had, sir.
General Frank. When had they arrived, please?
Colonel Powell. Two radar SCR-271s — that is the [52] temporary
set-— were received the 3d of June, and one SCR-271-A, which has the higher
tower, was received also the 3d of June.
General Frank. Were they complete?
Colonel Powell. No, sir; they were not complete. I have a prepared memo-
randum here which I would like to introduce, which I think would give you a
picture.
General Frank. Will you state the date on which all equipment was here
and complete so that they could be erected?
General Russell. You mean these three?
General Frank. Yes.
Colonel Powell. I do not have that information available, when the things
were received, except I consider that when you say “complete” that means
everything, including the conduit and the fittings and everything else.
General Frank. Well, so that they could operate; that is what I mean.
Colonel Powell. Oh, I see. Well, to the best of my knowledge and belief,
I think that they could have been operated in November of that year.
General Frank. Was installation of the permanent sets held up?
Colonel Powell. Yes, sir.
General Frank. What were the reasons?
Colonel Powell. The reasons were that the engineers were unable to com-
plete the sites for these permanent installations.
General Frank. Why were they unable to complete the sites, do you know?
Colonel Powell. I do not know, sir. (R., v. 32, p. 3885, 3886, 3887.)
General Frank. You had equipment for how many sites?
Colonel Powell. We had equipment for permanent stations. Now, wait a
minute — there were only three permanent stations, General Frank. .(R., v. 32,
p. 3887. )
General Frank. All right. Was there any delay in furnishing the Corps of
Engineers with drawings for the preparation of these sites — any delay on the
part of the Signal Corps?
Colonel Powell. Not by my office.
[55] General Frank. Well, was there any?
Colonel Powell. No, sir.
General Frank. Did you get the drawings from the Washington office of the
Signal Corps?
Colonel Pow t ell. Yes, sir. We gave them all the information that they asked
for. (R., v. 32, p. 3892.)
General Frank. Was there any delay in the building of the roads to the
sites?
Colonel Powell. That is what held us up.
General Frank. That is what held you up?
Colonel Powell. Yes, sir.
General F^ank. Who was responsible for building those roads?
Colonel Powell. The Corps of Engineers. (R., v. 32, p. 3892, 3893.)
196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
. v
Major Clausen. Sir, you refuted to Kaala, Kokee, and Haleakala as being
the sites for the permanent sets, is that correct?
Colonel Powell. That is correct
Major Clausen. When were those sites originally selected?
Colonel Pqwell. That was approved by the War Department on the fourth
endorsement, June 27, 1940. (R., v. 32, p. 3895.)
Major Clausen. You know, therefore, that as of that date, the engineers were
also advised that those were prospective sites?
Colonel Powell. Yes, sir. (R., v. 32, p. 3895.)
Major Clausen. I have a letter referring to your permanent sites dated No-
vember 14th, 1941, to Colonel Colton, Chief, Materiel Branch, from yourself.
Department Signal Office, then Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps, reading :
(Memorandum for Colonel Colton, Chief, Material Branch, from C. A. Powell,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps, Department Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, No-
vember 14, 1941, is as follows : )
“In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian Department, the operation of the
radio set SCR-270 was found to he very satisfactory. This exercise was started
[ 84 ] approximately 4 : 30 in the morning and with three radio sets in opera-
tion. We noted when the planes took off from the airplane carrier in the
oscilloscope. We determined this distance to be approximately 80 miles, due to
the fact that the planes would circle around waiting the assemblage of the
remainder from the carrier.
“As soon as the planes were assembled, they proceeded towards Hawaii. This
was very easily determined and within six minutes, the pursuit aircraft were
notified and they took off and intercepted the incoming bombers at approximately
30 miles from Pearl Harbor.
“It was a very interesting exercise. All the general officers present were
highly pleased with the proceedings of the radio direction finding sets and the
personnel associated with the information centers.
“We have had very little trouble with the operation of these sets. When the
fixed stations are installed in the higher mountains surrounding Hawaii, we
expect to have as good an air warning system available for use as is now operat-
ing for the British on their tight little island, as their situation is approximately
the same as ours is on Hawaii.”
Do you recall that, sir?
Colonel Powell. No, sir.
Major Clausen.. Just to shorten our proceedings here, I am going to ask you
the general question whether or not the facts you set forth in this letter are
correct ?
Colonel Powell. Yes, sir. (R., v. 32, p. 3896, 3897.)
General Frank. Do you consider that there were any avoidable delays in
the construction of the aircraft warning service system by the Engineers or by
the contractors?
Colonel Powell. I thought that they should have given the air warning a higher
priority than they did, to get our work done. They were working on the air-
fields, and we had to take our priority behind the airfields. (R., v. 32, p. 3901.)
General Frank. Was this place on the priority list that the aircraft warning
service held called to General Short’s attention ?
Colonel Powell. I am sure it was, because he decided on it. I am sure he
decided the priority. (R., v. 32, p. 3901.)
Major Clausen. It is just a question of putting up a tower?
Colonel Powell. Yes, the higher tower you can get the greater distance you
obtain, due to the curvature of the earth. That is solely due to the curvature of
the earth. That is solely due to the curvature of the earth at a low altitude.
Major Clausen. Getting back a moment to my question, as to whether the
Japanese planes actually did all come in [35] very low along the water,
I show you a graph of a plat of the Opana Station, and ask you whether you
have seen that before?
Colonel Powell Yes, I have seen that.
Major Clausen. That indicates that the planes were actually picked up by
the Opana mobile station at what range, what distance. That is exhibit No. 15
In evidence.
Colonel Powell Well, I cannot figure that from this, but, as I recall it, it was
around 80 miles.
Major Clausen. At least 80 miles?
Colonel Powell Yes.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 197
Major Clausen. That indicates to you, therefore, what, with respect to the
height of the attacking Japanese planes that came in that morning?
Colonel Powell. It would indicate they werefat least 600 feet in the air. (R. f
v. 32, p. 3903. )
Major Clausen. Now, you said something about the fact that the mobile sets
were subject to a conservation of instruments. Is it not true also that the mobile
sets were powered not by commercial power but by auxiliary power or gasoline
motors, is that correct.
Colonel Powell. That is true. (R., v. 32, p. 3904.)
General Gbunebt. Then there is no reason why there was any delay on the part
of the Engineers concerning the height of the towers on your permanent stations?
Colonel Powell. No, sir. I do not see any excuse for it. (R., v. 32, p. 3905.)
As of the date of the basic contract, 20 December 1940, the War
Department had authorized the construction of three permanent AWS
stations at Mt. Kaala on Oahu, Mt. Haleakala on Maui and Mt. Kokee
on Kauai, seven mobile stations and an information center at Fort
Shafter. (Letter from Chief of Engineers, 13 August 1944.)
Brig. Gen. James A. Mollison, AC, gave the following testimony:
General Russell. Suppose that you people had had ample warning of the
approach of these hostile aircraft but there had been no interference with their
take-off from the points from which they did depart : did you have any defensive
means to have repelled the attack of dive bombers [35 J on the naval
craft, naval ships?
General Mollison. Oh, I think we could have done a lot of damage to them.
I think that we could have kept almost all of those slow-moving torpedo bombers
out. Those things were just like shooting fish; they were going along at, I
should say, a hundred and ten miles an hour. They didn’t look to me as though
they were a bit faster than that. The dive bombers were faster. They were
probably 160 to 170. And the zero, the little fighter, was a good fast airplane.
General Russell. What type of aircraft produced the great damage to our
naval ships?
General Mollison. The torpedo bomber was the one that caused the most dam-
age to the largest number of ships. The most positive damage that was done
was done by high-altitude horizontal bombing on the battleship Arizona. They
just happened to get some lucky hits down the stack of the Arizona, and she
went up.
General Russell. Those were the people who were 10,000 feet up.
General Mollison. They were, I should say, between eight and ten thousand
feet. All of our antiaircraft was hitting way below and behind these planes.
General Russell. The question the General has stated is that if ample warn-
ing of the attack had been given the effect of the attack could have been greatly
minimized, if not completely eliminated.
General Mollison. I think there is no doubt about that. If we could have put
60 fighters in the air that morning — and we could have if we had had ample
warning — I do not think we could have done a thing against them offensively as
far as their carriers were concerned ; we did not have the type of aircraft with
which to do it. But we could certainly have raised cain with their formations
that came in if we had 50 fighters in the air.
General Russell. And you had more than 50 fighters available?
General Mollison. We had 105; 103 P-40s and we had something like 22
P-36s, but strangely enough that P-36 would not have been any good at all,
but the chap in the P-36 did shoot down one plane. We had about 14 fighters
in the air that morning, total. (R., v. 7, p. 829, 830.)
General Frank. You said that under normal conditions you had a certain num-
ber of the planes in each squadron, or certain squadrons that were designated as
alert squadrons?
General Mollison. That would not be under normal; [37] that was
under alert condition, I should have said, General ; under conditions of alert
General Gbunebt. But not under conditions of Alert 1?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
General Gbunert. Sabotage?
General Mollison. Yes, sir. There were alert squadrons, alert crews.
General Frank. How long did it take you to get those planes off the ground in
case of emergency?
198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Motjjson. They were supposed to be ready to go in thirty minutes,
General. You see, that is Alert A or condition of Readiness A.
General Frank. Where did the* crews sleep?
General Mollison. The crews slept in tents or hutments immediately adjacent
to the planes when the bombers were in dispersed position. When they were on
the line they slept in the operations rooms and hangars.
General Frank. Is that where the pilots also slept?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
General Frank. So there were certain pilots and crews sleeping on the line?
General Moujson. Yes, sir. May I add that that could not help matters at all
that morning during the attack because these things were on everybody before
there was a possibility of doing anything about It; they were just going down
the line.
General Russell. The 4-minute alert would not have helped you, would it,
General?
General Moluson. A 6-second alert would not have helped, because if they are
on top of you you can’t take a plane off without being shot down if you have got
a bunch of Zeros sitting up there waiting for you to take off.
General Gbunert. Then, the only effect, as far as I can gather from your testi-
mony, is that the difference between Alerts Nos. 1 and 2 as to protection against
what happened, would have been a certain amount of dispersion?
General Moluson. That is all. It would not have helped a bit, unless you had
warning of from 30 minutes to two hours before these people are going to attack
you, because when they are sitting up there looking down your throat you can’t
take an airplane off the ground.
[58] General Gruniut. Then, your only source of warning would have
been the air warning service or information from the Navy ; is that correct?
General Mollison. Yes, sir, that is true. (R., v. 7, p 821, 822, 823.)
Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, AC, testified :
General Frank. Now, had you been alerted so that your fighters could have
taken the air, to what extent do you estimate 80 fighters could have interfered
with the attack?
General Martin. Weil, they could have done considerable damage. They could
not have prevented it. It would have been impossible to have prevented it, but
they could have reduced its effectiveness quite materially.
General Frank. How many Jap planes actually were shot down over Oahu?
General Martin. I do not know. The Air Forces shot down about 10. The anti-
aircraft shot down others. As I remember, it was possibly 29 or 30. There is a
record of that.
General Frank. Yes, I know.
General Martin. I do not remember exactly. I think it was about 29 or 30. But
In my opinion, seeing a large number of those ships leaving the area with gasoline
streaming out behind them, they never made the carriers, and that was true in
many cases that I saw where there would be a white plume of gas — why it didn’t
catch fire I never new — leaving the tanks of the the airplanes that were making
for the sea. (R., v. 17, p. 1901.)
General Russell. General Frank asked you some questions a moment ago, Gen-
eral, about what could have been accomplished by 80 fighters on December 7th.
I want to ask you : Did you have 80 fighters available on December 7th before the
Japanese came in and destroyed a great part of your force?
General Martin. Now, let me see* We had approximately 100 P-40s.
General Russell. And they are fighters?
General Martin. Yes, they are fighters. We had approximately 50 P-36s.
General Russell. And they are fighters?
General Martin. They are fighters. At least half of those were always on the
ground, on account of lacking spare parts, so I reduced it to 75. Out of the 75
there [551 is always probably ten or fifteen per cent that would be out of
commission from day to day. They would be in today and out tomorrow. So it
is something less than 75 that would be the maximum that could have been put in
the air on that day. (R., v. 17, p. 1909, 1910.)
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, testified :
General Russell. Admiral, I have had some curiosity about what was done
with your radar as far as the ships in the harbor were concerned.
199
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
9
Admiral Kimmix* I have been informed by experts, and knew at the time, that
the radar on ships in port was virtually useless on account of the surrounding
hills, and the towers and buildings in the Navy Yard ; and we never made any
attempt to use ft, but depended entirely on the shore for radar information. Fur-
thermore, radar properly mounted on shore, and high up, has much longer range
than anything we could get, because one of the elements in the range of the radar
is the height above the sea at which it is mounted. (R., v. 17, p. 1809.)
General Gbunebt. Let us go forward with the intercepting command ; and we
included as one of its functions the Air Warning Service. I want to find out from
you just what you knew about that in the latter part of November and early in
December, and what you thought of it as to its status and its ability to operate.
Admiral Kimmel. Well, at the time, I thought the aircraft warning service of
the Army was probably somewhat better than it later proved to be. I knew that
in the drills that we had conducted they had been quite successful in following
the planes, and I recall that General Short, on one occasion, told me that he
thought he could give us a coverage up to 150 miles and probably to 200 miles.
This was just conversation, I didn’t inquire too closely into it, because that was
quite satisfactory to me ; and if he could do that, that was, I thought, doing pretty
well.
I knew that they were standing watches in the aircraft warning center to the
limit of their personnel and equipment ; and I knew that, even though I think now
I had somewhat overestimated the capacity of it, I knew it was far from perfect
and far from a finished product ; but it was all we had, and I believed they were
doing the very best they could with it.
General Gbunebt. Did you know they were “standing watch,” as you call it,
only from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., and that that was only for practice nurposes?
Admiral Kimmel. In detail, I didn’t know just the hours that they were stand-
ing watch. The aircraft warning service was manned during most of the day. I
had been informed of that. (R., v. 16, p. 1789. 1790.)
[40] General Russell. If the success of such an attack was assured and
the Japanese seemed to have known everything about the situation out there,
why would they not have made an attack which had to be successful?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, of course there are two or three answers to that.
One is that the Japanese Air Force, I think, without question, was much more
efficient than we had believed it to be. The attack was a well-planned and
well executed attack. Another phase is that the greatest damage done there
was done by aircraft torpedoes. We believed prior to the 7th of December
that they could not launch an aerial torpedo in Pearl Harbor. We thought
that the water was not deep enough. Our air service had not been able to do
it; and we had received official information from the Navy Department which
convinced us that it could not be done. We were wrong. The major part of
the damage was done by such torpedoes.
So far as reconnaissance is concerned, we had plans for reconnaissance and
could run reconnaissance of a sort, but in our estimate which had been sub-
mitted to Washington, and which was on file in both the War and Navy De-
partments, it was clearly stated that we had to know the time of the attack,
within rather narrow limits, in order to have anything like an effective search,
because we could not maintain a search except for a very few days. Then of
course we were hoping to get more planes all the time, and we had been promised
additional planes, patrol planes, and additional Army bombers, all of which were
necessary for the defense of Oahu. (R., v. 16, p. 1805, 1806.)
General Gbunert. Knowing what you did about radar and the information
center, did you feel that, on December 7, that had let you down?
Admibal Kimmel. Of course, I knew nothing about the receipt of any informa-
tion at all in the Army radar, until the Tuesday, I think it was, following the
attack ; and when I found out that 4hey had known where these planes came
from and located within rather narrow limits the attacking forces — yes, I felt
let down, because that was the information we wanted above everything else.
I have been Informed that the Navy, Admiral Bellinger, and Captain Logan
Ramsey, called the Army information center several times each, during this
attack of December 7, and asked them if they had been able to locate the direc-
tion from which these planes had come, and to which they returned ; and each
time they were informed they couldn’t get anything.
Then, when this information was reconstructed two days later, we felt that
it was unfortunate that we bad not had that information available. (R., v. 16,
p. 1791, 1792.)
200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
£
Col. Lorry N. Tindal, AC, testified :
Major Clausen. If the higher stations had been HI ] completed, do you
know if the direction of these returning planes could have been ascertained more
accurately?
Colonel Tindal. Yes.
Major Clausen. And is it a fact they could have been obtained more quickly?
Colonel Tindal. Yes, in my opinion. (R., v. 40, p. 4493, 4494.)
Col. Robert J. Fleming, CE, testified regarding the lack of airfields :
At thei beginning of the war there was only one airfield in the entire Hawaiian
Department from which a bombardment plane could operate. That was also true
on the day of December 7th. There was only one runway in the entire Depart-
ment from which a R-17 could take off, and that was at Hickam Field. On the
afternoon of Thursday, following December 7, whatever date that may be, thejy
had a 5,000-foot runway at Bellows Field, on a field which was never authorized
or approved by the War Department. (R., v. 11, p. 1331.)
Gen. Martin gave this testimony concerning this condition :
General Russell. Well, did any arrive?
General Martin. On the morning of December 7th we had nothing but our
12 B-17’s coming from the mainland. Those ships arrived during the time the
attack was taking place. We warned them in the open, because that is the only
way we could warn them, to remain in the air as long as possible; that we had
no airdromes at other islands that would accommodate them as yet. They were
only partially completed. Four of the eight were lost from the attack of the
Japanese. Eight were made available to the Air Force afterwards. Some were
damaged in landing. One landed at a golf course. One landed at Bellows Field
with the prevailing wind, on a very short runway. The new runway was not yet
completed there and it was badly crashed. (R., v. 17, p. 1896) .
Mr. Chester R. Clarke testified concerning the state of completion
of the defense projects as of the time of the attack :
Mr. Clarke. I would say a very pitiful condition that that should occur when
it did, because I frankly believe that had local contractors and mainland con-
tractors like Mr. McClure and Mr. McKee and some of the others had this work,
we would not have been in such a condition as we were whqp the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor. We were certainly far less progressed in our work than
we should have been. (R., v. 30, p. 3636.)
H2] Mr. George F. Bartlett of the United States Engineering Department,
stated;
General Frank. Which of those projects, in your opinion, should have been
finished prior to Pearl Harbor?
Mr. Bartlett. The radio transmitter station ( AWS) on Kokee should have been
finished.
General Frank. That is up on Kauai?
Mr. Bartlett. Kauai, yes, sir. And the radio transmitter (AWS) tunnel
should have been finished.
General Frank. On Kauai?
Mr. Bartlett. No.
General Frank. At Shafter?
Mr. Bartlett. At Shafter. (R., v. 22, p. 2502.)
This witness further testified :
General Grunebt. What do you know about that particular situation?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, I finished the job over there. That is where they sent
me on the second of December. I went over there as area engineer to speed
up the Barking Sand Airport, and the Kokee radar station.
General Grunert. You went over there on the 2nd of December?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
General Grunert. What did you find when you got over there?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, I found the Hawaiian Constructors there with three super-
visory personnel. They hadn’t the tower up. The material had been there for
some time.
General Frank. How long, about?
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
201
4
Mr. Babtlett. Oh, it had been there for — it was a matter of weeks. I couldn’t
recall now just how long; but we had it up; in five days, that tower was up.
(R., v. 22, p. 2510, 2511.)
k. Conduct of certain witnesses before the Board. — Col. Wyman,
at the request of the Board, appeared at Honolulu for the hearings.
He was accompanied by counsel made [45] available to him
by the War Department, namely, Brig. Gen. John S. Bragdon,
Office of the Chief of Engineers, and Maj. Bolling R. Powell, Jr.,
GSC, Legislative and Liaison Division, Major Lue Lozier, JAGD,
who had studied the case while assigned to the Office of the Chief
of Engineers, was also made available at Hawaii for their assistance.
Col. Wyman was afforded an opportunity to present to the Board
whatever evidence he desired. He gave testimony on various
matters set forth in the Report of the House Military Affairs Com-
mittee. Gen. Bragdon also testified as to his research. (R., v. 26,
p. 2894, 2923 ; v. 23, p. 3831.)
Col. Wyman testified that he was first advised in June 1941 that
Kohl was an alien. (R., v. 29, p 3503, 3534, 3552, 3579.) The falsity
of this statement is apparent from the testimony and exhibits previ-
ously mentioned A similar false statement was made by Col. Wyman
to the Inspector General. (P. 68, 601, Report of Col. Hunt.)
Col. Wyman testified that Paul Grafe was the source of his informa-
tion that Rohl was an alien. (R., v. 29, p. 3504, 3534, 3551, 3552.)
The falsity of this statement is observed from reading the testimony
and exhibits previously referred to. A similar false statement in this
respect was also made to the Inspector General. (P. 68, 601, Report
of Col. Hunt.)
Col. Wyman testified that he did not help Rohl get naturalized.
(R., v. 29, p. 3506, 3507, 3530.) The falsity of this statement is readily
shown. For example, Col. Wyman sent Rohl the letter dated 22 Jan-
uary 1941 which was used by Rohl’s lawyers (Martin at Los Angeles
and Galloway at Washington) for the purpose of having Rohl’s natu-
ralization petition favorably con- [44] sidered, treated as spe-
cial, and pushed through.
In this regard attention is invited to the startling history and
details of Rohl’s naturalization. He applied at Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, on February 3, 1941, for permission to file a petition for natu-
ralization. On 10 March 1941 he filed the petition. Rohl testified at
the preliminary examination that his marriage to his then wife was
his second and that he was first married in 1914 to a Marian Henderson
by whom he had four children. He also testified that this marriage
was dissolved by a divorce in 1924. Later, on 11 March 1941, he con-
fessed that this testimony was false. Investigations which followed
the filing of the petition disclosed the previously mentioned violations
of immigration laws. Consequently, on 27 May 1941, the Inspector in
Charge at Los Angeles submitted to the Central Office a formal appli-
cation for a warrant of arrest of Rohl on the ground that he was in
the United States in violation of the Immigration Law of 1924. The
Central Office did not concur in this request because the three year
period of limitations had expired. The files of the Bureau of Immi-
gration and Naturalization and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
indicate that the letter dated 22 January 1941 from Col. Wyman to
Rohl was only one of several communications by Col. Wyman to have
202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0 >
Rohl’s petition favorably considered. (R., v. 22, p. 2427; v. 33, p.
3972 et seq; v. 34, p. 4015; v. 35, p. 4103 et seq; v. 36, p. 4186, v. 37,
p. 4338, 4366.)
The letter reads as follows :
U5] Via Clipper
Wab Department,
United States Engineer Office,
Honolulu , T. H. t January 22, 1941.
Address reply to District Engineer,
U. S. Engineer Office, P. O. Box 2240, Honolulu, T. H.
Refer to File No.
Contract No. W-414-eng-602
Mr. H. W. Rohl, Bohl-Connolly Company,
4851 Alhambra Avenue , Los Angeles , California .
Dear Sir: Reference is made to Secret Contract No. W-414-eng-602 with
the Hawaiian Constructors for work in the Hawaiian Islands.
As you are actively interested in this venture, I desire you to proceed to
Honolulu at your earliest convenience to consult with the District Engineer
relative to ways and means to accomplish the purpose of the contract. You will
be allowed transportation either by clipper or steamboat, both ways, and travel
allowance not to exceed $6.00 per day while en route in accordance with existing
laws and regulations.
You will make application to either the District Engineer at Los Angeles or
the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, San Francisco, for transportation.
Very truly yours,
s/s Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
Lf. Col., Corps of Engineers , District Engineer.
In light of the language of this letter it is interesting to observe
Col. Wyman’s testimony to the effect that when the contract was
signed he did not expect that Rohl would go to Hawaii. (R., v. 29,
6 3528). Col. Wyman testified that he received no response from
ohl as to the letter but nevertheless did nothing. (R., v. 29, p. 3531) .
This testimony should be further considered with Col. Wyman’s an-
swer to Gen. Russell [4#] that he sent the letter because of
a fuss which he had with Grafe, although he later stated to General
Russell that this fuss arose in February, 1941. (R., v. 29, p. 3556).
Gen. Hannum indicated that Col. Wyman had this row with Grafe
about May 1941. (R., v. 18, p. 2055). Significantly, also, Gen.
Hannum who was the superior of Col. Wyman was never shown a
copy of the 22 January 1941 letter. (R., v. 18, p. 2057).
Attention is invited to this extract of a letter from Rohl’s attorney
David H. Cannon of Los Angeles to the Secretary of Commerce.
Major Clausen. In any event, do you know anything about a letter by this
Mr. Cannon, David H. Cannon, 650 South Spring Street, Los Angeles, California,
to the Secretary of Commerce, dated August 29, 1941, which states in part as
follows : ( Paragraph 5. )
“Theodore Wyman, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers, War Depart-
ment, in charge of all the above-mentioned defense work in Hawaii, has requested
Mr. Rohl and the War Department to have Mr. Rohl give his personal service
in connection with the emergency defense work in Hawaii, and as early as Jan-
uary 1941 and at numerous times since that date Colonel Wyman has tendered
Mr. Rohl transportation via clipper or boat to the Islands and has stated to Mr.
Rohl over interocean telephone that he will personally obtain special permission,
because of Mr. Rohrs alien status, to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this secret con-
tract.” (R., v. 20, p. 2229.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
203
Attention is also invited to the following letter dated 15 August
1941 which Col. Wyman sent to the Chief of Engineers :
Via Clipper
War Department,
United States Engineer Office,
Honolulu, T. H., August 15, 1941.
Id reply refer to :
ND 600.114-602
“ 230
Subject : Request for Final Citizenship Papers of Mr. H. W. Rohl of Rohl-Connolly
Company, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California.
To : The Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.
(Through The Division Engineer, South Pacific Division.)
W] 1. Mr. Paul Grafe, Attorney-in-Faet for the Hawaiian Constructors, a
joint venture consisting of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Los Angeles,
California ; Gunther & Shirley Company, Los Angeles, California ; and Mr. Ralph
E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, prosecuting Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contract
No. W-414-Eng-602, has requested the District Engineer to bring to the attention
of the Engineer Department the status of Mr. H. W. Rohl, 2519 Hollywood Boule-
vard, Los Angeles, California, one of the principal stockholders of the firm of
Rohl-Connolly Company. Mr. H. W. Rohl applied to the U. S. District Court at
Los Angeles, California on January 15, 1941 for his final citizenship papers which,
it appears, have not been issued to date.
2. Mr. H. W. Rohl is a very skillful construction supervisor. He has person-
ally supervised several large construction jobs for the Engineer Department under
various contracts, also, other agencies of the United States. Some of the out-
standing work performed by Mr. Rohl was the construction of the Los Angeles-
Long Beach Detached Breakwater, the construction of the Headgate Dam at
Parker, Arizona for the Indian Service, and miscellaneous dams, tunnels, and
other heavy construction in the State of California. Mr. Rohl is a man of out-
standing ability, and of excellent judgment and resourcefulness for the manage-
ment of difficult construction work.
3. Due to the fact that part of the work being performed under Contract No.
W-4l4-Eng-602 is of a restricted nature, and because of his alien status, Mr.
Rohl has been reluctant to take any active part in the supervision or uanagement
of the work under Contract No. W-414r-Eng-^602 ; therefore, his valuable services
have been lost
4. While District Engineer at Los Angeles, California, the WTiter had frequent
contacts with Mr. Rohl in connection with the Los Angeles-Long Beach Detached
Breakwater construction and the dredging of the Los Angeles Harbor. It is the
writer’s opinion that Mr. Rohl’s loyalty to the United States is beyond question.
5. In view of the scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel for construction
work in the Hawaiian Islands, it is the District Engineer’s opinion that Mr. Rohl’s
services would prove invaluable in prosecuting the work at hand under the above
cited contract ; therefore, it is recommended that the Attorney General’s attention
be invited to the case with a request that action on his application for final citizen-
ship papers be expedited.
Office, Division Engineer
South Pacific Division Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
Aug 18 ’41 9 00 AM Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers.
San Francisco , California District Engineer.
Inclosure: Ltr., 8/15/41 fr., Hawn. Const rs.
<*c:— Mr. H. W. Rohl.
[4#] On or about August 28, 1941, in pursuance of requests and
information from Col. Wyman and Kohl’s attorney, the Acting Chief
of Engineers wrote the following letter to the Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalization. (R., v. 14, p. 1539 et seq; v. 6, p. 543 et seq.)
204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Engineers,
Washington , August 28, 1941.
Lemuel B. Schofield,
Special Assistant, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,
Office of the Attorney General , Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mb. Schofield: The Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture consisting
of the W. E. Callahan Construction Co., Los Angeles, Calif. ; Rohl-Connolly Co.,
San Francisco and Los Angeles, Calif. ; Gunther & Shirley Co., Los Angeles, Calif.,
and Ralph E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, T. H., are working on very impor-
tant defense construction at Honolulu, T. H., pursuant to Engineer Corps Con-
tract No. W-414-Eng-602.
Mr. H. W. Kohl, 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif., one of the
principal stockholders of the Rohl-Connolly Co., applied to the United States
district court at Los Angeles, Calif., on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship
papers which have not, as yet, been issued. Mr. Rohl is possessed of outstanding
ability, excellent judgment, and resourcefulness for the management of difficult
construction work. Some of the outstanding work performed by Mr. Rohl was the
construction of the Los Angeles-Long Beach detached breakwater, the construc-
tion of the Headgate Dam at Parker, Ariz., for the Indian Service, and the miscel-
laneous dams, tunnels and other heavy construction in the State of California.
To date, Mr. Rohl’s valuable services have not been available for Government
defense projects because of his alien status.
The services of Mr. Rohl are of vital importance to the expeditious completion
of the afore-mentioned defense construction project because of his peculiar quali-
fications and scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel. It is the understanding
of this office that Mr. Rohl’s loyalty to the United States is beyond question. It is
therefore requested that the granting of Mr. Rohl’s final citizenship papers be
expedited.
Your consideration and cooperation will be very much appreciated.
Very respectfully,
John J. Kingman,
Brigadier General,
Acting Chief of Engineers.
[ 49 ] Accordingly, the petition of Rohl was specially heard as a
contested case on 15 September 1941 by the United States District
Court, Los Angeles, Judge J. F. T. O’Connor presiding. Rohl was
represented in court by still another attorney, one David H. Cannon
of Los Angeles. The court granted the petition after a statement of
facts had been presented by the Bureau of Immigration and Natural-
ization. This included a representation to the court that “no objection
will be made to the granting of this. petition.” The statement also set
forth that :
The petitioner is the President of the Rohl-Connolly Contracting Co., located
at 4351 Valley Blvd., Los Angeles, and has been awarded a secret contract in
connection with a defense construction project in Honolulu. His participation
in this project Is being held up until he has been naturalized.
The basis for this latter statement included the quoted letters.
The Board received from the former Division Engineer a copy of
a letter dated 10 October 1941 from the Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Service to attorney Benjamin L. Stilphen, of the Office of Chief
of Engineers, reading in part:
You are advised that all the facts in the case were presented to the
court. * * •
Wyman testified that he had maintained the same relations with
other contractors as he maintained with Rohl. (R., v. 29, p. 3360,
3364, 3365, 3383, 3564.) The falsity of this statement is clear from
what has previously been found as to the extraordinary and abnormal
relations which actually had existed between Rohl and Col. Wyman.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
205
Col. Wyman testified that he conducted an adequate investigation
to determine the availability of contractors in Hawaii. (R., v. 29,
p. 3388, 3481.)
The falsity of this statement is indicated by the proof that many
local contractors were available in Hawaii and would \50~\
have welcomed the work and were more competent than the Hawaiian
Constructors. Col. Wyman did not even communicate with these
contractors for this purpose.
Col. Wyman testified that there were no delays attributable to
the neglect of the Hawaiian Constructors. (R., v. 29, p. 3425.)
The falsity of this statement is apparent from the showing of undue
delays and deficiencies.
Col. Wyman testified that he was not relieved from Hawaii for
any deficiencies. (R., v. 29, p. 3516, 3575.) In an apparent effort
to support this statement he referred to his award of a Distinguished
Service Medal for his services in Hawaii. (R., v. 29, p. 3374.) Since
the point is thus raised, it becomes necessary to examine the history
of this decoration. The citation for this award reads:
GENERAL ORDERS WAR DEPARTMENT,
No. 42 Washington, August J7, 1942.
EXTRACT
II — A WARD OF DISTINGUISHED-SERVICE MEDAL — * * *
THEODORE WYMAN, JR., colonel (Lieutenant colonel. Corps of Engi-
neers), Army of the United States. For exceptionally meritorious and dis-
tinguished service in the performance of duty of great responsibility as
District Engineer, Honolulu (T. H.) Engineer Distri ct, f rom October 14, 1941,
to March 15, 1942. On October 14, 1941, Colonel WYMAN was directed to
proceed with emergency construction in the South Pacific Area, to be available
for use by January 15, 1942, at locations difficult of access and widely sepa-
rated. Under extremely difficult conditions of supply and construction, Colonel
WYMAN completed the work in 11 weeks from the date of notice to proceed,
and on December 28, 1941 over 2 w eeks ahead of schedule, reported the
projects ready for use. Colonel WYMAN displayed unusual judgment, fore-
sight, and energy in carrying out his duties, and through his accomplishment
rendered a service pt great value to the defense of this and cobelligerent
countries. * * •
By order of The Secretary of War :
G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff .
[5/] Official:
J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General .
It appears that that award was recommended by Brigadier Gen-
eral Warren T. Hannum, the former Division Engineer and superior
of Col. Wyman. (R., v. 6, p. 630.) It further appears, however,
that General Hannum first tried unsuccessfully to get the Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Department, to recommend the award.
(R., v. 19, p. 2048.) General Hannum also knew since October
1941 of the complaints from the Hawaiian Department against
Colonel Wyman. (R. 2041.)
Col. Wyman testified that he never even visited the chain of islands
which had been prepared as an air route. (R, v. 29, p. 3545.) The
Board further discovered that the impetus for the award came from
Mr. Walter F. Dillingham who was a stockholder in the Hawaiian
Contracting Co. during the period in question. This firm benefitted
79716— 46— Ex. 167 14
206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
from the mentioned equipment purchase and was one of those which
comprised the Hawaiian Constructors. Mr. Dillingham had com-
municated with his lawyer in Washington, Mr. Lee Warren, con-
cerning the initiation of the award. (R., v. 24, p. 2779.)
On this subject Mr. Wickiser testified:
♦ * * But I can tell you again that as far as the men that were working
out there, working on the construction work, they thought it was a joke.
General Grunert. Do you know anything about his work on the string of air
bases down toward Australia? Did you have anything to do with that?
Mr. Wickiser. No, sir.
General Grunert. Then, those who may have known about it and appeared to
be surprised that he received a decoration didn’t know but what he may have
done extraordinary work on something else of which they were not aware?
[52] Mr. Wickiser. That might have been. But I might also say that most
of these men also knew of Colonel Wyman in Los Angeles, sir, which goes back
a little further than that time. (R, v 22, p 2473.)
It was of record that Gen. Tinker finally ordered the Hawaiian
Constructors out of the chain of islands for apparent incompetence.
(R, v 22, p 2486.)
With respect to the work of Col. Wyman on Christmas Island, which
was one of the islands in question, following is a report of Col. E. W.
Leard, IOD, to the Inspector General, Hawaiian Department:
The following report is contained in a folder marked Secret the title of which
is “Report of Inspection of Station “X” Christmas Island, Pacific Arch. In-
spected : 2730 January, 1042 By : Captain W. E. Wilhelm, C. E.”
19 February, 1942.
Memorandum for : Colonel Lathe B. Row.
Subject : Analysis of Report of Inspection of Station X.
1. An analysis of the report of inspection of station “X”, made by Captain
W. E. Wilhelm, CE, shows :
a. That conditions at Station “X” are very bad.
b. That these conditions are entirely due to the fault of the District Engineer.
2. The following specific failures of the District Engineer are indicated :
a. Material for assembling various types of tanks was sent, but no hardware,
valve fittings, etc.
b. A ship load of lumber was sent, but no door jambs, window jambs, door
screens, etc.
c. Insufficient laundry facilities have been provided.
d. Insufficient motor transportation has been provided.
e. Insufficient heavy machinery has been provided.
f. Insufficient messing and cooking equipment has been provided for personnel.
g. Necessary quantities of asphalt, plumbing material, electrical material,
hardware, sinks, showers, lights, fans, and furniture have not been provided.
3. The following conditions have been permitted to exist without apparent
remedial action :
a. Sanitary conditions are very bad.
b. No effort has been made to provide adequate living conditions for personnel.
[53] c. Apparently no effort has been made to provide recreation and comforts.
d. The Navy has been permitted to take over Pan- Air facilities and Hotel, and
the engineers operate a mess for the Navy and perform all their chores.
e. The medical officer has not been required to fully perform his duties.
4. The following indicates that the work of the engineers has not been satis-
factory.
a. Too much time is required for the construction of runways.
b. Runways and bays are not properly completed.
c. Radio equipment is left unpacked and untried, and some equipment is out of
order.
d. One laundry is not in operating condition.
e. No effort has been made to provide the work camp with water.
f. No apparent effort has been made to utilize the filters and purifying appa-
ratus of the Pan Air Station.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
207
5. The above resume taken from the report submitted by Captain Wilhelm to
the office of the District Engineer indicates that a very bad state of affairs
exists at Station X, and that this state of affairs can be attributed only to lack
of proper supervision and competent personnel from the office of the District
Engineer.
/s/ E. W. L.
E. W. Leard,
Lt. Col I. G. D.
The Comanding General, Hawaiian Department directed that two
letters, dated 14 and 27 February requesting the relief of Col. Wyman
for what amounted to gross inefficiency in office, be sent to the Chief
of Engineers. These letters were sent and are as follows :
Letter of February 14, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Major General Rey-
bold:
Major General Eugene Reybold,
Chief of Engineers ,
Washington, D. C.
Dear General Reybold : We have had an unfortunate and unpleasant situation
develop here in the Hawaiian Department. The District Engineer has executed
some of his work in a most efficient manner, however, [54] due to an un-
fortunate personality he has antagonized a great many of the local people as
well as some of the new employees and officers who have recently been assigned
to his office. Since this atmosphere exists whenever any condition arises such as
slowness in making payments to dealers or to employees, even if this condition is
beyond the control of the District Engineer, the people wrathfully rise up in
arms against him.
Prior to December 7 I did not have very many official dealings with the District
Engineer and I know little about the efficiency of his administrative and engineer-
ing organization, but since December 7, when it was believed that it would be
more economical and in the interest of efficiency to continue using his office as the
procurement and dispersing agency for the Department Engineer’s office, I have
had many dealings with him. Some of the work which they were called upon to
perform for me has been carried on in a highly satisfactory manner but there
are many other items of work, which for some reason or other there was a slow-
ness in getting results. This, I am told by various Post and Station Com-
manders, obtains generally and as a result many of their assistants carry re-
sentments towards the office of the District Engineer. I shall have to state that
there was rather a very abrupt change made when the ACQM was taken over
by the District office and some of the difficulties were undoubtedly created by a
lack of a suitable transition period.
Even though this area has been officially declared a Theatre of Operations, the
District continues to function independently or under the Division Engineer on
certain work over which I have no control, and as a result there is a lack of cohe-
sion in our operations, and the whole engineer program is [55] suffering
with a consequent loss of prestige by the Engineers in both civilian and military
circles. However, this could be overcome by certain corrective measures in the
District Engineer’s organization and methods, and many of these are now being
undertaken. It is extremely questionable whether a change in sentiment of
method of operation by the District Engineer at this time could better the situa-
tion in the future due to the inense antagonism that now exists among civilians
and worse among military personnel towards the District Engineer. It may be
that the present District Engineer has outlived his usefulness in this Department.
The Department Commander discussed this situation with me two days ago and
suggested that I warn you that he may conclude that a change is necessary. I
know that General Emmons thinks very highly of the present District Engineer
in some of the work that he has performed; however, the General feels that
possibly an insurmountable condition has developed which is a handicap to
efficient operation and he may decide to recommend a change. Before doing this,
however, he has directed me to confer with the District Engineer and suggest
changes in both his organization and his method of operation in an attempt to
improve the existing unsatisfactory service.
Very truly yours,
A. K. B. Lyman,
Colonel , Corps of Engineers , Department Engineer.
208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[ 56\ Letter 27 February 1942 from Colonel Lyman to General
Reybold :
Dear General Reybold: I wrote you on 14 February 1942 in regard to the
unsatisfactory situation in the District Engineer office here. Since that time
I have personally investigated conditions and find that they are unsatisfactory*
particularly in the administrative branches. The administration of his office
and his handling of the air field construction program are not altogether pleasing
to the Department Commander and the general unpleasant feeling toward him
makes it desirable to effect his replacement.
With an organization as large as the present one of the District Engineer, de-
centralization of authority is essential. Colonel Wyman appears unwilling to
grant authority to subordinates and attempts to carry too much of the load him-
self. As a result some phases of the work suffer from lack of sufficient attention.
In addition three of the officers whom he has selected for important line island
projects have had unfavorable reports submitted against them evidencing lack of
judgment on the part of the District Engineer in the selection of key personnel.
When I wrote before, the Department Commander had not definitely decided
that a change in District Engineers was necessary. He realizes that Colonel*
Wyman has done an excellent job in many respects and does not want to take offi-
cial action that would tarnish the record of the officer. General Emmons feels
that perhaps Colonel Wyman has been in this semitropical climate too long or
that the pace at which the District Engineer has been driving himself has clouded
his judgment. On several occasions Colonel Wyman has received important ver-
bal instructions and failed to carry them out, either through forgetfulness or fail-
157] ure to understand. A reconsideration of the entire situation by the De-
partment Commander has resulted in asking me to informally request the re-
placement of Colonel Wyman as District Engineer.
I sincerely hope that you will see fit to ease Colonel Wyman out of the Hawaiian
Department in such a manner as to reflect no discredit on him and replace him
with someone who can visualize the high degree of cooperation which is necessary
between the various commanders, civilians, and the District Engineer’s office in
order that the Engineer Service may function to the fullest extent. I, personally
do not believe there is any solution to the problem short of the relief of the present
District Engineer.
In the event that you see fit to make a change I strongly recommend that two
experienced administrative assistants, thoroughly familiar with the Departmental
procedure, be either transferred here or sent on temporary duty to reorganize the
administrative branch of the District office to permit it to carry the tremendous
mass of detail expeditiously and effectively. The present administrative heads
haTe not had sufficient experience to manage the large organization that is now
required to perform the administrative detail. Errors in the preparation of pay
rolls and vouchers and delay in making payments have resulted in some hard-
ship and unpleasant feeling among local labor, contractors, except possibly the
one large company handling the bulk of his work, and supply firms.
Sincerely
(s) A. K. B. Lyman,
Colonel , Corps of Engineers ,
Department Engineer.
[68] To this the Chief of Engineers, Maj. Gen. Eugene Rey-
bold replied by letter dated 16 March 1942, which reads in part :
I appreciate very much your frank letter advising me of conditions in your
Department. As you will know upon receipt of this letter, we have effected the
reassignment of Colonel Wyman for important military construction activities
in another theatre of operations.
The Inspector General, Hawaiian Department, made a report dated
14 February 1942, to the Chief of Staff of the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, concerning gross inefficiencies and irregular-
ities of the District Engineer. This reads in part as follows :
1. a. That the District Engineer has antagonized the business firms of Hon-
olulu and private individuals of the community by his failure to properly meet
obligations, peremptory actions, and lack of tact on the part of himself and cer-
tain members of his staff.
hEPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
209
b. That due to the District Engineer’s failure to coordinate the procuring, au-
diting, and disbursing sections of his organization payments to dealers for mer-
chandise delivered and services rendered are in some cases long overdue. Some
firms are threatening to refuse further sales unless outstanding obligations are
paid in full and kept current. Many smaller businesses now are faced with
financial difficulties due to their inability to collect amounts due them from the
District Engineer. It has been ascertained that of the larger firms approxi-
mately $500,000.00 is due Lewers & Cooke and approximately $60,000.00 is due
Mr. MURPHY, the owner of Murphy Motors and Aloha Motors. There are in-
dications that similar large amounts are due other firms.
c. That the District Engineer’s delay in paying wages, sometimes for periods of
several weeks, is adversely affecting the prosecution of defense projects and the
morale of employees engaged on these projects.
d. That the failure on the part of the District Engineer to properly and sys-
tematically take over the activities of the Zone Constructing Quartermaster on
16 December has resulted in disruption of administrative functions to a marked
degree.
e. That the District Engineer’s office as a whole has not been organized in
such a manner as to operate with efficiency.
f. That there is evidence that the District Engineer [59] has harassed
the former employees of the Zone Constructing Quartermaster and has sub-
jected them to mental persecution to such an extent that many of the key men
have refused to work in his office.
g. There is evidence to indicate that the employees of the former Zone Con-
structing Quartermaster who have been transferred to the office of the District
Engineer are discontented and dissatisfied over conditions existing therein.
2. Mr. MURPHY, the owner of the Murphy Motors and Aloha Motors, stated
yesterday (13 February 1942) that he has been unable to collect past due ob-
ligations for trucks and automobiles purchased by the District Engineer. He
further stated that he is going to the mainland by clipper within three days and
that he contemplates bringing these matters to the attention of Delegate KING
and such other authorities in Washington as may be necessary to secure re-
medial action unless he can be assured his unpaid bills will be settled promptly.
He also stated that he contemplates refusin g to m ake delivery on orders now on
hand for more motor transportation. Mr. MURPHY is extremely bitter of the
manner in which he and other automobile dealers have been treated by the Dis-
trict Engineer.
3. In addition to the matters mentioned above, past inspections and recent
numerous incidents requiring investigation have disclosed that the administra-
tion and operation of the District Engineer activities since 7 December 1941
have been exemplified by extravagance and waste and general mal-administra-
tion. It was discovered during the course of inspections of District Engineer
activities prior to 7 December that his administrative setup was improperly
coordinated and was so mentioned in these reports of inspection. The District
Engineer, in his replies, has stated that steps had been Initiated to correct the
Irregularities and deficiencies reported. It is now evident that many of these
irregularities and deficiencies still existed on 7 December 1941 and have been
aggravated by the increased volume of his activities incident to the outbreak
of war and the taking over of the funct ions o f the Zone Construction Quarter-
master on 16 December 1941. Colonel WYMAN’S methods of administration
have been such as to antagonize many persons, military and civil, both within
and without his organization. His actions have also been ridiculed and criticized
to the community. I believe that this condition is to the great detriment of
Army as a whole and the En ginee r Corps in particular.
4. In my opinion Colonel WYMAN does not possess the necessary executive
and administrative ability or the leadership to cope with the present situation
existing in this Department. In addition to the matters set forth in paragraph 1
above, inefficiency of his office has further been demonstrated by :
a. His methods of purchase, assignment and use of motor vehicles.
[ 60 ] b. His waste of money in the renting, remodeling and furnishing of
offices for himself and his staff.
c. The building of elaborate and expensive ($41,652.46) air raid shelters at
the Punahou School for the use of himself and the executives of the contractor.
These shelters have sufficient capacity to protect only a small percentage of the
number of employees on the Punahou Campus.
d. Directing his contractor to take over and operate the Pleasanton Hotel at
an estimated loss of $2,500.00 per fflOfltJi ft jness is operated and at the
210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
rates and room assignments fixed by the District Engineer. The principal bene'
ficaries of the use of this hotel to date have been Colonel WYMAN and wife,
and his staff and their dependents. This hotel was taken over on 16 January 1942
and a mess was established on 26 January 1942.
e. Failing to utilize to best advantage the services of Lieutenant Colonel HAR-
ROLD, former Zone Constructing Quartermaster, and his highly trained
assistants.
f. His failure to stabilize assignments of personnel to positions of responsi-
bility, and his failure to delegate authority to his administrative assistants to
act for him.
g. His failure to establish a system of accountability to insure the proper
accounting for the receipt and issuance of construction material.
h. His failure to issue directives in necessary detail and to organize his staff
to insure compliance with directives issued by him.
i. His disregard for and violation of orders of the Military Governor concern-
ing the curfew law.
5. Although several of the investigations relative to matters mentioned in
paragraph 4 have not ben completed, the evidence already obtained substan-
tiates the statements made above and indicate that Colonel THEODORE
WYMAN, Jr., C. E., does not possess the necessary executive and administrative
ability to properly conduct the affairs of his office. The fact that Mr. MURPHY
contemplates such drastic action and the fact that business firms threaten to
refuse delivery on future orders submitted by the District Engineer indicate the
seriousness of the situation and the need for immediate remedial action.
*6. I strongly believe that unless a change in the administration of the office
of the District Engineer is accomplished within a short time, most serious reper-
cussions will result.
7. CONCLUSION
That it is to the best interests of the United States and [62] of the
Hawaiian Department that Colonel WYMAN be relieved at once as District
Engineer.
8. recommendation
That Colonel WYMAN be relieved as District Engineer at once.
Accordingly, Col. Wyman was relieved on 15 March 1942 as District
Engineer in Hawaii.
Captain William A. E. King, JAGD, testified that in the early part
of 1942, while assigned to the Hawaiian Department, he rendered an
opinion as to the serious derelictions of Col. Wyman which had existed
before 7 December 1941. (R, v. 39, p. 4455, et seq.)
Charges that Col. Wyman was inefficient have also been confirmed
by subsequent investigations of the Office of the Inspector General,
Washington, D. C. Reference is made especially to that of Colonel
John A. Hunt, IGD. (R, v. 7, p. 745, et seq.) His observations and
studies were very helpful to the Board as a starting point for the ex-
ploration of facts. The Board developed many additional points of
evidence.
[68] The report of Colonel Hunt, dated 14 June 1943 states in
part:
b. Mr. Rohl was owner of the yacht Ramona, at one time Commodore of the
Newport Harbor Yacht Club and well known as a sportsman and spender. Dur-
ing the period of Colonel Wyman’s duties in Los Angeles, 1935-1939, be was the
guest of Mr. Rohl aboard the Ramona and later the Vega, which Mr. Rohl
acquired in 1937. Colonel Wyman testified that the number of such occasions
was probably no more than four or five. These yacht trips, as described by
Colonel Wyman, were for the greater part essentially business trips, primarily
to inspect the quarries above referred to. Actually, there existed no necessity
for conducting the business of inspecting quarrying activities on Catalina Island
in this manner, since there were available to the District Engineer adequate
Government-owned vessels. These trips must therefore be classed as pleasure
trips at Mr. RobTg expense, official business being an incidental consideration.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
211
During the same period, Colonel Wyman was many times the guest of Mr. Rohl
at the latter’s Beverly Hills home. Colonel Wyman testified that he was very
meticulous in the matter of removing any sense of obligation to Mr. Rohl by
repaying these courtesies in kind. It is therefore apparent that Colonel Wyman
was on close and intimate social relations with Mr. Rohl during the period when,
as the Government’s representative, he administered extensive work for which
Mr. Rohl was the contractor.
c. The yacht trips and house parties given by Mr. Rohl and attended by Colonel
Wyman were expensive and lavish. Intoxicating liquors were habitually served,
with no limitation excepting the guest’s capacity to imbibe. Colonel Wyman,
claiming an ability to hold his liquor, imbibed freely. It is not in evidence that
he became intoxicated to an obvious extent. It is not evident, however, that his
acceptance of Mr. Rohl’s entertainment was in any sense necessary to that desir-
able degree of acquaintance between the Corps of Engineers and the construction
industry which may be considered necessary to their mutual interests. These
contracts were essentially, if not entirely, social and personal affairs, which by
their frequency and character tended strongly to bring discredit upon the Corps
of Engineers and to give rise to just such allegations as the ones now in question.
With respect to the duty of Colonel Wyman to ascertain whether
competent contractors were available in Hawaii for the construction
of the defense projects, Col. Hunt reported :
e. Colonel Wyman testified that he had tried to interest local contractors in
taking on the work originally proposed, and that they showed no interest. That
statement was not confirmed by inquiry among those contractors, seven of whom
were questioned in the matter, all of them [63] denying having been
given a chance to take on any part of the work. These contractors were then
seeking new work, and the bringing in of an outside contractor without giving
them a chance to participate, created a considerable natural resentment on their
part
Concerning the fact that Col. Wyman knew of Rohl’s alien status
when the contract was executed, Col. Hunt reported :
It is difficult, therefore, to escape the conclusion that Colonel Wyman knew of
Mr. Rohl’s non-citizenship when the contract was entered into, or at latest
shortly after writing the unanswered letter summoning him to Hawaii. In such
circumstances any close relationship between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl there-
after would have involved the former in dealings with a man of doubtful loyalty
to the United States.
As to the continuance in Hawaii of the unwholesome relationship
between Col. Wyman and Rohl which had existed in Los Angeles, Col.
Hunt reported :
d. Various witnesses testified to having seen Colonel Wyman with Mr. Rohl
at various semi-public functions, when both men indulged freely in toxicating
beverages. So far as could be ascertained, most of these instances were prior
to the attack of 7 December. No witness was found who could testify to drunken-
ness on Colonel Wyman’s part. His own testimony and that of other witnesses
in this respect indicates that Colonel Wyman maintained a totally unnecessary,
and in the circumstances, an undesirable social familiarity with the active head
of an organization whose prime business it was to profit from work under his
supervision. If there is reasonable doubt that this relationship was with a man
whose non-citizenship at the commencement of the contract was known to him,
there is no doubt whatever that it was with a man who at the time of this rela-
tionship in Hawaii, had been proven to Colonel Wyman to have concealed the fact
of his alien status. The least'that can be said of that relationship is that it dis-
played a callousness on Colonel Wyman’s part, not only toward the character of
his associate, but toward the possible consequences of its public display.
Concerning the purchase of equipment from the Rohl-Connolly Co.
and the Hawaiian Contracting Co., Col. Hunt reported :
7. a. It is next alleged that immediately prior to his departure from Hawaii,
Colonel Wyman rushed through the purchase from the Rohl-Connolly Company
of certain equipment owned by the latter, paying the price asked by Mr. Rohl,
212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATI' AC K
although his own appraiser valued that equipment at approximately $35,000 less
than the price asked. At [ 64 ] this point it is pertinent to indicate that
the original composition of the Hawaiian Constructors had been twice changed
by the addition of two more co-adventurers prior to the events here in discus-
sion. On 22 May 1941, Mr. Ralph B. Wooley, an independent contractor of
Honolulu, had been added to the membership. On 4 January 1942, the Hawaiian
Contracting Company became the fifth associated contractor, with Mr. H. P.
Benson, President, becoming a member of the Executive Committee. Both of
these men figure in the purchase of the equipment here in discussion, as well
as in other equipment purchases. Some time prior to 9 December 1941, the
need for more construction equipment became evident as increased operations to
the south of Hawaii became necessary. It was known by Colonel Wyman that
the Rohl-Connolly Company owned certain equipment which was then idle at
the Cqddoa project in Colorado. It was arranged that this equipment would
be shipped to Los Angeles for ovehaul and trans-shipment to Canton Island,
Christmas Island, and other points in the Pacific. Efforts to trace the move-
ments of this equipment failed, although it was determined that some reached
Canton Island, some was en route to Christmas Island on 7 December 1941
when the ship carrying it was diverted by Navy orders, and some reached
Honolulu. Under date of 11 March 1942, a letter signed by Mr. Rohl on behalf
of the Hawaiian Constructors requested the District Engineer to purchase cer-
tain listed equipment from the Rohl-Connolly Company at prices stipulated
therein. (Exhibit M.) The items listed appear to have been among those re-
ferred to above, though strict identification was not found possible. On 10
March 1942, Mr. M. C. Parker, employed by the District Engineer, was directed
to appraise this list of equipment, which he did, reporting his findings of a
value of $131,411.03 on 11 March 1942. On 12 March 1942, Mr. Parker was
ordered to report to Colonel B. L. Robinson, Operations Officer under Colonel
Wyman. The former discussed the appraisal with Mr. Parker and they directed
him to confer with Mr. Rohl in the matter. Mr. Parker was directed to a table
at which Mr. Rohl sat with Mr. Ralph E. Wooley and Mr. H. P. Benson. A dis-
cussion was had, in which Mr. Rohl displayed certain paid repair bills relating
to the equipment in question, with the evident intention of swaying Mr. Parker’s
appraisal. The latter refused to recede from his recorded judgment, where-
upon Mr. Rohl asked him if he was aware that a good deal of back rental was
due on the equipment. Mr. Parker disclaimed any knowledge thereof, but in-
sisted that the fact would not alter his appraisal of the value of the equipment
as he had observed it.
b. Both Mr. Wooley and Mr. Benson testified that they had no part in this
discussion and were not aware of its subject or trend. Colonel Wyman expressed
a complete ignorance of the discussions. On 12 March, Mr. Parker sent a memo-
randum to Colonel Robinson recommending that if back rental were due in an
amount which, added to the amount of his appraisal, would equal or exceed the
price requested [G5] by Mr. Rohl, the latter figure be approved as the
purchase price. (Exhibit N.) By letter dated 13 March, Colonel Wyman di-
rected purchase of the equipment at prices stated by Mr. Rohl in his letter of
11 March. (Exhibit O.) The purchase was completed accordingly. Payment
in the amount of $166,423.17 was made by Captain W. P. McCrone, CE, on 19
March who had been displaced as disbursing officer several days previously when
disbursements were taken over by the Department Finance Officer. Diligent
search of files and inquiry among possible witnesses having knowledge of the
matter, failed to disclose any facts explaining or justifying the rejection of
Mr. Parker’s appraisal and the payment of prices asked by Mr. Rohl. Colonel
Robinson could not be reached, he having been transferred to some place in
Australia.
c. It appears to be reasonably certain that the equipment in question had
been in actual use for various lengths of time during January, February, and
part of March at the time of purchase, although use records were not available
and apparently were not maintained. There was no record of any rental agree-
ment relating to any of this equipment. It Is quite possible that assuming the
fairness of Mr. Parker’s appraisal on 12 March, the equipment had a substan-
tially higher value when delivered to the site of use or at point of shipment.
It does not, however, appear that a depreciation of approximately $35,000 In
value, or about 26% could have occurred in that period. No suitable basis w-as
available upon which to reconstruct a fair value to apply to the equipment as
of the date of delivery. Mr. Rohl’s effort to sway the appraiser’s judgment by
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
213
references to rentals due, seems an obvious effort to distort the facts in bis
own favor. All trace of the retained voucher and supporting papers were miss-
ing. No memoranda or other papers were found in connection with Colonel
Wyman’s letter directing the purchase at Mr. Kohl’s figures. In the absence
of Justifying evidence or testimony, the conclusion seems Inescapable that Colonel
Wyman was unduly swayed, contrary to the Government’s interests, by an
unwarranted acceptance of these representations of Mr. Kohl in the face of con-
flicting recommendations.
& a. It is next alleged that just prior to his departure from Hawaii, Colonel
Wyman rushed through a purchase of equipment from the Hawaiian Contracting
Compauy paying $156,411 for the lot, including a considerable amount of equip-
ment, as mentioned in c below, that was unfit for the emergency use for which,
it was represented, it was immediately needed. In this connection, the procedure
to be followed in purchasing equipment in Hawaii was recommended in a letter
signed by Mr. Kohl. (Exhibit P.) The procedure was to base payment upon an
appraisal to be made by a Mr. Bruce Gentry, representing the Hawaiian Con-
structors; a Mr. H. J. Roblee, employee of the Edward R. Bacon Company of
Honolulu and a third man representing the owner. In the case of the equip-
ment purchase now in question, the third party was Mr. Edward Ross, employee
of [Gtf] the Hawaiian Contracting Company. These three appraised the
equipment in question, placing an upper value of $156*150 upon it. This ap-
praisal was substantially the amount named in a letter addressed by Mr. Rohl
to the District Engineer dated 9 January 1942. In this case, the Government was
not properly represented. Mr. Roblee, ostensibly the Government's representa-
tive, owed his livelihood to the Edward R. Bacon Company, of which the Ha-
waiian Contracting Company was a substantial customer in equipment pur-
chases, his interests relating to those of his employer and its substantial cus-
tomer. Mr. Gentry was a contractor employee and Mr. Ross obviously served the
interests of the vendor.
b. Data secured by Major George R. Lumsden, Assistant to the Inspector Gen-
eral, Hawaiian Department, from the files and records of the District Engineer,
indicated that much of the equipment concerned in this purchase had been ap-
propriated by U. S. Engineer agencies upon the outbreak of war, putting it to
use on authorized projects. Testimony taken by this investigating officer con-
firmed these facts. Other items were obtained from time to time as needed, still
others remaining in the owner’s equipment yard until many months after the
purchase was consummated, and a substantial portion remained at the time of
the present investigation in the District Engineer's salvage yard where it had
been placed directly from the owner’s equipment yard. The facts, in detail, are
indicated in the tabulation, Exhibit Q.
c. The items hauled to salvage, unused, totaling $9,100, were examined by the
investigating officer. These items were so far obsolete as to warrtnt the descrip-
tion “archaic”. Some of the Watson wagons (hand operated, bottom dump
wooden wagons) were arranged for animal draft, while others had been equipped
with trailer tongues. All had been robbed of metal parts before the purchase,
some were badly rotted and others were termite eaten beyond any possible use-
fulness. Scrapers, scarifiers and like items were incomplete, badly rusted and
of doubtful useability, even in an extremity. Other items accepted and taken
into possession of the District Engineer subsequent to 1 July 1942 aggregated an-
other $20,511. These last items were useable, but their acquisition was totally
unnecessary, suitable like items having been available in sufficient quantity
prior to acceptance by the District Engineer’s farces.
d. This transaction was directed by Colonel Wyman on 13 March 1942, and pay-
ment was effected in the same manner as in the case of the Rohl-Connolly equip-
ment (paragraph 7). The files yielded no correspondence in the matter other
than that mentioned herein. In the course of Major Lumsden’s inquiry, it de-
veloped that the District Engineer’s appraiser had undertaken an appraisal of
some items of this equipment, had been denied access to it on the first attempt,
and had later been permitted to examine [07] it with the result that on
the items inspected, values were recommended which were in substantial agree-
ment with those later used, in the actual purchases. Nothing further was done
at the time, however, and when the purchase was finally directed, this appraisal
was ignored and the new one made as indicated above.
e. Mr. Benson, President of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, owner of the
equipment, testified that in his opinion, all the equipment was useable. Con-
fronted with the writer’s description of what he found, Mr. Benson’s protesta-
214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tions weakened, being obviously unsupportable. Colonel Wyman testified that
he was not familiar with the details and that he left such matters largely to
Colonel Robinson. Mr. Wooley and Mr. C. C. Middleton, the latter Administrator
for the Hawaiian Constructors, professed ignorance of the matter beyond the
fact that the purchase was made. Mr. Benson protested that by seizing his
company's equipment, the District Engineer had deprived the company of the
means of operating as a contractor. This was true excepting that as a part of
the Hawaiian Constructors it did continue in business. Furthermore, Mr. Ben-
son chose first to justify and then to ignore the fact that the questionable items
were useless or nearly so, and that many had already been depreciated off the
company's books.
f. The most charitable construction applicable to this transaction is that the
Hawaiian Constructors, Colonel Wyman, the owner and the appraisers negli-
gently failed to ascertain that the United States received in each case property
reasanobly worth the price paid. Such a construction strains credulity. That
Colonel Wyman in failing to require such assurance was negligent cannot be
doubted. The several co-adventurers who desired to dispose of equipment to
the Government had a common interest in upholding evaluations. The arrange-
ment by which the Hawaiian Contracting Company’s equipment was appraised is
an obvious violation of the principle that in such matters the Government be
directly represented, if not actually a deliberate evasion of that principle. The
circumstances disclosed indicate a highly probable arrangement between Mr.
Rohl and Mr. Benson to serve their respective interests. While proof of actual
conspiracy was not procurable, the presumption thereof is strong.
Concerning the charges connected with the lease of the Yacht Vega,
Colonel Hunt reported :
e. The charge that Colonel Wyman permitted his friendship for Mr. Rohl to
govern in this transaction is lent color by the absence in the official files of any
correspondence indicating that the chartering of the Vega had been discussed
with the actual charterers, the Hawaiian Constructors, who were to be and
now are being held responsible in the matter. Their first official entrance into
[68] the case appears to have occurred only after receipt by them of Colonel
Wyman’s directions that they enter into a charter agreement some one and
one-half months after the plan had been conceived by Colonel Wyman. Mr.
Wooley, Mr. Benson and Mr. Grafe, the responsible heads of the Hawaiian Con-
structors, aside from Mr. Rohl himself, all disclaimed prior contact with the
arrangement. There is reason to believe that these gentlemen found the entire
scheme distasteful, and that they believed that Mr. Rohl had dealt unfairly
with them in seeking to dodge certain responsibilities by adhering to what they
judged to be the fiction that Mrs. Rohl, not H. W. Rohl was the Vega's owner.
(Exhibit R.) Certainly the absence of written matter, frankly and openly
expressing interest, proper consideration and the fixing of clear responsibilities
for action taken, is strong cause to suspect irregularity and questionable schem-
ing. While proof of the allegation under discussion was not found, it is again
obvious that Colonel Wyman’s addiction to the making of verbal commitments
laid the foundation for those charges, involving both himself and the Corps of
Engineers in an undesirable situation.
Colonel Hunt reached the following conclusions among others :
CONCLUSIONS
21. A very careful study of all facts and circumstances brought to light in
the course of this investigation leads to the following conclusions :
a. During the years 1936-1939, Colonel Wyman, as District Engineer, Los
Angeles, maintained a close personal friendship, as distinguished from a business
friendship, with Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which was inappropriate on the part
of the United States Army officer administering costly works on which the said
Mr. Rohl was engaged as contractor. This relationship extended so far beyond
the need for ordinary cordial business relation as to give rise to such presump-
tions of impropriety as formed, in part, the basis of this investigation. In
maintaining that relationship, Colonel Wyman was not sufficiently mindful of
that unquestionable reputation for integrity and impartiality which it was the
duty of a man in his position to cultivate at aU times.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
215
b. The flattery of Colonel Wyman personally and professionally, which was
bestowed upon him by his wealthy associate, Mr. Rohl, evoked in Colonel Wyman
so complete a confidence in the former as to lead him to an unwise acceptance
of Mr. Kohl’s judgment and advice during their subsequent association in Ha-
waii. He thereby relinquished to some extent that independence of judgment
required of an officer in charge of the Government’s interests, as indicated in
his too ready acceptance of Mr. Kohl’s [63] recommendations relating to
equipment purchases and appraisals.
* ******
e. Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government’s best interest when in pur-
chasing Kohl-Con nolly equipment at a cost of $166,423.17 against the appraised
value of $131,411.03, he failed to fully justify for the record, the payment of
the larger of the two amounts. • * •
f. Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government’s best interests in the pur-
chase of equipment from the Hawaiian Contracting Company at a cost of $156,000,
in that he based that payment upon a prejudiced appraisal, and failed to take
such action as would insure that the equipment purchases vjas actually required,
was in good condition and useable and was worth the amount paid. * * *
g. The inefficiencies charged to the management of construction matters in
Hawaii actually existed, * * *
Since the Board uncovered more evidence than was adduced by
Col. Hunt, it is now possible to determine more accurately the dere-
lictions of Col. Wyman and the extent to which the inefficiencies of
the Hawaiian Constructors were due to his acts and omissions.
The report of Col. Hunt was preceded by an investigation of Col.
L. George Horowitz concerning Col. Wyman’s activities on the Canol
Project and the Alcan Highway in the Northwest Division to which
he was assigned after his tour in Hawaii. (Exhibit No. 6.) These
recommendations conclude with the statement:
The retainment of the Division Engineer (Col. Wyman) in his present capacity
wiU ana must eventuate in disgraceful performance or failure.
In this regard reference is made to information supplied the Board
bv the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to the effect that the Canadian
Government had suggested the reassignment of Col. Wyman from
Canada because of the way in w y hich he conducted himself. (R., v. 34,
p. 4034.)
[70] Col. Wyman was also officially reprimanded under the
104th Article of War for neglect in connection with his duties as Di-
vision Engineer in the Northwest Division. Following is the direc-
tion of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces:
War Department,
Headquarters, Armyy Service Forces,
Washington , D. C ., Mag 5, 1943.
SPAAW 201-Wyman, Jr., Theodore
Subject : Reprimand Under 104th Article of War.
To: Commanding General, Eighth Service Command.
1. It is directed that you administer a reprimand under the 104th Artcile of
War to Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., now a member of your command, sub-
stantially as follows :
a. Pursuant to instructions of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces,
War Department, you are hereby reprimanded under the 104th Article of War
for your failure to enforce safety precautions in connection with the field opera-
tions of the Miller Construction Company and the Omian-Smith Company,
which failure was in part responsible for the explosion and fire which occurred
at Dawson Creek, British Columbia, on February 13, 1943.
b. Should you prefer to stand trial, under the provisions of the KHth Article
of War rather than accept this reprimand, you will so indicate, by indorse-
216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ment hereon, within three (3) days following receipt hereof. Should you elect
to accept this reprimand in lieu of trial, no action other than acknowledge
receipt hereof need be taken by you.
2. Advise this officer of your action.
By command of Lieutenant General SOMERVELL :
/s/ Madison Pearson,
Madison Pearson,
Brigadier General , G. 8. G.,
Deputy Chief of Administrative Services.
Col. Wyman testified that he had no relations with Rohl which tend-
ed to interfere with the proper discharge of his duties. (R., v. 29, p.
3383.) The falsity of this statement is apparent from what has pre-
viously been shown.
[77 J Reference should also be made to the significant features of
certain testimony of other witnesses before the Board. For example,
the Chief of Engineers, Major General Eugene Reybold, testified that
he conducted no investigation even after he received the derogatory
reports concerning Rohl. (R. 576, v. 6, p. 9) ; that the system regard-
ing the award of contracts and the investigation of contractors was ad-
mittedly loose ; (R. v. 6, p. 581, 607) that he did not know whether CoL
Wyman had taken any steps to expedite the work. (R. v. 6 p. 593.)
The Chief of Engineers testified :
169. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or have knowledge of any
reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman in Hawaii that were de-
rogatory to Colonel Wyman?
General Reybold. No ; I never had any such report.
170. General Frank. Were you Chief of Engineers when he was relieved from
Hawaii?
General Reybold. Yes. (R. v. 6 p. 608.)
General Hannum testified :
General Frank. Did you state that you knew nothing about the association of
Wyman and Rohl in Los Angeles?
General Hannum. No; I did not know of any relationship between Wyman and
Rohl. I knew that Rohl was a contractor, but I had no knowledge of any partie-
ular social relations or other relations, other than official, that Wyman may have
had with Rohl.
[72] General Frank. When Wyman had the supervision of this contract in
which Rohl was involved, in Los Angeles, was he then under your jurisdiction?
General Hannum. No, General Kingman was then Division Engineer, here. I
relieved General Kingman, here, in January 1938, and that contract, as I recall,
for the breakwater had been made the year or two before that.
General Frank. The contract had been made, but Wyman was operating down
there, in 1938 and 1939, while you were the division engineer here?
General Hannum. Wyman went out there in 1935, 1 believe.
General Frank. Out where?
General Hannum. To Los Angeles. He was assigned as district engineer in
1935 or 1936, along about that time.
General Frank. And when did he go to Honolulu?
General Hannum. He went out there in 1939 or 1940, as I recall.
General Frank. Therefore, he was in Los Angeles for over a year under your
Jurisdiction while you were division engineer here?
General Hannum. Yes, yes ; that is correct.
General Frank. And you knew nothing of his associations?
General Hannum. No, no. I don’t know that he had any association with Rohl
during the period that he was district engineer, after my arrival. It never came
to my attention. We had no contracts with Rohl in the Los Angeles district, at
that time.
General Frank. When did they have the breakwater contract down there?
General Hannum. That breakwater was finished, as I recall, in December 1938.
General Frank. What kind of system or arrangement did you have as divi-
sion engineer to check on your district engineers?
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
217
General Hannum. Well, when the engineering papers came in, these plans
and specifications were reviewed in the engineering division in my office, and
comments submitted to me, and I passed on them, and the contracts at that time
had to be approved in Washington. Copies of the contract, plans and specifica-
tions, and I went out and [75] inspected the work with the district
engineer, to inspect the progress, and also see whether the work was being car-
ried out, and discussed with him as to whether it was being carried out in
accordance with the plans and specifications.
General Frank. Did he know you were coming, generally?
General Hannum. Generally speaking, I think he did; yes. I customarily
let him know when I was coming, to make sure that they would be there when
I arrived. (R., v. 18, p. 2070, 2071.)
Major Clausen. Do you recall, when you testified before Colonel Hunt, with
regard to Colonel W^yman, you said : “On one occasion, not necessarily in serious
conversation, I know that he indicated that he could hold his liquor, indicating
that he had a capacity to consume a considerable amount, without it very seriously
affecting him.”
General Hannum. I recall it
Major Clausen. When did you have that discussion with Colonel Wyman?
General Hannum. With Colonel Wyman? I don’t recall the exact incident,
whether it was on this side, or over in Honolulu. (R., v. 18, p. 2082.)
Major Clausen. Sir, with respect to this portion of the letter where it says —
“There were many other items of work, on which, for some reason or
other, there was a slowness in getting results.”
— what did Colonel Lyman tell you about that?
General Hannum. He didn’t tell me anything about that, specifically. What
he mentioned was that he said to me when I was over there that Wyman’s
administration had not been efficient or effective.
Major Clausen. And this was May that you were there, or October, 1942, did
you say?
General Hannum. I know it was in May that I went over there. No, I quess
it was probably in October. I was over there in October 1941 ; it may have been
that Lyman mentioned something to rne about that time. There were differences
between Wyman and Lyman at that time when I was over there in October 1941.
[7 4 ] Major Clausen. This trip that you made in October 1941 was a sort
of inspection trip, was it not, sir?
General Hannum. It was. I made one in May 1941 — I think it was May
1941 — and also in October 1941. (R., v. 18, p. 2041.)
Colonel Bernard L. Robinson, CE, gave this testimony on recall
with respect to a statement he Submitted in an attempt to justify the
purchase of equipment from the Hawaiian Contracting Co.:
General Frank. Haven’t you already submitted this as sworn testimony?
Major Clausen. Yes.
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir.
Major Clausen. And had we not had the privilege of cross-examining you,
don’t you know that this may have swayed the Board?
(There was no response.)
Major Clausen. Who is this Mr. H. J. Roblee that you refer to in your
statement?
Colonel Robinson. I will have to find out, sir.
Major Clausen. You don’t know?
Colonel Robinson. I don’t know at this time, no, sir.
Major Clausen. All right. Who else was in on this appraisal that you referred
to here? Mr. Gentry and Mr. Roblee and who else?
Colonel Robinson. As far as I know, those were the only two appraisers,
as given by this record right there.
Major Clausen. Wasn’t there a Mr. Ross?
Colonel Robinson. Not to my knowledge.
Major Clausen. A Mr. Edward Ross, an employee of the Hawaiian Con-
tracting Company? You don’t know that either, sir?
Colonel Robinson. Well, we had the Hawaiian Contracting Company price
here. I don’t know who his represent — who brought up this price over here.
Major Clausen. Well, do you know if a Mr. Edward [75] Ross, an
employee of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, had anything to do with
this appraisal?
218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Robinson. No, sir; I don’t recall Mr. Ross.
Major Clausen. Do you know whether this appraisal that you have offered
to the Board here this morning is the amount, substantially, named in a letter
addressed by Mr. Rohl to the District Engineer, dated 9 January 1942, that he
wanted?
Colonel Robinson. That may be true. I don’t know, sir.
Major Clausen. Do you know that?
Colonel Robinson. No, sir, I don’t.
Major Clausen. You haven’t found that in your search of the files?
Colonel Robinson. My search of the files simply asked for — calling for the
documents on the appraisals.
Major Clausen. No. Colonel, you say you have reviewed the files?
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir.
Major Clausen. Relative to that appraisal?
Colonel Robinson. I have reviewed these files.
Major Clausen. Now, just refer back to the Rohl-Connolly equipment. That
was finally at a price set by Mr. Rohl; isn’t that correst? Some $166,000?
Colonel Robinson. That was his asking price, yes, sir. I believe so, sir.
Major Clausen. Yes. Now, I am asking you the question, with regard to
this property purchased from the Hawaiian Contracting Company, whether
the same thing wasn’t true there, that Mr. Rohl suggested this price that was
finally the appraisal of these three men, Gentry, Roblee, and Ross.
Colonel Robinson. It may have been. I do not know, sir.
Major Clausen. Now let me ask you this: You said here In this statement
this morning
(There was colloquy off the record.)
Major Clausen. You say now something about this equipment not being junk.
You make the bald statement here :
• [76] “It is to be noted that each and every item of equipment was appraised
by competent appraisers at some substantial value and any statement therefore
that this equipment or any item of it was ‘valueless’, ‘worthless’, or ‘junk* is in
error and any inference that the government did not get full value is incorrect.”
Whose language is that sir?
Colonel Robinson. That is my language, sir.
Major Clausen. And when did you dictate that?
Colonel Robinson. I did not dictate it, sir. I wrote it in longhand on the—
Saturday, I believe it was.
Major Clausen. Don’t you know, sir, that some of that same equipment is, even
today, or as recently as a few days ago, unused because it was just plain, clear
junk?
Colonel Robinson. No, sir, I don’t know that.
Major Clausen. Have you looked to see?
Colonel Robinson. No, sir.
Major Clausen. Have you inquired to find out?
Colonel Robinson. No, sir.
Major Clausen. And yet you made that statement that it is not junk, and you
haven’t inquired to find out?
Colonel Robinson. I base that on this record right here.
Major Clausen. You base it on the appraisal?
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir.
Major Clausen. But the appraisal was made before the price was paid, wasn’t
it?
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir.
Major Clausen. So you don’t know whether the equipment was ever used
or not, do you?
Colonel Robinson. No, sir, I don’t.
Major Clausen. All right; that is about all. (R., v. 32, p. 3817, 3818, 3819,
3820.)
[77] 3. Acknowledgments.
The Board desires to express its appreciation to the House Mili-
tary Affairs Committee and its Chief Counsel, H. Ralph Burton, Esq.,
and to the California State Legislature’s Joint Fact Finding Commit-
tee on Un-American Activities and its Chief Counsel, R. E. Combs,
Esq., and to many witnesses who appeared and assisted in uncovering
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
219
facts and leads which have been the subject of this report. Through
the courtesy of Mr. Burton and Mr. Combs the Board also received
a gTeat deal of reliable information from investigators for these legis-
lative committees.
[78] Exhibit “A”
. Wab Department,
Washington , D. C. f Jul 12 1944-
Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General.
Subject : Report of House Military Affairs Committee alleging neglect and mis-
conduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and others, concerning Hawaiian
and Canadian Defense Projects.
1. The recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of the memorandum dated
July 10, 1944, of Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., to Mr. Amberg, Special
Assistant to the Secretary of War, on the above subject, are approved. Major
Clausen is directed to continue his investigation of the above matter and to co-
operate with the House Military Affairs Committee in its investigation of this
matter in the way described in paragraph 5 of Major Clausen’s memorandum.
2. Immediately upon the appointment of a board of officers pursuant to Public
Law 339, 78th Congress, to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor
catastrophe, the phases of the present matter relating thereto will be referred to
such board for investigation and such other action as may be proper under the
directive appointing such board. As it is understood Major Clausen will be
detailed as assistant recorder of this board, he will continue in that capacity to
coordinate the activities referred to paragraph 1 hereof with the activities of
the Pearl Harbor Board in the present case.
/s/ Robert P. Patterson,
Robert P. Patterson,
Acting Secretary of War.
[79] Exhibit “B”
WCM mer 2401
Off Br-WCM-ph 78270
In reply
refer to: AGPO-A-A 210.311 (21 Jul 44).
Wab Department,
The Adjutant General’s Office,
Washington 25, D. C., 22 July 1944-
Subject: Supplemental Orders.
To: Each Officer Mentioned.
1. The Board appointed by letter orders, this office, AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24
Jun 44), 8 July 1944, subject: “Orders”, as amended by letter orders, this office,
AGPO-A-A 210.311 (10 Jul 44), 11 July 1944, subject: “Amendment of Orders”,
pertaining to each of the following-named officers will consider the phases which
related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs
Committee, as directed by the Acting Secretary of War in his memorandum for
the Judge Advocate General, 12 July 1944 :
Lt. Gen. George Grunert, 01534, USA,
Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, 0212769, USA,
Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, 02871, USA, Col. Charles W. West, 012774,
JAGD.
2. Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, is appointed as Assistant Recorder
without vote on the above referred to Board.
By order of the Secretary of War :
/s/ W. C. Me Million,
Adjutant General.
1 Incl. Memo 12 July
The Adjutant General’s Office
Official
War Department
220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[a] ARMY PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION
TOP SECRET REPORT AND TOP SECRET MEMORANDA
1. Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, discussing cer-
tain evidence and documents.
2. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 25
November 1944, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army
Pearl Harbor Board, and recommending further investigation.
3. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 14
September 1945, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army
Pearl Harbor Board on the basis of additional evidence.
4. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated
14 September 1945, reviewing in greater detail certain aspects of the
Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board in the light of addi-
tional evidence and modifications of previous testimony.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
221
[b] TOP SECRET REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR
BOARD
[c] Memo: To The Secretary of War:
The following is a brief discussion of the evidence and documents
in the possession of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which for reasons
of security should not be incorporated in the General Report. The Sec-
retary of War is entirely familiar with this type of evidence and the
Board is sure concurs in its decision to treat it separately and as Top
Secret.
[I] 1. General. Information from informers and other means
as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the
negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession
of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December
of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the
Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what
were the Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them
against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession
of essential facts as to the enemy’s intentions.
This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late
in November absolutely imminent. It clearlv demonstrated the ne-
cessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate
day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare
for the eventualities of war.
The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy
gave only a small fraction on this information. No direction was given
the Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the
“Do-Don ’t” message of November 27, 1941. It would have been possi-
ble to have sent safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting
the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives could have been
formulated to put the Department on Alert Number 3.
This was not done.
Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing
upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and this information
cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders,
it is incumbent upon the War Department then [2] to assume
the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders.
This is an exception to the admirable policy of the War Department
of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field
commanders.
Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department.
The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent
that its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The
difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from
the War Department based upon this information and the failure to
alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsi-
ble, wholly aside from Short’s responsibility in not himself having
selected the right alert.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 15
222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The War Department had the information. All they had to do
was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it.
The details of this information follow :
2. Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Inten-
tions from September to December 19^1. The record shows almost
daily information as to the J apanese plans and intentions during this
period.
1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29
had been fixed (Tokyo time) as the government date for Japanese
offensive military operations. (R. 86)
2. On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Jap-
anese’ intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the
United States. (R. 87) War Department G-2 advised the Chief of
Staff on November 26 that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported
the [J] concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an un-
known port ready for offensive action.
3. On December 1 definite information came from three independ-
ent sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the
United States, but would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87)
As Colonel Bratton summed it up :
The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning officials,
from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the Chief of the
War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it was a picture that
was being painted over a period of weeks if not months. (R. 243-244)
The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese inten-
tions as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information
that Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This
was construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 280) All
the information that the War Department G-2 had was presented in
one form or another to the jwlicy making and planning agencies of
the government. These officials included Secretary of State, Secre-
tary of War, Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division.
In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was
presented, were sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them
abreast of our trend of thought. (R. 297)
Colonel Bratton on occasions had gone to the Chief of the War
Plans Division and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and stood by
while they read the contents of these folders, in case they wished to
question him about any of it. Colonel Bratton testifies :
I bad an arrangement with Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff,
how he could get me on the telephone at any time in case the Chief [ 4 ]
of Staff wished to be briefed on any of them. (R. 299)
4. When the information on December 3 came as to the Japanese
destroying their codes and code machines, which was construed as
certain war. Colonel Bratton took the information to General Miles
and General Gerow and talked at length with both of them. General
Gerow opposed sending out any further warning to the overseas com-
mand. General Miles felt he could not go over General Gerow’s
decision. (R. 283) Colonel Bratton then went to see Commander
McCullom of the Navy, Head of the Far Eastern Section in ONI, and
he concurred in Bratton’s judgment that further warning should be
sent out because this action of the Japanese meant war almost imme-
diately. Colonel Bratton then returned after making arrangements
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
223
with McCullom and persuaded General Miles to send a message to
G-2, Hawaiian Department, instructing him to go to Commander
Rochefort, Office of Naval Intelligence, with the Fleet to have him
secure from Rochefort the same information which General Gerow
would not permit to be sent directly in a war warning message. (R.
283-284)
All of this important information which was supplied to higher
authority in the War Department, Navy Department, and State De-
partment did not go out to the field, with the possible exception of the
general statements in occasional messages which are shown in the
Board’s report. Only the higher-ups in Washington secured this in-
formation. (R. 302) G-2 was prevented as a matter of policy from
giving out intelligence information of this sort to G-2 in overseas
departments. The Navy also objected to any of this type of intelli-
gence being sent by the Army without its authority.
[5] The War Plans Division refused to act upon the recom-
mendations of G-2. Intelligence Bulletins were distributed giving this
information. When G-2 recommended, for instance, the occupation of
the outer Aleutians ahead of the Japanese, the War Plans Division took
no action upon the estimate and recommendation, with the result that
we later had to fight two costly campaigns to regain Attu and Kiska.
(R. 301-302) ' ~
Captain Safford of the Communications Security Division in Naval
Operations, testified as to the type of information that was coming into
the Navy during November and December.
Tokyo informed Nomura on the 22nd of November that the 25th was
the last date they could permit him negotiations. (R. 121) On No-
vember 26th specific information received from the Navy indicated that
Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United States. (R.
123-124) Nomura on the 26th said he thought he had failed the Em-
peror and that his humiliation was complete, evidently referring to the
ultimatum delivered to him by the Secretary of State.
Colonel Sadtler testified as to the information that was coming in as
to Japanese intentions in the fall of 1941, saying :
The information began to assume rather serious proportions regarding the
tense and strained relations between the two countries, and the number of mes-
sages about warnings of conditions that obtain in case of hostilities really reached
a climax around the middle of November, to such an extent that we were of the
opinion that there might be a declaration of war between Japan and the United
States on Sunday, November 30. This, as you all know, proved to be a “dud,” and
on Monday, December 1, if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning
began coming in from Tokyo telling the Consuls to destroy their codes and to reply
to Tokyo with one code word when they had so complied with their directive.
[tf] The Japanese Embassy in Washington was advised to de-
stroy their codes on December 3. (R. 249-250)
3. The “Winds” Message . Colonel Sadtler said that about November
20, a message was intercepted by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, to the effect that the Japanese were notifying nationals of possible
war with the United States. The “winds” message was indicated in
these instructions, which would indicate whether the war would be with
the United States, Russia, or Great Britain, or any combination of
them. The Federal Communications Commission was asked to listen
for such information.
224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On the morning of December 5, 1941, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval
Communications, called Colonel Sadtler at 9 : 30 saying, “Sadder, the
message is in !” He did not know whether the particular message was
the one that meant war with the United States, but it meant war with
either the United States, Russia, or Great Britain. He immediately
advised General Miles and Colonel Bratton.
Sadtler was instructed to go back to Admiral Noyes to get the precise
wording used, but Admiral Noyes said that he was too busy with a
conference and he would have to attend to it later. Colonel Sadtler
protested that that would be too late. (R. 251-252) He reported back
to General Miles. He then went to see General Gerow, Head of the War
Plans Division, and suggested a message be sent to Hawaii. General
Gerow said, “No, that they had plenty of information in Hawaii.” He
then went to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Smith, and
made the same suggestion. When Smith learned that G-2 and the War
Plans Division had been talked to, he declined to discuss it further.
[7] It was about the 5th or 6th of December that Tokyo notified the
Japanese Embassy at Washington to destroy their remaining codes.
It was on December 5 that Sadtler discussed this matter with General
Gerow and Colonel Smith, because as Sadtler said, “I was sure war was
coming, and coming very quickly.” (R. 254)
Colonel Bratton arranged on behalf of G-2 for monitoring of Japa-
nese weather broadcasts with the Federal Communications Commis-
sion. These arrangements were made through Colonel Sadtler.
(R. 57, 103) Colonel Bratton testified that no information reached
him as to the break in relations shown by the “winds” message prior
to the Pearl Harbor disaster, December 7, 1941, and he does not
believe anybody else in G-2 received any such information. (R.
58-59)
He conferred with Kramer and McCullom of the Navy. The mes-
sage sent to him by the Federal Communications Commission was not
the message he was looking for. (R. 60) Later he learned from the
Navy about their monitoring efforts in Hawaii and the Far East, and
the fact that they would probably secure the “winds” message sooner
than he would in Washington. That is the reason w}iy he sent the
message of December 5, to Fielder, G-2, in Hawaii, to make contact
with Commander Rochefort, to secure orally information of this sort.
(R. 62-63) A copy of this message has been produced in the record
showing that it was sent. Colonel Bratton ana Colonel Sadtler testi-
fied to the fact that their records showed that it was sent. (R. 69,70,
71) But Colonel Fielder said he got no such message. (R. 68) The
Navy now admits having received this “winds” activating message
about December 6, but the War Department files show no copy of such
message. (R. 89, 281)
[<*?] From the naval point of view Captain Safford recites the
story of the “winds” message saying that Japan announced about the
26th of November 1941 that she would state her intentions in regard to
war with Russia, England, the Dutch, and the United States, T>y the
“winds” message. On November 28, 1941, the “winds” code was given.
On December 3, 1941, the Naval Attache at Batavia gave another ver-
sion of the “winds” code. All three of these messages indicated the
probalility of the breaking off of relations and offensive warfare by
Japan against the United States or the other nations mentioned.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
225
On December 4, 1941, information was received through the Navy
Department which was sent to Captain Salford which contained the
Japanese “winds” message, “War with England, War with America,
Peace with Russia.” (R. 132) 1
This original message has now disappeared from the Navy files and
cannot be found. It was in existence just after Pearl Harbor and was
collected with other messages for submission to the Roberts Commis-
sion. Copies were in existence in various places but they have all
disappeared. (R. 133-135)
[ 9 ] Captain Safford testified :
General Russell. Have you helped or been active at all in this search which
has been made in the Naval Department to discover this original message?
Captain Safford. I have. As a last resort I requested copies of the message
repeatedly from 20G, and on the last occasion I asked the officer in charge, who
was Captain Stone, to stir his people up a little harder and see If they couldn’t
make one more search and discover it. And when Captain Stone discovered it
couldn’t be found, he called for — required written statements for anybody who
might have any notice of that; and though the written statements disclosed a
lot of destruction of other messages and things — not messages, but the intercepts ;
not the translations — nothing ever came to light on that message, either the
carbon copy of the original incoming message, which should have been filed with
the work sheet, or of the translation. And one copy of the translation should
have been filed under the JD number, which I think is 7001, because that number
is missing and unaccounted for, and that falls very close to the proper date. It
actually comes in with the 3rd, but things sometimes got a little bit out as far
as putting those numbers on was concerned. And the other should be filed under
the date and with the translation. We had a double file.
The last time I saw that message after the attack on Pearl Harbor about the
15th of December, Admiral Noyes called for the assembling of all important
messages into one file, to show as evidence to the Roberts Commission; and
Kramer assembled them, and I checked them over for completeness and to see
that we strained out the unimportant ones; and that “Winds” translation, the
‘ Winds execute,” was included in those. I do not recall whether that ever came
back or not. So far as I know, it may even be with the original papers of the
Roberts Commission. It never came back that I know of, and we have never
seen it since, and that is the last I have seen of it.
We also asked the people in the Army on several occasions if they could run
It down and give us a copy. We were trying to find out the exact date of it and
the exact wording of the message, to run this thing down and not make the
thing a question depending upon my memory or the memory of Kramer or the
memory of Murray, who do districtly recall It.
* ******
General Russell. Well, now, let us talk cases.
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
[ 10 ] General Russell. I want to know if over there in 20G you had a
place where you had 20G files of messages, and then over here some other place
you had a JD file which was separate and distinct from the one I have Just
discussed.
Captain Safford. Yes, sir.
General Russell. But you had messages over there in the JD file?
Captain Safford. We had. Yes, sir ; that is correct.
General Russell. And they were the same as the ones in the 20G file?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir, but they were in a different order.
General Russell. All right. Now, this message of December 4th, when it went
to the JD file, was given the number, according to your testimony, of 7001?
1 Captain Safford testified that the Japanese were no longer using the code employed to
transmit the wind messages ; that there was no reason now why they should not be
discussed openly.
Colonel Rufus Bratton, on the contrary, testified that it would be dangerous to acquaint
the Japanese with the fact that we intercepted the winds message, as this might result
in further code changes by the Japanese.
The Board, as a matter of course, decided to follow the safe plan and treat these
messages as Top Secret.
226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Saffobo. It probably was.
General Russell. You don't know that?
Captain Safford. Not to know ; only circumstantial evidence.
General Russell. Well, is JD 7000 in that file now?
Captain Safford. JD 7000 is there, and 7002.
General Russell. But 7001 just isn't there?
Captain Safford. The whole file for the month of December 1941 is present or
accounted for except 7001.
General Russell. Now let us talk about 20G, which is some other place in this
office. Is this December 4th message the only one that is out of those files?
Captain Safford. That is the only one that we looked for that we couldn’t
find. It is possible that there will be others missing which we haven’t looked for,
but we couldn't find that serial number. We looked all through the month to
make certain. That is the only one that is missing or unaccounted for.
[77] The radio station logs, showing the reception of the mes-
sage have been destroyed, within the last year. Captain Safford
testified that this message, and everything else they got from November
12 on, was sent to the White House by the Navy. It was a circulated
copy that circulated to the White House and to the Admirals of the
Navy.
It is this message which the Army witnesses testified was never re-
ceived by the Army. It was a clear indication to the United States
as early as December 4. The vital nature of this message can be
realized.
4. Accowit of the Delivery of the Long Ilf Part Message; the Short
Implementing Message . The first 13 parts of the long reply of the
Japanese finally terminating the relationships with the United States
began to come in in translated form from the Navy on the afternoon
of December 6, and the 13 parts were completed between 7 : 00 and
9 : 00 the evening of December 6. Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far
Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of War Department G-2,
was the designated representative for receiving and distributing to the
Army and to the Secretary of State copies of messages of this character
received from the Navy. The Navy undertook to deliver to the Presi-
dent and to its own organization copies of similar messages.
Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9 : 00
and 10: 30 p. m., December 6, as follows:
To Colonel Smith (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General
Staff in a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238 )
He told General Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained
very important papers and General Marshall should be told at once
so that he could unlock the [12] bag and see the contents.
(R. 307)
To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by dis-
cussing the message with General Miles inliis office and reading it in
his presence. (R. 239-241) He stated that General Miles did nothing
about it as far as he knows. (R. 241) This record shows no action by
General Miles.
Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Gailey, General Gerow’s
executive in the War Plans Division. (R. 238)
He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the
State Department for the Secretary of State and did so between
10: 00 and 10 :30 p.m. (R. 234, 239)
Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10 : 30,
had urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to General Staff, to communicate
with General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 227
<3eneral Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action
on the part of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently
the Chief of Staff was not advised of the situation until the following
morning.
In the meantime, as the testimony of Captain Salford shows, the fol-
lowing action was taken with the distribution of the same 13 parts
of the message by the Navy which clearly indicates its importance.
Captain Safford testifies that the first 13 parts came in on the after-
noon of December 6 and were translated to English and delivered to
the Army to Major Doud by 9 o’clock Saturday night,. December 6.
This portion of the message was distributed as follows : Commander
Kramer consulted with- the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral
Wilkinson, and was directed to go to the White House to deliver a
copy. He then delivered a [iJ] copy to Admiral Wilkinson
at his house. As the President was engaged, Kramer gave a copy to
the White House Aide, Admiral Beardall. When Kramer reached
Admiral Wilkinson’s house he also gave a copy to Admiral Turner,
Director of War Plans. He delivered the final copy by midnight to
Admiral Ingersoll, who read it and initialed it. Admiral Wilfinson
{ phoned Admiral Stark, as did also Admiral Turner. Admiral Stark
ordered Kramer to be at his office at 9 : 00 Sunday morning. Kramer
came back to the Navy Department about 1 a. m. to see if part 14
had come in, but it had not.
I When part 14 did come in it was ready for delivery to the Army in
English by 7 : 15 a. m., December 7. (R. 158, 160, 164, 166)
The net result was that no one took any action based upon the first
13 parts until the 14th part came in and the Army took no action on
that until between 11:30 and 12:00 on the morning of December 7,
| or about 13 hours after the first 13 parts came in which clearly indi-
cated the rupture of relations with tne Japanese.
Nothing more was done with this clear warning in the first 13 parts
of the long message until the following events occurred.
Colonel Bratton received from a naval officer courier between 8 : 30
and 9 : 00 a. m. on the Sunday morning of December 7, the English
translation of the 14th part of the long message and the short message
of the Japanese direction the Ambassador to deliver the long message
at 1 p. m. on December 7 and to destroy their codes. Colonel Brat-
ton immediately called General Marshall’s quarters at 9:00 a. m.
(R. 85) [1-4] General Marshall was out horseback riding and
he asked that he be sent for. General Marshall called him back
between 10 : 00 and 11 : 00 a. m. General Marshall came into his office
at 11 : 25 a. m., of which there is a contemporaneous written record
maintained by Colonel Bratton. In the meantime, Colonel Bratton
called his Chief, General Miles, and reported what he had done. (R.
77) Neither General Miles nor General Gerow were in their office
on Sunday morning. General Miles arrived at the same time as Gen-
eral Marshall at 11 : 25 a. m. The Chief of Staff prepared a message
to General Short and called Admiral Stark, who said he was not send-
ing any further warning but asked General Marshall to inform the
Navy in Hawaii through Short.
The answer to the following question on the record has not been
supplied this Board :
Why were not the first 13 parts, which were considered important enough by
the Navy to be delivered to the President and everyone of the important Admir al*
228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of the Navy, delivered by the War Department officers to the Chief of Staff, and
his attention called to It so that he could have taken some sort of action upon
it? (R )
The only possible answer lies in the testimony that Colonel Smith,
Secretary to the General Staff was told about 9 p. m. December 6 that
there was an important document and that General Marshall should
see it right away. (R. 242) There is no proof that Colonel Smith
did so act except that from General Marshall, which shows that he
was not advised of this situation until the following morning when
he received a message from Colonel Bratton between 10 : 00 and 11 : 00
a. m., December 7.
The record shows that subordinate officers who were [16] en-
trusted with this information were so impressed with it that they
strongly recommended that definite action be taken.
When subordinate officers were prevented from sending this infor-
mation to the Hawaiian Department, by arrangement with their oppo-
site numbers in the Office of Naval Intelligence, upon learning that
the Navy had this information in Hawaii, an apparently innocuous
telegram was dispatched by G-2 to Colonel Fielder, G-2 in Hawaii,
telling him to see his opposite number in the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, Commander Rochefort, to secure information from him of
importance.
The story of the message of November 27 takes on a whole new aspect
when the facts are really known as to the background of knowledge
in the War Department of Japanese intentions. At the time the
Chief of Staff drafted the message of the 27th on the 26th, he knew
everything that the Japanese had been proposing between themselves
for a long period of time prior to that day, and knew their inten-
tions with respect to the prospects of war. The message of the 27th
which he drafted in rough and which was apparently submitted to the
Joint Board of the Army and Navy, therefore could have been cast
in the clearest sort of language and direction to the Hawaiian Depart-
ment.
It was no surprise that the Japanese would reject the Ten points
on November 26 ; that course of events had been well pictured by com-
plete information of the conversations between the Japanese Govern-
ment and its representatives available to the Government of the United
States.
[16] 5. Summary. Now let us turn to the fateful period between
November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces
of information came to our State, War and Navy Departments in
all of their top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese
including the probable exact hour and date of the attack.
To clinch this extraordinary situation we but have to look at the
record to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final
reply were completely known in detail to the War Department, com-
pletely translated and available in plain English, by not later than
between 7 and 9 o’clock on the evening of December 6 or approxi-
mately Honolulu time. This information was taken by the Officer
in Charge of the Far Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department
personally in a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen Smith,
and Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then Secretary to
the General Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
229
vital importance to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2
General Miles, with whom it was discussed and to the Executive,
Colonel Gailey, of the War Plans Division, each of whom was advised
of the vital importance of this information that showed that the hour
had struck, and that war was at band. Before 10 : 30 o’clock that night,
this same officer personally delivered the same information to the
Secretary of State’s duty officer.
General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This informa-
tion, as vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him
on that date by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows.
When the final part 14 came in [27] on the morning of Decem-
ber 7 and with it the short message directing the long message be de-
livered to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m., December 7, 1941. It was
then that this same officer, Colonel Bratton of G-2, took the initiative
and went direct to General Marshall, calling him at his quarters at Fort
Myer and sending an orderly to find him, where he was out horseback
riding. When he finally did reach him on the phone, General Marshall
said ne was coming to the War Department. He met him at about
11 : 25 a .m., after which time the message of December 7 was formu-
lated by General Marshall in his own handwriting. It faded to reach
its destination due to sending it by commercial Western Union — RCA.
It arrived several hours after the attack.
This brings us to the “winds” message. The “winds” message was
one that was to be inserted in the Japanese news and weather broad-
casts and repeated with a definite pattern of words, so as to indicate
that war would take place either with Great Britain, Russia, or the
United States, or all three.
The Federal Communications Commission was asked to be on the
outlook for these key words through their monitoring stations. Such
information was picaed up by a monitoring station. This information
was received and translated on December 3, 1941, and the contents
distributed to the same high authority. The Navy received during the
evening of December 3, 1941, this message, which when translated
said, “War with the United States, War with Britain, including the
NEI, except peace with Russia.” Captain Safford said he first saw
the “winds” message himself about 8 a. m., on Thursday, December 4,
1941. It had been received the previous evening, [25] accord-
ing to handwriting on it by Commander Kramer, who had been noti-
fied by the duty officer, Lt. (jg) Brotherhood, USNR, who was the
watch officer on the receipt of this message.
It was based upon the receipt of the message that Captain Safford
prepared five messages between 1200 and 1600 December 4, ordering
the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential
papers on the Asiatic stations. Captain McCullom of the Navy drafted
a long message to be sent to all outlying fleet and naval stations. This
was aissapproved by higher naval authority. This message was con-
firmation to Naval Intelligence and Navy Department Communica-
tions Intelligence Units that war was definitely set
This “winds execute” message has now disappeared from the Navy
files and cannot be found despite the extensive search for it. It was
last seen by Commander Safford about December 14, 1941, when he
collected the papers together with Commander Kramer and turned
230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
them over to the Director of Naval Communication for use as evidence
before the Roberts Commission.
There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of
December 4 and December 6, the imminence of war on the following
Saturday and Sunday. December 6 and 7, was clear-cut and definite.
Up to the morning oi December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese
were planning to do was known to the United States except the final
message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part
together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o’clock
on December 7, or the very hour and minute wnen bombs were falling
on Pearl Harbor.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
231
[a] Memorandum for The Secretary of War
Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report, 25 November 1944
[i] 25 Nov 1944.
Memorandum for the Secretary of War
Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report.
You have referred to me for opinion the Report of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board dated 20 October 1944 together with the testimony and
exhibits. I have examined this Report with great care and submit
herewith my views. The present memorandum does not cover so much
of the investigation as pertains to the conduct of Colonel Theodore
Wyman, Jr. and related matters referred to in the Report of the House
Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 1944.
Technical Legality of Board’s Proceedings:
No question of the technical legality of the Board’s proceedings is
E resented. As shown in the Report (Rep. 1) the Board was appointed
y the Secretary of War by Letter Order AGO, 8 July 1944, (AGPO-
A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)), as amended and supplemented, in order
to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in Public Law 339, 78th
Congress, approved 13 June 1944. The Board followed judicial forms,
affording full opportunity to witnesses to produce any data in their
possession. Interested parties such as General Short and others were
likewise offered the fullest possible opportunity to appear before the
Board and submit information.
Board's Conclusions in General:
The Board concludes broadly that the attack on Pearl Harbor was
a surprise to all concerned : the nation, the War Department, and the
Hawaiian Department, which caught the defending forces practically
unprepared to meet it and to minimize its destructiveness (Rep. 297).
The extent of the disaster was due, the Board states, (a) to the failure
of General Short adequately to alert his command for war; (b) to
the failure of the War Department, with knowledge of the type of
alert taken by Short, to direct him to take an adequate alert; and (c)
the failure to keep him adequately informed of the status of the United
States- Japanese negotiations, which might have caused him to change
from the inadequate alert to an adequate one (Rep. 297). The Board
follows these general conclusions by criticizing the conduct of the
Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the then Chief of War Plans
Division, and General Short (Rep. 297-300). The Board makes no
recommendations.
It is believed that the most feasible method of examining the Report
is to take up first the Report’s conclusions as to General Snort and the
other conclusions later.
232
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[f] Board's Conclusion As to General Short:
Taking them up in their order the Board concludes that General
Short failed in his duties in the following particulars :
(a) To place his command In a state of readiness for war In the face of a
war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The Information which
he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the
tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that
hostilities might be momentarily expected. This required that he guard against
surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might
be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that
the enemy might launch.
(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding
the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Naval District for lmple
menting the Joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence which
provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by which they
might have become operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible
commanders.
(c) To ilnform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance
being conducted by the Navy.
(d) To replace inefficient staff officers. (Rep. 300.)
Short' 8 Defenses:
General Short, as the commander of a citadel taken by surprise, is
in the position or the captain of a ship which has been wrecked : it is a
question of the validity of his defenses.
Within a half hour after receiving the 27 November warning radio
signed “Marshall,” (see p. 8, present memorandum) Short ordered
Alert No. 1, which his SOP described as a defense against sabotage
“with no threat from without.” (Tr., Short 283, 395, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5,
par. 14.) He did this without consulting his staff, other than his
Chief of Staff, and without consulting the Navy. (Tr., Short 282,
395.)
He also ordered into operation the radar air raid warning system,
but only from 4 to 7 a. m., and primarily on a training basis. (Tr.,
Short 297, 4442.)
(JJ The action of Short, which was taken in pursuance of the
27 November wire signed “Marshall,” did not contemplate any outside
threat. (Tr., Short 283, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14.) His failure to pro-
vide for an outside threat was a serious mistake and resulted in over-
whelming tactical advantages to the attackers, his being 'taken by
surprise, the destruction of his aircraft on the ground, the severity
of the damage done to the warships in Pearl Harbor and military in-
stallations. Short testified that when he ordered Alert No. 1 he did
not consider there was any probability of an air attack and that in
this regard “I was wrong.” (Tr., Short 4440.)
Numerous witnesses confirm that the failure of Short to provide
against an outside threat constituted a grave error of judgment. (Tr.,
Allen 3113 ; Burgin 2618, 2656 ; Farthing 838-839 ; Gerow 4274 ; Hayes
268; Herron 238; King 2700; Murray 3096-3097; Phillips 1127-1128,
1151-1152; Powell 3911-3912; Throckmorton 1395-1396; Wells 2731;
Wilson 1380-1381.)
Short sought to excuse his error by claiming: (1) that he had as-
sumed the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and
would warn him in ample time in the event of an impending attack
(Short, Ex. 1, p. 55; Tr., 299, 300, 451, 452; cf. Kimmel 1769);
(2) that in response to the radio signed “Marshall” of 27 November
he informed the War Department of the alert against sabotage and
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
233
the War Department had acquiesced therein and did not give him
additional warnings after 27 November (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54; Tr., 286,
287, 308) ; (3) that measures to provide for threats from without
would have interfered with training (Ex. 1, p. 16), and would have
disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population (Ex. 1, p.
16-17) contrary to War Department instructions, and that the prime
danger was sabotage. (Tr., Short 285, 286, 289, 428, 522; Ex. 1, p.
13-18,54-57.)
These excuses are untenable. Short’s belief that the Navy knew the
whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in tune cannot
excuse him for his failure to take precautions against an outside threat.
In the same way he cannot be heard to justify nis failure to adopt the
necessary alert against an air attack because of fear of sabotage, or
disclosure of possible intent, or possibility of alarming the civilian
population, or interference with his training program. These latter
must clearly be subordinated to the overshadowing danger of a possible
air attack.
Short’s testimony indicates that he felt he was not given sufficient
information as to the true Japanese situation by Washington and that
what information he got was at least in part misleading. (Short,
Ex. 1, p. 54-56 ; Tr., 278-281, 291, 4427. )
The Board in its conclusion stated :
The Information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was
sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the
Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected. (Bep. 300.)
[4] General Short took command 7 February 1941. That very
day the Secretary of War transmitted to him a copy of a letter from
the Secretary of the Navy dated 24 January 1941 which stated:
If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would -
be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor.
(Roberts Report, p. 5) (Italics supplied.)
Secretary Knox further stated that “inherent possibilities of a major
disaster” warranted speedy action to “increase the joint readiness of
the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character men-
tioned * * The letter proceeded:
The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered
to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4)
submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire. (Roberts Report,
P.5.)
The letter stated that the defenses against all but the first two were
satisfactory, described the nature of the probable air attack and urged
that the Army consider methods to repel it. It recommended revision
of joint Army and Navy defense plans and special training for the
forces to meet such raids. (Roberts Report, p. 5.) Short admitted
he received Secretary Stimson’s letter inclosing Secretary Knox’s
letter, both of which he recalled very well. (Tr., Short 368—369.) •
On the same date, 7 February 1941, General Marshall wrote Short a
letter containing the following statement :
My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is
done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing de-
fenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of
sabotage and the risk Involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, con-
stitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat
234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority. (Tr., Marshall 17)
(Italics supplied.)
On 5 March 1941 General Marshall wrote Short a follow-up letter
saying :
I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory
system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority.
(Tr., Marshall 19) (Italics supplied.)
[6] Short replied by a letter, dated 15 March 1941, outlining
the situation at length and stating :
The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability
of both the Army and Navy airfields to the attack. (Tr., Marshall 21.) (Italics
supplied.)
Short further stated :
The Island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning
that would exist on the mainland. (Tr. Marshall 24.)
On 14 April 1941 Short, reporting progress in coperating with the
Navy, sent General Marshall three agreements made with the Navy
to implement the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Flan and concluding
with the remark :
We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air
force and the anti-aircraft defense. (Tr., Marshall 27.) (Italics supplied.)
General Marshall on 5 May 1941 complimented him for “being on the
job. (Tr., Marshall 27.)
On 7 July 1941, The Adjutant General sent Short a radio fully ad-
vising him of the Japanese situation. It told him that the Japanese
Government had determined upon its future policy which might in-
volve aggressive action against Russia and that an advance against the
British and Dutch could not be entirely ruled out. It further advised
him that all Jap vessels had been warned by Japan to be west of the
Panama Canal by 1 August, that the movement of Japanese shipping
from Japan had been suspended, and that merchant vessels were being
requisitioned. (Tr., Marshall 33, Fielder 2974, Stimson 4055.)
Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent
General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing
three alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation
of field positions ; Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not suf-
ficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No.
1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and uprisings
within the Islands “with no particular threat from without.” It will
be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of
the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in
paragraph 13 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the
earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short ex-
pressly recognized the necessity for preparation for “a surprise hostile
attack .” (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64.) ( Italics supplied.)
[i 6 ] On 6 September, Colonel Fielder, Short’s G-2, advised the
War Department that many of the Summaries of Information re-
ceived from the War Department originated with the Office of Naval
Intelligence, 14th Naval District, and that he had already received
them. He stated that as the cooperation between his office, the Office
of Naval Intelligence, and the FJBI was most complete, that all such
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBpR BOARD
235
data was given him simultaneously with its dispatch to Washington
and recommended that such notices from Washington to him be dis-
continued to avoid duplication of effort. (Tr., Bratton D. 292-293.)
On 16 October, the Chief of Naval Operations advised Kimmel that
the Japanese Cabinet resignation created a grace situation, that the
new cabinet would probably be anti-American, that hostilities between
Japan and Russia were strongly possible, and that since Japan held
Britain and the United States responsible for the present situation
there was also a possibility that Japan might attack these two powers.
The radio concluded :
In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such
preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or constitute
provocative action against Japan. (Tr. Short 279.)
Short admits receiving this message. (Tr., Short 278.)
Secretary Stimson testified the War Department had this warning
sent to Short. (Tr., Stimson 4055.)
On 17 October, Short’s G-2 furnished Short’s staff with a full esti-
mate of the Japanese situation which stated the situation was ex-
tremely critical, that Japan would shortty announce her decision to
challenge militarily any nation which might oppose her policy, and that
the major successes of the Axis afforded an unparalleled opportunity
for expansion with chances of minimum resistance, that probable
moves included an attack upon Russia, upon British possessions in
the Far East, a defense against American attack in support of the
British, and a simultaneous attack upon the ABCD bloc “at whatever
points might promise her greatest tactical, strategic, and economical
advantages.” The report stated that a simultaneous attack on the
ABCD powers
* * * cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan con-
siders war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions
against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before
our naval program is completed. (Tr. 3688.)
[7] On 18 or 20 October the War Department advised Short :
The following War Department estimate of the Japanese situation for your in-
formation. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but
no, repeat no, abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy seems imminent. (Tr.,
Short 412-413, Hain 3307, Gerow 4258, 4264.)
Short’s G-2 gave him a further estimate of the Japanese situation
on 25 October 1941 stating that there had been no fundamental change
in the situation since his warning advice of 17 October above referred
to. It stated that a crisis of the first magnitude was created in the
Pacific by the fall of the Japense Cabinet, that actions of the new
cabinet “definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States”
and “forces America into a state of constant vigilance.” It predicted
Jap use of peace negotiations “as a means to delude and disarm her
potential enemies.” It predicted a major move would be made before
the latter part of November “with a chance that the great break, if
it comes, will not occur before spring.” (Tr., 3689-3694.)
On 5 November, the War Department G-2 wrote Short’s G-2 that
Hirota, head of the Black Dragon Society, had stated that
* * * War with the United States would best begin in December or in Febru-
ary. • ♦ * The new cabinet would likely start war within sixty days. * * •
(Tr., Bratton D. 289-291.)
236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Bicknell. Short’s Asst. G-2, testified that early in November
in his Weekly Intelligence Summary the statement was made that
* * * from all Information which had been gathered in our office in Hawaii
it looked as though hostilities could be expected either by the end of November
or, if not, then not until spring. (Tr., Bicknell 1439-1440.)
Captain Edwin T. Layton, Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet,
testified he believed he had informed Colonel Edwin Raley, G-2 of the
Hawaiian Air Force and who had been assigned as liaison with the
Navy, that Japanese troops, vessels, naval vessels, and transports were
moving south. This information came from Naval observers in
China, the naval attach^ in Tokyo, the naval attache in Chungking,
British and other sources. Tfiis intelligence indicated that the Japa-
nese would invade the Kra Isthmus. Jap submarines about this time
had been contacted in the vicinity of Oahu. (Tr., Layton 3030, 3031,
3040-3041.)
[5] On 24 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations
radioed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, that
There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with
Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government and
movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a
surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the
Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch
and concurs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAP, COMS 11, 12,
13, 14) inform senior army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy Is
necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate
Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch. (Tr., Gerow
4258; cf. Bloch 1503-C.)
This message was presented to General Short by Captain Layton
with his estimate. Not only did he deliver the message but he
discussed it fully with Short. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059.) Short said,
“I do not think I ever got that message. * * * I might have
seen it, * * * and I might have forgotten about it. (Tr.,
Short 414.)
On 26 November 1941, the War Department radioed Short:
It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24 v s on special
photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Carolina group while
simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to
location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps and naval
vessels including submarines * * * before they depart Honolulu insure
that both B-24’s are fully supplied with ammunition for guns. (Tr., Gerow
4259.)
The War Department sent Short three messages on 27 November,
all of which arrived. The one signed “Marshall” read as follows:
Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come
back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile
action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided.
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This poUcy
should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile [5] Japanese action
you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you
deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat
not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken.
Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5
as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret
information to minimum essential officers. (Tr., Gerow 4259-4200, Short
280-281.)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
237
This same day, 27 November, G-2 of the War Department radioed
Short’s G-2 as follows :
Advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it appears
that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock.
Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may
begin. (Tr. f Gerow 4260.) (Italics supplied.)
The third message sent Short on 27 November 1941 was through
the Navy Department, reading as follows:
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an
aggressve move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number
and equipment of Jap troops and the organization of naval task forces indi-
cates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra
Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment
preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District
and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Depart-
ment. Spanavo informed British. Continental district Guam Samoa directed
to take appropriate measures against sabotage. (Tr., Gerow 4262.)
Short admits he got this message. (Tr., Short 415, 416, 469.)
The following day, 28 November, The Adjutant General sent Short a long
radio stating that the critical situation demanded that all precautions be taken
immediately against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Arnold 170, Short
293, Scanlon 4176.) Short stated he took this as tacit consent to his alert
against sabotage only (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54) and as a reply to his radio report
of 27 November. (Tr., Short 422.) Short sent a long reply to this message
giving the various precautions taken by him against subversive activities and
sabotage. (Tr., Short 294-296.)
[ 10 ] There was a further message from the Chief of Naval
Operations, dated 30 November, stating that Japan was about to
launch an attack on the Kra Isthmus. ( Roberts Report, p. 8.) Short
also received Admiral Kimmel’s Fortnightly Summary of Current
International Situations, dated December 1, 1941, which stated that
deployment of Jap naval ships southward indicated clearly that ex-
tensive preparations were under way for hostilities and referred to
naval and air activity in the Mandates. (Tr., Kimmel 1769-1770.)
An FBI or War Department report that the Jap Consuls in Honolulu
were burning their codes and secret papers was given to Short’s G-2
on 5 or 6 December 1941. (Tr., Fielder 2986, Bicknell 1413-1414.)
The Navy advised Kimmel on 3 December that Jap Consulates in
Washington and London were destroying codes and burning secret
documents. (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513.) There were two Navy messages
on 4 December 1941, the first on information copy to Kimmel of advice
to certain naval commanders to destroy confidential documents (Tr.,
Bloch 1514)., the second a similar radiogram advising “be prepared
to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you
retain.” (Tr., Bloch 1514, Safford C. 187.) Another Navy message
of 6 December “directed that in view of the tense situation naval com-
manders in Western Pacific areas should be authorized to destroy con-
fidential papers.” (Tr., Safford C. 189, Bloch 1514.)
In addition to all the above, G-2 of the War Department radioed
Short’s G-2 on 5 December 1941 to contact Commander Rochefort, in
charge of naval cryptographic work in Pearl Harbor, relative to Jap
weather broadcasts from Tokyo “that you must obtain” and stating
categorically “contact him at once.” This had reference to the impor-
tant “Winds” intercept, to be discussed more fully later. (Tr., Bratton
79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 16
238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
B. 62, D. 283.) Also, Colonel Bicknell of Short’s G-2 staff advised
Short’s entire staff on 5 December that the Jap Consulate was burning
papers and that to him this meant war was imminent. (Tr., Bicknell
1413.) Colonel Fielder, Short’s G-2, confirmed the fact that Colonel
Bicknell so reported. (Tr., Fielder 2986.)
On 5 December 1941, Hawaii time, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith,
U. S. Military Attache in Melbourne, Australia, sent a cable to the
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, stating that the Nether-
lands Far Eastern Command had ordered the execution of Plan A-2
based on their intelligence report of Japanese naval movements in
the vicinity of Palau. (Tr., O’Dell 4506-4507.) Lieutenant Robert
H. O’Dell who was then Assistant Military Attache in the American
Legation, Melbourne, Australia, testified that Plan A-2 was integrated
into the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., O’Dell 4511-4512.) The message in
question was supposed to be relayed to the War Department by the
CommandingGeneral, Hawaiian Department, for deciphering and re-
peat. (Tr., O’Dell 4509.) The record does not show whether Short
ever received this message. Other messages in the same code had been
transmitted between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, and the American Legation in Australia. (Tr., O’Dell 4510.)
Colonel Merle-Smith had not sent the cable in question to Washington
in the first instance in order that there should be no delay.
[7/] Lastly, on 6 December 1941, Short’s Assistant G-2, Colonel
Bicknell, informed him that the FBI at Honolulu had intercepted a
telephone conversation between one Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent in
Honolulu, and a person in Tokyo who inquired as to the fleet, sailors,
searchlights, aircraft, and “Hibiscus” and “poinsettias,” (probably
code words). This message evidently had “military significance” as
Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge, and Colonel Bicknell testi-
fied. (Tr., Shivers 3205, Bicknell 1415-1416.)
Short knew that the most dangerous form of attack on Pearl Har-
bor would be a surprise air attack at dawn. He had participated in
plans and exercises against such a possibility. The fact is that on
31 March 1941 he signed the Martin-Bellinger Air Operations Agree-
ment with the Navy ? paragraph IV of which provided that daily
patrols should be instituted to reduce the probability of “air surprise. ’
fTr., Short 387-388.) Paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Agreement
(quoted in Report on page 98; Roberts Record 556-D-F) state :
(d) • * * It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on
Oahu would be an air attack. • * *
(e) In a dawn air attack there Is a high probability that It would be delivered
as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might
find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to
start • • *.
General Short himself testified that he was fully aware of a possible
surprise air attack. (Tr., Short 388.)
General Hayes, Short’s Chief of Staff up to the middle of October
1941, (Tr., Hayes 242) testified that he, General Martin, Short’s air
chief, and Admiral Bellinger, the naval air chief, considered a surprise
air raid as the most probable enemy action and that this was the esti-
mate of the Hawaiian Department in Short’s time and also in the time
of his predecessor General Herron. (Tr., Hayes 267-268.) Colonel
Donegan, Short’s G-3 at the time of the attack (Tr., Donegan 1929),
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
239
testified that the possibility of a surprise air raid had been discussed
“many, many times.” (Tr., Donegan 1961-1963.) Short had at least
one air defense exercise each week with the Navy from March (Tr.,
Short 293) and he conducted an air raid drill as late as 29 November
1941. (Tr., DeLanv 1727.)
General Short admitted that while the 27 November message in-
structed him to undertake reconnaissance, this only indicated to him
that “whoever wrote that message was not familiar with the fact that
the Navy had assumed the full responsibility for that long-distance
reconnaissance * * (Tr., Short 4442.)
[i#] Thus, Short concluded that in drafting the message Wash-
ington did not understand the situation but that he, Short, did. It
should be borne in mind that Short at no time called on Washington
for clarification of any of these messages.
Short contended that both the War Department message of 16
October and that of 27 November stressed the necessity of avoiding
provocative action against Japan (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 279-
281) and that when the 27 November message was sent there was still
hope in the minds of the War Department that differences might be
avoided. (Tr., Short 281.) He likewise interpreted the 27 Novem-
ber message to mean that he must avoid any action which would alarm
the Japanese population, which was confirmed by The Adjutant
General’s radio to him of 28 November. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr.,
293-294.) As Short testified :
Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there
was going to be anything more than sabotage * * *. (Tr., Short 437.)
Short testified he was confirmed in this conclusion by the action of
the War Department in sending the flight of B-l7’s to Hawaii without
ammunition for defense. The planes arrived in this condition during
the attack. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 21, 22, 55 : Tr., 307, 471.)
Asked about “the possibility of contusion” created by the messages
from Washington and whether he did not think the situation de-
manded vigorous action on his part, Short replied “very definitely not,
from the information I had.” (Tr., Short 453.)
The Board stated in its conclusions that the information furnished
General Short was “incomplete and confusing.” (Rep. 300.)
Notwithstanding any information from Washington which Short
regarded as conflicting or qualifying, the responsibility rested upon
Short to be prepared for the most dangerous situation with which he
could be confronted. This precaution on his part as the Commanding
General was mandatory. Short was adequately advised of the immi-
nent rupture in diplomatic relations between the United States and
Japan, of the imminence of war, of the probable momentary outbreak
of hostilities by Japan against the United States, and of the possibility
of sabotage and espionage. The prime and unanswered question was
when and where Japan would strike. As to this danger, the limita-
tions and restrictions set forth in the messages were at all times sub-
ordinate to the principal instruction, namely that war was imminent
and Short should be prepared for it. The instruction to this effect
contained in the message of 27 November was as follows :
[ IS ] * * * This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restrict-
ing you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. * * *
(Tr., Short 280-281.)
240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Thus, a mere reading of the messages will show that Short should
not have been misled as to their essential meaning, namely, that he
must be on the alert against threats both from within and from with -
out .
Short stresses greatly his reply to the 27 November message signed
“Marshall.” This reads :
Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. (Short,
Ex. 1, p. 16 ; Tr.286.)
As previously pointed out, Short sent this brief reply within thirty
minutes after receipt of the 27 November radio from Washington, and
without consulting the Navy or the members of his staff. This de-
cision and action by Short occurred before Short’s G-2 received the
message which the War Department G-2 radioed to Short on 27
November, clearly indicating that both sabotage and hostilities might
commence and be concurrent. (Tr., Short 282, 395, 520, Fielder 2962) .
Short claims his report to Washington, quoted above, was in effect a
notice that he had only ordered an alert against sabotage, pursuant to
the directive to report contained in the 27 November message signed
“Marshall.”
He testified :
Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe there
was going to be anything more tiian sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had
a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we
went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn’t meet
the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they
told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I
reported action taken and there was no comment that my action was to little
or too much I was a hundred per cent convinced that they agreed with it. (Tr.,
Short 437.)
When, however, he was asked what that portion of his reply reading,
“liaison with the Navy” meant, he replied :
General Shobt. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with
the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing.
General Gbunebt. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to
carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance?
[ 14 ] General Shobt. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that
or not, it would have affected it, because they had signed a definite agreement
which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff. (Tr., Short 380)
Both the Army and Navy messages of 27 November 1941pictured
an emergency and called for action under the War Plan. Tne Navy
message expressly stated :
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. * * * Execute an ap-
propriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned
in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is
being sent by the War Department.* * * (Tr., Gerow 4262)
The symbols WPL 46X refer to the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., Bloch 1512)
On 27 November 1941, the Navy informed the Army authorities of
the message. (Tr., Lavton 3041, Kimmel 1779) Short admits he re-
ceived this message. (*!>., Short 416, 469) The corresponding warn-
ing sent by the War Department was Radiogram No. 472, 27 Novem-
ber 1941. That message after stating “hostile action possible at any
moment” goes on to say that after the outbreak of hostilities the tasks
assigned in the Rainbow Plan will be carried out in so far as they per-
tain to Japan. The implementation of that portion of the Plan by
means of reconnaissance refers to paragraph 18 (i) of the Plan whicn
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 241
provides that the Navy shall undertake the distant reconnaissance.
(Tr. Kimmel 1745)
Short is in a dilemna in contending that distant reconnaissance was
a Navy responsibility, (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 15 ; Tr. 54, 281, 373, 377-380,
383, 393-394, 4443 1444 ) because it only became a Navy responsibility
if and when the Joint Army and Navy Agreement was put into effect.
Yet Short made no effort to put it into effect, even in part. (Tr.,
Lawton 2675-2676, Short 4437, 4441)
General Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division at the time, testified :
* * * A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated In the War Plans mes-
sage of November 27, and there was no reason for members of the War Plans
Division to believe that the CQ of the Hawaiian Department did not recognize
that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in accordance with
the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the
Fourteenth Naval District. ( Tr., Gerow 4283-1284 )
[75] General Gerow testified further that from Short’s reply
“liaison with the Navy” it was reasonable for General Gerow to as-
sume further that
General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures
in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the
basic Plan. * * * (Tr., Gerow 4289)
Thus, in reality, the reply of Short indicated to the War Depart-
ment not only that he had taken precautions against sabotage but also
that defense measures were being taken in accordance with the basic
War Plan. There is nothing in the Plan to compel its being put into
effect in toto. Paragraph 15 (c), (2) of the Plan provides:
Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior
to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed
upon by local commanders. (Tr., Bellinger 1584)
It is therefore clear that even assuming that the Chief of the War
Plans Division should have checked up more thoroughly on the in-
adequacy of the brief report by Short, nevertheless Short did not in-
form the War Department that he had merely alerted his command
against sabotage. In any event, a military commander with a great
responsibility cannot entirely divest himself of that responsibility
with respect to 7 December 1941 by giving the War Department on 27
November 1941 the report that he did. Furthermore, during the time
which intervened from 27 November to 7 December he received other
messages, heretofore quoted, which called for his reexamination of
his decision.
Reconnaissance: Means Available:
Short’s reply did not fully or accurately inform the War Depart-
ment of his action taken. For example, on 27 November, after receiv-
ing the message in question, he ordered the radar air raid warning
service into operation but only from 4 to 7 a. m. (Tr., Short 297,
469-470) and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 516, 4442)
No mention of this was made in his reply. One of the most important
means of reconnaissance was the radar air raid warning service. The
27 November message signed “Marshall” ordered Short “to undertake
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.” An
added reason for twenty-four hour operation of the radar is Short’s
claim that the Hawaiian Department did not have sufficient aircraft
242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
for 360 degree reconnaissance. It is clear that the radar air raid warn-
ing system was capable of twentv-four hour operation since this sched-
ule was maintained immediately following the attack. (Tr., Short
470)
[itf] Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance
reconnaissance by air and water to a measurable extent (Tr., Short 284,
385), but he also realized that such reconnaissance by the Navy was
not perfect. (Tr., Short 375, 384) He even failed to ascertain from
the Navy, in a business-like way, just what reconnaissance was in fact
being conducted. (Cf. Roberts Report, p. 18, 19) The Navy con-
ducted reconnaissance but this was only incidental to the maneuvers
of the task forces of the fleet. These maneuvers were for training
purposes and also to guard against Japanese submarines. (Tr., Short
359-360, 384; Bloch 157; Bellinger 1600; DeLany 175; Kimmel 1773;
1794-1795; 1802; McMorris 2885; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16)
According to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy “had plans for reconnais-
sance and could rum reconnaissance of a sort , but in our estimate which
had been submitted to Washington, * * * it was clearly stated
that we had to know the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits,
in order to have anything like an effective search, because we could not
maintain a search except for a very few days. Then of course we were
hoping to get more planes all the time * * *” ( Tr., Kimmel 1806 )
(Italics supplied) Concerning the air force necessary for naval recon-
naissance, Admiral Kimmel stated :
* * * I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against
aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from
Oahu, around a 360 degree arc, if you want a full coverage, and this will take about
84 planes , assuming a 15 miles visibility, for one day. * * * (Tr., Kimmel
1763) (Italics supplied)
How many planes were available? From Kimmel’s own testimony
it appears that the Navy had 81 patrol planes :
* * * it was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as
might be available at any one time, augmented by such planes as the Army could
supply to do that distant reconnaissance. The number of patrol planes in the
fleet was 81, all told. Of those approximately between 50 and 60 were in the
Island of Oahu and suitable for service on the 7th of December. * * ♦ an( ]
they had to cover all the Hawaiian Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific
Fleet * * *. (Tr., Kimmel 1739; cf. Bellinger 1598, 1630) (Italics supplied)
Testifying from hearsay only and not purporting to render an expert
opinion, Admiral Bloch stated 170 aircraft and 350 pilots would be
needed for such reconnaissance. (Tr., Bloch 1494)
According to General Martin, 72 long-range bomber planes were
needed for distant reconnaissance,
flying at an interval of five degrees. (Tr., Martin 1872)
An additional 72 ships were required for the next day’s reconnaissance mission,
with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. * * * This brought the
total of heavy bombardment to 180. (Tr., Martin 1873)
Short contended that perfect 360 degree reconnaissance would have
required 180 B-17 Flying Fortresses. (Tr., Short 324, 374) But Short
testified that he believed the naval task forces and planes from outlying
islands were conducting reconnaissance equivalent to covering a 180
degree arc (Tr., Short 385 ; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16) , and that the task
force reconnaissance covered a strip 600 miles wide. (Tr., Short 4438)
On Short’s assumption only 90 B-17 Flying Fortresses would have been
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
243
needed to cover the remaining 180 degree arc. (Tr., Short 324, 374)
According to Kimmel 42 planes could have scouted that arc. (Tr.,
Kimmel 1763) The Navy had about 58 patrol planes available in
Oahu (Tr., Bellinger 1598, 1630; Kimmel 1739) , but how many of these
could have been used for reconnaissance is debatable. Some at least
were needed to scout ahead of the then operating task forces. The
Army had available 6 B-I7’s, 10 A-20’s, and 54 B-18’s. (Tr., Short
281, 314, 479) These B~18’s were not the best type of plane, but as
General Martin says,
* * * They could he used for reconnaissance , but * * * were always
recognized as not being a combat ship. (Tr., Martin 1859) (Italics supplied)
General Martin was not asked whether for purposes of distant
reconnaissance a B-18 or A-20 plane was substantially the equivalent
of a Navy Flying Fortress.
Thus, there were 58 naval planes and 70 army planes, or a total of
128 planes in Oahu in late November and early December. How many
of these planes were actually available for operations as distinguished
from those undergoing repairs, is not clear from the record. It is clear,
however, from the above that a substantial number of planes were
available by which reconnaissance could have been undertaken to some
extent. Hence, the testimony of both Kimmel and Short that the
number of planes on hand was entirely insufficient for reconnaissance
must be taken with some qualifications.
I agree with the following statement in the Roberts Report (para-
graph XV, p. 12) :
[18] Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan, when the plan became
effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating from Oahu
to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no distant
reconnaissances were conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. The fleet
from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the island of
Oahu and, in connection with such operations, carrier and patrol planes conducted
reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched, however, con-
stituted but small arcs of the total arc of 360°, and rarely extended to a radius
of 700 miles.
Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded
a measure of security against a surprise air attack.
General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance,
but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War
and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant recon-
naissance, if any, being conducted by the Navy.
InfomnationNot Received by Short ; In General:
Short claimed that the War Department had considerable important
information prior to the attack which should have been but was not
transmitted to him and the Board so found. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1)
The Board held that under these circumstances, where vital informa-
tion cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders
it is incumbent upon the War Department to assume the responsibility
for specific instructions to these commanders. (Top Secret Rep., p.
1) I do not feel that these are proper conclusions in the present
case.
It should be made clear at the outset that so far as the present
record or the Roberts Report shows, the War Department possessed
no information definitely pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor and
no advance information as to the date of an attack anywhere. This
is contrary to many past and current newspaper stories. Indeed, aside
244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
from the Top Secret information which will now be considered, the
Dutch-British-United States agreement for joint action, which Short
said would have made him “more conscious” war was practically un-
avoidable, (Tr., Short 449-450), and possibly Navy messages not
presented to the Board, there was no substantial information in the
War Department which was not transmitted to Short. Short, as
Commanding General, must be charged with having all the important
information sent to his G-2. It is. a fact also that Short received
important information from his G-2 of which the War Department
was not informed.
[Iff] An examination of the Top Secret Report of the Board in-
dicates that it is mainly a collection oi conclusions by the Board which
cite as a basis references to Top Secret transcripts and exhibits. These
references in turn indicate that the testimony given by the witnesses
consists largely of their conclusions or evaluations of certain inter-
cepts. The testimony of some of these witnesses is undefined and in-
conclusive. Moreover, the quantum of the information thus received
by the War Department and not sent to Short has been magnified
out of all proportions to its reasonable evaluation as each message was
received from day to day. This is all the more apparent when funda-
mental military concepts are borne in mind as to the responsibilities
of the commander of the Hawaiian Department. The Board con-
sidered that the most damning indictment of the War Department was
that it has possession of information which indicated war at a time
certain (Top Secret Rep., p. 3) and that this information was ex-
clusively in the possession of the War Department and did not go
to Short. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) The basis for this conclusion By
the Board ? however, is that the War Department was advised that the
Japanese in London, Washington, and elsewhere were burning their
consular records, and destroying their codes and confidential papers.
(Top Secret Rep., p. 4) But Short’s G-2, Colonel Fielder, and his
Asst. G-2, Colonel Bicknell, had information before 7 December that
the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was likewise destroying its codes
and burning its secret papers, which information in the opinion of
Colonel Bicknell meant war. (Tr., Fielder 2985-2986 ; Bicknell 1413-
1417) Furthermore, Colonel Fielder testified that he believed the
source of his information was the War Department. (Tr., Fielder
2986) It must be presumed that Short was informed of his own G-2’s
information. Colonel Bicknell testified definitely that he told Short’s
staff he had such information and that to him this meant war. (Tr.,
Bicknell 1413-1414) Colonel Phillips, Short’s Chief of Staff, testi-
fied Short was given this information. (Tr., Phillips 1242-1243)
Moreover, the Navy at Hawaii had received information of the burn-
ing of codes by Japanese Consular agents in London and Washing-
ton (Tr., Blocn 1512-1513) which information, according to Short’s
G-2 would come to him in the natural course. (Top Secret Tr., Brat-
ton D. 292-293)
The principal information of the character above described is con-
tained in Top Secret Exhibit “B”, a series of forty-seven intercepted
radiograms principally between Washington and Tokyo and the so-
called “Winds” message. In order to compare the information Wash-
ington had and what it sent Short it is necessary briefly to recite the
contents of these various messages :
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
245
24 September, translated 9 October. Tokyo to Honolulu. Request-
ing reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into
various subdivisions for that purpose.
14 October, translated 16 October. Ambassador Nomura, Washing-
ton to Tokyo. Giving interview with Rear Admiral Turner; Turner
suggesting Japan abandon her obligations under the Three-Power
Alliance and gradually withdraw Jap troops from China.
[20] 16 October, translated presumably 17 October. Toyoda,
Foreign Minister, Toyko to Washington. Stating war between Ger-
many and U. S. might result in Japan joining, fulfilling its obligations
under Three-Power agreement. At the same time, Japan wished to
make a success of the Japanese- American negotiations, hence Japan
was warning the U. S. of the above.
22 October, translated 23 October. Nomura, Washington to Tokyo.
Advises Tokyo of his lack of success in negotiations and asks to be
relieved.
5 November, translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of ut-
most secrecy. Setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement
and urging renewed effort.
14 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Hongkong. Stat-
ing that should U. S.-Jap negotiations collapse Japan will destroy
British and American power in China.
15 November, translated 3 December. Foreign Minister Togo to
Honolulu stating:
As relations between Japan and tbe United States are most critical, make your
“ships in harbor report” irregular, but at a rate of twice a week.
16 November, translated 17 November. Tokyo to Washington. Re-
ferring to impossibility to change deadline of 25 November and to
press negotiations with the U. S.
18 November, translated 6 December. Kita, Honolulu to Tokyo.
Bringing Tokyo up to date as to warships in Pearl Harbor and giving
course of eight destroyers entering harbor.
19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Ad-
vises to present “the proposal” and that “if the U. S. consent to this
cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off.”
19 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington.
Giving three code words to be added at end of Jap intelligence broad-
casts if Jap-U. S.-Russian-British relations should become dangerous.
22 November, translated 22 November. Tokyo to Washington. Ex-
tends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November.
Latter is absolute deadline. “After that things are automatically
going to happen.”
[21] 26 'November, translated 28 November. Ambassador No-
mura and Kurusu to Tokyo. Advising hardly any possibility of U. S.
considering the “proposal” in toto, that if situation remains tense as
it is negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not
already be called so. “Our failure and humiliation are complete.”
Suggest that rupture of present negotiations does not necessarily mean
war between Japan and U. S. but would be followed by U. S. and
English military occupations of Netherlands Indies, which would
make war inevitable.
26 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington.
Stating “the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and tele-
246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
• 9
grams take too long.” Contains code for future telephone conversa-
tions.
26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Ku-
rusu and Yamamoto, Kurusu stating U. S. will not yield, that he could
make no progress.
26 November, translated 29 November. Nomura to Tokyo. Stating
great danger responsibility for rupture of negotiations will be cast
upon Japan and suggesting plan to avoid this.
28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stat-
ing that in spite of Ambassadors super-human efforts, U. S. has “pre-
sented a humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as basis for
negotiations”; therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or
three days after which negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Am-
bassadors are told not to give impression negotiations are broken off.
29 November, translated 5 December. Tokyo to Honolulu. “We
have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the
future will you also report even when there are no movements.”
29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. In-
structing Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of
approach.
30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Advising
Japan’s adherence to Tri-Partite Alliance and that U. S. on 26th made
insulting proposal, in effect demanding Japan not give assistance to
Germany and Italy in accordance with alliance. “This clause alone,
let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American
proposal for negotiations” and that United States in collusion with
the allied nations “has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany
and Italy, as an enemy.”
[SIS], 30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin.
Stating negotiations with Washington “now stand ruptured — broken”
and to give Hitler and Ribbentrop a summary of the developments;
that England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude,
were planning to move forces into East Asia which would require
counter measures by Japan, that there was extreme danger that war
might suddenly break out and that “the time of the breaking out of this
war may come quicker than anyone dreams.” This message was to be
sent to Rome and to be held “in the most absolute secrecy.”
30 November, translated 30 November. Telephone conversation be-
tween Kurusu, Washington, and Yamamoto. Discussion as to stretch-
ing out negotiations ana effect of return of President Roosevelt.
1 December, translated 5 December. Tokyo to London. Directing
destruction of code machine and to confirm this by cable.
1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Date
set in deadline message has gone by. To prevent U. S. becoming unduly
suspicious press has been advised negotiations are continuing. States
note will not be presented to U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo as suggested,
but in Washington only.
1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Advis-
ing when faced with necessity of destroying codes to use chemicals on
hand for that purpose.
1 December, translated 4 December. Washington to Tokyo. Advis-
ing continuation of negotiations and meeting leaders, if not top leaders
then those lower down.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
247
1 December, translated 4 December. Tokyo to Hsinking. Advising
that it was Jap policy to have Manchuria participate in war and that
British and American Consular rights would not be recognized.
2 December, translated 3 December. Washington to Tokyo. Recit-
ing conversation between Jap Ambassadors and Under Secretary
Welles wherein Japs complain against pyramiding U. S. economic
pressure upon Japan and expressing doubt as to whether Japan could
consider again proposals of 26th. Japan convinced U. S. would like to
bring about a speedy settlement which fact Foreign’ Office should con-
sider in making reply to new American proposals.
2 December, translated 3 December. Tokyo to Washington.
(Strictly Secret) Destroy all codes except one, destroy one code ma-
chine unit and destroy all secret documents.
[23] 3 December, translated 5 December. Washington to Tokyo.
Stating that in event of occupation of Thailand joint military action by
Great Britain and U. S. with or without declaration of war was a cer-
tainty.
4 December, translated 5 December. Berlin to Tokyo asking for cer-
tain members of London staff in event Jap Embassy in London was
evacuated.
5 December, translated 6 December. Washington to Tokyo. Re-
ports destruction of codes and states that since negotiations are still
continuing request delay in destruction of one code machine.
6 December, translated 6 December. Tokyo to Washington. Gives
advance notice of memorandum for U. S. to be sent in fourteen parts
and to prepare to present it when directed.
6 December, translated 7 December. Washington to Tokyo, urgent.
Stating that in addition to negotiating with Hull Japs had worked with
other Cabinet Members some of whom had dined with President
and advised against Jap- American war.
7 December, translated 7 December. Tokyo to Washington, ex-
tremely urgent. Advising that after deciphering fourteenth part of
final memorandum, Japan to U. S., to destroy at once remaining cipher
machine and all machine codes, also all secret documents.
7 December, translated 7 December. Budapest to Tokyo stating:
“On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of
this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state
of war would break out on the 7th.”
The final message, outside the “Winds” message which will be noticed
in detail later was the diplomatic note of the Japanese Government to
the United States Government sent from Tokyo to Washington 6 De-
cember 1941 in fourteen parts, thirteen of which arrived and were
translated on 6 December and the fourteenth part the morning of 7
December. (Top Secret Ex. “B”; Tr., Safford C. 154) The Japanese
note in general is a review of the Japanese- American negotiations and
the Japanese position, complaining m effect of an insult and breaking
off the negotiations. A radio from Tokyo to Washington 7 December,
translated the same day, marked “urgent, very important,” instructs
the Ambassador to present this note to the United States at 1 : 00 p. m.,
7 December. (Top Secret Ex. “B”)
[24] The Winds Message:
The Federal Communications Commission, around 20 November
1941, intercepted a message from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic repre-
248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sentatives to the effect that “in case of emergency (danger of cutting
off our diplomatic relations)” a warning message would be given in
the middle and the end of the J apanese daily short-wave news broad-
casts as follows :
(1) In case of a .lapan-U. S. relations in danger:
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations:
KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-Brltish relations:
NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)
When this signal was heard, all codes and papers were to be de-
stroyed. (Exhibit “B”, 19 Nov., S.I.S. 25432; Tr., Marshall A. 35;
Sadtler D. 250; Safford C. 125-126)
A radio from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November and trails*
lated 26 November, was to the same effect. (Top Secret Ex. “B”, S.I.S.
25432) The Army, Navy, and Federal Communications intercept sta-
tions immediately commenced a close watch for the second or imple-
menting “Winds” message. On 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief
of Navy Communications, phoned Colonel Sadtler, in charge or Army
codes and ciphers, saying, “The message is in.” Asked which one it
was, Admiral Noyes stated he did not know but believed it meant war
between Japan and Great Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251} Sadtler im-
mediately went to General Miles, A. C. of S., G-2, where ne was joined
by Colonel Bratton of G-2. Discussing Admiral Noyes’ uncertainty
as to which message it was. General Miles stated: “Do you think you
can verify that word? This may be a false alarm.” Colonel Bratton
telephoned Admiral Noyes, who was on his way to a meeting and had
no time to discuss the matter except to say that he could not verify it
at that time but would telephone later. Sadtler reurned to General
Miles, who told him to keep on the lookout. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252-253)
Colonel Sadtler then advised General Gerow of the message and sug-
gested that the various overseas stations including Hawaii should be
notified. General Gerow replied, “I think they have had plenty of
notification,” and the matter dropped. Sadtler then informed Colonel
(now Lieutenant General) Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General
Staff, of the message and that he had talked to G-2 and War Plans,
and Colonel Smith aid not wish to discuss it further. (Tr., Sadtler D.
253-254)
It will be noted from the above that the activating or second “Winds”
message apparently indicated a breach in diplomatic relations with
Great Britain. Colonel Sadtler testified he told General Miles and
Colonel Bratton that Admiral Noyes was positive that it did not in-
dicate a breach in Japanese- American relations. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252)
According to \2o] Colonel Bratton no one in G-2 ever received
a message of this latter character. (Tr., Bratton B. 59, 66-67 ; see
also Marshall A. 36-38) The present record fails to show whether
Colonel Sadtler or Colonel Bratton ever ascertained the exact mean-
ing of the Navy activating “Winds” message. Colonel Sadtler ap-
parently made no further inquiry of Admiral Noyes nor did the Board
examine him further on the subject. On this general subject there is
the testimony of General Marshall who stated : “I find that no officer
of the Navy advised General Miles or Colonel Bratton that any mes-
sage implementing the ‘Winds’ code (indicating with whom relations
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
249
would be ruptured) had been received by the Navy.” (Tr., Marshall
A. 38-39) It seems clear that no J apanese message using the “Winds”
coda was intercepted by the FCC or by the Army Signal Corps until
after Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 37) Colonel Sadtler testified
that he discussed with General Miles and Colonel Bratton the Navy
activating “Winds” message, indicating to him, war with Great Britain.
(Tr., Sadtler D. 251-252) Apparently, therefore, the source of the
activating or second “Winds” message was the Navy.
The Navy story as to the “Winds” message is as follows : Captain
Safford, head of the Navy Communications Security Division, stated
that on 4 December the activating “Winds” message came in and was
sent to him in teletype. Lieutenant Commander Kramer, the senior
language officer, wrote on the bottom of it, “War with England, War
with America, Peace* with Russia.” The message was different in
wording from what had been expected but, according to Captain Saf-
ford, its meaning was clear. It was given immediately to Admiral
Noyes. (Tr., Safford C. 131-132) According to Captain Safford two
copies were sent to the War Department. (Tr., Safford C. 133)
Colonel Gibson of War Department G-2 testified that there is no
record that G-2 of the War Department or the Army Signal Intel-
ligence ever received any implementing message from the Navy. (Tr.,
Gibson D. 273) Neither the original nor copies of the message can
now be found in the files of either the War or Navy Departments ac-
cording to Captain Safford. The message was distributed to various
high officials of the Navy Department and copies were sent to the State
Department and White House. (Tr., Safford C. 133, 136-138, 172)
The proof that it got to the White House seems to be that this was
routine distribution (Tr., Safford C. 136-138) ; the same is true as to
its getting to the Secretary of State. (Tr., Safford C. 138)
Captain Safford also testified that the Navy had roughly around sixty
intercepted Japanese messages pertaining to this period which were
in the possession of the Navy Court of Inquiry. Tr., Safford C. 139-
MO, 152) Whether these include the forty-seven messages submitted
in evidence by Colonel Bratton (Top Secret Ex. “B”) is not known
as they do not appear in the present record. Captain Safford testified
that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he submitted
S.I.S. 25850, the message to the Jap Ambassadors to present the Jap-
anese reply at 1 : 00 p. m., to Secretary Knox, he sent a note along with
it saying in effect, “This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today
and possibly a midnight attack on Manila.” (Tr., Safford C. 167)
[26] Captain Safford testified that coupling the “Winds” acti-
vating message with the messages instructing destruction of codes
and secret papers, he became worried and telephoned Commander
McCollum ana asked him whether Naval Intelligence was doing any-
thing to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet. McCollum said they
were ana as a result McCollum finally succeeded in having sent a
message to the Pacific naval commanders, including the Commandant
of the 14th Naval District, Honolulu, to the effect that the Japanese
had been instructed to destroy their codes. (Tr., Safford C. 182-
184) Safford stated he also arranged for four additional messages
to be sent out to various naval attaches in the Far East advising de-
struction of our own secret papers. (Tr., Safford C. 184-185) This
message was sent 4 December. A message to the same effect was also
250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sent to Guam, (Tr., Safford C. 186-187) with an information copy
to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in Honolulu. (Tr.,
Safford C. 187) An additional message was sent to the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, covering destruction of papers on Wake
Island. (Tr., Safford C. 188-190)
One of the members of the Board, General Russell, had in his pos-
session a statement, unidentified as to source, but which he says
“reached the Naval authorities and which it is alleged was sent over
to the War Department.” (Tr., Russell A. 30) This statement ap-
parently was the testimony given by Captain Safford which was con-
tained in a volume of the examination of various witnesses conducted
by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, during April to June 1944, in accord-
ance with directions of the Secretary of the Navy. (Tr., Safford C.
120, 123, 145, 152, 168) Examining General Marshall from this
document, General Russell stated:
This same naval source from which I have been quoting stated that :
“On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning
message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, sum-
marizing significant events up to that date, quoting the ‘Winds Message*, and
ending with the positive warning that war was imminent.’*
Now, this is on the 4th day of December :
“Admiral Wilkinson approved this message” —
which I shall talk about in a minute more definitely,
— “and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the mes- |
sage to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it about three p. m., Wash- I
ington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, ‘What do you
thing of the message?* Admiral Noyes replied, T think it is an insult to the
intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief.* Admiral Wilkinson stated, ‘I do not
agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man,* **
and so forth. (Tr., Russell A. 33-34)
[#7] Colonel Gibson referred to the above incident, stating that
“Admiral Noyes said they had been alerted enough 55 and disapproved
sending it. (Tr., Gibson D. 27&-277)
Colonel Bratton testified that on receipt of the 2 December mes-
sage translated 4 December, from Tokyo to Washington, ordering
destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this mes-
sage to General Miles and General Gerow and discussed it with them
at some length. Bratton advocated sending further warnings or
alerts to our overseas commanders. General Gerow* felt that suffi-
cient warning had already been given. General Miles felt that he
could not go over General Gerow’s decision. Bratton, however, con-
tinued to feel uneasy about the matter and went over to the Navy
Department where he had a conference with Commander McCollum
who felt as he did that further warnings should be sent out. Mc-
Collum stated that Commander Rochefort in Honolulu had gotten
the first “Winds 55 message and was listening for the implementing
message. He suggested that as a way out of their difficulty a wire
be sent to the Army G-2 in Hawaii to see Rochefort at once. (Tr.,
Bratton D. 283-284) Bratton stated he managed to get General
Miles to OK this message which was sent 5 December to Short’s G-2
and read as follows:
“Commander Rochefort, who can be located through the 14th Naval District,
has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are
mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once.” (Tr. f Bratton D. 283)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 251
In addition to the “Winds” message, the sheaf of forty-seven inter-
cepts, Top Secret Exhibit “B”, contains a somewhat similar message
from Tokyo, dated 19 November 1941, reading as follows :
“When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following
at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts :
(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations “ HIGASHI ”
(2) Japan Russia relations “KIT A”
(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malay, and NEI) ‘NISHI*
(Top Secret Ex. “B”, S. I. S. 25392)
There is a conflict as to the meaning of the “Winds” message,
namely, as to whether it meant war or only a breach of diplomatic
relations. (Tr., [28] Bratton B. 60-71; Safford C. 126-130;
Sadtler D. 250; See also Top Secret Ex. “B”, §. I. S. 25392 and
25432, both 19 November 1941) This conflict is not significant, how-
ever, as it was common knowledge that Japan might begin war prior
to terminating diplomatic relations. Even Short realized this.
(Tr., Short 456-457 ; see also Stimson 4051)
There is no clear showing in the record as to what higher officers in
the War Department got either the original “Winds” message, in
whatever version, or the activating message, or got the brief message
of 19 November as to the single code word to be inserted in the intelli-
gence broadcasts when diplomatic relations became dangerous. (Top
Secret Ex. “B”, S. I. S. 25392)
Colonel Bratton, apparently testifying from Top Secret Exhibit
“B”, a sheaf of forty-seven messages, stated :
All the information that we had was presented in one form or another to the
policy making and planning agencies of the Government. ♦ * * The officials to
whom I refer include the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division (Tr., Bratton
D. 297)
Assuming this refers to the 47 intercepts, there is no testimony
that any one of these specifically got to the various officials mentioned,
or if so, when. Nor, assuming some or all of these intercepts got
to these officials, is there any showing of the form in which they re-
ceived them. Such general testimony as that of Colonel Bratton’s,
above quoted — relying, as it apparently does, entirely on a practice,
without specific recollection of specific occasions — cannot be regarded
as fairly bringing^home to any of the individuals concerned knowledge
of any specific intercept. This is certainly so where the record con-
tains a specific denial, such as in the case of General Marshall, of any
recollection of having seen some of these documents. (Tr., Marshall
A 30-31, 33-40, 209-211)
Discussion of Foregoing Information:
It is obvious that these Top Secret intercepts show a gradual deteri-
oration in Japanese- American relations and the probability of war.
Short, however, was specifically advised of the possibility of the
outbreak of hostilities at any time and in this respect these intercepts
are merely cumulative. Some of them, however, are very pointed;
for example, the radio of 24 September, translated 9 October, from
Tokyo to Honolulu, requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor
and dividing Pearl Harbor into subdivisions for that purpose; the
radio of 15 November, translated 3 December, from Togo to Honolulu,
requesting that the “ships in harbor” [29] report be made
252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
twice a week in view of the critical Jap-U. S. relations ; the radio of
18 November, translated 6 December ^ from Honolulu to Tokyo, bring-
ing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving
the course of eight destroyers entering the harbor; the radio of 24
November, translated 5 December, from Tokyo to Honolulu, asking
for a “ships in harbor” report even when there were no movements.
The above appear to point to some specific action against Pearl Har-
bor. However, this inference is in the light of after-events; at that
time these radios, to an unimaginative person, were consistent with
routine Japanese effort to keep themselves advised as to our naval
strength in the Pacific or possible sabotage attacks on ships in Pearl
Harbor by native Jap fishing boats. Similarly, the radio of 5 No-
vember, translated the same day, from Tokyo to Washington, setting
25 November as the deadline for signing the agreement; the radio oi
16 November, translated 17 November, reiterating the impossibility
of changing the deadline ; the radio of 22 November, translated the
same day, extending the deadline from 25 November to 29 November,
and stating “after that things are automatically going to happen”
indicate in the light of information we now have, but which was not
available prior to the attack, that steps were being taken for an
early attack. But at that time these dates had no such significance.
As General Marshall testified, November 29 came and passed and
nothing happened. (Tr., Marshall A. 4r-5) As to the “Winds 55 mes-
sage, according to War Department witnesses this meant war between
Japan and Great Britain, not war with the United States. The most
significant messages were the radios of 1 December, translated the
same day; 2 December, translated 3 December, 5 December, trans-
lated 6 December, directing the destruction of codes, code machines,
and secret papers. There is also the reference to destroying codes in
the “Winds” message. These messages, to Colonel Bratton, meant
war. But General Short had already been warned that war was im-
minent and hostilities might commence at any moment. Whether,
had General Short received these messages, he would have altered
his view that there was no threat from without is problematical.
One message clearly suggested an attack on Pearl Harbor, namely
the radio of 2 December from Tokyo to Honolulu, inquiring as to the
war ships there, whether there were barrage balloons above Pearl
Harbor, and whether the war ships there were provided with anti-
mine nets. But this message was not received until 23 December
and not translated until 30 December 1941. (Top Secret Ex. “B”,
S. I. S. 27065)
It is a fair conclusion from the testimony that the Navy interpreta-
tion of the “Winds” message was that it meant war with the United
States. Also, there is the testimony of Captain Safford that Com-
mander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he handed Secretary
Knox S. I. S. 25850 instructing the J ap Ambassadors to present the
Japanese reply at 1:00 p. m., ne sent along a [30] note stat-
ing “This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today. 55 (Tr.,
Safford C. 167) Action upon this information if believed credible,
was a Navy responsibility. There is no testimony it was communi-
cated to the War Department.
The most that can be said relative to the Top Secret information
available in Washington is that a keener and more incisive analysis
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
253
by the intelligence sections of either service of the over-all picture
presented by these intercepts, along the line of Commander Kramer’s
deductions (Tr., Salford C. 167), might have led to an anticipation of
the possibility, at least, of an attack on Pearl Harbor at or about the
time it actually occurred. The danger in attempting to make such
an estimate is, however, the fact that unconsciously we do so in the
light of after-occurring events and read into each message a signifi-
cance which was not obvious at the time of receipt. It must also be
borne in mind that substantially all the definite information received
as to Jap naval movements pointed to activity in the Philippines or
in Southeast Asia.
As to whether if Short had gotten the Top Secret information above
referred to he would have made a different estimate of the situation
and placed in operation a different alert, we are in the realm of con-
jecture. The fact that Short regarded as unimportant the informa-
tion he got on 3 December 1941 that the Japanese Consuls in Honolulu
were destroying their codes and secret papers (which meant war to
Short’s Asst. G-2) is very significant in postulating what Short would
have done if he had gotten all the information he complains he did
not get.
As I have previously stated, while there was more information in
Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indi-
cate to any responsible commander that there was an outside threat
against which he should make preparations. To the same effect was
the testimony of General Marshall (Tr., Marshall A. 14-15), Gen-
eral Gerow (Tr., Gerow 4300, Sadtler D. 253 ; Bratton D. 283) , Gen-
eral Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), General Miles (Tr., Miles
127-128, 128-129; Sadtler D. 253-254; Bratton D. 283), Admiral
Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8, 14; Bratton B. 78), and Admiral Noyes
(Tr., Gibson D. 276-277; Russell A. 34). This was the opinion of
the Roberts Board. (Roberts Rep., pp. 18-21)
Comment on Short's Defenses:
The fundamental fact to bear in mind and from which there can
be no escape is that Short was the sole responsible Army commander
charged with the mission of defending Pearl Harbor. Knowing as
he did that there were threats both from within and from without
and that the most dangerous form of attack which he could expect
was a surprise air attack, he cannot now [Ji] be heard to sav
that he was led into becoming sabotage-minded to the exclusion of all
else by War Department messages stressing sabotage. It is obvious'
that General Marshall’s radio of 27 November was not intended to
change the official War Department estimate, solidly imbedded in
elaborate war plans and stressed continuously from Short’s assump-
tion of command 7 February 1941 into the fall of 1941, that a surprise
air attack was a primary threat. It is equally obvious that Short’s
reply to General Marshall’s radio of 27 November did not amount to
a communication by Short to the War Department that he had ar-
rived at a new and entirely different estimate of the situation which
excluded a surprise air attack as a then present basic threat.
As to Short’s defense that he was not given sufficient information,
or, as held by the Board, that the information which he had was “in-
complete ana confusing” (though the Board held it sufficient), it is
clear that the information given Short continually stressed the pos-
70716 — 46 — Ex. 157 17
254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sible outbreak of war which necessarily implied a threat from with-
out. But, as seen, Short’s Alert No. 1 expressly excluded the idea of
a threat from without. Unless it can be said that Short would have
interpreted the Top Secret intercepts as indicating a specific attack
on Pearl Harbor, an unreasonable assumption, they merely stress the
inevitability of war. But this would not necessarily have led Short
to establish Alert No. 3, bearing in mind the Navy view that there
was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor and Short’s claim
that in any event he could rely upon the Navy for warning in ample
time of the whereabouts of the Jap fleet. Short’s defense that Alert
No. 3 would have interfered with training and that Alert No. 3 would
have disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population, is re-
futed by the statement in General Marshall’s radio to him of 27
November that the policy of avoiding the first overt act should not
be construed as restricting him to a course of action that might jeop- j
ardize his defense. But they are also answered by the fact that Alert
No. 2, at least, would not have disclosed his intent or alarmed the
civilian population. It should be borne in mind that Short’s prob-
lem was two-fold, both to guard against an outside attack and. at the
same time to do so without alarming the civil population. This
should not have been beyond the capabilities of an experienced com-
mander. j
I am of the opinion therefore that the Board’s conclusion (Rep.
300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a
state of readiness for war, in the face of a war warning, appears
justified except in so far as it holds the information which Short had
wp° incomplete and confusing.
I likewise agree that the Board’s conclusion (b) that Short failed
in his duties in not reaching an agreement with the naval authorities
in Hawaii for joint Army and Navy action under the various plans,
is supported by the record. I also concur in the opinion of the Board
(c) that Short failed in his duties in not informing himself of the
effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by
the Navy.
[32] The question whether Short’s failure in the performance
of these various duties constituted a neglect of duty in the sense of an
offense under military law, will be discussed later. In my opinion
Short’s various failures were not so much the result of a neglect of duty
as of serious errors of judgment. His first error of judgment was in
the erroneous estimate of the situation which he made and which led
him to the conclusion that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor
from the air. His second error was in failing to realize that it was his
duty to be on the alert against even what might appear to him as the
highly improbable. I believe, however, that these mistakes were
honest ones, not the result of any conscious fault, and, having in mind
all the circumstances, do not constitute a criminal neglect of duty.
Board's Conclusion {d) as to Short's Failure to Replace Inefficient
Staff Officers:
The Board found that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient
staff officers. (Rep. 300) This conclusion is related to the statement
in the body of the Report that “Phillips was recognized by the staff
as without force and far too weak for a position of such importance.”
(Rep. 74)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
255
A careful reading of the transcript citations upon which the Board
relies for its findings as to Colonel Phillips shows that certain wit-
nesses were asked as to their ovinion of Phillips as Chief of Staff.
Their replies varied from complete reluctance to answer (Tr., Done-
gan 1946) to positive expressions that the Colonel was unqualified.
7Tr., Throckmorton 1408-1409) General Burgin considered Phillips
“one of General Short’s fair-haired boys,” high-handed, not prone to
confer with subordinates, not “extremely efficient, or otherwise — the
average, run-of-the-mine.” (Tr., Burgin 2625-2626) General
Haves, the preceding Chief of Staff, very mildly stated that Phillips
had a G-3 trend, and that he did not “feel that he had worked him-
self into the position of Chief of Staff by the time of the Pearl Harbor
attack.” (Tr., Hayes 265) Colonel Pratt merely added that he con-
sidered that Hayes had been a stronger Chief of Staff. (Tr., Pratt
1977-1978)
These scattered opinions, unsupported by a factual examination of
Phillips’ training, experience, and activities can hardly be thought to
support the blanket conclusion of the Board about Short’s staff. The
Board adds, however, that Phillips’ own testimony “as to his conception
of his duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to compe-
tent decisions in critical situations, is sufficient evidence of the matter.”
(Rep. 74) The testimony cited by the Board to support this finding
is that Phillips and Short considered the inevitable interference with
training which would occur if Alerts 2 or 3 were ordered, that all
phases of the situation were discussed, the danger of a Jap landing,
of an air attack, [S3] what Phillips considered to be his duties
as Chief of Staff, how Short ordered Alert No. 1 without a “specific
recommendation” from Colonel Phillips, and a general discussion of
activities in the Department after 27 November. (Tr., Phillips 1134-
H44)
It is established, of course, that Phillips was inexperienced as
a Chief of Staff, as he had not been appointed until 5 November
1941, (Tr., Phillips 1108) and that Short did not treat Phillips as
a Chief of Staff, for example, in not having him present at important
Navy conferences. (Rep. 74) But there is no substantial evidence
that Phillips was inefficient to a degree that would require his removal
by Short, or that Short’s failure to remove Phillips was in any way
a proximate or concurrent cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The
most that can be said is that there were indications that Short selected
a man not fully qualified as Chief of Staff. These indications were
not fully investigated by the Board, either as to their accuracy or
as to their possible contribution to the disaster on 7 December 1941.
Aside from the above as to Colonel Phillips, there is no testimony
in the record as to the efficiency or inefficiency of Short’s G-l, G-3,
or G-4. Short’s G-2, Colonel Fielder, testified at length but there
is no substantial testimony either from his own lips or from other
witnesses from which the Board could hold Colonel Fielder inefficient.
The w r orst that can be said against Fielder is that he failed to realize
the importance of the Dr. Mori message and the fact that Japanese
Consuls were destroying tReir codes ana burning their papers. How-
ever, this viewpoint was shared by Short who was as iully informed
as Fielder about these matters.
The Board also stated that
256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
While the various assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the
results are more important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of
requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that
their testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short.
(Rep. 74)
The only testimony on this score was the testimony of Cblonel
Throckmorton, Short’s G-l at the time of the attack, who testified
there was complete harmony when General Hayes was Chief of Staff
and that “such disharmony as existed under Phillips I do not think
was of a serious enough nature to have affected what happened on
December 7.” (Tr., Throckmorton 1409) There is, therefore, no
substantial testimony as to any significant disharmony among Short’s
staff.
It follows from the above that the Board’s conclusion (Rep. 300)
that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers is not
justified.
[ 3b ] Board? 8 Conclusions as to General Marshall:
The Board concludes that General Marshall failed in his relations
with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:
(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully
advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which Indicated an
increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he
bad an abundance and Short had little.
(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Ha-
waiian Department on November i & , 1941, when evidently he failed to realise
the import of General Short’s reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly
that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of No-
vember 27 ( 472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war.
(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early
morning of December 7th, the critical Information indicating an almost imme-
diate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this.
(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the HawaUan
Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending
threat of war. (Rep. 298-299)
Adequacy of General MarshalVs 27 November Warning Message:
The Chief of Staff testified that the message of 27 November signed
“Marshall” should be regarded as containing all the information con-
cerning the Japanese and the instructions necessary for General Short
to accomplish his mission. (Tr., Marshall A. 14, 15 j C. 197)
The Board’s statement that General Marshall failed “to keep the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of f
the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation” (Rep. 298) over-
looks the fact that the 27 November message signed “Marshall” pic-
tured the Japanese-United States situation accurately as it appeared
from the information available to the War Department at that time
and up until 7 December. The negotiations between the Japanese
representatives in the United States and our State Department ac-
tually continued up to 7 December, and various intercepts suggest
the possibility that they may have been conducted by the envoys in
good faith and with evident nope of a peaceful settlement.
[<?5] Thus, on 29 November Tokyo radioed its representative in
Washington to make one more attempt at settlement along certain
lines ana “in carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this
does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.” (Top
Secret Ex. “B”)
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
257
Mr. KurUsU, in talking to Tokyo on 30 November, spoke to Tojo’s
drastic statement, and urged that unless greater caution was exercised,
the Japanese negotiators would be in a difficult position. Further, he
stated they were doing their best and that negotiations were to con-
tinue. (Top Secret Ex. “B”)
On 1 December Tokyo radioed its representatives in Washington,
suggesting a ^possible approach for making some progress in negotia-
tions. (lop Secret Ex. “B”)
On 2 December a radio intercept from Washington to Tokyo stated :
Judging from my Interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and my
considerations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to
peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they
mold like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in
mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals
and to my separate wire #1233. (Top Secret Ex. “B”)
On 5 December a Japanese radio to Tokyo requested approval to
delay destruction of one code machine as Japanese negotiations were
still continuing. (Top Secret Ex. “B”)
Former Ambassador Grew said with regard to the alleged inevita-
bility of war :
• * * If the whole problem had lain with the military authorities, I would
have said without question that war was inevitable, but there were times when
| I believed the Japanese government was doing its best to prevent war for the
j reason that it realized much better than the military people did what might
be the result of war. * * * Now the question at that time was whether they
would be successful or not, and, as I say, I was not in a position to answer that
question definitely and finally prior to the outbreak of war. (Tr., Grew 4213-
, 4214)
l When asked when it became evident that war with Japan was in-
evitable, Mr. Grew replied :
[3G] I could not put my finger on any particular date, General. My own
position, there, was that I was going to fight up to the last possible minute to
prevent war; and I did everything in my power to prevent it; and, not being
a defeatist by nature, I was unwUling to admit that war was inevitable, up to
the last minute. So that I cannot mention any particular date, prior to December
7, 1941, when I felt that war was definitely inevitable. (Tr., Grew 4199)
With reference to Japan’s decision to go to war, he stated that there
were “two J apans.” The Army and Navy were practically independent
and reported directly to the Emperor over the heads of the Cabinet
and the Prime Minister.
I think it is perfectly possible that the Cabinet was not informed of the
plans for attacking Pearl Harbor. My belief is — well, I won’t say confirmed,
but it is increased by the fact that I had a conversation with Mr. Togo, the
foreign minister, at half past twelve, half past midnight, on December 7, 1941.
I That was about three hours before Pearl Harbor. And I have always been
convinced from the nature of that conversation that Mr. Togo did not at that
moment know that Pearl Harbor was about to break. I have other evidence,
too, which convinces me personally that he didn’t know. * * * (Tr., Grew
4214-4215)
When asked about the effect of the economic sanctions in forcing
action by Japan, Mr. Grew stated :
I do not mean to say, when you say something had to be done about it, that
it had to be war, because there were other things to do about it besides war.
The Japanese at that time could have taken steps to meet some of our views
in connection with their expansion through the Far East. They could readily
have done that, and if they had done that we might, for our part, have relaxed
258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
some of the economic pressure which we were placing on them. I think that
that would have been a perfectly logical thing to have happened, but it didn’t
happen. (Tr., Grew 4218)
As to the 25 November deadline, later extended to 29 November,
General Marshall stated that this had certain significance, but that
the War Department was unable to tell just what it was. (Tr., Mar-
shall A. 5) It was first thought that the 25 November deadline per-
tained to the anti-Comitem pact. When the time was*extended to
29 November that possibility was removed. (Tr., Marshall A. 4)
“November 29 arrived and passed, and we entered into December
without anything happening other than the continuation of these
movements, which we could follow fairly well, down the China coast
and Indo-China and headed quite plainly towards Thailand and the
Gulf of Siam.” (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5)
[87] In the light of all the information possessed by the War
Department at that time and the fact that the 14th part of the
Japanese note breaking off negotiations, and the direction to the
Japanese representatives to present the fourteen parts at 1 : 00 p. m.
(Washington time) 7 December, was not available until that day, it
is my opinion that the 27 November message signed “Marshall”
was an accurate and adequate description of the Japanese situation
at the time it was sent, and up until 7 December. Furthermore, this
message should be read in the light of the other Army and Navy
messages to Short.
General Marshall’s Views on Warning:
The Chief of Staff emphasized that the so-called “Winds” mes-
sage referred not to war but to the rupture of diplomatic relations
and that “very remarkable things had been done under the rupture
of diplomatic relations while still evading an actual act of war.”
(Tr., Marshall A. 45-46) With respect to other information of the
Japanese activities which reached him from secret sources and in-
fluenced his thinking as to the imminence of war, the Chief of Staff
testified that while it may have been practical and feasible to have
sent this information to Short, nevertheless in his opinion at that
time, it would have been unwise. (Tr., Marshall A. 46) The Chief
of Staff conceded that “considering what has happened. * * * the
situation might well have been helped by translating that informa-
tion to them.” (Tr., Marshall A. 46) Speaking of his decision at
the time, however, he stated :
In our own view, an alert of the character, particularly the char-
acter of the two that occurred at that time, the Naval alert and then
the later Army alert, (messages to Short from War Department and
Navy Department) were sufficient for any Commander with a great
responsibility ; and in addition to that you must remember that we
were pouring through Hawaii, on the way to the Philippines, con-
voys, rushing everybody. Everything was being pushed to the last
extreme. Nobody could look at that without realizing that some-
thing very critical was in the wind. Our great problem was how
to do these things, energized in the way we were — the shipments,
and collecting the means and getting them out, particularly to the
Philippines, which passed entirety through Hawaii — without giving
such notice to the Japanese that it would have an unfortunate effect
in our stalling off this affair.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
259
Undoubtedly they did obtain that view. I think they were rushed
in their decision by the fact that if they didn’t catch it, didn’t act
within a certain period of time, it would be too late; we would have
gained the necessary strength to make it undesirable, to make it too
dangerous for them to act.
[58] All of that was apparent to the Commanders in the place. Only the
most critical necessities would have involved us in taking over all that commercial
shipping, in taxing the Pacific Fleet’s resources in providing convoys. Every-
thing was involved there at the time, and I cannot see how — I never have quite
understood how the change from a great fear, as expressed In all the previous
communications, of an air assault, suddenly seemed to lapse. I don’t know what
the explanation of it is, and I myself have toever discussed it. (Tr., Marshall
A. 46-47)
As already indicated, General Marshall had no information of
any kind which indicated an immediate attack on Hawaii. (Tr.,
Marshall A. 27-28)
The Chief of Staff also believed that Short had adequate weapons,
ammunition, and other means for the discharge of his mission to
protect Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A 27) He also was under
the belief in late November and early Decemoer of 1941 that Short
had adequate reconnaissance agencies to carry out the desired recon-
naissance. In this regard, he testified:
We had made every conceivable effort to deploy the radar out there ahead
of other places. We had done everything we could to provide the means to carry
out the air functions of that command, -particularly as they were determined in
the final agreement between General Short and Admiral Kimmel. (Tr., MarshaU
A. 27)
The Chief of Staff knew that this agreement called for distant
reconnaissance by the Navy. .(Tr., Marshall A 26)
The Chief of Staff further testified that Hawaii was but one of
several places on the Japanese front and that “it was by far the best
prepared that we had.” (Tr., Marshall A 25) He stated :
* * * if the Hawiian state of preparation in men and materiel was 100,
Panama was about 25 percent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and Alaska
and the Aleutians completely negligible. (Tr., Marshall A. 23)
The Chief of Staff continued :
I think we all knew that we were poverty stricken, * * * (Tr., Marshall
A 26)
To show the ramifications of the activities of the Chief of Staff
and the over-all supervision which was required of him from a global
perspective, the Chief of Staff testified concerning the Panama Canal
Department :
[50] * * * we had had very peculiar things there, and of course they
could chop into us very badly there. We were open in a more vulnerable way in
the Panama Canal than we were in Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A 13-14)
General Marshall's 7 December Message:
Concerning the Board’s conclusion (c) (Rep. 298) that the Chief of
Staff should have advised Short on the evening of 6 December or the
early morning of 7 December of an almost immediate break with
Japan, the Chief of Staff testified that he did not receive the intercept
which indicated such a break until about 11 o’clock on 7 December.
(Tr., Marshall A. 6) He then immediately conferred with appropri-
ate members of his Staff and wrote a draft of a mesage to be transmitted
260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to Short. (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8) He gave this message when com*
pleted to Colonel Bratton for transmittal by radio to the Western
Defense Command, the Panama command, the Hawaiian command,
and the Philippine command. (Tr., Marshall A. 8) The Chief of
Staff knew that the time required for coding was “ a very quick pro-
cedure. It is done on a machine as rapidly as the girl types.” (Tr.,
Marshall A. 13) Colonel Bratton took the message to the Message
Center and upon his return was asked by the Chief of Staff as to the
procedure which would be followed and the time within which it could
be expected the message would reach the recipients. The Chief of
Staff did not understand the explanation by Colonel Bratton, so he
with Colonel Bundy was sent back for additional information. (Tr.,
Marshall A. 9) Colonel Bundy was on duty in the War Plans
Division of the General Staff in charge of matters pertaining to the
Pacific. (Tr. Marshall A. 9-10) When Colonel Bratton and Colonel
Bundy returned they informed the Chief of Staff in effect that the
message would be in the hands of the recipients within thirty minutes
from that moment. (Tr. Marshall A. 10) It being still not clear to
the Chief of Staff as to what were the time elements, he sent Colonel
Bratton and Colonel Bundy back for a third time to check again.
When they returned their reply confirmed that the time for transmit-
tal would be satisfactory. (Tr., Marshall A. 10)
The hief of Staff believed that the message would reach the recipi-
ents before the one o’clock hour at which things might happen. (Tr.,
Marshall A. 14)
Actually, and unknown to the Chief of Staff, the Signal Corps sent
the message to San Francisco by Western Union and from San Fran-
cisco to Hawaii via Radio Corporation of America. This was because
the Army radio was not able to get through to Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall
A. 10) A further delay, which was also unknown to the Chief of Staff
was caused by the nonoperation of a teletype at Honolulu on 7 Decem-
ber. Thus when the message was received in Honolulu it was given
to a boy for delivery on a bicycle. The boy was caught in the bombing
and did not deliver the message until after the attack. (Tr., Marshall
A. 10)
[.£#] The telephone was not considered as means of transmission
because, in the nature of things, it would have been too “time consum-
ing.” (Tr., Marshall A. 13.) The Chief of Staff testified :
* * * I would certainly have called MacArthur first, and then I would have
called the Panama Canal second, * * *. And from our own experience, my
own experience, even now our telephone Is a long-time procedure. * * * we
now find we do a little bit better by teletype than we do on the telephone (Tr.,
Marshall A. 13-14).
Colonel Bratton testified that when the Chief of Staff gave him the
message for delivery to the Message Center :
I took the message to Colonel French, Signal Corps officer In charge of the
message center, explained to him that It was General Marshall's desire that the
message be transmitted to the addresses by the fastest possible safe means,
* * *. I then returned to the Office of the Chief of Staff. The latter directed
me to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the
addressees. I returned to the message center and talked the matter over with
Colonel French, who informed me that the message would be encoded in about
three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addresses
in about thirty minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was
11 : 50 a. m. (Tr., Bratton B. 79-80) (Ths would be 6 : 20 a. m. Honolulu time) .
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
261
Colonel French testified that :
Colonel Bratton was at the code room, and he asked me how long it would
take to get the message transmitted, and I told him it would take about 30 to
45 minutes to transmit the message to its destination (Tr. French 196).
Concerning the question as to whether members of the General
Staff, other than the Chief of Staff, should have transmitted to Short
a warning without waiting for the arrival of the Chief of Staff on the
morning of 7 December, the following testimony by the Chief of Staff
is pertinent :
General Russell. Was there anyone of the General Staff other than yourself
with authority to have dispatched to the overseas departmental commanders a
message which would have told them of these recent developments, and includ-
ing the reply of the Japanese to our message of November 26, and particularly as
to the substance of this message of December [ 41 ] 7th relative to the
delivery of the ultimatum and the destruction of the code machines?
General Marshall. That would depend, I think, entirely on the officer con-
cerned. There is no specific regulation about who, of those in charge of principal
affairs, can do what in time of a great emergency. It depends on the judgment of
the individual. If the Deputy Chief of Staff was here, if the head of the War
Plans Division were here, if possible the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 were aware
of this and of the possibilties of delay, they might have acted. It is very hard
to answer, because you are inevitably involved in backsight regarding a great
catastrophe, and I can only answer it in that way. (Tr., MarshaU C. 211-212)
Comment on Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall:
As to the Board’s conclusion (a) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall
failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to
keep Short fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese
situation, “of which information he had 'an abundance and Short had
little,” I feel, as already indicated, that General Marshall’s radio to
Short of 27 November, considered along with the other messages to
Short, accurately pictured the Japanese- American situation as it then
existed and as it continued to exist until 7 December. Short as a mil-
itary commander was required to take the information contained in
this radio from his Chief of Staff as true and not in the critical spirit
of awaiting further information or proof of what he was told. Gen-
eral Marshall was not in the position of carrying on a negotiation with
a foreign plenipotentiary but was telling a subordinate what the situ-
ation was for his guidance. The Board’s conclusion reduces itself to
a holding that General Marshall should have given Short at length
and in detail the factual basis for his succinct statement in his 27
November radio that there was only a bare possibility the Japanese
might renew the negotiations, and that Japanese future action was
unpredictable but hostile action was possible at any moment.
So far as the transmission of information by the Chief of Staff to
Short is concerned, mentioned in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of
the Board’s Conclusions, clearly the radiograms of 24 and 27 Novem-
bed adequately pictured the emergency, the imminence of hostilities,
and the necessity that Short be on the alert against threats from within
and from without. The most that can be said is that the War De-
partment did not transmit to Short the Top Secret messages, but these
were cumulative. This is evident from a reading of the messages ac-
tually sent Short over a period of months, hereinbefore referred to.
While the War Department was possessed of more information than
Short received, he did receive enough to require that he be on the qui
vive . That Hawaii had already been sufficiently alerted was [|#]
262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the opinion of Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7 ,14, 15 ; Bratton B.
78; Gibson D. 276-277), of Admiral Noyes (Tr., D. 276-277, Russell
A. 34), of General Gerow (Tr., Sadtler D. 253, Bratton D. 283), of
General Miles (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), and of General Bedell Smith
(Tr., Sadtler D. 253).
Moreover, Short received various important naval messages. Gen-
eral Marshall testified it was SOP that the Navy give Short these
messages. (Tr., Marshall 35, 36; Kimmel 1772.) The Navy messages
of 24 and 27 November specifically so provided. (Tr., Marshall 35,
36, D. 306 ; Short 358, 363. ) Captain Layton testified that he delivered
to and discussed with General Short in person the message from the
Chief of Naval Operations dated 24 November 1941. (Tr. Layton
3058-3059.)
Thus, Short was fully advised of the tenseness of the Japanese situa-
tion, of the requirement that he act in accordance with the clear in-
structions from the Chief of Staff to prepare for both threats from
within and from without, and for eventualities which could be momen-
tarily expected.
As to the Board’s conclusion (b) that General Marshall failed in
his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to send addi-
tional instructions to Short when evidently he failed to realize the
import of Short’s 27 November reply, which indicated, the Board said,
that Short had misunderstood General Marshall’s radio and had not
alerted his command for war, (Rep. 298) this statement is a non
sequitur. But, in addition, there was no testimony before the Board
that General Marshall ever saw Short’s reply. He himself testified
that he had no recollection of ever having seen it, though “the pre-
sumption would be that I had seen it.” ( Tr., Marshal 38-40 ; cf . Top
Secret Tr., Marshall C. 201.) It is sir 'i:licant that Short’s radiogram
to the Chief of Staff, though ini tic , 4 “Noted” by the Secretary of
War and General Gerow, is not init ed by the Chief of Staff, although
the latter initialed the correspon .ig radio from General MacArthur.
(Tr., Marshall 39.) The repl itself was indicative that Short had
taken precautions against S' ' cage and in stating “liaison with the
Navy” was susceptible of . ue interpretation that Short had also
ordered defense measure- m accordance with the War Plan. That
plan contemplated that . .slant reconnaissance would be conducted by
the Navy. .This was v ell known to General Marshall. Hence, the
Chief of Staff, if he saw Short’s reply, was entitled to believe that
Short’s use of the words “liaison with the Navy” in his reply meant
the establishment of full reconnaissance. It must be remembered that
Short was given a definite order in General Marshall’s radio of 27
November to conduct reconnaissance. The Chief of Staff was entitled
to believe that his order would be obeyed.
Short testified that “liaison with the Navy” meant to him “keeping
in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had ana
what they were doing.” (Tr., Short 380.) He also stated that this
phrase indicated he expected the Navy to carry out its part of the
agreement for long distance reconnaissance. (Tr., Short 380.) Gen-
eral Gerow, head of War Plans Division for the Chief of Staff, testified
that the portion of the reply stating “liaison with the Navy” led to the
reasonable assumption that “General Short was working out recon-
naissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
263
Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic plan, * * *.
(Tr., Gerow 4289.) In other words, the Chief of Staff was not defi-
nitely advised by this reply of Short that Short had made no prepara-
tions against an outside threat.
[45] In a consideration of this point it should also be remembered
that while Short had received from the Chief of Staff many communi-
cations calling his attention to the danger of a surprise air attack
Short at no time, so far as the record shows, questioned this estimate
by a communication to the Chief of Staff.
The very brevity of the reply by Short would also indicate to the
War Department that Short had taken all necessary defense measures.
It would be a most anomolous situation if a theater commander could
be heard to say that because he reecived warnings from the Chief of
Staff and had replied with a fragmentary report that ipso facto he
was relieved of his responsibilities and that these responsibilities were
then fastened upon the Chief of Staff.
Also, since Short reecived numerous messages and information after
27 November, especially the naval messages, which the Chief of Staff
testified it was SOP to exchange (Tr., Marshall 35, 36 ; Kimmel 1772) ,
the silence of Short after the message of 28 November would indicate
to a busy Chief of Staff that he was ready to meet all threats, both
those from within and those from without.
It appears, therefore, that in his relations with the Hawaiian De-
partment the Chief of Staff fulfilled his functions as Commander-in-
Chief and, in point of truth, personally warned the Hawaiian Depart-
ment with prophetic accuracy, against the very type of attack which
occurred.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that the functions of the Chief of
Staff did not include the duty of personally directing and supervising
the detailed administration of the various sections of the Office of the
Chief of Staff. His primary duty was to advise the Secretary of War
and the President, to plan and supervise the organization, equipment,
and training of the Army, to make decisions and give advice concern-
ing the over-all and vital problems of military strategy from the
perspective of global war and the broad military problems which then
confronted the United States. Moreover, it was a fundamental policy
of the War Department, the wisdom of which has been demonstrated
in the recent victories, not to interfere unduly with commanders in the
field whose records justified the assumption of great responsibilities.
Thus, the prime responsibility is on the theater commander. No duty
could thus devolve upon the Chief of Staff to check personally on the
Hawaiian Command other than as may be related to the stated funda-
mental policy. To have singled out the Hawaiian Department for
any different attention would have been peculiar and repugnant to
the policy and purposes of a General Staff. The very nature of an
over-all supervision in preparation for a global war makes mandatory
that the Chief of Staff be divorced from administrative details. In
no sense, of course, does the Chief of Staff avoid his responsibility in
the event his organization is ineffective. There is a distinction, how-
ever, between the personal performance of his especial duties and the
performance of duties by members of his staff.
[441 It is my opinion that the Board’s conclusion (b) (Rep. 298)
that General Marshall should have sent additional instructions to
Short upon receipt of Short’s reply, is not justified.
264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
As to the Board’s conclusion (c) that General Marshall failed to
get to Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning of
7 December the critical information indicating an almost immediate
break with Japan “though there was ample time to have accom-
plished this” the record makes entirely clear that General Marshall
personally did not receive this information until late in the morning
of 7 December and that he did his best to get it to Short immediately
but failed because of circumstances beyond his control.
As to the Board’s conclusion (d) that General Marshall failed to
investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian
Command between 27 November and 7 December, the record is silent
as to whether this was the personal duty of the Chief of Staff. It has
been already indicated that General Marshall was entitled to rely
upon his subordinates, including Short, and to believe that elaborate
preparations for the defense of Hawaii embodied in war plans formu-
lated over a long period of time would be' carried out by a theater
commander in accordance with the traditional American military
policy. General Marshall had been General Short’s tentative SOP
dated 14 July 1941 which contained elaborate plans for execution in
an emergency. (Tr., Marshall 29)
To sum up, I am of the opinion that none of the Board’s conclusions
as to General Marshall are justified. My views are confirmed by the
Roberts Report (Roberts Report, p. 19-20).
Board' 8 Conclusions as to General Gerow:
As to General Gerow the Board concluded that he failed in his duties
as follows :
(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department adequately
informed on the impending war situation by making available to him the sub-
stance of the data being delivered to the War Plans Division by the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2.
(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on
November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive; on the contrary he approved the
message of November 27, 1941 (472) which contained confusing statements.
(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short’s reply to the
November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he failed to
take corrective action.
(d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint plans and
agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of the two
services in the manner contemplated. (Rep. 299)
[45] General Gerow was recalled from France where he was
Commanding General of the Fifth Corps which had fought its way
from the Normandy beach-head to the Siegfried Line. He testified
concerning his activities as Chief or Acting Chief of the War Plans
Division under the Chief of Staff during the time in question. (Tr.,
Gerow 4225) This Division of the General Staff was charged with
war plans and operations, and was under the general direction and
supervision of the Chief of Staff.
From what has been hereinbefore stated it is apparent that General
Short was given adequate information as to the rupture of diplomatic
relations and the situation with Japanese, the unpredictable nature
of Japanese future action, the imm inence of hostilities, and that under ,
no circumstances should any limitations or qualifications expressed in
the messages jeopardize his defense, He was also ordered to establish
reconnaissance,
REPORT OP ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
265
But since we know in retrospect that Short was not, apparently,
fully alive to an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans
Division had received substantial information from the Intelligence
Section, G-2, the Board argues that had this additional information
been transmitted to Short it might have convinced him not only that
war was imminent but that there was a real possibility of a surprise
air attack on Hawaii. In retrospect it is difficult to perceive any sub-
stantial reason for not sending Short this additional information or,
in the alternative, checking to see whether Short was sufficiently alive to
the danger. General Gerow did neither. In my opinion General
Gerow showed a lack of imagination in failing to realize that had
the Top Secret information been sent to Short it could not have had
any other than a beneficial effect. General Gerow also showed lack
of imagination in failing to make the proper deductions from the
Japanese intercepts. For instance, the message of 24 September from
Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and
dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose
coupled with the message of 15 November to Honolulu to make ‘‘the
ships in harbor report” irregular, and the further message of 29 No-
vember to Honolulu asking for reports even when there were no ship
movements (Top Secet Ex. “B”) might readily have suggested to
an imaginative person a possible Jap design on Pearl Harbor. Fail-
ure to appreciate the significance of such messages shows a lack of
the type of skill in anticipating and ‘preparing against eventualities
which we have a right to expect in an officer at the head of the War
Plans Division. If this criticism seems harsh, it only illustrates the
advisability of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret informa-
tion to Short.
The Board concludes (b) that General Gerow failed in his duty in
sending Short the 27 November radiogram, which the Board held was
not a clear and concise directive. In various places in the Report,
the Board refers to this radiogram as containing confusing and con-
flicting statements. In my opinion this is an erroneous characteriza-
tion of the message. It fails to take into account the very essence
of the situation which then presented [4<>] itself. Those in
authority in Washington, from the President down, were confronted
at that moment with a most difficult and delicate situation. The diplo-
matic negotiations which had been taking place between the Secre-
tary of State and the Japanese emissaries had practically reached the
breaking point. They knew that the Japanese might resort to war
at any moment. On the other hand, they knew that the United States
was not prepared for war and that every week or month' of delay
would help the situation. In a memorandum dated that very day —
27 November 1941 — the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of
Operations of the Navy addressed a joint memorandum to the Presi-
dent of the United States, urging him to postpone any action that
might precipitate war as long as possible because we were not ready.
Confronted with this situation, those in authority in the War Depart-
ment, including the Secretary of W ar ^participated in the preparation
of this radiogram and similar ones (Tr., Stimson 4055, 4056), which
were sent to other department commanders, and undertook to express
as accurately as possible the essential elements of this delicate situa-
tion, warning of the possibility of an attack at any moment and
266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that nothing must be omitted to jeopardize our defense. At the same
time they warned them of the importance of not doing anything that
would precipitate war on our part. This naturally presented a delicate
problem, but it was delicate because of the very nature of the facte
and not because of any confusion of thought which was translated
into the language. There was no other course except to present this
problem just as it was to the responsible theater commander. In any
delicate situation conflicting factors are bound to exist. It is because
it requires wisdom and judgment to deal with them that only men
supposedly qualified are given posts of such responsibility. In any
event, the Board overlooks the Navy radio of 27 November, beginning
“This is a war warning”, which General Gerow knew was being sent.
(Tr., Gerow 4261-4262)
As to the Board’s conclusion (c) that General Gerow failed to note
Short’s reply and to take corrective action, the Board is on firmer
ground. General Gerow admitted that while it was physically im-
possible for him to check every message (Tr., Gerow 4288) and that
he considered the War Department gave Short adequate warning
(Tr., Gerow 4300), nevertheless he had erred by asuming that the
reply of Short was to the sabotage radiogram from The Adjutant
General of 27 November. (Tr., Gerow 4290-4291) This being so,
it follows that he failed also to follow up on the demand in the radio-
gram of 27 November signed “Marshall”, for a report from Short.
As to this, General Gerow testified :
The thought that he had not replied never occurred to me between the interval
of November 27 and December 7. As I say, there were many other important
problems coming up at the time, and I expected my staff to follow through.
(Tr., Gerow 4290)
[47] In fairness to General Gerow it should also be mentioned that
Colonel Bundy, now deceased, was directly under General Gerow
in charge of the Planning and Operational Group and had been
handling the Pacific matters. (Tr., Gerow 4288, 4291)
General Gerow, as head of the Division, must be held accountable
for the failure of his Division to function with the efficiency that
would have made impossible such an oversight. This is so even though
the War Plans Division is concerned with the operation of many
theaters and although its functions are not comparable to those of a
commander of a theater who, like a sentinel on post, is charged with
specific responsibilities.
As to the conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the
required steps to insure the functioning of the two services in Hawaii
pursuant to their joint agreements, it has already been seen that these
agreements for joint defensive action could be put into effect by the
two commanders in Hawaii when they deemed it advisable. (Tr.,
Gerow 4284, Kimmel 1759-1760, Short 4440) General Gerow assumed
and had the right to assume that, warned by the threat of hostile
attack contained in the 27 November message, the two commanders
would put into effect the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Tr.,
Gerow 4289), or at least such portions therefore as would assure ade-
quate reconnaissance.
On the whole, I feel that the Board’s criticism (a) of General
Gerow in failing to send Short the substance of the data delivered
to him by G-2 is, in the light of after-events, to a degree justified.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
267
(Bep. 299) At least it was a precautionary measure which Qeneral
Gerow could well have taken. I agree too with the Board’s con-
clusion (c) in so far as it holds that General Gerow was culpable in
failing to check on Short’s reply to the November 27 message signed
“Marshall.” I disagree with the Board in its conclusion (b) that
General Gerow in approving the 27 November message to Short failed
to send a clear, concise directive. As already indicated, I feel that
this radiogram accurately and adequately picture the situation as it
existed and gave definite instructions. I also disagree with the Board’s
conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required steps
to implement the existing Joint Army and Navy War Plan. General
Gerow was entitled to believe that, warned as they were, the two
commanders would themselves put these plans into effect.
Miscellaneous Statements of Board:
Certain conclusions of the Board, such as those relating to Secretary
Hull, are not in my opinion relevant to the Board’s inquiry. My
failure to discuss such matters should not be regarded as indicating
my agreement with these conclusions. Nor has it been necessary to
consider such irrelevant matters in arriving at my conclusions.
[48] Unexplored Leads:
In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain
further inquiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opin-
ion, might advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries
would not, in all probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the
same time in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain
personnel these leads should be further explored. I do not mean to
suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the
work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter.
In the event you approve of this suggestion I will discuss these mat-
ters in detail with the officer selected by you.
Recommendations:
As to General Marshall I have already expressed my opinion that
the conclusions of the Board are unjustified and erroneous.
As to General Gerow I have stated my agreement with the conclu-
sions of the Board (a) that he erred in not sending to Short more
information that he did, and (c) in not checking on Short’s reply
to the 27 November message signed “Marshall.” In my opinion these
errors do not warrant disciplinary action against General Gerow.
General Gerow admitted the error of his division in not checking
Short’s reply, for which he frankly took the blame. The nature of
the errors and the fact that he has since demonstrated his great quali-
fications for field command indicate that his case is now bar removed
from disciplinary action.
As to Short I have concurred in the conclusions of the Board (Rep.
300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a
state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting
an alert against sabotage only; (b) in failing to reach or attempt to
reach an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the
Joint Army and Navy Plans for defense into operation; and (c) to
inform himself on the effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance
being conducted by the Navy. As to whether Short’s culpability in
268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the above respects is of the type which constitutes a military offense
suggesting trial by court-martial, I have already indicated as to (a)
above that Short in failing to put into operation the proper alert was
not so much guilty of a neglect of duty as of a serious error of judg-
ment. It is difficult to visualize his mistake in the form of a neglect
of duty when the evidence shows that he considered his various alterna-
tives and came to the conclusion that Alert No. 1 was the proper alert.
The fact that in arriving at this conclusion he failed to take into con-
sideration certain factors such as that a surprise air attack was the
primary threat, or that he failed to subordinate certain other factors |
such as possible alarm of the civil population does not remove the case
from the category of a mistake of judgment. These mistakes simply
led up to the error of judgment in establishing the wrong alert. The
fact also that he communicated to the War Department his decision to
establish what was tantamount to Alert No. 1 is likewise inconsistent
with the concept of a neglect of duty.
[$?] As to whether (b) Short’s failure to reach or attempt to
reach an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the
Joint Army and Navy Defense Plans into operation is a neglect of
duty in the nature of being a triable offense, I am of the opinion that,
on the testimony now of record, this question is answered by what has
been said above. Short’s failure stemmed from a mistake of judgment
on his part.
As to the Board’s conclusion (c) that Short failed in his duties in
failing to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long distance
reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy, Short’s defense would
be, as he indicated in th e pr esent proceedings, that such reconnaissance
was a Navy function. Whether he was entitled to rely upon the fact
that the Navy was conducting, to the best of its ability, such recon-
naissance as it had means to conduct, seems doubtful. I do not feel
that it can be made the basis of charges against General Short. I
believe the truer picture to be that General Short had adopted whole-
heartedly what was apparently the viewpoint of the Navy, namely,
that there was literally no chance of a surprise air attack on Pearl
Harbor.
Considering the matter of General Short’s possible trial by court-
martial at the present time, I have been informed that the Japanese
are still using some of the code systems in which various intercepted
messages were sent and that information of great military value con-
tinues to be obtained from present day intercepts sent in these code
systems. A present trial would undoubtedly result in disclosing these
facts. There is also the difficulty of assembling the necessary court
of high ranking officers and securing the attendance of numerous wit-
nesses who would be recalled from their various war-time duties all
over the world. I feel therefore that trial of General Short in time of
war is out of the question.
As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor
to be considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the Court
would adjudge. As I have already indicated, upon any charge of
neglect of duty, or of his various duties, General Short would have the i
formidable defense that he responded to the request to report measures
he had taken with a message, incomplete and ambiguous it may be,
but which should have prompted doubt as to the sufficiency of the
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
269
action taken. My experience with courts-martial leads me to the
belief that a court would be reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence in
a case of this kind where the general picture would be clouded by a
claim that others were contributory causes. (Cf., Roberts Report,
Conclusion 18, p. 21 ) There is also in cases like this the historic prece-
dent of President Lincoln’s refusal to rebuke Secretary of War Simon
Cameron for a gross error of judgment. (Life of Abraham Lincoln
by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p. 125-130) I am therefore forced to con-
clude that if General Short is tried and if such trial should result in
his conviction there is considerable likelihood the Court would adjudge
a sentence less than dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond
a reprimand.
[60] As on the whole, there is doubt whether a court would con-
vict or if it convicted would adjudge a sentence in excess of reprimand,
I am inclined to feel that some disposition of the matter other than by
a trial should be made rather than to permit the case to linger on as a
recurrent public irritation. I suggest therefore that a public state-
ment be made by you giving a brief review of the Board’s proceedings
and pointing out that General Short was guilty of errors of judgment
for which he was properly removed from command, and that this
constitutes a sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the
event further investigation should disclose a different situation the
matter could later be reexamined in the light of such additional
evidence.
Myron C. Cramer,
Major General ,
The Judge Advocate General.
i
78719— 46— El. 157 18
270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fa] Memorandum for the Secretary of War
Subject : Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation, 14 September 1945
[f] 14 September 1945.
Memorandum for the Secretary of War
Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation
This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.
Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, appointed by you
pursuant to your public statement, dated 1 December 1944, to con-
tinue the Army Pearl Harbor investigation, has submitted the affi-
davits obtained by him in the course of nis further investigation. The
present memorandum is my opinion as to whether my original memo-
randum to you, dated 25 November 1944, reviewing the report of the
Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944, requires modifica-
tion either in respect of the conclusions reached or the statements
of fact contained therein drawn from the Army Pearl Harbor Board
report. In my opinion, the conclusions therein are in no way affected
by the additional data obtained by Colonel Clausen’s investigation.
Certain statements of fact, however, made by me in my prior memo-
randum, which statements I made as a result of my examination of
the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, require clarification in some
respects.
The “Winds” Message:
On pages 24-28 of my memorandum I discussed as part of the in-
formation the War Department possessed and which Short claimed
he did not receive, the so-called “Winds Code” message of 20 Novem-
ber 1941 from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives. This
was to the effect that
“In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)”, a
warning message would be given in the middle and at the end of the Japanese
daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows :
“(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO
KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
“(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH
WIND CLOUDY)
i “(3) Japan-British relations: NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND
CLEAR)”
When this signal was heard, all codes and ciphers were to be destroyed.
It is admitted by all that this first “Winds” message, setting up a
code or signal to be given later, was received by the War Department
around 20 November 1941. However, the testimony before the Army
Pearl \2~\ Harbor Board left in doubt whether a second or
activating or execute “Winds” message was ever received and if so
by whom. The testimony of Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army
codes and ciphers, (my Memo., p. 24) that an activating “Winds”
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
271
message indicating a breach in Japanese-British diplomatic relations
had been received was not entirely satisfactory. This is likewise true
of the testimony of Captain Salford, head of the Navy’s Security
Division, to the same effect (my Memo. p. 25).
Colonel Clausen’s subsequent investigation fails to disclose any tes-
timony that an activating or implementing “Winds” message indicat-
ing breach of Japanese relations with either Great Britain, Russia
or the United States was ever received bv the War Department.
Thus, Colonel Harold Doud, in charge of B Section, Signal Intelli-
gence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section, in
November and December 1941, stated :
I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know
there was no such execute message received In the War Department. ( Affid., Col.
Harold Doud)
Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific
Fleet, testified no such message was ever received at Pearl Harbor
(affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton, p. 2). A statement of Commander
J. S. Holtwickj Commander Rochefort’s assistant at Pearl Harbor, was
to the same effect. (Memorandum of Comdr. J. S. Holtwick)
Colonel Rox W. Minckler, Signal Corps, in charge of Signal Intelli-
gence Service at the time, stated :
I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either
before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent.
(Affid., Col. Rex W. Minckler)
He said there were “one or two ‘false alarms’ ”, which he discussed
with representatives of G-2 and the Navy. His opposite number in
the Navy was Captain L. F. Safford.
Major General Sherman Miles, in charge of G-2 at the time did not
reAll meeting Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler on 5 December
1941, at which meeting Colonel Sadtler is supposed to have advised
him of Admiral Noyes^ telephone call that “The message is in.” (See
Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 24) General Miles stated : “To the best
of my knowledge and belief, no authentic execute message was ever
received in the War Department before the outbreak of hostilities.”
(Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2) General Miles stated that
the Far Eastern Section of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for the
activating “Winds” message which was regarded as of vital concern.
He stated there were several [J] messages intercepted which
were thought at first to be the execute message but which turned out
not to be authentic. He thought that if there was any meeting with
Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, it concerned an unauthentic mes-
sage. ( Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2)
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Corps, in charge of military codes
and ciphers in the Chief Signal Office, in November and December
1941, stated that when he got word from Admiral Noyes that “The
message is in” (See Vol. D., Top Secret testimony, p. 251) , he did
nothing further to ascertain from Admiral Noyes or other persons
the exact wording of the 4 intercept as he assumed that according to
standard practice, it would be transmitted without delay to G-2
(Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler) . In his affidavit given to Colonel Clau-
sen, Colonel Sadtler stated that after talking to General Miles and
272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Bratton about Admiral Noyes’ message he went to his office
and typed a proposed warning as follows :
C. G.-P. I., Hawaii-Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan
in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repetition of
Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall.
However he did not show this message to anyone or make a copy
of it and he quoted it only from memory. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler)
According to his original testimony he conferred with General Gerow
and General Bedell Smith about Admiral Noyes’ message. He did not
show them the above-quoted draft but stated he did suggest that a
warning message be sent the overseas commanders as he testified be-
fore the Army Pearl Harbor Board (Vol. D, Top Secret testimony,
p. 253). He reiterated this testimony before Colonel Clausen (Affid.,
Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 1) . Neither General Gerow nor General Smith
had any recollection of any such conference with Colonel Sadtler or
any such recommendation by him. General Gerow pointed out quite
appositely that Colonel Sadtler was “purely a Signal Corps officer
and that he was not concerned with the dissemination and interpreta-
tion of ‘Magic’ ” messages (Affid., General Leonard Gerow) . Gen-
eral Smith likewise has no recollection of Colonel Sadtler discussing
the matter with him. General Smith stated that he was not on the
very restricted list of officers with whom top secret matters of the
“Magic” type could be discussed, and thus it would have been im-
possible for Colonel Sadtler to have discussed the matter with him.
(Afid., Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith)
[4] Colonel Sadtler in his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen
stated that other than his testimony relative to the Admiral Noyes
message (probably a “false alarm”), he had never seen any execute
message to the “Winds Code” and, so far as he knew, no such execute
message was received in the War Department. He at no time urged
General Miles, G-2, or any other representative of G-2 to send a
warning message to overseas commanders. (Affid., Col. Otis. K.
Sadtler, p. 3)
I have been informed that Admiral Noyes and other witnesses
appearing before Admiral Hewitt in the Navy inquiry into the Pearl
Harbor matter, denied the receipt of an authentic execute “Winds”
message.
Colonel Rufus W. Bratton,, in charge of the Far Eastern Section,
G-2, in 1941, recalled a meeting 5 December 1941 with General Miles
and Colonel Sadtler at which Colonel Sadtler presented the informa-
tion he had received from Admiral Noyes. Colonel Sadtler was in-
structed to get the exact text from Admiral Noyes, as there had been
several “false alarm” reports to the same effect. So far as he knew.
Colonel Sadtler never returned to G-2 with the text or any additional
information. Colonel Bratton had no information about any alleged
visit of Colonel Sadtler to General Gerow or General Bedell Smith.
Colonel Bratton never brought Colonel Sadtler’s report to the atten-
tion of the Chief of Staff. (Affid., Col. Rufys W. Bratton, p. 2)
Colonel Bratton stated that at no time prior to 7 December 1941
did he ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the
“Winds Code.” As to the testimony of Captain Safford of the Navy
to the effect that two copies of such a message were sent to the Army,
Colonel Bratton pointed out that not two but six copies of any such
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
273
message were required to be sent by the Navy to the Army, the in-
ference being that no copies at all were sent. Prior to 7 December
1941, representatives of the Navy had discussed with him several
“false alarms” relative to the “Winds” message but no one in the
Navy or in G-2 ever discussed with him the message supposed to
have been sent to the Army according to Captain Saffora’s testi-
mony. (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton)
Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, Signal Corps, in charge of radio
interception for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department,
prior to 7 December 1941, testified that on receipt of the original
“Winds” message, [5] ‘ he directed the San Francisco inter-
ception station to be on the watch for an activating message and to
send it to him. To the best of his knowledge, no execute message was
ever picked up. (Affid., Col. Robert E. Schukraft)
General Gerow’s and General Bedell Smith’s comment on Colonel
Sadtler’s testimony relative to the alleged execute “Winds” message
received from Admiral Noyes has already been discussed. (See affi-
davits, Gen. Gerow, p. 2 ; Gen. W. Bedell Smith, p. 3) .
Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, the 1941 Executive Assistant
to the Chief, Intelligence Branch, MID } General Staff, testified to
Colonel Clausen that the source of his information on all “Ultra”
(or “Magic”) messages concerning Japan was Colonel Bratton and
Major Dusenbury, Colonel Bratton’s assistant. He inquired of
Colonel Bratton on several occasions as to whether any execute mes-
sage had come in under the “Winds Code.” He did not recall re-
ceiving any such information from Colonel Bratton and stated that,
if he had received it, he would have remembered it. No other person
informed him of any such execute “Winds” message prior to 7 Decem-
ber 1941 (Affid., Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts) .
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur testified to Colonel
Clausen that he had no recollection of having received any of the
messages in Top Secret Exhibit B (see my first memorandum of 25
November 1944, pp. 19-23). He never got the “Winds Code” or
any activating or implementing message. He believed he had seen
every “Ultra” message delivered to his headquarters. (Affid., Gen.
Douglas MacArthur) His Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Richard
K. Sutherland, testified to the same effect. (Affid., Lt. Gen. Richard
K. Sutherland) Major General C. A. Willoughby, assistant Chief
of Staff, Southwest Pacific Area, stated he had never seen any of
the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B except isolated fragments
of the Kurusu series. Neither he nor anyone else in the USAFFE to
his knowledge were advised of the “Winds Code” or of any execute
message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby)
Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Rowlett testified to Colonel Clausen
that immediately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack he was a civilian
technical assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytic
Unit, Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington,
D. C., at present Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency, Signal Corps,
War Department. In the latter capacity, he made a search for an
activating “Winds” message, which he failed to find. (Affid., Lt.
Col. Frame B. Rowlett)
.[«] My conclusion, from the above testimony, read in connec-
tion with the testimony in the Pearl Harbor Report as to the
274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
“Winds” message, discussed by me in my memorandum dated 25
November 1944, is that the most diligent search fails to reveal that
any activating or execute “Winds” message was ever received by the
War Department. In this connection, General Marshall’s testimony
will be recalled, “I find that no officer of the Navy advised Gen.
Miles or Col. Bratton that any message implementing the ‘Winds’
Code had been received by the Navy. (Vol. A, Top Secret Tr.,
Marshall, P. 38.)
The Rochefort Message:
In my original memorandum (p. 27), I referred to Colonel Brat-
ton’s testimony that on receipt of the 2 December message, translated
4 December, from Tokyo to the Embassy at Washington, ordering
destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this
message to General Miles and General Gerow and after discussing
it, recommended a further warning or alert to our overseas com-
manders. General Gerow, felt that sufficient warning had already
been given and General Miles stated he was in no position to over-
rule him. Colonel Bratton, however, still feeling uneasy about the
matter, went to the Navy, where he discussed it with Commander
McCollum, who felt as he did. McCollum stated that as Commander
Rochefort, the Naval Combat Intelligence Officer with the Fourteenth
Naval District in Honolulu, had gotten the first “Winds” message
and wsa listening for the second or implementing message, a radio-
gram be sent to General Short’s G-2 in Hawaii to see Commander
Rochefort at once. Colonel Bratton thereupon drafted a radiogram
signed “Miles,” which was sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, on 5 December 1941, read-
ing as follows :
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteenth
Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.
No testimony is contained in the original Army Pearl Harbor
Board Report or in the Top Secret report as to whether Short was
informed of the above message. However, realizing its importance.
Colonel Clausen in his subsequent investigation examined General
Fielder, Short’s G-2, and Colonel Bicknell, his Assistant G-2, as to
whether this radiogram was received and what action was taken.
General Fielder testified he had no recollection of ever having seen
this radiogram (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 2) .
As to the likelihood of the “Winds” information being sent to him
by the Navy, independently of the so-called Rochefort message, Gen-
eral Fielder testified :
[7] My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their
combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of in-
formation between the InteUigence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do
primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me
by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the
Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known
that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed immi-
nent, but aU my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles
for Hawaii. (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 6, p. 2.)
General Fielder further said:
No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies
except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believe the Pa-
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
275
ciflc Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent Information of the Japanese
fleet and assumed that if any information which I needed to know was possessed
by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I
asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would
not have been given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had
turned any over to me he would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would
have given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col.
Bicknell. The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command
justified principally to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast
batteries, anti-aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force
as the weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive
action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii.
1 have been told that prior to December 7, 1941, the Intelligence Officer of
7th AF, Lt. Col. Raley, was in liaison with and received some information from
Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to
divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did not come to me and I didn’t
know of the liaison until after the war started. (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J.
Fielder, par. 8, p. 2.)
General Fielder had no recollection of ever having seen any of the
Japanese messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit B which included
the “Winds” message (referred to in my original memorandum, pp.
19-23) (Affid., Brig. Gen. Fielder, par. 11, p. 3).
Colonel George W. Bicknell, Short’s Assistant G-2, in charge of the
Contact Office in downtown Honolulu, stated that he maintained
very close [5] liaison with Commander Rochefort and knew
prior to Pearl Harbor Day that the latter was engaged in intercept-
ing and decrypting Japanese messages. During the latter part of
November, 1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted the Jap-
anese message containing the “Winds Code.” He took immediate
action to have the local Federal Communications Commission agency
monitor for the execute message, which was not received (Affid., Col.
George W. Bicknell, p. 1). His attention was again called to the
“Winds Code” when on 5 December 1941 he saw on General (then
Colonel) Fielder’s desk the radiogram from General Miles to con-
tact Commander Rochefort. (This directly conflicts with General
Fielder’s testimony that he never saw the Rochefort radiogram.)
Colonel Bicknell that day communicated with Commander Roche-
fort to ascertain the pertinent information and was told that Com-
mander Rochefort was monitoring for the execute message. This in-
formation was also given to Mr. Robert L. Shivers, in charge of the
FBI in Honolulu.
The affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Executive Officer of
the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, who assisted in send-
ing the Rochefort message, contains hearsay statements to the effect
that “Hawaii had everything in the way of information that Wash-
ington had” (including the “Winds” message), the source of which
was Navy personnel whose identity he could not recall. His undis-
closed Navy sources were also authority for his statement that Com-
mander Rochefort’s ciypto -analytic unit in Hawaii were monitoring
for intercepts, breaking and translating the codes and that the Army
in Hawaii would receive all this information. He said he sent the
Rochefort message on 5 December merely as a precautionary meas-
use. (Affid., Col. Moses W. Pettigrew)
Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu at the
time, does not mention the “Winds” message as such in his affidavit.
Apparently, however, the Navy had guardedly advised him of this
276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
message or its equivalent prior to 7 December. Thus, he said Cap-
tain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, told him he
was aware of the code the Japanese would use to announce a break in
Japanese relations. Mayfield gave Shivers a code by which he would
inform Shivers of Japanese activities in this line and Shivers passed
this information on to Colonel Bicknell. Mayfield never gave him
the code signal. (Affid., Robert L. Shivers)
Mr. Shivers testified:
(Commander Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he
disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after 7
December. (Affid., Robert L. Shivers)
There is a conflict in this respect between Mr. Shivers and Colonel
Bicknell.
[9] General Fielder, when presented with Commander Roche-
fort’s affidavit indicating the “Winds Code” message was given to
him, specifically denied that he received it. General Fielder stated :
I fell sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt Col Bicknell, who accord-
ing to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any of it
came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming
from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt Col Bicknell was get-
ting the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event
Rochefort did not give it to me direct. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, par. 10, p. 3)
General Short was not specifically examined as to whether he re-
ceived the “Winds Code” message. Impliedly it is covered by his
general denial of the receipt of information other than that he ad-
mitted he received.
In my opinion, the state of the present record fails to show con-
clusively that the “Winds Code” message as such reached General
Short personally either through the medium of liaison between the
Navy and the Army Intelligence Sections in Hawaii or as a result of
the Rochefort message. Whether Short received equivalent infor-
mation will now be considered.
Other Information Possessed by General Short:
I have been informed that Short, when he appeared before the
Navy Board, testified that had he gotten General Marshall’s 7 Decem-
ber radiogram prior to the attack, it might have been a different story.
In answer to a question as to whether he would then have gone on a
different alert, he said :
I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about
the destruction of the code machines. The other matter wouldn't have made
much of an impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or code ma-
chines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this
advantage also: I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving
that out, the destruction of the code machine would have been very significant
to me. I would have been very much more alarmed about that than the other
matter. * * * I would have taken the destruction of the code machine*
very seriously. (Italics supplied)
It is a fair inference that long prior to Pearl Harbor Day, Short
obtained equivalent information from Colonel Bicknell and possibly
others.. In my memorandum of 25 November 1944 (p. 10, 19, 30),
I referred to General Fielder’s and Colonel Bicknell’s testimony that
they had information prior to 7 December that the Japanese Consulate
in Honolulu was [ 10] “destroying its codes and burning its
secret papers,” which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
277
meant war. This information Colonel Bicknell brought to the atten-
tion of General Short’s staff conference on the morning of 6 Decem-
ber, a conference presided over by General Short’s Chief of Staff,
Colonel Phillips. (Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 10, 19) Colonel
Phillips stated he brought it to the attention of General Short (Memo.
25 November 1944, p. 19).
The above testimony was amplified by further testimony by Mr.
Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu. Mr. Shivers testified
that on 3 December 1941 Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Offi-
cer for the Navy, called him, asking him if he could verify informa-
tion that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was burning his
codes and papers. About two hours later the FBI intercepted a
telephone message between the cook at the Japanese Consulate and a
Japanese in Honolulu, during which the cook stated that the Consul
General was “burning and destryoing all his important papers.”
Shivers immediately gave this information to Captain Mayfield and
Colonel Bicknell. Shivers likewise telegraphed Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Japanese Consul
General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers.”
Worthy of note also is Mr. Shivers’ statement that on 28 November
1941 he received a radiogram from Mr. Hoover to the effect that peace
negotiations between the United States and Japan were breaking
down and to be on the alert at all times as anything was liable to hap-
pen. Shivers gave this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel
Bicknell, ho stated they had already received similar information
from their respective heads in Washington. (Affid., Robert L.
Shivers)
General Fielder confirmed Colonel Bicknell’s testimony that the
destruction by the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu of “codes
and papers” was related by Colonel Bicknell at the staff conference
on 6 December 1941. General Fielder testified, “I gave this latter
information to General Short the same day.” (Affid., Brig. Gen.
Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3)
Colonel Bicknell testified that about 3 December 1941 he learned
from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japa-
nese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong,
Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. This apparently was radio Op-
Nav No. 031850, dated 3 December 1941, addresed to the Commander-
in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. Pacific Fleet, Commandant, 14th Naval Dis-
trict, Commandant, 16tn Naval District, reading as follows :
Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in-
structions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at
Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy
most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important con-
fidential and secret documents. (Top Secret Vol. C, Safford, p. 183)
[ 11 ] Colonel Bicknell saw the above radiogram. (Affid., Col.
Bicknell, p. 2)
About this time he got the information above referred to from Mr.
Shivers, and told the staff conference “what I had learned concerning
the destruction of their important papers by Japanese consuls.”
(Affid.. Col. Bicknell, p. 2)
He also informed the conference that because of this and subsequent
information which he had from reliable sources, the destruction of
278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
such papers had a very serious intent and that something war like by
Japan was about to happen somewhere. He had previously prepared
and signed weekly estimates given to the Chief of Staff to the same
effect. (Vol. 30, Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, p. 3684r-
3685) Colonel Bicknell also testified further relative to giving General
Fielder and General Short the Dr. Mori mesage intercepted by the
FBI on 6 December 1941 (referred to in Memo., 25 November 1944,
p. 11). Their reaction was as follows, according to Colonel Bicknell :
Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too
“Intelligence conscious” and that to them this message seemed to be quite in
order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General
Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for
about five minutes.
Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short while waiting to testify before
the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me words
to the effect, “Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens you
were right and I was wrong.” (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 3)
It is difficult to believe. that General Short was not advised prior to
Pearl Harbor Day by General Fielder, Colonel Phillips, Colonel
Bicknell, or all three, of current intelligence reports and, in particular,
that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was burning its papers. In
the interest of strict accuracy, however, I must mention statements
made bv me on pages 10, 19 and 30 of my prior memorandum, based
on the Army Pearl Harbor Board record, that Short’s G-2 and Assist-
ant G-2 had information that the Jap Consulate in Honolulu was
destroying its codes and secret papers. Mr. Shivers, the source of this
information, does not mention “codes” in his affidavit but simply states
the Consul General was “burning and destroying all his important
papers.” To most people, this would mean codes, since it is well known
Consulates possess codes, which are in paper form. Colonel Bicknell
evidently so interpreted it, judging from his statement that he evalu-
ated the Dr. Mori message (See Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11) in
the light of the information he had received concerning the destruction
by Jap Consuls of their “codes and papers.” This is confirmed by
General Fielder’s testimony that Colonel Bicknell told the Staff Con-
ference 6 December 1941 that the Jap Consul was [i£] burning
his “codes and papers. (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3)
Without, however, bringing home to General Short in strict accuracy
the information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was
destroying his codes , as distinguished from other papers, the fact that
he was destroying his secret papers and not some but all such papers
at that juncture of world affairs is entitled to great weight in consider-
ing whether General Short had adequate knowledge or the true Japa-
nese-American situation. While it may be said that codes are tech-
nically different from secret papers, or “papers,” of the Jap Consulate,
and Colonel Bicknell or other Hawaiian contacts are quite different as
sources of information from the Chief of Staff, the fact remains that
to an alert commander information, from whatever source, of the
destruction of either codes, secret papers, or merely “all important
papers” by the Jap Consulate in Honolulu at that time should have had
extreme significance.
The Manila Warning Message:
This was an urgent cablegram dispatched 3 December 1941 by Colo-
nel G. H. Wilkinson, the British representative of Theodore H. Davies
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
279
& Co., Honolulu, one of the Big Five, to Mr. Harry L. Dawson, an
employee of the Davies Company, and the British Consul in Honolulu.
Colonel Wilkinson was a member by marriage of the Davies family and
was secretly working for the British Government as a secret agent in
Manila. The cablegram received by the Davies Company in Honolulu
the night of 3 December read as follows :
We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments
in Indo-China :
A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.
2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and consider-
able quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).
B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington
Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities
with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at
present but will act in South.
You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Inteligence Honolulu.
[18] Immediately upon receipt of it, Mr. John E. Bussell, Pres-
ident of Theodore H. Davies & Company, cancelled a considerable
volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines. A copy of the cable-
gram was given to Colonel Bicknell, Short* s Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers,
head of the FBI in Honolulu, and Captain Mayfield, the District Intel-
ligence Officer of the Navy. (Statement of Mr. John E. Russell and
exhibit)
Mr. Shivers has already been informed by Colonel Wilkinson of his
undercover activities and of his connection with Mr. Harry Dawson,
the British Vice Consul in Honolulu, likewise an employee of the
Davies Company. Colonel Wilkinson arranged with him in July of
1941 to give him information through Mr. Dawson. Mr. Shivers said
his files indicated his receipt of the cablegram of 3 December 1941
from Colonel Wilkinson. Major General C. A. Willoughby, at that
time G-2 of the Philippine Department, knew of Wilkinson and of
his activities.
Colonel Bicknell, Short’s Assistant G-2 admitted receipt of the Ma-
nila cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson. He stated he gave the
information contained in it to General Short. (Amendment to affi-
davit of Col. George W. Bicknell)
In addition to the cablegram above referred to, Colonel Bicknell
stated he obtained a mass of information from the British SIS, through
Colonel Wilkinson, which he brought to the attention of General Short,
in one form or another. (Amend, affid., Col. George W. Bicknell)
A file of this information is attached to Colonel Clausen’s report.
General Fielder was shown this file. Some few items struck a respon-
sive chord in his memory, but he could not remember if they were
brought to his attention prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the
information was not brought to his attention, according to General
Fielder. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, p. 3)
It is difficult to believe that General Short was not made aware of the
highly inportant information contained in the 3 December cablegram
from Manila. The same comment is applicable to the 27 November
cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, the British Vice
Consul, which stated :
Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1 repeat Dec. 1, without
any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view to getting between Bangkok
and Singapore.
280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A copy of this cablegram also went to Colonel Bicknell, Mr. Shivers,
and Captain Mayfield. Colonel Bicknell said this was part of the
information he gave to Short “in one form or another.” (Amend,
affid., Col. George W. Bicknell)
[ 14 ] British SIS Reports Furnished Colonel Bicknell:
These reports, referred to above, which were transmitted in triplicate
by Colonel Wilkinson at Manila, through the British Vice Consul at
Honolulu, Mr. Dawson, to Colonel Bicknell, Short’s Assistant G-2,
Mr. Shivers of the FBI, and Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence
Officer of the Navy, are too voluminous to be discussed in detail. In
the aggregate, these reports make an impressive showing of growing
tension in the Far East. Much of the data contained in these reports
found its way into Colonel Bicknell’s estimates of the Japanese situa-
tion, which he testified he furnished General Short. (Amend. Affid.,
Col. George W. Bicknell)
Information Received By Captain Edwin T. Layton, TJSN :
Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, was, for a year prior to the Pearl
Harbor disaster, Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He
testified to Colonel Clausen that about three months prior to 7 Decem-
ber 1941 the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air
Force, Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Raley, came to him and re-
quested various items of intelligence. About ten days to two weeks
prior to 7 December 1941, Captain Layton gave Colonel Raley certain
top secret intelligence, without, however, disclosing its origin, which
included the “Winds Code” message and information tending to show
a general movement of Japanese naval forces to the South. When the
Army proposed to make photographic reconnaissance of the Japanese
mandated islands in November, 1941, he held a series of conferences
with Colonel Raley about the matter. F rom time to time when General
Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel, he was called to pre-
sent the intelligence picture to them. (Affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton,
USN ) According to Colonel Raley, his contacts with Captain Layton
were limited to about six conversations with him over the entire year
1941, the last in October, 1941. He told Captain Layton and Colonel
Bicknell that hostilities with Japan were possible at any moment.
This was in October, 1941. They apparently shared his view. He
also reported this to General Martin. (Affid., Col. Edward W. Raley)
Comment on Information Which Reached General Short:
In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, after discussing the in-
formation as to Japanese activities which admittedly reached Short
and additional information possessed by the War Department which
was not sent him, I said :
* * * while there was more information in Washington than Short had.
Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander that
there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations. (P. 30)
Colonel Clausen’s investigation has fortified me in my conclusions
above stated. Reference is made to my memorandum to you of even
date, subject “Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board,” for a
further discussion on this subject.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
281
[15] Short' 8 SOP Against Attack :
In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, 1 stated :
Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General
Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts, Alert No. 1
being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions ; Alert No. 2 being
applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field
positions as in Alert No. 1 ; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and
uprisings within the Islands “with no particular threat from without.” It will
be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of the final
plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 14 of the
SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of the SOP,
sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for preparation for
“o surprise hostile attack .” (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64.) (Italics supplied.)
As stated in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, Short on re-
ceipt of the radiogram from General Marshall, dated 27 November
1941, within half an hour ordered Alert No. 1, which is SOP described
as a defense against sabotage “with no threat from without.” (Memo.,
25 Nov. 1944, p. 2). In response to so much of General Marshall’s
radiogram as ordered him to “report measures taken,” he sent the short
reply “Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the
Navy.” (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 13) Short testified that his SOP
of 5 November 1941 was sent to the War Department on that date or
about that time (Tr., Short, p. 431, Vol. 5). Under this SOP, Alert
No. 1 was against sabotage only. Apparently Short’s present con-
tention is that in advising the War Department by radiogram that
the Department was alerted against sabotage, he brought home to the
War Department that only Alert No. 1 under his SOP of 5 November
1941 was being put into effect. (Tr., Short, p. 431 )
Colonel Clausen’s investigation fails to disclose any evidence that
Short transmitted his SOP of 5 November 1941 to the War Depart-
ment on or around that date. The best evidence indicates that it was
not received in the War Department until March of 1942. Colonel
Clarence G. Jensen, A. C., was specially deputized to make a careful
investigation to ascertain the date of receipt by the War Department
of this document. He searched in the files of The Adjutant General,
the War Plans Division, and the Army Air Forces, and made specific
inquiries of those likely to have any knowledge of the matter. His
search indicated that no such SOP was received by the War Depart-
ment until March, 1942. A letter from the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department (Lt. Glen. Emmons), dated 29 January 1942,
transmitting the SOP to the War Department bears a receipt dated
10 March 1942. ( Affid., Col. Clarence G. Jensen)
Receipt and Distribution of the 13 Parts a/nd the 14th Part of the
Japanese Intercept of 6-7 December 1941 :
[16] Attached hereto is a copy of a separate memorandum by
me to you of even date which sufficiently discusses Colonel Clausen’s
investigation of the above matter. No further comment is deemed
necessary in this place.
Conclusion:
My conclusions contained in my memorandum of 25 November 1944
relative to the Board’s findings as to General Short, General Marshall,
282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Gerow and Secretary Hull have been reexamined by me in
the light of Colonel Clausen’s investigation. I find nothing in Colonel
Clausen’s investigation which leads me to modify these conclusions.
The statements of fact made in my memorandum of 25 November 1944,
based upon the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and
that Board’s report, are clarified and modified in accordance with
the present memorandum.
Myron C. Cramer,
Major General ,
The Judge Advocate General .
1 Incl: Copy memo from TJAG To S/W, “Top Secret Report,
Army Pearl Harbor Board.”
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
283
[a] Memorandum for The Secretary of War
Subject: Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 14 Septem-
ber 1945
[2] 14 September 1945.
Memorandum for the Secretary of War
Subject : Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board
This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.
The Army Pearl Harbor Board made two separate reports. One was
classified as secret and consisted of two volumes. The other was classi-
fied as top secret and consisted of one volume.
I have examined the latter Top Secret Report in the light of evidence
obtained by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, in his in-
vestigation and feel that as a result thereof certain statements of fact
contained in the Top Secret Report require modification.
In its top secret report, the Board stated on pages 1 and 2 and on
page 16 :
Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential
enemy and their intentions In the negotiations between the United States and
Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November
and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the
Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what were the
Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them against the United. States.
Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy’s
intentions.
This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November
absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every
trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the
Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.
The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only a
small fraction on this information. No direction was given the Hawaiian Depart-
ment based upon this information except the “Do-Don’ t” message of November 27,
1941. It would have been possible to have sent safely information, ample for the
purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives could have
been formulated to put the Department on Alert No. 3.
This was not done.
Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon actions
to be taken by field commanders, and [ 2 ] this information cannot be dis-
closed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon the
War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the
theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable policy of the War
Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field
commanders.
Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of
Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were
available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting those
defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this informa-
tion and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is
responsible, wholly aside from Short’s responsibility in not himself having selected
the right alert.
The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give
it to Short or give him directions based upon it. (Pp 1 & 2)
Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6,
1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our State, War and
284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Navy Departments in all of their top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of
the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack. (P 16)
The Board then set forth what it called “the details of this informa-
tion.” I have analyzed these details and conclusions of the Board in
the light of Colonel Clausen’s investigation and find that they should be
revised in accordance with the new and additional evidence. These
revisions include the following :
As to information available to the War Department, the Board set
forth on page 2 :
Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions from Sep-
tember to December 1941. The record shows almost daily information as to the
Japanese plans and intentions during this period.
1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been
fixed (Tokyo time) as the governing date for Japanese offensive military opera-
tions. (R. 86)
The reference “(R. 86)” is to Page 86 of the Top Secret transcripts
of the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. These con-
sist of volumes A to D. Examination of Page 86 shows, as a basis for
the record reference in its report, a quotation by General Russell from
a document as follows :
[3] On the 24th of November we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo
time was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some
nature. We interpreted this to mean that large-scale movements for the conquest
of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because,
at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds.
The document from which General Russell quoted was the record
of the Examination conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart from
April to June, 1944, for the Secretary of the Navy. The testimony
read by General Russell was an excerpt of that given by Captain L. F.
Safford, USN. A more detailed examination of this testimony shows
that it was in reality the interpretation by Captain Safford of a
Japanese intercept message which was translated on 22 November
1941, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Wash-
ington. This message authorized the Japanese envoys to extend the
time for signing an agreement with the United States from 25 Novem-
ber to 29 November and it stated that the latter time was the absolute
deadline and “after that, things are automatically going to happen.”
The War Department did not send this specific information to the
Hawaiian Department.
It will be observed that the Board did not set forth the additional
testimony of Captain Safford to the effect that “Hawaii was out of
our minds.”
The Board further found :
^ On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese* inten-
tions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States.
(R. 87) (P2)
• ♦ ♦ On November 26th specific information received from the Navy indi-
cated that Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United States.
(R. 126-124) * * * (P 5)
This finding of the Board was based on the same reference by
General Russell to the testimony of Captain Safford. The reference
“(R. 123-124)” is to the testimony oi Captain Safford before the
Army Pearl Harbor Board. He was asked by a member of the Board
as to the source of the information which he mentioned in his testi-
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
285
mony to Admiral Hart. He stated that he could not then recollect
the source. He further stated that on 26 November the Navy had
information that Japan contemplated offensive action against England
and the United States and probably against Russia. He gave as a
basis for this information his interpretation of an intercept, SIS No.
25392, which was a circular message from Tokyo on 19 November
1941. Reference to additional testimony of Captain Safford set forth
on page 125 shows that what he had in mind was the so-called
Japanese “Winds Code” message.
[4] Colonel Clausen’s investigation shows that this information
reached Colonel Bicknell, Short’s Assistant G-2, the latter part of
November 1941.
Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department,
testified before Colonel Clausen that in the latter part of November,
1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded this
Japanese “Winds Code.” He took immediate action to monitor in
Hawaii for the execute message. He further testified that his atten-
tion was again called to the “Winds Code” when he saw on the desk
of General Fielder a warning message from G-2, War Department,
dated 5 December 1941, asking that the G-2, Hawaiian Department,
communicate with Commander Rochefort immediately regarding
weather broadcasts from Tokyo. This obviously refers to the “Winds
Code.” Colonel Bicknell further testified that he also received in-
formation of the “Winds Code” broadcasts from Mr. Robert L.
Shivers, FBI agent in charge, Honolulu, and information that Com-
mander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Unit,
Pearl Harbor, was also monitoring for the execute message.
Commander Rochefort testified before Colonel Clausen that he and
General Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, had estab-
lished and maintained liaison pertaining to their respective functions,
and that he gave General Fielder such information as he had received
concerning intercepts and Japanese diplomatic messages, and con-
cerning other information of importance in which the Army and
Navy were jointly interested, and which came to his knowledge in
the course of his duties. The information thus given to General
Fielder during the latter part of November, 1941, included the sub-
stance of the “Winds Code” intercept.
The Board found :
* * * War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on November 26
that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the
Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action. (Pp. 2 & 3)
The basis for this conclusion was testimony of Colonel Rufus S.
Bratton as he read from a summary called “A Summary of Far
Eastern Documents” which he prepared in the Fall of 1943. The
pertinent portion reads as follows :
G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that O. N. I. reported a con-
centration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after moving from
Japanese home waters southward towards Formosa and that air and submarine
activity was intensified in the Marshall Islands. (P 87)
This information was available in the Hawaiian Department before
7 December 1941.
[5] Testimony given before Colonel Clausen by Captain Lay-
ton, Captain Rochefort, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins and Com-
79716— 46— Ex. 157 19
286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mander Holtwick, of the Navy, in the additional investigation indi-
cates the probability that General Short was advised of the presence
of Japanese navy task forces in the Marshalls. The Fleet Intelligence
Officer had an established liaison relationship with the G-2, Hawaiian
Air Force. In the two months preceding 7 December the Fleet In-
telligence Officer gave to G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, pertinent infor-
mation of the increasing Japanese naval activity in the Marshalls.
The Navy Combat Intelligence Officer supervised a unit at Pearl Har-
bor primarily engaged in intercepting, decrypting and analyzing
radio traffic of the Japanese navy. The Daily Radio Intelligence
Summaries distributed by the Combat Intelligence Officer, during
November and continuing down to 7 December, indicated considerable
Japanese military activity in the Mandates and concentrations of
Japanese naval forces in tne Marshalls. (See documentary evidence
attached to Colonel Clausen’s Report.)
The Board found :
On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources that
Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States, bnt would main-
tain peace with Russia. (R. 87.) (P. 3.)
This again, was based on the testimony of Captain Safford in the
Admiral Hart examination. General Russell read from this while
questioning Colonel Bratton, as follows :
General Russell Yes. I will identify the questions. That is the December
1st message, Colonel.
Colonel Bratton. I have nothing on the 1st of December, General. * » •
(P. 88.)
Colonel Clausen’s investigation has shown that the basis for this
statement of Captain Safford was his interpretation of messages that
the Navy received, i. e., the Navy Department intercept of the “Winds
Code” message and a message from Colonel Thorpe, Batavia, giving
the substance of the “Winds Code” intercept and stating that by this
means Japan would notify her consuls of war decision, and another
message to the same general effect from Mr. Foote, Consul General at
Batavia, to the State Department. Mr. Foote also stated : “I attached
little or no importance to it and viewed it with some suspicion. Such
have been coming since 1936.”
As shown above, the “Winds Code” information was available in
the Hawaiian Department. But the “Winds Code” in itself was not
definite information that Japan was going to attack Great Britain
And the United States.
[£] The Board stated :
The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to
war and the attack came on December 3 with information that Japanese were
destroying their codes and code machines. This was construed by G-2 as mean-
ing immediate war. (R. 280.) * * * (P.3.)
Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that he learned
from Navy sources on about 3 December 1941 that Japanese diplomatic
representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Manila and elsewhere, had been instructed to destroy their codes and
S apers, and that he was shown a wire from the Navy Department,
ated 3 December 1941, reading as follows :
Highly reliable information has beeen received that categoric and urgent in-
structions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at
Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 287
most of their codes and ciphers at once and burn all other important confidential
and secret documents.
Colonel Clausen’s investigation further discloses that at about the
time Colonel Bicknell received this information it was discussed with
Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat In-
telligence Unit in Honolulu ; and that Mr. Shivers told him* that the
FBI in Honolulu had intercepted a telephone message from the Jap-
anese Consulate in Honolulu which disclosed that the Japanese Consul
General there was burning his papers. The additional evidence also
shows that on the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual Staff Con-
ference conducted by General Short’s Chief of Staff, those assembled
were given this information. General Fielder testified before Colonel
Clausen that he was present at the Staff Conference and that on 6
December 1941 he gave to General Short the information that the
Japanese Consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers.
(Colonel Phillips, Short’s Chief of Staff, also gave this information
to Short.) General Fielder further testified that he gave General
Short any pertinent information that came to his attention.
The Board further stated :
As Colonel Bratton summed it up :
“Trtie picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning officials,
from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the Chief of the War
Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it was a picture that was
being painted over a period of weeks if not months.” (R. 243-244.) (P. 3.)
[7] * * * All the information that the War Department G-2 had was
presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of
the Government. These officials included Secretary of State, Secretary of War,
Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances, copies
of our intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the Office of
Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thought. (R. 297) (P 3)
The basis for this conclusion of the Board was the testimony given
by Colonel Bratton. When testifying before Colonel Clausen, how-
ever, Colonel Bratton corrected his previous testimony and asked that
his prior testimony be modified in accordance with his testimony to
Colonel Clausen. He stated that his testimony to Colonel Clausen
represented a better recollection than when he previously testified.
He had previously testified that the intercepts, of the character men-
tioned and which were contained in the Top Secret Exhibit “B” before
the Board, had been delivered to the President, the Secretary of War,
the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff,
W. P. D., and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. But in testifying
before Colonel Clausen, he stated that he could not recall with any de-
gree of accuracy what material was delivered to whom during the
period in question, and that there were no records to show who de-
livered or who received the material. He had also previously testi-
fied that he personally delivered these intercepts to the officials men-
tioned. But in his testimony to Colonel Clausen, he stated that, as
to such deliveries as were made, the deliveries were made not only by
himself, but also by then Lieutenant Colonel or Major Dusenbury,
Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel.
The basis for the last-mentioned conclusion of the Board, therefore,
must be revised in accordance with the corrected testimony of Colonel
Bratton. Similarly, the conclusion of the Board on page 4 :
All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority in
the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department did not go out to
288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the field, with the possible exception of the general statements in occasional
messages which are shown in the Board’s report. Only the higher-ups in Wash-
ington secured this information. (R. 302)
The reference “(R. 302)” is also to testimony of Colonel Bratton
which hence must be revised in accordance with his corrected testi-
mony given to Colonel Clausen, and in accordance with the new evi-
dence uncovered by Colonel Clausen as to the information sent to Gen-
eral Short and available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 De-
cember.
The Board found, pages 4 and 5, other testimony of Colonel Bratton
to the effect that on 3 December, when he was informed that the Jap-
anese were under instructions to destroy their codes and code ma-
chines, he asked [<S] General Gerow to send more warnings to
the overseas commanders and that General Gerow replied, “Sufficient
had been sent.” Following this, according to the testimony of Colonel
Bratton, he conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he
sent, on 5 December 1941, a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to
confer with Commander Rochefort concerning the Japanese “Winds
Code.”
General Gerow testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not re-
call the incident, and that if a representative of G-2 thought his ac-
tion inadequate, he could quite properly have reported the facts to
his superior who had direct access to General Gerow and to the Chief
of Staff, in a matter of such importance.
The Board set forth, on pages 5 and 6, the general type of informa-
tion which, according to Captain Salford, came to the Navy at Wash-
ington during November and December 1941. This included the in-
formation already mentioned that Tokyo, on 22 November, informed
the Washington Japanese Embassy that the deadline for signing an
agreement, first fixed for 25 November, was extended to 29 November;
and also information available at Washington on 28 November in the
form of an intercept of a message by Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo,
advising that there was hardly any possibility of the United States
considering the “proposal” in toto , and that if the situation remained
as tense as it then was, negotiations would inevitably be ruptured, if,
indeed, they might not already be called so, and that “our failure and
humiliation are complete” and suggesting that the rupture of the pres-
ent negotiations did not necessarily mean war between the Japanese
and the United States but would be followed by military occupation
of the Netherlands Indies by the United States and the English which
would make war inevitable. The proposal referred to was the reply
given the Japanese envoys on 26 November 1941 by the Secretary of
State. The Board further referred to information available to the
War Department on 5 December, as related by Colonel Sadtler, rela-
tive to the “false alarm” execute message to the “Winds Code.”
None of the above information was given to General Short before 7
December. However, the Secretary of War has, in his public state-
ment of 29 August 1945, and analyzed and shown the substantial nature
of the information which the War Department sent to General Short.
Colonel Clausen’s investigation also shows that a great deal of ad-
ditional information was available initially to General Short in the
Hawaiian Department, which was not given to the War Department,
on the general subject of the tense and strained relations between Ja-
pan and the United States and warnings of w T ar.
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
289
TRe British Intelligence Service gave Colonel Bicknell, Captain
Mayfield, and Mr. Shivers information in the form of many intelli-
gence reports. Colonel Clausen has collected these as documentary
evidence [9] which is mentioned in his report to the Secretary
of War. One such dispatch from Manila, given to these three persons
in Honolulu on 4 December 1941, set forth prophetically :
Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities with
Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present
but will act in South.
The source of this intelligence was a British intercept of a Japanese
diplomatic radio message which could have been based upon a Japanese
execute message to the^Winds Code,” or some equivalent message.
In addition, the three persons mentioned had available over a long
period of time intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the
Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and related places. Copies of some of
these are included in the documentary evidence attached to Colonel
Clausen’s report.
Also, the Navy had derived some information from commercial radio
traffic out of the Japanese Consulate.
Colonel Clausen’s investigation shows that the files of the Hawaiian
Department G-2 contained much material gathered from observers,
travelers, and Washington sources, which, together with the other in-
telligence and information mentioned, was evaluated and dissemi-
nated by the G-2 sections of the Hawaiian Department. These are
mentioned by Colonel Clausen in his report to the Secretary of War.
Some are initialed by General Short.
Attention is invited to estimates by Colonel Bicknell disseminated
on 17 and 25 October 1941 which set forth, again with prophetic
accuracy, the probable moves of Japan.
General Short’s G-2 asked, on 6 September 1941, that the War De-
partment cease sending certain G-2 summaries of information for the
reason that they were duplicates of information made available to
him in Hawaii, and that has cooperation with the Office of Naval In-
telligence and the FBI was most complete. (See Memo., 25 Nov.
1944, p. 6.}
General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen, in the additional
investigation, “it was well known that relations with Japan were
severely strained and that war seemed imminent.”
Hence, while the War Department did not send to General Short
the specific intercepts mentioned, there was available to him or his
Hawaiian command similar information. The reasons why the War
Department did not send the actual intercepts were, according to wit-
nesses before Colonel [ 10 ] Clausen that this type of informa-
tion and its source, of necessity, had to be guarded most carefully,
and that its dissemination to the overseas commanders would have
included not only General Short but also all the overseas commanders
and that this, in itself, would be dangerous from a security standpoint
since it would spread the information into too many hands., There
has been considerable evidence given Colonel Clausen to the effect, as
General Marshall testified before Colonel Clausen,
♦ * * Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would
have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence mentioned had been
so compromised.
290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The former Commanding General of the Philippine Department,
General Douglas MacArthur, who had received the same general War
Department information as General Short, testified before Colonel
Clausen,
Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information
and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines
on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941.
The Board did not conclude that the War Department had advance
information that Pearl Harbor was a specific attack target. It should
be observed, however, that in addition to the intercepts received by the
War Department, which are contained in Top Secret Exhibit “B” be-
fore the Board, there were others which, in retrospect and with the
benefit of hindsight, indicated a possible attack on Pearl Harbor.
These intercepts were radio messages, exchanged between Tokyo and
the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, concerning reports to Tokyo of ship
movements in Pearl Harbor according to a pre-arranged division of
Pearl Harbor. The requests of Tokyo increased and the reports by
Honolulu were made with more frequency and in greater detail as 7
December approached. Two intercepts, which were not decrypted and
translated until 8 December, were part of the series mentioned. These
were not included in the Top Secret Exhibit given the Board. They
were sent 6 December by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo,
Japanese Numbers 253 and 254. The two in question, Nos. 253 and
254, are attached to Colonel Clausen’s report to the Secretary of War.
These latter, Colonel Clausen’s investigation shows, were apparently
intercepted at San Francisco and transmitted to Washington by tele-
type on 6 or 7 December. They were not in the code which had the
highest priority for immediate attention, and the teletype between
San Francisco and Washington was not in operation until the night of
6 December or the morning of 7 December. Even so, time elapsing
between receipt at Washington and dissemination in readable English
form (2 days) was less than the normal time required of 8.5 days.
There was available to General Short, at Hawaii, information from
which he could have inferred that Pearl Harber would be the attack
target in the event of war with Japan. Colonel Clausen’s investiga-
tion shows [77] that the Navy at Honolulu arranged to obtain
information from commercial traffic sources shortly before 7 Decem-
ber. These arrangements included an opportunity to the Navy for
obtaining the commercial cable traffic of the Japanese Consulate at
Honlulu. Some of this traffic included the same types of reports as
were intercepted and forwarded to Washington concerning ship move •
ments in Pearl Harbor. It is not entirely clear just what commercial
traffic was decrypted and translated by tne Navy at Honolulu before
7 December. While similar reports were being made to Tokyo by
Japanese Consulates in other places as we, in like manner, attempted
to keep track of Japanese ships, still the types of reports from Hono-
lulu were more suspicious, since they were requested by Tokyo and
made by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu with increasing fre-
quency as 7 December approached, and were made according to the
pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor.
The Board set forth the findings concerning the Japanese “Winds
Code” at pages 6 and 17. On page 6, the Board referred to testimony
of Colonel Sadtler that, on 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
291
Naval Communications, called him and stated the execute message
had been intercepted. Colonel Sadtler then conferred with General
Miles and Colonel Bratton. From Colonel Clausen’s investigation it
appears that Admiral Noyes, in his testimony before Admiral Hewitt,
who conducted for the Secretary of the Navy the same type of inves-
tigation Colonel Clausen conducted for the Secretary of War, stated
that he did not recall having so informed Colonel Sadtler. Colonel
Sadtler testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not follow up the
information given by Admiral Noyes on 5 December and that to his
knowledge this was not done by anyone else at the time. He assumed
that the Navy would send to the Army the actual intercept which was
before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned.
Captain Salford had testified before the Board that on 4 December
he saw a Navy intercept which contained the execute message to the
Japanese “Winds Code”, and that two copies were sent to the Army.
Colonel Clausen’s investigation discloses no evidence that the Army
ever received any such copies and I understand the testimony of Cap-
tain Salford has been qualified considerably by testimony of himself
and other Navy personnel before Admiral Hewitt.
Colonel Clausen has uncovered what amounts to a possible inference
that the Japanese did broadcast an execute message to the “Winds
Code” or some equivalent warning code, and that this was intercepted
by the British Intelligence Service and formed the basis for the dis-
patch from London to Manila and, in turn, from Manila to Honolulu
mentioned above. This dispatch was disseminated to the British
Intelligence Service sub-agent in Honolulu on 4 December. A com-
plete file of the dispatches from the British Intelligence Service, and
avaliable to the Hawaiian Department at Honolulu, and the British
response to Colonel Clausen’s query as to* the basis for the dispatch
of 4 December, are contained in the documentary evidence collected
by Colonel Clausen and attached to his report.
[7#] Attention is invited to the testimony of General Gerow
and General Smith before Colonel Clausen concerning the findings
bv the Board based on the testimony of Colonel Sadtler that he asked
General Gerow and General Smith to send more warning to the over-
seas commanders. Colonel Sadtler also testified before Colonel
Clausen, as follows:
I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith In affidavits
given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, referring
to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference with
them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe the comments by
General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits mentioned, are
correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows concerning this
subject:
General Gerow: “I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler
is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that be was purely a Signal
Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpre-
tation of Magic.’ I would naturally expect that enemy Information of such
grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief
of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps Officer.
To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notifi-
cation from any source of Implementing message to the Japanese ‘Winds
Code.’ If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would
now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler
told me of an unverified report, or that be had received some tentative informa-
tion which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written
292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which
evidence would be more reliable than any person’s memory at this time, especially
since so many major events have intervened.”
General Smith: “I do not recall Colonel Sad tier’s coming to me as he has stated.
However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion
between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of
whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had
any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would
have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I
was not at that time an ‘Ultra’ officer, and it would have been impossible fjar
him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out
of my rather minor province.” P 2 — Affidavit of Colonel O. K. Sadtler.)
From page 7 of the Board’s Top Secret Report it may be inferred
that the Board meant to find that Colonel Bratton sent the G-2 War
Department Rochefort message of 5 December to G-2 Hawaiian
Department, because [75] of receipt of an execute message to
the “Winds Code.” But Colonel Bratton has testified that the reason
which prompted him to recommend this warning was information
derived from other intercepts to the effect that the Japanese were
destroying their codes and important papers. The Board, also on
page 7, referring to the G-2 warning message of 5 December, set
forth the contention of General Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department,
that he got no such message. In his testimony before Colonel Clausen,
however, General Fielder stated :
* * * I have no recollections of having received the War Department radio,
but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt Col
Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close
liaison with Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer:
particularly since the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed
urgent or particularly important. * * *
Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that on about 5
December he saw the War Department message on the desk of General
Fielder and that he then communicated with Commander Rochefort
to ascertain the pertinent information and was advised that Com-
mander Rochefort was also monitoring for the execute message of
the “Winds Code.”
It should be borne in mind that the execute message to the “Winds
Code” was to notify the Japanese diplomatic and consular representa-
tives of a crisis with the United States, Great Britain or Russia and
to instruct the Japanese representatives to burn their codes and secret
papers. The Japanese later sent the same information to their diplo-
matic and consular representatives by other and more direct means.
This latter information, it appears from Colonel Clausen’s investiga-
tion, was available in the Hawaiian Department prior to 7 December
1941.
On page 11 of the Top Secret Report, the Board sets forth several
findings concerning the delivery of a 14-part intercept of a Japanese
message from Tokyo to the envoys in Washington. The Board
concludes :
Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9: 00 and 10: 30
p. m., December 6, as follows :
To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in a
locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238.) He told General
Smith that' the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers and
General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the bag and
see the contents. (R. 307.)
REPORT OP ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
293
To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing the
message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his presence. (R.
239-241.) He stated that [ 14 ] General Miles did nothing about it as
far as he knows. (R. 241.) This record shows no action by General Miles.
Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Galley, General Gerow’s executive
in the War Plans Division. (R. 238. )
He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State Depart-
ment for the Secretary of State and did so between 10 : 00 and 10 : 30 p. m.
(R. 234, 239.)
Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10 : 30, had urged
Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff, to communicate with General
Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General Miles after reading
the message. This record shows no action on the part of General Smith and
none by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of Staff was not advised of
the situation until the following morning.” (Pp. 11,12. )
To clinch this extraordinary situation, we but have to look at the record
to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final reply were com-
pletely known in detail to the War Department, completely translated and
available in plain English, by not later than between 7 and 9 o’clock on the
evening of December 6 or approximately Honolulu time. This infor-
mation was taken by the Officer in Charge of the Far Eastern Section of G-2[
of the War Department personally in a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith,
now Lt. General Smith, and Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then
Secretary to the General Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most
vital importance to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2 General
Miles, with whom it was discussed, and to the Executive, Colonel Gailey, of
the War Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital importance of this
information that showed that the hour had struck, and that war was at hand.
Before 10 : 30 o’clock that night, this same officer personally delivered the same
information to the Secretary of State’s duty officer.
General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as
vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date by
either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows. ( P. 16. )
These conclusions must be completely revised in view of the new evidence.
The basis for these conclusions is the testimony of Colonel Bratton. In testi-
fying before Colonel Clausen, he admitted that he gave the Board incorrect
testimony ; that the only set of the 13 parts he delivered on the night of 6 December
was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State; that the sets for the Secre-
tary of War, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War
Plans Division, were not delivered the night of 6 December; that these sets
were not given the night of 6 December to General Gerow, General Smith or
[15] General Miles; that he could not recall having discussed the message
with General Miles on 6 December ; and that he did not know how the set for
the Chief of Staff came into his possession the morning of 7 December. Colonel
Bratton claimed that on the night of 6 December he had asked Colonel Dusen-
bury to deliver the set to the home of the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury
testified before Colonel Clausen that he received the messages the night of 6
December but did not deliver any until after 9 : 00 a. m., on the morning of 7
December. Colonel Dusenbury stated Colonel Bratton went home before the
13 parts were entirely received.
On the subject of the delivery of the 13 parts, attention is also invited to the
testimony given Colonel Clausen by General Gerow, General Smith and General
Miles. From Colonel Clausen’s investigation, it appears that General Gerow
and General Smith did not receive any of the 13 parts before the morning
of 7 December. General Miles testified that he became aware accidentlly of
the general contents of the 13 parts the evening of 6 December. He was dining
at the home of his opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when
Admiral Beardall, the President’s Aide, brought the information to Admiral
Wilkinson, who transmitted it to General Miles.
The Board, on page 14 and again on page 17, finds that Colonel Bratton
telephoned General Marshall’s quarters at 9 : 00 a. m. the morning of 7 December
to give him the 14th part of the 14-part message and the Japanese messages
directing the Ambassador to deliver the 14-part message at 1 : 00 p. m., 7
December, and to destroy their code machines. The Board further finds that
General Marshall did not come into his office until 11 : 25 a. m.
These times so found by the Board are subject to qualification in light of
additional evidence given Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton testified before
294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Clausen that he gave the actual intercepts to the Chief of Staff, which
would be in the office of the Chief of Staff “between 10 : 30 and 11 : 30 that
morning.” Major General John R. Deane testified before Colonel Clausen that
on the morning of 7 December he and Colonel Bratton did not arrive at the
Munitions Building until between 9 : 00 and 9 : 30 a. m. General Miles testified
before Colonel Clausen that he conferred with General Marshall the morning
of 7 December in his office at about 11 : 00 a. m. Colonel Dusenbury testified
before Colonel Clausen that the intercept instructing the envoys to deliver the
reply to the United States at 1 : 00 p. m., 7 December, was not received by
Colonel Bratton until “after he arrived that morning, between! 9:00 and
10 : 00 a. m.”
The Board further found :
There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December 4
and December 6, the imminence of war on the following Saturday and Sunday,
December 6 and 7, was [15] clear-cut and definite. (P. 15)
The evidence does not seem to justify any such conclusion. There
was not received between the dates oi 4 December and 6 December
any information which indicated that war would take place on Sat-
urday or Sunday, 6 and 7 December. It is true that on the night of
6 December the War Department received the intercepted text of
thirteen parts of the fourteen-part reply of the Japanese Government
to the proposal of the United States, but this at most suggested a
possible breach of diplomatic relations at some time in the near future,
which may or may not have been followed by war. The only other
information that was received between 4 and 6 December of signif-
icance, in addition to what had already been transmitted to General
Short, was information received on 4 December that certain Japanese
diplomatic and consular posts had been instructed to destroy certain
codes. As I have heretofore pointed out, this information was fully
available to General Short from his own sources in Hawaii. The
intercept which indicated that the Japanese reply was to be delivered
at 1 : 00 p. m., Washington Time on 7 December was, as heretofore
pointed out, not received until the morning of 7 December and it
itself was not a “clear-cut and definite” indication that war would
occur at that time.
The Board further found :
Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were
planning to do was known to the United States except the final message
Instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with the
preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o’clock on December 7, or the
very hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor. (P. 18)
This statement is ambiguous but if it implies that it was known
that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December
1941, this is not the fact. There is no justification in the evidence
for such a statement.
This conclusion, as well as the other conclusions of the Board in
the Top Secret Report, should be considered in the light of what
General Short has since testified was information he should have
received. General Short testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry
concerning the message which General Marshall attempted to send to
him the morning of 7 December, referred to by the Board on page 17.
He testified that he would have gone into a different alert if General
Marshall had given him this message by telephone. General Short
testified in response to a question as to whether he would then have
done on a different alert :
REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
295
[17] I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there,
about the destruction of the code machines. The other matter wouldn’t have
made much of an impression on me. (Underscoring supplied.)
As I have already pointed out, there was available to General Short
from his own sources in Hawaii prior to 7 December 1941 informa-
tion that the Japanese Government had sent orders to various diplo-
matic and consular posts to destroy certain of its codes and important
papers.
The “other matter” referred to was the information which General
Marshall included in his message which read as follows :
Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code
machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do
not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this
communication.
My Conclusion:
The views expressed by me in my memorandum of 25 November
1944, based upon the evidence then collected by the Army Pearl
Harbor Board and its reports, should be considered modified in ac-
cordance with the views expressed herein.
Myron C. Cramer,
Major General ,
The Judge Advocate General .
REPORT OP NAVY COURT OP INQUIRY
297
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
[ 1156 } Under date of 13 July, 1944, this Court of Inquiry was
ordered by the Secretary of the Navy to inquire into all circumstances
connected with the attack made by the Japanese armed forces on Pearl
Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December, 1941, to include in its
findings a full statement of facts deemed to be established, to give its
opinion as to whether any offenses have been committed or serious
blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service
and, in case its opinion be that offenses have been committed or serious
blame incurred, to specifically recommend what further proceedings
should be had.
The Court convened on 24 July, 1944, and since then has held daily
sessions almost continuously in Washington, San Francisco, and Pearl
Harbor, having called and examined numerous witnesses from the
State, War, and Navy Departments.
The Court, having thoroughly inquired into all facts and circum-
stances in connection with the attack by the Japanese armed forces
on Pearl Harbor on 7 December, 1941, and having considered all evi-
dence adduced, finds as follows :
Findings op Facts
I
Pearl Harbor is situated on the Island of Oahu, near the city of
Honolulu, the capital of the Territory of Hawaii, distant 2100 miles
from San Francisco. It is the only permanent outlying United States
Naval Base in the Eastern Pacific. It possesses great strategic im-
portance as a point from which naval operations in defense of the
Western United States can be conducted, and offensive operations
against an enemy to the Westward launched and supported. The
United States possesses no base on the West Coast of the United States
that meets these requirements to an equivalent extent.
II
Prior to 1940 certain subdivisions of the Pacific Fleet and, beginning
in May, 1940, the entire Fleet operated in the [ 1157 } Hawaiian
area with Pearl Harbor as a base. In May, 1941, three battleships,
one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers were detached
from the Pacific Fleet and transferred to the Atlantic.
For the purpose of conducting exercises and maneuvers at sea de-
signed to increase efficiency and readiness for war, the remaining major
vessels of the Pacific Fleet were organized in three main Task Forces.
The operating schedule was so arranged that there was always at least
one of these Task ForceSj and usually two, at sea. Frequently, during
Fleet maneuvers, the entire available Fleet was at sea.
298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The vessels and the Fleet planes thus rotated their scheduled periods
in port, periods essential to the mobility of the Fleet for purposes
impossible of achievement at sea. At no time during 1941 were all
the vessels of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor.
The operating schedule in effect on 7 December, 1941, was issued
in September, 1941. In accordance with its provisions Task Force
One, under the command of Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U. S. N., and
part of Task Force Two were in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack.
Task Force Three, under the command of Vice Admiral Wilson Brown,
U. S. N., was at sea, engaged chiefly in escorting the aircraft carrier
LEXINGTON to Midway to whicn point planes were being ferried.
Part of Task Force Two, under the command of Vice Admiral W. F.
Halsey, Jr., U. S. N., and including the aircraft carrier ENTER-
PRISE, was returning from ferrying planes to Wake.
[ii>5£] Task Force One included the preponderance of the bat-
tleship strength of the Fleet. The three battleships of Task F orce Two
had been left behind in Pearl Harbor because their slow speed did
not permit them to accompany the ENTERPRISE to Wake. It was
purely a coincidence that all battleships of the Pacific Fleet, except
one undergoing overhaul at the Puget Sound Navy Yard, were in
Pearl Harbor on 7 December.
Ill
Beginning at 0755, Honolulu time, on 7 December, 1941, an attack
was delivered from the northward of Oahu by Japanese carrier air-
craft against units of the United States Pacific Fleet then moored and
anchored inside the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, against Army and
Navy aircraft, and against shore installations on the Island of Oahu.
An attack delivered simultaneously by Japanese midget submarines
was without effect. The details of these attacks and the extent of the
loss of life and of the damage inflicted by Japanese aircraft have
since been made matters of public record.
Within the same 24 hours the Japanese also delivered attacks on
the Philippines, Wake and Guam, as well as on Hong Kong and
Malaya. The attack on Pearl Harbor cannot be disassociated from
these. All were the reprehensible acts of a warrior nation, war-
minded and geared to war through having been engaged in hostilities
for the past four years, and long known to have aggressive designs
for the dominance of the Far East. The United States was then at
peace with all nations and for more than 20 years had not engaged
in [II5P] hostilities.
In time of peace it is a difficult and complicated matter for the
United States to prevent an attack by another nation because of the
constitutional requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by
the Congress, no blow may be struck until after a hostile attack has
been delivered. This is a military consideration which gives to a dis-
honorable potential enemy the advantage of the initiative, deprives
the United States of an opportunity to employ the offensive as a
means of defense, and places great additional responsibility on the
shoulders of commanders afloat in situations where instant action,
or its absence, may entail momentous consequences.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
299
IV
From 1 August, 1939, to 25 March, 1942, the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, charged by law under the Secretary of the Navy with the
operations of the Fleet and with the preparation and readiness of
plans for its use in war, was Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet from 1 February to 17
December, 1941, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N. The
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department from 7 February
to 17 December, 1941, was Lieut. General Walter C. Short, U. S. A.
The Commandant of the 14th Naval District from 11 April, 1940,
until 1 April, 1942, was Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. N. He
was an immediate subordinate of Admiral Kimmel ana was charged
by him with the task of assisting the Army in [1160] protect-
ing Pearl Harbor. With respect to those duties connected with the
defense of Pearl Harbor, Rear Admiral Bloch’s responsibility was
solely to Admiral Kimmel. It is an established fact that this respon-
sibility was discharged to the complete satisfaction of the latter.
V
Admiral Kimmel and Lieut. General Short were personal friends.
They met frequently, both socially and officially. Their relations
were cordial and cooperative in every respect and, in general, this
was true as regards their subordinates. They frequently conferred
with each other on official matters of common interest, and invariably
did so when messages were received by either which had any bearing
on the development of the United States-Japanese situation, or on
their several plans in preparing for war. Each was mindful of his
own responsibility and of the responsibilities vested in the other.
Each was informed of measures being undertaken bv the other in the
defense of the Base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes.
VI
For some time preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United
States, engaged in the protection of shipping and the patrolling of
sea lanes in the Atlantic, was passing through the preliminary stage
of a transition from a state of national military unpreparedness to an
ability to cope successfully with two resourceful and fully prepared
enemies. The vigorous and convincing representations made by
Admiral [H6l] Stark before Congressional committees, be-
ginning in January, 1940, showed clearly that the Navy was unpre-
pared for war and greatly needed ships, planes, and men. These
representations, linked with the fall of France, resulted in an Act of
Congress in June, 1940, whereby appropriations were voted for prac-
tically doubling the size of our Navy.
During all of 1941 and for some time thereafter theproblem con-
fronting Doth the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff,
TJ. S. Army, was one of expansion and of distributing, to the best
advantage, the limited supply of ships, planes, guns, and men and
intensifying the training of personnel while production was being
stepped up.
300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Under date of 30 December, 1940, Rear Admiral Bloch, Command-
ing the 14th Naval District and the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, after
conference with Admiral Richardson, the then Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, and Lieut. General Herron, the then Commanding
General Hawaiian Department, initiated correspondence addressed
to the Chief of Naval Operations in which he set forth the inability
of the 14th Naval District to meet a hostile attack with the equipment
and forces at hand. He pointed out that, as Naval Base Defense
Officer, he had no planes for distant reconnaissance. He gave as his
opinion that neither in numbers nor types were the Army bombers
satisfactory for the purpose intended. He invited attention to the
serious deficiency on the part of the Army with regard to both fight-
ing planes and anti-aircraft guns. He noted also that an anti-aircraft
warning system planned [1162'] by the Army was scheduled
for completion at an indefinite time in the future.
This letter was forwarded to the Navy Department by Admiral
Richardson, by endorsement. He concurred in the opinion that the
Army aircraft and anti-aircraft batteries were inadequate to protect
the Fleet in Pearl Harbor against air attack, and urged that aaequate
local defense forces be provided. He further expressed the opinion
that the forces provided should be sufficient for lull protection, and
should be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the Fleet.
Under date of 24 January, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy addressed
a letter to the Secretary of War, based upon the representations made
by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the recommenda-
tions of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and in general con-
currence therewith. In this letter the belief was expressed that, in
case of war with Japan hostilities might be initiated by a surprise
attack upon the Fleet or on the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The
dangers envisaged in the order of their importance and probability
were considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack. (2) Air topedo
plane attack. (3) Sabotage. (4) Submarine attack. (5) Mining.
(6) Bombardment by gunfire.
Defense against all but (1) and (2) being considered satisfactory,
it was proposed that the Army assign the highest priority to the in-
crease of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the estab-
lishment of an air warning net in Hawaii ; also that the Army give
consideration [1163] to the questions of balloon barrages,
the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving
the defenses at Pearl Harbor; that local joint plans be drawn for
defense against surprise aircraft raids; that there be agreement on
appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action against
a surprise aircraft raid ; and that joint exercises for defense against
surprise aircraft raids be held.
The Secretary of War, under date of 7 February, 1941, expressed
complete concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the
urgency of making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile
effort. He pointed out that the Hawaiian Department was the best
equipped of all overseas Army departments and held a high priority
for completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of
giving full protection to the Fleet. He outlined the details of the
Hawaiian project and stated the number of pursuit planes and anti-
aircraft guns eventually to be supplied. He stated that the equipment
for the aircraft warning system was expected to be delivered in
REPORT OP NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
301
Hawaii in June, 1941. and that all arrangements for installation
would have been made by the time the equipment was delivered.
Copies of these letters were furnished Admiral Kimmel, Lieut.
General Short, and Bear Admiral Bloch.
In a letter dated 17 October, 1941, Bear Admiral Bloch reported to
the Chief of Naval Operations that the only increment that had been
made to the local defense forces during the past year, exclusive of net
vessels, was the U.S.S. SACBAMENTO, an old gunboat of negligible
gun power [ 1164 ] and low speed. He urged that the Depart-
ment send a number of small fast craft equipped with listening gear
and depth charges for anti-submarine purposes and further urged
that he be sent two squadrons of VSO planes to be used for patrol
against enemy submarines.
Admiral Kimmel forwarded this letter with the following en-
dorsement:
There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department
to furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces adequate to his
needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the
U. S. Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the
case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A fleet, tied to its
base by diversions to other purposes of light forces necessary for its security
at sea is, in a real sense, no fleet at all. Moreover, this Fleet has been assigned,
in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which re-
quires not only all the units now assigned but as many more as can possibly
be made available. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary
measures in meeting the Commandant’s needs.
The Chief of Naval Operations replied, under date of 25 November,
1941, that no additional vessels could be supplied for the present but
that certain sub chasers, due for completion in May, 1942, had been
tentatively assigned to the 14th Naval District, certain privately
owned vessels might be expected at a future time, and that there were
no additional airplanes available for assignment to the 14th Naval
District.
It is a fact that, through 1941, the demand for munitions and war
supplies exceeded the capacity of the nation and in all important
commands there existed marged [ 1165 ] deficiencies in trained
personnel and in material equipment and instruments of war. Al-
though shortages were inevitable, it is a further fact that they had
direct bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor.
VII
On 5 November, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, submitted a joint memorandum to the
President^ recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan
at that time and giving, as one of the basic reasons the existing
numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the U. S. Pacific
Fleet.
On 7 December, 1941, the U. S. Pacific Fleet was numerically in-
ferior to the Japanese naval forces in both combatant and auxiliary
vessels.
Aware of this existing weakness in relative fighting strength, and
of the vigorous steps being taken by the United States to overcome
deficiencies, Japan early sensed the advantage of striking before these
steps could become effective. Her advantageous position was strength-
79716 — 46— Ex. 167 20
302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ened by her extensive espionage system which utilized her civilian,
consular and diplomatic nationals throughout the world, and enabled
her constantly to keep accurately informed of the U. S. naval build-
ing program and oi the location and movements of U. S. naval
vessels.
The topography of Oahu is peculiarly suited to the observation of
Pearl Harbor and its activities. The local officials of the United
States were unable to overcome Japan’s advantage in this respect.
It was impossible for [ 1166 ] them to prevent anyone from
obtaining military information and, because of legal restrictions
imposed by the Federal statutes, they could not interfere with the mails
and the transmission of messages by radio, telegram, and cable.
In addition, having in mind Japan’s traditional tendency to dis-
tort legitimate actions of a peaceful nation into deliberate threats
to her own security and prestige, the War and Navy Departments were
compelled to take every precaution to avoid offending her super-
sensitive sensibilities. For example, as of 16 October, 1941, the
Chief of Naval Operations directed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, to “take such preparatory deployments as will not constitute
E rovocative action against Japan” and, on 28 November, 1941, the War
►epartment directed the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De-
partment to “undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed
an overt act”.
In contrast to the ease with which Japanese in United States terri-
tory, particularly in Hawaii, were able to obtain and to transmit to
Japan military information of value, every obstacle was placed in the
way of such information being collected in Japan by foreign nationals.
As an instance of Japanese secretiveness and surveillance of for-
eigners, including those of the U. S. diplomatic services, the U. S.
Naval attache in Tokyo was compelled to report to the Japanese Navy
Department whenever he contemplated an excursion beyond the limits
of the city, and he was closely watched at all times. He was effectively
prevented from obtaining any information as to the type and
[ 1167 ] number of Japanese ships under construction and the ca-
pacity of their naval shore establishments, as well as of the location
and movements of Japanese ships.
It is a fact that the superiority of the Japanese Fleet and the ability
of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial
advantage not attainable by the United States up to 7 December, 1941.
VIII
A naval base exists solely for the support of the Fleet. The funda-
mental requirement that tne strategic freedom of action of the Fleet
must be assured demands that the defense of a permanent naval base
be so effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety
of the Fleet in regard to the security of the base, or for that of the
vessels within its limits. Periodical visits to a base are necessarily
made by mobile seagoing forces in order that logistics support may
be provided and opportunity given for repair and replenishment, for
rest and recreation, and for release of the personnel from a state of
tension.
To superimpose upon these essentials the further requirements that
the seagoing personnel shall have the additional responsibility for se-
REPORT OP NAVY COURT OP INQUIRY.
303
curitv from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent
naval base, is to challenge a fundamental concept of naval warfare.
There is not, and there has not been, any lack of understanding on
the part of the Armyr and Navy on this point. The defense of a per-
manent naval base is the direct responsi- [1168] bility of the
Army. The Navy is expected to assist with the means provided the
nival district witnin whose limits the permanent naval base is located
and the defense of the base is a joint operation only to that extent.
To be adequate, the defense must function effectively during the pe-
riods when the Commander-in-Chief and all the units of the Fleet
are absent.
In the case of naval districts lying beyond the continental limits of
the United States, the commandant of the district occupies a dual
status. As commandant of the district, he is governed by all existing
instructions relating to the duties of commandants of naval districts
and is answerable direct to the Navy Department. He is also an offi-
cer of the Fleet and as such is under the Commander-in-Chief of the
Fleet for such duties as the latter may designate.
The fact that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was thus
designated as an officer of the Pacific Fleet is the circumstance that
links the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, with the duty of assist-
ing the Army in defending the permanent naval base of Pearl Harbor.
Except for this, the chief responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, was for the reaainess, the efficiency, and the security of
the vessels of the Fleet while at sea. It is through gaining and main-
taining control of vital sea areas that a Fleet contributes to the defense
of the shore and its activities.
The defense of the permanent naval base of Pearl Harbor was the
direct responsibility of the Army.
[1169] IX
Under date of 27 February, 1941, the Commandant, 14th Naval
District, Bear Admiral Bloch, in his capacity as Naval Base Defense
Officer, issued an operations plan establishing security measures, in-
cluding air defense and surface ship patrol, in order to cooperate
with and assist the Army in protecting Pearl Harbor and safeguard-
ing the Fleet.
Under date of 28 March, 1941, joint agreements were reached be-
tween Lieut. General Short and Bear Admiral Bloch, as to joint
security measures for the protection of the Fleet and the Pearl Harbor
Base. It was agreed that when the threat of a hostile raid or attack
was considered sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each
commander was to take such preliminary steps as were necessary to
make available without delay to the other commander such portion
of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warranted.
Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels were to be executed
under the tactical command of the Navy. The Army bombardment
strength to participate in each such mission was to be determined by
the Commander, Hawaiian Department, the number of bombardment
planes released to Navy control to be the maximum practicable.
Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu
were to be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The
304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commandant, 14th Naval District, was to determine the Navy fighter
strength to participate [ 1170 ] in these missions, the number
of fighter aircraft released to Army control to be the maximum
practicable.
When naval aircraft under the command of the Naval Base De-
fense Officer were insufficient for long-distance patrol and search
operations, and Army aircraft were made available, the Army air-
craft so made available were to be under the tactical control of the
Naval commander directing the search operations.
The Naval Base Defense Officer was entirely without aircraft, either
fighters or patrol planes, assigned permanently to him. He was
compelled to rely upon Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction
with Army air units. The Commander Patrol Wing Two, Rear
Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger. U. S. N., was by Admiral l5mmel placed
under Rear Admiral Bloch’s orders, and was by the latter directed to
consult with the Army and to prepare a detailed naval participation
air defense plan. Rear Admiral Bellinger thus was given the addi-
tional status of the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, while
retaining his status as an air officer of the Fleet.
Under date of 31 March, 1941, plans were drawn up and jointly
agreed upon by Rear Admiral Bellinger and Major (General F. L.
Martin, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force. These plans
were complete, and their concept was sound. Their basic defect lay
in the fact that the naval participation depended entirely upon the
availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet. This circumstance was
forced by necessity, but was at complete variance with the funda-
mental requirement that to be adequate, the defense of [ 1171 ]
a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance from the
Fleet.
The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance
knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits
of time and the plans were drawn with this as a premise. It was not
possible for the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet to make Fleet planes
permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer, because of
his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews and because of the demands
of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at sea.
X
Shortly after assuming command of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral
Kimmel issued specific comprehensive instructions as to the steps
to be taken for the security of the Fleet in the operating sea areas.
Aware of the inadequacy of the shore defenses of Pearl Harbor, he
also required the vessels, while at the base, to assist to the limit of their
resources. These instructions were revised and brought to date on 14
October, 1941, were given wide circulation within the Pacific Fleet,
and were sent for information to other commands and to the Navy
Department.
The security of the Pacific Fleet, operating in the Hawaiian Area
and based on Pearl Harbor, was predicted on two assumptions :
(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing
conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided
nationals of such powers may attempt ;
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRE
305
[ 1112 ] (1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.
(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the
Channel.
(3) To lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.
(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by :
(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
£ (3) a combination of these two.
The measures prescribed to provide against these possibilities in-
cluded continuous inshore, boom, and harbor patrols, intermittent pa-
trol of the inner and offshore areas by destroyers, daily search of oper-
ating areas by air, the covering of sortie and entry, and daily sweeps
for magnetic* and anchored mines. The only entrance to Pearl Harbor
was-guarded by an anti-torpedo net.
The Task Forces operatmg at sea were screened protectively by
aircraft and destroyers. Torpedo defense batteries were manned day
and night, ammunition was at hand, and depth charges were ready for
use. Water-tight integrity was maintained, horizon and surface battle
lookouts were kept posted, the ships steamed darkened at night, and
the use of the radio was restricted to a minimum.
Admiral Kimmel, recognizing the potentialities of the submarine as
an instrument of stealthy attack, and believing that Japanese subma-
rines were operating in Hawaiian waters, was of the opinion that this
form of surprise attack against his Fleet was the one most likely to
be employed by Japan. Therefore, he had issued, on his own respon-
sibility, orders that all unidentified submarines discovered in Hawaiian
waters [1173] were to be depth-charged and sunk. In so doing
he exceeded his orders from higher authority and ran the risk of
committing an overt act against Japan, but did so feeling that it is best
to follow the rule “shoot first and explain afterwards”.
Actually, in execution of these orders, a midget submarine was dis-
covered in an operating area, attacked and destroyed by the combined
efforts of a naval patrol plane and a destroyer of the inshore patrol,
about 20 minutes prior to the air attack on the morning of 7 Decem-
ber. There was nothing, however, in the presence of a single sub-
marine iir the vicinity of Oahu to indicate that an air attack on Pearl
Harbor was imminent.
It is a fact that the precautions taken by Admiral Kimmel for the
security of his Fleet while at sea were adequate and effective^ No
naval units were either surprised or damaged while operating at sea
in the Pacific prior to or on 7 December, 1941.
XI
While vessels of the United States Navy are lying in port, it is the
invariable custom to keep on board a number of officers and men suffi-
cient to provide for internal security, and to protect against fire and the
entrance of water. The force so remaining on board is always bal-
anced as to ranks and ratings so that all requirements can be met in
case of emergency. A watch is maintained day and night.
In other than normal situations a “condition of readiness” is placed
in effect. On the morning of 7 December considerably
more than half of the Naval personnel were on board their ships in
Pearl Harbor, more than ample to meet an emergency in port. Their
306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
efficiency and their heroic behavior on that day are proof of their
fitness for duty.
The Navy’s practice in numbering its three prescribed “conditions
of readiness” is opposite to the method adopted by the Hawaiian De-
partment of the Army in numbering its “alerts . With the Army,
the No. 3 alert represents the maximum state of readiness, while th*
Navy refers to that state as No. 1. In the interest of clarification, deti-
nition of the respective states of readiness is here set forth :
Army Alerts
Navy Conditions of Readiness
No. 1. Defense against sabotage and
uprisings. No threat from without.
No. 2. Security against attacks from
hostile sub-surface, and aircraft, in ad-
dition to No. 1.
No. 3. Requires occupation of all
field positions.
No. 1. Entire crew, officers and men
at battle stations. Action imminent.
No. 2. Provides the means of opening
fire immediately with one-half the arma-
ment. Enemy believed to be In vicinity.
No. 3. Provides a means of opening
fire with a portion of the secondary and
anti-aircraft batteries in case of surprise j
encounter.
The alert in effect in the Hawaiian Department of the Army at the
time of the attack was their No. 1. The condition of readiness of the
vessels in Pearl Harbor at that time was an augmented Navy No. 3.
This condition had been in effect for many months preceding that
date. To^ssume [ii76] a high condition of readiness in port
and to man guns and stations which cannot be utilized in any circum- i
stance, is to impose on the entire personnel an unjustified state of
tension and to defeat the purpose for which the vessels have entered
the base ; i. e., to make repairs, to replenish supplies, to give the per-
sonnel rest and relaxation, and thus to prepare for operations at sea.
The same holds true with regard to the patrol planes of the Fleet,
and to a small number of fighters that had been left behind by the
absent carriers. They were part of the Fleet, engaged in daily opera-
tions and, when not operating, were undergoing overhaul or the crews
were being rested in anticipation of further operations. At. the time of
and immediately prior to the attack on the morning of 7 December,
1941, some were in the air covering the movement of a task force, 1
others were on 30 minutes notice, some others were on 4 hours notice,
and the remainder were under overhaul.
These planes were not part of the permanent defense of Pearl Har-
bor. To have kept the crews awake and ready with engines warmed
up, in the absence of any indication of an impending attack, would
have been to undermine their further usefulness.
The Navy controlled none of the guns mounted on shore. The only
means available to the vessels of the Fleet for contributing to their own
defense against aircraft while in Pearl Harbor was their anti-aircraft
batteries. The anti-aircraft batteries installed on the ships in Pearl
Harbor were incapable of a volume of fire at all comparable to that
of the batteries of the same ships today.
On all ships inside Pearl Harbor a considerable propor-
tion of the anti-aircraft guns was kept manned day and night and
with ammunition immediately at hand. Also, by prearrangement with
the Army, there was in effect a system, correct as to its details, for the
coordinating of the anti-aircrait fire of vessels of the Fleet in part
with that of the Army on shore.
REPORT OP NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
307
Existing Fleet orders provided for the establishment of air defense
sectors within the Pearl Harbor area, and for the berthing of ships
within the Harbor in such positions as to develop the maximum anti-
aircraft gun fire in each sector, commensurate with the total number
of ships of all types in port.
These orders were carried out to the letter. On the morning of the
Attack the vessels of the Fleet brought hostile planes, as they came
within one or more of these air defense sectors, under heavy fire
intensified within a very few moments by the full fire of the entire
anti-aircraft batteries of all ships.
It is a fact that the Navy’s condition of readiness in effect on the
morning of 7 December, 1941, was that best suited to the circum-
stances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific
Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if
anything to their defense.
* xn
An attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting
and destroying the carrier prior to the launch- [7177] ing of
planes. Once launched, the attacking planes can be prevented worn
inflicting damage only by other planes or anti-aircraft gunfire or both.
Even when a determined air attack is intercepted, engaged by aircraft,
and opposed by gunfire, some of the attacking planes rarely fail to get
through and inflict damage.
To destroy an aircraft carrier before she can launch her planes re-
quires that her location be known and that sufficient force, in the form
of surface or underwater craft, or aircraft, or all three, be at hand.
To have the necessary force at or near the point of intended launching
in time to insure the destruction of the carrier, it is necessary that the
carrier’s presence in a general area, and within narrow limits of time,
be known or predicted with reasonable accuracy. Even in time of war
the fulfillment of this condition is difficult where vast sea areas are
involved, and where both the point from which the carrier departs, as
well as the fact of her departure, are unknown.
This was the case during the days immediately prior to 7 December
1941. Japanese carriers sailed at ah unknown time from an unknown
port. Their departure and whereabouts were a closely guarded Jap-
anese secret and were likewise unknown, all rumors to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Although the U. S. Ambassador to Japan reported, as of 27 January,
1941, that there was a rumor to the effect that a surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor was planned, its authenticity was discounted in the Embassy
[or the reason that such an attack, if actually contemplated, would
scarcely belikely to be a topic of conversation in Japan.
V, [117#] The Navy Department informed tne Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, of this rumor and stated that the Navy Depart-
ment “places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on
known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Jap-
anese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears
imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future”.^
In time of war, an outlying naval base may be expected to become
an enemy objective, sooner or later. It is an established fact, how-
ever, that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded
308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other
ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941.
The attack of 7 December, 1941, on Pearl Harbor, delivered under
the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable. Wh en it would
take place was unpredictable. " ' " ~
xm
Where a carrier’s presence in a general area is not known in advance
and is not predictable within narrow limits of time, there must be resort
to procedure which will give warning of a hostile approach. The usual
procedure employed by carriers bent on delivering a surprise attack,
although by no means the only procedure possible, is to arrive about
700 mues from the objective at dark the night preceding the attack,
steam at high speed daring the night, and launch the planes at dawn,
about 400 miles from the objective. It [1179] is this general
procedure which establishes early morning as the time when an air
attack is most likely to be delivered. The events of 7 December. 1941,
J oint to the likelihood of this procedure having been followed Dy the
apanese.
The greatest degree of warning of an impending early morning air
attack is obtained if the hostile carrier be sighted, prior to dark
the night before. In such event, a maximum warning of about
twelve nours may be obtained. In the case of an island base, such as
Pearl Harbor, it is necessary to cover the circumference of a circle of
700 miles radius each day (the direction from which the attack is ex-
pected being unknown) m order to obtain either positive or negative
information. ■
Assuming 25 miles visability (which in the Hawaiian area is not
found everywhere nor always assured), an effective daily search re-
quires the daily employment of 90 patrol planes which, in turn, requires
that double or triple that number (180-270) be available, it being
impossible to employ the same planes and crews every day, or even
every other day. ,
If only the dawn circle of 400 mile radius is to be searched daily, the
total number of planes required to be available is 100-150. The maxi- 1
mum warning is then reduced to about two hours.
Where planes are not available to cover all sectors, the selection of
sectors to he omitted is left purely to chance and under such circum-
stances the advisability of the diversion of all planes from other duties
is questionable unless there be information as to the fact of a hostile
[ 1180 ] approach and of the direction, within reasonable limits,
from which the approach is expected.
Neither surface ships nor submarines properly may be employed to
perform this duty, even if the necessary number is available. The
resulting dispersion of strength not only renders the Fleet incapable
of performing its proper function, but exposes the units to destruction
in detail. A defensive deployment of surface ships and submarines
over an extensive sea area as a means of continuously guarding
against a possible attack from an unknown quarter and at an unknown 1
time, is not sound military procedure either in peace or in war.
It was the duty of Rear Admiral Bloch, when and if ordered by the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to conduct long-range reconnais-
sance. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for definite and sound
reasons and after making provision for such reconnaissance in case of
REPORT OP NAVT COURT OF INQUIRY
309
emergency, specifically ordered that no routine long-range recon-
naissance be undertaken and assumed full responsibility for this action.
The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect.
It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation
and consultation with experienced officers, and after weighing the
information at hand and all the factors involved.
> In brief, the deciding factors were :
(a) The Naval Base Defense Officer, Rear Admiral Bloch,
although charged with the conduct of the reconnaissance, had no
patrol planes permanently assigned to his command.
[ 1181 ] (b) The only Naval patrol planes in the Hawaiian
area were the 69 planes of Patrol Wing Two and these were handi-
capped by shortages of relief pilots and crews. They were a part
of the Fleet, and not a part of the permanent defense of Pearl
Harbor. The only other planes suitable and available for daily
long range reconnaissance were six Army bombers.
(c) The task assigned the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
was to prepare his Fleet for war. War was known to be im-
minent (how imminent he did not know) . The Fleet planes were
being constantly employed in patrolling the operating areas in
which the Fleets preparations for war were being carried on. Di-
version of these planes for reconnaissance or other purposes was
not justified under existing circumstances and in the light of
available information.
(d) If so diverted, the state of readiness of the Fleet for war
would be reduced because of the enforced suspension of Fleet
operations.
(e) The value of the Fleet patrol planes to the Fleet would be
reduced seriously after a few days because of the inability of
planes and crews to stand up under the demands of daily long-
range reconnaissance.
It is a fact that the use of Fleet patrol planes for daily long-range,
all-around reconnaissance was not justified [ 1182 ] in the ab-
sence of information indicating that an attack was to be expected
within narrow limits of time. It is a further fact that, even if justi-
fied, this was not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes
available.
XIY
At the time of the attack, only a few vessels of the Pacific Fleet
were fitted with radar. The radar of vessels berthed in a harbor such
as Pearl Harbor, partially surrounded by high land, is of limited use-
fulness at best and does not provide the necessary warning of a hostile
approach.
The shore-based radar on the Island of Oahu was an Army service
and entirely under Army control. The original project called for
6 permanent (fixed) and 6 mobile installations. The fixed installa-
tions had not been completed by 7 December, 1941, and only 3 sets had
been shipped to Oahu up to that time. On that day there were in
operation 5 mobile sets located in selected positions, with equipment
in efficient condition, but inadequately manned.
Training of personnel had started on 1 November, 1941. Lieut. Gen-
eral Short earlier had requested that the Navy assist in this training,
310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and 15 of his men had been sent to sea on vessels of the Fleet for that
purpose. Admiral Kimmel also had detailed the Pacific Fleet Com-
munication Officer as liaison officer with the Army. He could not
supply six other naval officers requested for permanent duty in the
Information Center of the air warning system because no officers were
available for such detail.
During the second week of November, 1941, Commander
W. G. Taylor. USNR, was, by Admiral Kimmel, detailed to the Army
Interceptor Command for duty in an advisory capacity, in connection
with the setting up of the Army air warning system. Commander
Taylor had had experience with the British air warning system and
was familiar with radar in the stage of its development that existed
at that time.
On 24 November, 1941, he called a conference for the purpose of de-
termining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully
operative on a war-time basis, and to decide what additional per-
sonnel and equipment would be needed. Two naval officers and 6
Army officers were present at this conference.
The minutes of the conference, concurred in by all present, included
an exhaustive statement of deficiencies and the steps to be taken for
their remedy. Copies of the minutes were furnished the conferees
and copies were forwarded to the Acting Commanding Officer of the
Interceptor Command, and to the Acting Signal Officer, Headquarters,
Hawaiian Department. Steps agreed upon as necessary for the im-
provement of the system had not become effective by 7 December,
1941.
The Army Interceptor Command was barely in the first stages of
organization by 7 December. Four of its officers had been sent to
school on the mainland in order to fit them for their new duties. Until
17 December, 1941, the organization was on a tentative basis- only and
the actual order setting up the Command was not issued until that
date. One of the [IJ 84 ] principal weaknesses of the. Intercep-
tor Command on 7 December, 1941, was that the Information Center
had no provision for keeping track of planes in the air near and over
Oahu, and for distinguishing between those friendly and those hostile.
Between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, the Air Warning Sys-
tem operated from 0400 to 0700, the basis for these hours being that
the critical time of possible attack was considered to be from one hour
before sunrise until two hours after sunrise. On week days training
in the operation of the system also took place during working hours.
On the morning of 7 December the only officer in the Army Informa-
tion Center was 1st Lieutenant (now Lt. Colonel) K. A. Tyler, Army
Air Corps. He had received no previous instruction as to his duties,
had been on duty there only once before, and on the morning in ques-
tion was present only in the capacity of an observer for training. At
0715 that moring he received a call from the radar station at Opana,
located in the northern part of the Island of Oahu, to the effect that
a large number of planes, bearing approximately north, had been
£ ickea up on the screen. Assuming that these were friendly planes
scause he had heard indirectly that a flight of B-17s was en route
from Hamilton Field, California, to Oahu, he did nothing about this
report. These B-17s actually arrived over Oahu during the attack,
and many of them were destroyed.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
311
At the Opana station, where this report originated, Private Locard
(now 1st Lieutenant) and Private Elliott [ 1186 ] (now ser-
geant) were on duty with instructions to observe and track flights and
report them to the Information Center. Private Locard had had some
previous training but Elliott none. The station was scheduled to shut
down at 0700, but as the truck had not come to take these men to their
camp for breakfast, Private Locard continued to operate the radar
set in order to assist in the training of Elliott.
Shortly after 0700 there was picked up on the screen an unusually
large flight of planes, coming in from a northerly direction at a dis-
tance of about 136 miles. Checking the equipment to make sure, Locard
decided to call the Information Center and did so when the planes had
come in to 132 miles. Having reported the fact to the Army officer on
duty (1st Lt. Tyler), Locard and Elliott continued to track the planes
in to twenty miles from Oahu, when they lost them due to distortion.
For information of this flight to have been of value as a warning, it
would have been necessary for the planes first to have been promptly
identified as hostile, and then their presence and their bearing and dis-
t ance immediately reported to and received by higher authority, and
disseminated throughout the Command. The organization and train-
ing of the Information Center and Communication System at this time
was not such as to permit these important requirements to be fulfilled.
Acually, the oncoming planes were not identified as hostile until the
Japanese marking on their wings came into view.
11186 ] XV
The greatest damage to ships resulting from the attack of 7
December was that inflicted by torpedoes launched from Japanese
torpedo planes. These torpedoes were designed specially for the form
of attack in which they were used. Up to the time that the Japanese
demonstrated the feasibility of delivering an attack from torpedo
planes in relatively shallow water and under conditions of restricted
length of approach, the best professional opinion in the United States
and Great Britain was to the effect that such an attack was not
practicable.”)
After a study had been made of the problem of protecting vessels in
port against torpedo attack, the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated 15 February, 1941,
stated that it was considered that the relatively shallow depth of water
(about 45 feet) limited the need of anti-torpedo baffles in Pearl Har-
bor, and, in addition, that the congestion ana the necessity for maneu-
vering room limited the practicability of the present type of baffles.
The letter further stated that certain limitations ana considerations
must be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo
baffles within harbors, among which were the following :
(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be
assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes.
One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum
height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet.
Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height
[ 1187 ] for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred
yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is
armed, but this may be altered.
312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for
vessels approaching and leaving berths.
(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.
(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil
barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.
(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and
channels used by shipping.
£f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels
to insure the vessels’ safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking
a baffle.
(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a success-
ful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.
(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to
compel attacking planes to come within effective range of anti-
aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.
(i) Availablility of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection,
balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.
(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within
a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships.
Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of sat-
isfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.
On 13 June, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations, in a letter to the
Commandants of the various naval districts, modified limitation (a)
by stating that recent developments had shown that United States
and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights as much
as 300 feet and, in [1188] some cases, make initial dives of con-
siderably less than 75 feet with excellent runs. This letter, however,
did not modify the view expressed in the letter of 15 February as to the
need for anti -torpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor.
Barrage balloons and smoke were also considered as means of de-
fense but were rejected, the barrage balloons because they would
interfere with the activity of U. S. aircraft, and the smoke because the
strength of the prevailing winds would render it ineffective.
The specially designed Japanese torpedo and the technique for its
use fell in the category of the so-called secret weapon, of which the
robot bomb and the magnetic mine are examples. Such weapons
always give to the originator an initial advantage which continues
until the defense against them has been perfected.
It is a fact that bv far the greatest portion of the damage inflicted
by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due to the secret develop-
ment and employment of a specially designed torpedo.
XVI
Strained relations between the United States and Japan had existed
and been a source of concern to this country for many months prior to
7 December, 1941. That the Japanese policy in the Far East was
one of aggression had been well known for many years. Their program
of expansion, which envisaged Japan as the dominating power in
the Western Pacific, was in direct conflict with the policies of the
United States [1189] and Great Britain, and opposed to agree-
ments established by treaty.
At the instigation of the Japanese, negotiations were begun by the
State Department on 12 May, 1941, looking to the peaceful settlement
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
313
of existing problems. On 17 November, 1941, the Japanese Ambassa-
dor in Washington was joined by Mr. Kurusu in the capacity of
special envoy.
On 26 July, 1941, Japanese assets in the United States were frozen.
The order freezing these assets required a system of licensing ship-
ments to Japan, and no licenses were issued for oil or petroleum
products.
There was a feeling on the part of U. S. officials that hostilities,
unless prevented by some means, would become an actuality in the not
distant future. They were familiar with the Japanese trait of attack-
ing without declaration of war, as had been done against China in
1894, and against Russia in 1904.
The Secretary of State held numerous conferences with the Secretary
of War and the Secretary of the Navy, at which the negotiations with
Japan were ditcussed. The Chief of the Army General Staff and the
Chief of Naval Operations attended many of these conferences and
were kept informed of the progress of these negotiations. At the
same time efforts to improve the military position of the United States
were being vigorously prosecuted.
On 16 October, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations informed Ad-
miral Kiminel by dispatch that a grave situation had been created by
the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, [ 1190 ] that the new
cabinet would probably be anti-American, that hostilities between
Japan and Russia were a possibility, and that the Japanese might also
attack the United States and Great Britain. In the same dispatch,
Admiral Kimmel was directed to take precautions and to make such
deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions, nor constitute
provocative action against Japan.
On the following day, 17 October, 1941, Admiral Stark addressed
a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated, “Personally,
I do not believe that the Japs are going to sail into us and the message
I sent you (that of 16 October) merely stated the ‘possibility’ ”.
For the purpose of viewing the events of the succeeding months in
their true relation to the events of 7 December, this date of 16 October,
1941, may well be taken as the beginning of a critical period which
terminated in the attack of 7 December, 1941.
In accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16
October, Admiral Kimmel made certain preparatory deployments, in-
cluding the stationing of submarines off both Wake ana Midway,
the reinforcement of Johnston and Wake with additional Marines,
ammunition, and stores, and the dispatch of additional Marines to
Palmyra. He also placed on 12 hours’ notice certain vessels of the
Fleet which were in West Coast ports, held six submarines in readiness
to depart for Japan, delayed the sailing of one battleship which was
scheduled to visit a West Coast Navy Yard, and placed in [ 1191 ]
effect additional security measures in the Fleet operating areas.
He reported to the Chief of Naval Operations the steps taken and
received written approval of his action. He continued the measures
which he had already placed in effect looking to readiness for war,
preparation of the Pacific Fleet for war being his assigned task.
He did not interpret the dispatch of 16 October as directing or war-
ranting that he abandon his preparations for war. He held daily
conferences with his subordinate commanders and the members of
his staff, all experienced officers of long service, and sought by every
314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
means to ascertain wherein his interpretation might be incorrect. The
concensus throughout was that no further steps were warranted by
the information at hand.
On 24 November, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from
the Chief of Naval Operations, addressed also to the Commander-in -
Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to Commandants of Naval districts with
headquarters at San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Panama, which
stated :
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiation with Japan very doubtful X This
situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possi-
bility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action ad-
dressees to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary
in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese
action X Guam wUl be informed separately. «
The contents of this dispatch were made known to Lieut. General
Short and discussed with him.
[ 1192 ] The reaction on Admiral Kimmel and his advisers was
to direct their attention to the Far East. They did not consider that
the expression “a surprise aggressive movement in any direction”
included the probability or imminence of attack in the Hawaiian area,
specific mention having been made of the Philippines and Guam with
no mention of Hawaii.
They recognized the capability of Japan to deliver a long-range
surprise bombing attack and that she might attack without a declara-
tion of war. They reasoned that she would not commit the strategic
blunder of delivering a surprise attack on United States territory,
the one course that irrevocably would unite the American people m
war against Japan. Public opinion in the United States was far from
being crystallized on the question of taking steps to curb her expansion
in the Western Pacific.
Conceivably, Japan might well have taken aggressive action against
British and Dutch possessions in the Far East, gaining the oil and
other raw materials that she was seeking, without military interference
from the United States. An attack elsewhere than in the Far East
seemed, therefore, to be only a remote possibility and not enough of
a probability to warrant abandonment of the preparation or the
Fleet for war.
To continue these preparations was, therefore, Admiral KimmePs
decision, made on his own responsibility in the light of the information
then available to him and m the knowledge that every precaution
within his power, compatible [ 1193 ] with maintaining the
Fleet in a state of readiness for war, had already been taken.
On 27 November, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from
the Chief of Naval Operations, reading as follows :
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific* have ceased and an
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number
and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
REPORT OP NAVT COURT OF INQUIRY 315
indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or
Kra Peninsula or pQSsiblyJSorneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment
preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned. Inform District and Army
authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Continental
districts, Guam, Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.
This dispatch was sent also to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic
Fleet, and nas since become known as the “war warning message”.
On the morning following the receipt of this dispatch, Admiral
Kimmel discussed its contents with Lieut. General Short, Rear Ad-
miral Bloch, the Flag officers of the Fleet present, and the members
of his staff.
After much further study, Admiral Kimmel and his advisers in-
terpreted the warning to mean that war was imminent, and that readi-
ness to undertake active operations was expected. They were unable
to read into it any indication that an attack against the Hawaiian
area was to be expected, particular attention having been directed to
the Japanese activities in the Far East, with objectives in that area
[1194] specifically mentioned. No reference was made to the pos-
sibility of a surprise aggressive move “in any direction”, as had been
done in the dispatch of 24 November.
There was nothing to indicate that defensive measures should take
precedence over all others. The “appropriate defensive deployment”
that was directed was not interpreted as referring specifically to the
Pacific Fleet, in view of the deployments of the Pacific Fleet already
made in compliance with the directive contained in the dispatch of
16 October. In addition, since that date, a squadron of submarines
had been sent to the Philippines, leaving only 5 in Pearl Harbor.
There were other considerations which no doubt influenced Admiral
Kimmel. The Navy Department’s dispatch of 30 November, ad-
dressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and sent to Admiral
Kimmel for his information, ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic
Fleet, to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China
Sea. This appeared to indicate that the authorities in Washington
expected hostilities to occur in the Far East, rather than elsewhere.
On 28 November the Chief of Naval Operations advised Admiral
Kimmel that the Department had requested, and the Army had agreed
to, the relief of Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army
troops, and the replacement of Marine planes with Army pursuit
planes. This action, involving as it did a complicated problem and
the movements of sizeable U. S. Naval forces westward to effect their
transfer, was an indication of the fact that the authorities [1195]
in the War and Navy Departments did not then expect a hostile move-
ment toward the Hawaiian Islands.
On 28 November, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations repeated to
Admiral Kimmel the information contained in a dispatch which the
War Department, on 27 November, had transmitted to Lieut. General
Short, and other Army addressees, to the effect that negotiations
appeared to be terminated, that Japanese future action was unpredict-
able, that hostile action was possible at any moment, and that it was
desirable that Japan commit the first overt act in case hostilities could
not be avoided. Such measures as were undertaken were to be car-
ried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.
316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
To this dispatch Lieut. General Short had replied on 27 November :
Report Department alerted against sabotage. Liaison with Navy.
The steps taken caused the Army planes to be grouped in such
manner as to afford better protection against sabotage, although mili-
tating against their taking the air promptly. In the absence of a
reply from the War Department, Lieut. General Short considered that
the alert he had placed in effect was approved.
Lieut. General Short having, on 28 November, 1941, received instruc-
tions from the Adjutant General of the Army to take measures to
protect military establishments, property, and equipment against
sabotage, reported in detail the measures that he had taken and re-
peated the fact that he had placed in effect Alert (No. 1) against
sabotage. He interpreted the dispatch from the Adjutant General as
further [ 1196 ] indicating that his alert against sabotage con-
stituted complete compliance with the War Department’s wishes.
There was no mention in any of the dispatches received by Lieut.
General Short, between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, of the
possibility or probability of an attack against Oahu.
As further evidence of the prevailing sentiment against the likeli-
hood of an immediate move toward Hawaii, it is a fact that a flight
of B-I7s from the Mainland arrived over Oahu during the attack of
7 December, without ammunition and with guns not ready for firing.
These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testi-
fying before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7
December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and
Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area,
there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin
in the Far East, rather than elsewhere.
XVIII
From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, conversations between our
government and Japan did continue, notwithstanding the statement
contained in the war warning message under date of 27 November,
1941, that “negotiations with Japan, looking toward stabilization of
conditions in the Pacific have ceased.”
This statement was based upon the note delivered by the State De-
partment to the Japanese representatives on 26 November, a copy of
which was furnished the Navy [ 1197 ] Department. It did
not in itself discontinue negotiations and conversations, but, on the
contrary, gave an “outline of proposed basis for agreement between
the United States and Japan.” The stipulations contained therein
were drastic and were likely to be unacceptable to Japan.
The reply to this note was anxiously awaited by the high officials
of the War and Navy Department because of the feeling that Japan
would not accept the condiitons presented, and that diplomatic rela-
tions would be severed or that war would be declared. The sending
of the note therefore began the final phase of the critical period which
culminated on 7 December.
Although it was stated in the press that a note had been delivered,
none of its contents was given out to the public until after the attack.
Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note
nor of its contents until many months after the attack.
. REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
317
In a personal letter to Admiral Stark, dated 26 May, 1941, he had
invited attention to the importance of keeping commanders, well re-
moved from Washington, informed of developments and eventualities,
stating :
The Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is
far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situ-
ation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, re-
flected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to
evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what
force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radicaUy affecting
his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturb-
ing and tends to create uncertainty, a [1198] condition which directly
contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one’s own course of
action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.
It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international
picture, both diplomatic and mUitary, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge
of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing
of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to
marked improvement. FuU and authoritative knowledge of current policies and
objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses
of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the
current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive trainig of a par-
tially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of inter-
ruption of this trainig by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending
eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the De-
partment itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly
with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making
it even more necessary that the Comander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by
broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.
It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Comamnder-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as
they occur and by the quickest secure means available.
From time to time during this critical period there was received in
the War and Navy Departments certain other important information
bearing on the current situation. The testimonv as to this informa-
tion forms a part of the record of this Court. Tfhe details of this in-
formation are not discussed or analyzed in these findings, the Court
having been informed that their disclosure would militate against
the successful prosecution of the war.
[ 1199 ] This information was not transmitted to the Comman-
der-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor to the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department. No facilities were available to them, either in the Fleet
or m the Hawaiian area, which would enable them to obtain the in-
formation direct. They were dependent solely upon Washington for
such information.
With regard to not transmitting this information, the stand taken
by the Chief of Naval Operations was that the “war warning message”
of 27 November completely covered the situation. The fact remains,
however, that this message, standing alone, could not convey to the
commanders in the field the picture as it was seen in Washington.
Only three other messages were received by the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Chief of Naval Operations between 26
November and 7 December, one informing him that the Japanese had
instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington,
and London to destroy certain codes, and the other two relative to the
destruction of United States codes at Guam and outlying islands.
79716— 46— Ex. 167 21
318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time, the War
and Navy Departments had information which appeared to indicate
that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent and, by inference
and deduction, that an attack in the Hawaiian area could Be expected
soon. This information was embodied in a dispatch by the Chief of
Staff, U. S. Army, who, after consulting with the Chief of Naval
Operations bv telephone, had it encoded and sent to the Commanding
Generals in Panama, Manila, and Hawaii, with instructions that the
naval authorities in those areas be informed of its contents.
[1000] The dispatch to Hawaii left Washington at 12 : 17 p. m.,
Washington time (6:47 a. m., Honolulu time) and arrived in Hono-
lulu’s RCA office at 7 : 33 a. m. (Honolulu time) . Thus there remained
but 22 minutes before the attack began for delivery, decoding, dis-
semination, and action. Lieut. General Short did not receive the
decoded dispatch until the afternoon of 7 December, several hours
after the attacking force had departed.
Had the telephone and plain language been used, this information
could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack
began. Even in this event, however, there was no action open, nor
means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the
attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon
its outcome. There was already in effect the condition of readiness
best suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of
the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases
on Oahu.
XIX
It is a prime obligation of Command to keep subordinate com-
manders, particularly those in distant areas, constantly supplied with
information. To fail to meet this obligation is to commit a military
error.
It is a fact that Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations and
responsible for the operation of the Fleet, and having important infor-
mation in his possession during this critical period, especially on the
morning of 7 December, failed to transmit this information to
Admiral [120J] Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear
picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington.
OPINION
Based on Finding II, the Court is of the opinion that the presence
of a large number of combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl
-A Harbor on 7 December, 1941, was necessary, and that the information
available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require
any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules.
Based on Finding III, the Court is of the opinion that the Consti-
tutional requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the Con-
gress, no blow may be struck until after a hostile attack has been
delivered, prevented the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from
taking offensive action as a means of defense in the event of Japanese
vessels or planes appearing the Hawaiian area, and that it imposed
upon him the responsibility of avoiding taking any action which
might be construed as an overt act.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
319
Based on Finding V, the Court is of the opinion that the relations
between Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N., and Lieut. General
Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, were friendly, cordial and cooperative,
that there was no lack of, interest, ' [J£0£] no lack of apprecia-
tion of responsibility, and no failure to cooperate on the part of either,
and that each was cognizant of the measures being undertaken by the
other for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the degree
required by the common interest.
Based on Finding VI, the Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies
in personnel and material which existed during 1941, had a direct ad-
verse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor
on and prior to 7 December.
Based on Finding VII. the Court is of the opinion that the supe-
riority of the Japanese Fleet over the U. S. Pacific Fleet during the
year 1941, and the ability of Japan to obtain military and naval infor-
mation gave her an initial advantage not attainble by the United
States up to 7 December, 1941.
Based on Finding VIII, the Court is of the opinion that the defense
o f the Pearl Harbor Naval Base was the direct responsibility of JHe
ArmyrJhat the JNavy was to assist only with the means provided the
14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint oper-
ation only to this extent. The Court is further of the opinion that the
defense should have been such as to function effectively independently
of the Fleet, in view of the fundamental requirement that the strategic
freedom of action of the Fleet [120S] must be assured demands
that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided
for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to
the security of the base, or for that of the vessels within its limits.
Based on Findings IV, VIII and IX, the Court is of the opinion
that the duties of Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. N., in connec-
tion with the defense of Pearl Harbor, were performed satisfactorily.
Based on Finding IX, the Court is of the opinion that the detailed
Naval Participation Air Defense plans drawn up and jointly agreed
upon were complete and sound in concept, but that they contained a
basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the
availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet,
and that on the morning of 7 December these plans were ineffective
because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would
be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow
limits of time, which was not the case on that morning.
The Court is further of the opinion that it was not possible for the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to make his Fleet planes perma-
nently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer in view of the need
for their employment with the Fleet.
Based on Finding X, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kim-
mel’s action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing
in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Pacific
Fleet at sea and in the operating areas, is indicative of his appreciation
of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet, and that the steps
taken were adequate and effective.
Based on Finding XI, the Court is of the opinion that, by virtue of
the information that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which indicated
320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
neither the probability nor the imminence of an air attack on Pearl
Harbor, and bearing in mind that he had not knowledge of the State
Department’s note of 26 November, the Navy’s condition of readiness
on the morning of 7 December, 1941, which resulted in the hostile
planes being brought under heavy fire of the ships’ anti-aircraft bat-
teries as they came within range, was that best suited to the circum-
stances, although had all anti-aircraft batteries been manned in ad-
vance, the total damage inflicted on ships would have been lessened to
a minor extent and to a degree which is problematical ; and that, had
the Fleet patrol planes, slow and unsuited for aerial combat, been in
the air, they might have escaped and the number of these planes lost
might thus have been reduced.
The Court is of the opinion, however, that only had it been known
in advance that the attack would take place on [120 If] 7
December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps
that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects, and that, beyond
the fact that conditions were unsettled and that, therefore, anything
might happen, there was nothing to distinguish one day from another
in so far as expectation of attack is concerned.
It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have
been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-air-
craft guns manned. The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of
this is questionable when it is considered that it could not be known
when an attack would take place and that, to make sure, it would have
been necessary to impose a state of tension on the personnel day after
day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules of ships
and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7
December.
Based on Finding XII, the Court is of the opinion that, as no infor-
mation of any sort was at any time either forwarded or received from
any source which would indicate that Japanese carriers or other Jap-
anese ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or Decem-
ber, 1941, the attack of 7 December at Pearl Harbor, delivered under
the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and that when it
would take place was unpredictable.
Based on Finding XIII, the Court is of the opinion that the action
of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in ordering that no rou-
tine, long-range reconnaissance be undertaken was sound and that the
use of Fleet patrol planes for daily, long-range, all-around reconnais-
sance was not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes
available, and was not jutified in the absence of any information indi-
cating that an attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within
narrow limits of time.
[1206] Based on Finding XIV, the Court is of th$ opinion that
the shore-based air warning system, an Army service under the direct
control of the Army, was ineffective on the morning of 7 December, in
that there was no provision for keeping track of planes in the air
near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing between those friendly
and those hostile and that, because of this deficiency, a flight of planes
which appeared on the radar screen shortly after 0700 was confused
with a flight of Army B-l7s en route from California, and that the
information obtained by Army radar was valueless as a warning, be-
cause the planes could not be identified as hostile until the Japanese
markings on their wings came into view.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
321
Based on Finding XV, the Court is of the opinion that by far the
greatest portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in
Pearl Harbor was due to__spee i a Hy d es ign ed Japanese torpedoes, the
development and existence of which was unknown to the United
States.
Based on Finding XVI, and particularly in view of the Chief of
Naval Operations’ approval of the precautions taken and the deploy-
ments made by Admiral Kimmel in accordance with the directive con-
tained in the dispatch of 16 October, 1941, the Court is of the opinion
that Admiral Kimmel’s decision, made after receiving the dispatch
of [WOT] 24 November, to continue preparations of the Pacific
Fleet for war, was sound in the light of the information then avail-
able to him.
Based on Finding XVII, the Court is of the opinion that, although
the attack of 7 December came as a surprise, there were good grounds
for the belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy
Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian
area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than else-
where, and that the same considerations which influenced the senti-
ment of the authorities in Washington in this respect, support the in-
terpretation which Admiral Kimmel placed upon the “war warning
message” of 27 November, to the effect that this message directed
attention away from Pearl Harbor rather than toward it.
Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that
Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and
responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound
judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral
Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical
period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he
had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the
morning of 7 December, 1941, he did not transmit immediately
[1208) the fact that a message had been received which appeared
to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that
an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.
The Court is further of the opinion that, had this important infor-
mation been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture
as to what action he would have taken.
Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion
that no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on
the part of any person or persons in the naval service.
RECOMMENDATION
The Court recommends that no further proceedings be had in the
matter.
Orin G. Murfin,
Admiral , U. S. Navy ( Ret .),
President.
Edward C. Kalbfus,
Admiral , U. S. Navy ( Ret .),
Member.
Adolphus Andrews,
Vice Admiral , U. S. Navy (Ret.),
Member.
322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Court having finished the inquiry, then at 4 p. m., [120$\
Thursday, October 19, 1944, adjourned to await the action of the Con-
vening Authority.
Orin G. Mukfin,
Admiral , U. S. Navy (Ret.),
President.
Harold Biesemeier,
Captain , U. S. Navy ,
Judge Advocate.
REPORT OP NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
323
[2] ADDENDUM TO COURTS FINDING OF FACTS
In the Finding of Facts, No. XVIII, the Court has referred to
“certain other important information” as being available in the War
and Navy Departments. This information was obtained by intercept-
ing Japanese messages and breaking their diplomatic codes. The
Court has been informed that these codes are still in use and, if it
became known to the Japanese Government that they had been broken
by the United States, the codes would be changed and, as a conse-
quence, the war effort would be adversely affected.
For this reason, the Court has refrained from analyzing or dis-
cussing the details of the information in its Finding of Facts but
feels that its report would not be complete without a record of such
details. The Court, therefore, submits the following record in this
addendum and transmits it to the Secretary of the Navy for filing
with other highly secret matter referred to as such in the record of
the Court’s proceedings.
High ly secret messages, hereinafter mentioned, were intercepted
by the War and Navy Departments during the very critical period
26 November to 7 December, 1941, and prior thereto. The method of
handling these messages in the Navy Department was as follows :
The Director of Naval Intelligence ana the Director of Naval Com-
munications operated directly under the Chief of [£] Naval
Operations. They were responsible to see that all messages were trans-
mitted to him in order that he might be kept conversant at all times
with existing conditions.
Officers in Intelligence and Communications, Divisions of Naval
Operations, remained on duty night and day. They made every effort
to obtain all possible diplomatic and military information, in order
that high officials of our government might be kept fully informed.
Messages were translated and placed in a folder immediately upon
receipt or intercept. The important messages were marked witn a
clip and taken by a designated officer to the Secretary of the Navy,
the Chief of Naval Operations, the Directors of War Plans, Naval
Intelligence, and Naval Communications, and to the Chief of the Far
Eastern Division of Naval Intelligence. The Director of Naval In-
telligence, Captain Wilkinson, kept himself constantly informed re-
garding all messages. He checked as to whether or not the Chief of
Naval Operations had seen the important ones and in many cases
took them personally to the Chief of Naval Operations and discussed
them with him.
Immediately after the receipt of the note of 26 November, 1941,
from the Secretary of State, the Japanese representatives in Washing-
ton sent a message to Tokyo which was intercepted by the Navy De-
partment. This is Document 17, Exhibit 63, which gave to Tokyo
the following stipulations contained in the note :
(al The recognition of Hull’s “four principles”.
(b) (1) Conclusion of mutual non-aggression treaty between
Tokyo, Moscow, Washington, The Netherlands, Chungking and
Bangkok.
324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[■?] (2) Agreement between Japan, United States, Eng-
land, The Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of
French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French
Indo-China.
(3) Complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and
all French Indo-China.
(4) Japan and the United States both definitely to promise to
support no regime but that of Chiang Kai-shek.
(5) The abolition of extraterritoriality, the concessions in
China, and other requirements bearing on reciprocal trade treaty,
rescinding freezing orders^ stabilization of yen, etc., and for
Japan to amend her tripartite pact with Germany and Italy.
The Japanese representatives added in their report to Tokyo the
following :
Both dumbfounded and stated to Hull we could not even cooperate to the
extent of even reporting this to Tokyo.
No information regarding the delivery of this note or of its con-
tents was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or
to other Commanders afloat.
From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, there was much diplomatic
dispatch traffic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Am-
bassador in Washington which had a bearing on the critical situation
existing and which was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific. A message dated 19 November, 1941, Tokyo to Washington,
translated on 28 November, 1941, and referred to as “The Winds
Code” was as follows :
Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the
cutting off of International communications, the following warning will be added
In the middle of the dally Japanese language short wave news broadcast
[41 (1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO
KAZEAME.*
(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**
(3) Japan-British relations : NISHI NO KAZE HARE.***
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and
each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code
papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement
Forward as urgent intelligence.
The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 November, 1941, sent
to the Chief of Naval Operations, information to Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commandant 16th Naval District; and Com-
mandant 14th Naval District, substantially the same information as
outlined above. On 5 December, 1941, the United States Naval At-
tache, Batavia, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations substantially
the same information. These messages stated that at some future
date information would be sent by Japan indicating a breaking off
of diplomatic relations or possibly war between countries designated.
- All officers of the Communication and Intelligence Divisions in
the Navy Department, considering the expected information most im-
portant, were on the lookout for this notification of Japanese inten-
tions. On 4 December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing
this code was received in the Navy Department. Although this noti-
fication was subject to two interpretations, either a breaking off of
’East wind rain.
••North wind cloudy.
•••West wind dear.
REPORT OP NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
325
diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, or [5]
war, this information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.
It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-
Chief, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broad-
casts for this code, and apparently there was a mistaken impression
in the Navy Department that the execute message had also been inter-
cepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this message was never inter-
cepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the Navy Depart-
ment to ascertain whether this information had been obtained by the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat.
Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, although
Admiral Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and pre-
sumed that Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot now be
located in the Navy Department.
It is a matter of general knowledge that Japan has had for many
years a thorough system of espionage throughout the world and con-
tinuously sought and received mformation regarding the location and
movements of United States naval vessels. There were certain mes-
sages received in the Navy Department which showed very clearly
that Japan, at this critical period, was particularly desirous of ob-
taining exact information from two sources, namely, Manila and
Honolulu. Messages between Tokyo, Manila, and Honolulu inquir-
ing especially about planes, ships, their places of anchorage, etc., in
the latter ports, were intercepted. Similar messages were sent to Jap-
anese officials in Honolulu clearly indicating that Japan was most
[£] desirous of obtaining exact information as to ships in Pearl
Harbor.
The important messages having special reference to Pearl Harbor
were as follows:
(a) On 15 November, 1941, Document 24, Exhibit 63, an intercept
from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department, 3 Decem-
ber, 1941, states :
As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical make your
“ships in harbor report” Irregular but at rate of twice a week. Although you
already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.
(b) On 18 November, 1941, Document 37, Exhibit 63, an intercept
from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department on 5 Decem-
ber, 1941, states :
Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein : Area “N”
Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, and areas adjacent thereto. Make your Investigation
with great secrecy.
Note by Navy Department on this message:
“Manila Bay” probably means “Mamala Bay.”
(c) On 18 November, 1941, Document 40, Exhibit 63, an intercept
from Honolulu to Tokyo and translated in Navy Department 6 Decem-
ber, 1941, gives information as to ships moored in certain areas in
Pearl Harbor and movements of ships in and out.
[7] (d) On 29 November, 1941, Document 36, Exhibit 63, an
intercept from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Washington 5 Decem-
ber, 1941, states :
We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements but in future
will you also report even where there are no movements.
326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Kimmel was not aware of and had no information regard-
ing these messages.
On 5 November, 1941, Document 7, Exhibit 63, Tokyo to Washing-
ton, was intercepted. This message stresses the necessity of signing
an agreement between the United States and Japan by 25 November,
1941.
On 22 November, 1941, Document 11, Exhibit 63, intercept from
Tokyo to Washington, stated that the signing of agreement set for
25 November, 1941, could be postponed until 29 November, and in
explanation this message stated:
• * * There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to
settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three
or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans ; if the sign-
ing can be completed by the 29th, * * * if the pertinent notes can be ex-
changed; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Nether-
lands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait
until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be
changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. * * *
No intimation of the receipt of this message was transmitted to the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or to other Commanders afloat, nor was
any information transmitted to them regarding contents of the mes-
sages mentioned in the following paragraphs.
t&] On 28 November, 1941, a dispatch, Document 18, Exhibit 63,
was intercepted between Tokyo and Washington which in part reads as
follows :
♦ * * The United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating
proposal —
referring to note of 26 November —
* * * the Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations.
Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this Ameri-
can proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be
de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the
impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are
awaiting instructions * * *
etc.
The message indicates the position of Japan regarding the note of
26 November, and further indicates that within two or three days
negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Further, it emphasizes tne
importance of delay. Neither the message nor any of its contents were
transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or to other Com-
manders afloat.
On 29 November, 1941, Document 19, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to
Washington and translated by the Navy Department 30 November,
1941, directs that Japanese representatives make one more attempt to
have United States reconsider and states :
* * * please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off
of negotiations.
Again, on 30 November, 1941, Document 20, Exhibit 63, an intercept
from Washington to Tokyo indicated that negotiations were to be
stretched out.
These two messages indicate that the Japanese were sparring for
time.
[ 9 ] On 30 November, 1941, Document 22, Exhibit 63, translated
by the Navy Department on 1 December, 1941, was intercepted, being
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 327
a message from Tokyo to Japanese representatives in Berlin, reading
as follows :
1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period
the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the
cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the inter-
national situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan
and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within
the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from
participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through
these negotiations.
2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of
defending the Empire’s existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis,
has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views
and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations
rested (they demanded the exacuation of Imperial troops from China and French
Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.
Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first
came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional
idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her
fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on
between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of
the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establish-
ment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East
(that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire
of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance
of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they
took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand
the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was
brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in tjhe
negotiations of the last few days that it has [ 10 ] become gradually more
and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotia-
tions with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of nego-
tiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of
theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no
matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be
interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the
maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power
Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any
time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and
Italy. It Is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impos-
sible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more,
before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England,
Australia, The Netherlands, and China — they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is
clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided
to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.
On 1 December, 1941, the Navy Department intercepted a message
from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin as follows :
The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say
very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may
suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may
come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet,
but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north.
Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.
On 1 December, 1941, document 21, Exhibit 63, was intercepted,
being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Washing-
ton which reads as follows:
1. The date set In my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the [ 11 ] United
States from becoming unduly suspicious w’p have been advising the press and
••JD-l : 6710.
328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United
States, the negotiations are continuing. ( The above is for only your information ) .
2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to
Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the
necessary representations at your end only.
3. There are reports here that the President’s sudden return to the capital is an
effect of Premier Tojo’s statement. We have an idea that the President did so
because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make
investigations Into this matter.
On 2 December, 1941, Document 25, Exhibit 63, intercept Washing-
ton to Tokyo, translated by the Navy Department 3 December, 1941,
reports that conversations with the State Department continue; that
the Japanese representatives stated to Welles, the Under Secretary of
State, that it is virtually impossible for Japan to accept new American
proposals as they now stand, and that the Japanese representatives feel
that the United States is anxious to peacefully conclude the current
difficult situation.
On 3 December, 1941, Document 29, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to
Washington, translated by the Navy Department 4 December, 1941,
requests their representatives to explain Japan’s increased forces in
Indo-China.
On 3 December, 1941, Document 33, Exhibit 63, intercept Washing-
ton to Tokyo, translated by Navy Department 5 December [i#l
1941, states:
Judging from all Indications, we feel that some joint military action between
Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a
definite certainty In the event of an occupation of Thailand.
On 6 December, 1941, Document 38, Exhibit 63, from Tokyo to
Washington, was intercepted, giving notive to the Japanese represent-
atives that a reply consisting of 14 parts to American proposal of 2f>
November is being sent to them, directing that secrecy should be main-
tained and stating that the time of presenting this'reply would be sent
in a separate message.
The first 13 parts of this Teply were intercepted and received by
the Navy Department at about 3 :00 p. m., December 6, 1941, and were
translated and made ready for distribution by 9 :00 p. m., Washington
time, of that date. These 13 parts contain a very strong and conclu-
sive answer to the note of November 26 and state in part,
Japan cannot accept proposal as a basis of negotiations.
Commander Kramer, the officer whose duty it was to distribute this
class of information, prior to 9:00 p. m., 6 December, 1941, ’phoned
Captain Wilkinson that an important message had been received and
was being translated. He also tried to communicate with Admiral
Stark ana Rear Admiral Turner at their homes but found them out.
At about 9 :00 p. m., Washington time, Commander Kramer pro-
ceeded to the White House with the 13 parts of reply and delivered
copy to a White House aide, with the request that [ 13 ] it be
delivered immediately to the President. Kramer then proceeded to
the home of Secretary Knox where he personally delivered to the
Secretary a copy of the Japanese reply. Secretary Knox read the
reply, did not discuss it in detail with Examer, but ’phoned the Secre-
tary of War and Secretary of State.
•JD-l : 6921.
•**Not Available.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
329
Kramer then proceeded to the home of Captain Wilkinson and gave
a copy to him. Kramer told Wilkinson that he had tried to get Stark
and Turner. Wilkinson made several ’phone calls, presumably to
Admiral Stark and others. This information regarding receipt of
these 13 parts or their contents was not transmitted to the Com-
mander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet or other Commanders Afloat.
Kramer then returned to his office in the Navy Department, arriving
about 12 :30 a. m., 7 December, and as no other important messages
were at hand, went home and returned to the Navy Department about
7 :00 a. m. Upon his arrival he found the 14th part of the Japanese
reply had been received and decoded. He then delivered a copy of
all 14 parts to the Flag Secretary in his office of the Chief of Naval
■Operations at about 9 a. m. ; where he found several officers gathering
for a conference with Admiral Stark. Kramer then proceeded about
'9 :30 a. m., to the White House and made delivery of the 14 parts of
the message. He proceeded then, at about 9 :50 a. m., to tne State
Department and delivered same to the Secretary of the Navy, who was
there in conference with the Secretary of State.
At about 10 :30 a .m., Kramer returned to the Navy Depart- [H]
jnent where he found another message had been translated. This
message, an intercept from Tokyo to Washington, was marked
‘“Urgent, very important” and read as follows:
Will the ambassador please submit to the U. S. Government (if possible to the
:Secretary of State) our reply to the U. S. at 1 :00 p. m., on the 7th, your time.
Kramer delivered a copy of this message (hereinafter referred to as
(the “one p. m. message”) to the Flag Secretary of Admiral Stark, the
latter at the time being in conference with several officers.
Kramer then returned to the White House and delivered the “1 :00
p. aa. message.” From there he went to the State Department where
the Secretary of the Navy was still in conference with the Secretary
•of State. On arrival he requested one of the State Department
assistants to present the message to the Secretary of the Navy and to
invite his attention to the fact that 1 : 00 p. m., Washingon time, meant
•dawn at Honolulu and midnight in East Asia.
Admiral Stark had arrived in his office at the Navy Department
•at some time between 9:00 and 10:30 a. m., on the morning of 7
December. Although he testified that he had no information prior
to this time relative to the Japanese reply to the note of November
26th he was informed of the 14 parts and “the 1 :00 p. m. message” not
later than 10:30 a. m., of that date. He testified that General
Marshall ’phoned him and suggested that the information regarding
the delivery of the 14 parts at 1 :00 p. m. was most important ana
significant and, in his opinion, should he transmitted to Commanders
[16] in the Pacific. Admiral Stark at first demurred and hung
up the receiver. Shortly thereafter he ’phoned General Marshall
requesting that, in the event he sent the message to the Commanding
Generals m the Pacific area, he instruct them to relay this message
to naval opposites.
The message which General Marshall sent to the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department (Exhibit 48) reads as follows:
Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code
machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we
330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this
communication.
This message left the War Department at 11 :52 a. m., Washing-
ton time, was sent out over R. C. A. at 12:17 p. m. (6:47 a. m. Hono-
lulu time) and arrived in Honolulu’s R. C. A. office at 7 :33 a. m.
Honolulu time. There remained but 22 minutes before the attack
for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action. Lieut. General
Short did not receive the decoded dispatch until the afternoon of 7
December, several hours after the attacking force had departed.
Had the telephone and plain language been used, this message
could have been received in Hawaii before the attack began. Even
in this event, however, there was no action open to Admiral Kimmel
which could have stopped the attack or which could have had other
than negligible bearing upon its outcome. There was already in
effect the condition of readiness [25] best suited to the cir-
cumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl Harbor
Naval Base and the Fleet planes in their air bases in Oahu.
Orin G. Murtin,
Admiral , U. S. Navy (Ret.),
President.
Edward C. Kalbfus,
Admiral , U. S. Navy (Ret.),
Member.
Adolphus Andrews,
Vice Admired , TJ. S. Navy (Ret .) ,
Member .
[Stamped:] Nov. 2, 1944.
[ 1 ] FIRST ENDORSEMENT
To : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
Subj : Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed
forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by
the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July, 1944.
1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.
2. The weighing of conflicting evidence and testimony is peculiarly the function
of a Court of Inquiry or Board of Investigation, and not that of the reviewing
authorities. Where the testimony is such as will reasonably support either of
two or more different conclusions, it is not within the province of the Judge
Advocate General to attempt to substitute his evaluation of the evidence for
that of the Court. But where there is no creditable evidence in a record to
support a finding or opinion, or where the weight of evidence is so preponder-
antly on one side that it appears unreasonable to reach a contrary conclusion,
the Judge Advocate General must hold, as a matter of law, that such a finding
or opinion is not supported by the evidence adduced. See CMO 9 of 1928, P. 8 ;
CMO 12 of 1937, P. 8; CMO 5 of 1936, P. 11.
3. Attention is invited to the following portion of Finding of Fact XVIII :
“In the early forenoon of 7 December, 1941, Washington time, the War
and Navy Departments had information which appeared to indicate that
a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, by inference and deduc-
tion, that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon.”
4. This Finding, standing alone, may be misleading, in the sense that it may
convey an impression that the Court concluded that responsible officials of the
War and Navy Departments did in fact make the inference and deduction under-
scored above. The fact that the Court, in phrasing this Finding, used the past
tense of the verb “appear”, and used the expression “appeared to indicate”,
rather than “should have indicated” lends support to this construction. Such
REPORT OP NAVY COURT OP INQUIRY
331
an [2] impression would not be supported by the record, as the great
preponderance of the evidence before the Court refutes any such conclusion.
It is quite clear from the evidence that the responsible officials of the Navy
Department had evaluated the information available to them in Washington to
mean that a hostile move by the Japanese could be expected, not in the Hawaiian
area, except by submarines, but rather against Guam, the Philippines, and
British and Dutch possessions in the Far East.
5. Those witnesses who, on 7 December, lf>41, held positions in the Navy
Department which qualify them to speak authoritatively as to the prevailing
opinion there just prior to the attack, are all in substantial accord that the
Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants had not deduced or inferred that
an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. On the contrary, the
concensus in the Navy Department was that any attack would probably come in
the Far East, and the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was given a
comparatively low probability rating. Those witnesses who stated that the
information available to the Navy Department clearly indicated, by inference and
deduction, that an attack on Hawaii could be expected, were all officers who
were not on duty in the Navy Department at that time, or occupied subordinate
positions. Their testimony is opinion evidence, undoubtedly unconsciously
colored by hindsight, and arrived at by a process of selecting, from the great
mass of intelligence reports available to the Chief of Naval Operations, those
which in the light of subsequent events proved to be hints or indications of
Japanese intentions.
6. Therefore, any finding, opinion or inference that the reponsible officials
of the Navy Department knew, prior to the actual attack, that an attack on
Hawaii was impending, is not supported by the evidence. The Court recognizes
this fact, as shown by its finding (last paragraph of Finding XVII) that) ;
“These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying
before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7 December
came as a surprise to high officials In the State, War, and Navy Depart-
ments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, there were good
grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather
than elsewhere.”
[d] 7. The foregoing remarks apply equally to the underscored portion of
the Opinion expressed by the Court (P. 1207) that :
“Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and respon-
sible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment
expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral KImmel, Commander-
In-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7
December, Important information which he had regarding the Japanese
situation, and especially in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did
not transmit immediately the fact that a message had been received which
appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent,
and, that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon”
As has been previously pointed out, the message herein referred to was not con-
strued by the Chief of Naval Operations and his principal advisers as indicating
an attack in the Hawaiian area.
8. It is noted that the Court finds (Finding of Fact XVIII) that the time at
which the War and Navy Departments had information indicating a break in
diplomatic relations on 7 December 1941, and the possibility of hostile action
by the Japanese on that date, was “in the early forenoon of 7 December, Wash-
ington time.” It Is not considered amiss to comment in further detail on this
finding, in view of a widespread misconception in some quarters that this Infor-
mation was known In Washington on 6 December 1941. The evidence before
this Court establishes, beyond any doubt, that the Information referred to was
not available to any responsible official in Washington prior to approximately
10 : 00 a. m., the morning of 7 December 1941.
9. The Judge Advocate General feels constrained to comment on the apparent
contradiction between the Opinion expressed by the Court that the Chief of Naval
Operations failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in failing to
transmit certain information to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the
final Opinion that “no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred
on the part of any person in the naval service.” That this is only an apparent,
and not a real, incongruity, Is shown by the Opinion that “had this important
information been conevyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to
what action he would have taken.” This statement, as well as the Finding of
332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Facts and Opinions taken as a whole, indicate [ 4 ] that it was the con-
clusion of the Court, although not clearly expressed, that the evidence adduced
did not prove that Admiral Stark's failure to transmit the information in question
to Admiral Kimmel was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the Fleet
on 7 December, 1941, and that any causal connection between this failure on
Admiral Stark’s part and the disaster would be entirely speculative. Such a
conclusion is fully supported by the testimony in this record.
10. Subject to the foregoing remarks, the proceedings, findings, opinions and
recommendations of the attached Court of Inquiry are, in the opinion of the
Judge Advocate General, legal.
T. L. Gatch,
T. L. Gatch,
The Judge Advocate General.
TOP SECRET
[1] United States Fleet
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Navy Department
Washington 25, D. C.
3 Nov. 1944.
FF/A17-25.
Serial: 003191.
TOP SECRET .
From : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Opera-
tions.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject : Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry — Review of.
Reference : (a) SecNav ltr of 21 October 1944.
Annex: (A) List of Parts of Record that Contain Information of super-secret
nature.
1. In compliance with Reference (a), the following comment is submitted as
to how much of the record of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bears such a
relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.
2. There are only two general classifications of information, which, if made
public, would be detrimental to the conduct of current and future operations.
These are:
(a) Information which, directly or by inference, would lead the Japanese
to suspect that we have been able to break their codes.
(b) Verbatim plain language reproductions of messages sent in United
States Codes. The Japanese presumably have the enciphered versions of
these messages, and if they are given the word for word, plain language
version, it would help them to work on our codes. This is a matter of less
importance than the possible compromise of what we know about Japanese
encryption, but it should be guarded against.
[ 2 ] 3. The really vital point is to preserve absolute secrecy as to our
success in breaking Japanese codes. It is essential to keep this information to
ourselves. I say this for the following reasons :
(a) All Japanese intercepts considered by the Court were in diplomatic codes.
Most of these are still in effect, with only minor changes. They are still the
sources of Information of incalculable value. Furthermore, all Japanese codes,
Atmy and Navy, as well as diplomatic, are of the same general structure. The
Japanese codes of today are not basically different from those they used in 1941.
Breaking one code makes it easy to break the others. The Japanese presumably
are well aware of this. If they were told that we broke their diplomatic codes in
1941, there is a reasonable assumption that they will change the whole basic
code structure. If they were to do this, the damage would be irreparable. The
information we get relates not only to the current and prospective movement
of Japanese naval vessels, upon which we base our operating plans, but also
include data as to troop strength and prospective troop movements which is
vital to the Army. It also relates to the disposition of Japanese Army and Navy
air forces. It is impossible to overstate the disadvantages we would suffer if
there were to be a leakage, direct or indirect, that an alert enemy might interpret
as indicating that we can and do break his codes. It is no exaggeration to state
that Midway might have been a Japanese victory had it not been for the informa-
Jtlon which we obtained l>y Intercepting his coded desjpatches. Xhe risks we Jtxgyy
REPORT OP NAVY COURT OP INQUIRY
333
taken in advancing into the Marshall Islands and the Philippines would have
been far greater than they actually were had we not been able to obtain infor-
mation of Japanese dispositions and movements from Japanese sources.
(b) In view of the foregoing I strongly recommend that there be no public
release of any information which would alert the Japanese as to the possibility
that we are breaking their codes.
[3] (c) It is a pertinent question as to just what part, if any, of the
record of proceedings can be made public, without resulting in a leak of vital
information.
(d) I can say unequivocally that Volume 5 (the “Top Secret” volume of pro-
ceedings) must not be made public. With regard to the other volumes of the
record I find there are certain paragraphs which do point quite clearly to the
fact that we have information which could only be obtained by reading Japanese
coded messages. I have listed these in Annex (A) of the report, which also
includes certain references which might be damaging to the security of our own
codes.
(e) lam not any too certain of the effectiveness of the deletions recommended
in Annex (A). There are statements of a border-line nature concerning which
it is difficult to tell whether or not an alert enemy might find a clue as to what
our knowledge of his codes really is. However, if the record is abridged by
deletion of the matter enumerated in Annex (A), it would be devoid of any
direct reference to information which we must keep from becoming public.
(f) The foregoing should not be interpreted to mean that I am in favor of
making public the parts of the record not referred to in the Annex. On the
contrary, I am of the opinion that publication of a “weeded” record or of
abridged Findings would have the following undesirable results:
(1) The picture presented would be disjointed and full of unexplained gaps.
I think this would lead to a demand of Congress and by the Press for more
information, on the ground that the part made public was incomplete, and that
withholding of any information is indicative of a desire on the part of the Navy
to “whitewash” high naval officers. A situation such as this might well lead
to discussions that would inadvertently disclose just the information that we feel
is vital to keep secret.
[4] (2) Admiral Kimmel’s principal contention is that he was kept in
the dark as to certain information which the Navy Department had obtained
from various sources, including the breaking of Japanese codes. This is a matter
which cannot be made public without irreparable damage to the' conduct of the
war. It is not unlikely that if there is a public release of some of the Facts and
Opinions, but no release concerning matters in which Admiral Kimmel is
particularly concerned, he may take further action to protect his own reputa-
tion. The potentialities are particularly dangerous, because Admiral Kimmel’s
civilian lawyers have now been informed, so I understand, of the existence and
content of the many Japanese messages in question. I know of no means of
keeping these lawyers from talking in public, except such ethical views as they
may have concerning their responsibility for not doing anything that would
jeopardize war operations. It is a question just how far they could be re-
strained by ethical considerations, if the Navy Department were to make public
the part of the record which is unfavorable to Admiral Kimmel, while supressing
that part which he regards as a main element of his defense.
(3)1 also invite attention to the fact that the Findings include certain Facts
and Opinions critical of Army efficiency, ascertained by proceedings to which
the Army was not a party. The publication of this part of the record might well
result In an inter-service dispute, which would tend to bring out the very in-
formation which It is essential to conceal.
4. In regard to the requirements of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, I note that
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to
proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl
Harbor catastrophe, and to commence proceedings against such persons as the
facts may Justify. This law does [5] not obligate the Secretary of the
Navy to make any public statement of what the Court of Inquiry has ascertained.
Furthermore, as I understand it, the President has definitely expressed himself
as opposed to any act which might interfere with the war effort. I, therefore,
conclude that there is no necessity for making anything public, except on the
ground that something should be done to suppress the rumors and Irresponsible
accusations that are now current. I do not believe that such considerations In
any way warrant jeopardizing the war effort by publicising all or any part of
the record.
79716— 46— Bx. 157 22
334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
5. With regard as to whether or not there should be any public statement, I
offer the opinion that no steps should be taken without consulting the Secretary
of War, and aranging for parallel action. The two Departments should not
issue conflicting statements, nor should one keep silent while the other one
makes a statement. Assuming that the War Department would take parallel
action I recommend that there be no public release whatsoever. However, if
the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War decide that there must be
some report to the public, I recommend a statement to the Press in substance as
follows :
“The Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry is of the opinion that no offenses
have been committed which warrant court martial proceedings against any
person or persons in the naval service. The Secretary of the Navy approves
the Findings. The record of the Court will not be made public while the
war is in progress.”
6. If you should find it advisable, at a later time, to issue a further statement
it seems to me that it would also be desirable to make public in some manner the
fact (see page 1160 of the record) that Admiral Kimmel and General Short
were personal friends, that they met frequently, that their relations were cordial
and cooperative in every respect, and that they [6] invariably conferred
on matters bearing on the development of the Japanese situation and their sev-
eral plans in preparing for war. This would refute the statements and rumors
that have been prevalent to the effect that Admiral Kimmel and General Short
were ait odds with one another. Of course, no such statement could be made
unless the Secretary of War concurs. If the Secretary of War. does concur you
might find occasion to make informal comment on the matter at a press con-
ference.
/s/ E. J. King,
E. J. King.
TOP SECRET
Annex “A” To Cominch Serial 003191
1. The following portions of the Record of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry
should not be made public, because they convey information which the enemy
could use to the detriment of United States war operations.
(a) Volume 5 (the “Top Secret” volume).
(b) The following paragraphs of Volumes 1, 2, 3, and 4 :
(1) Volume 1
Page Paragraph
166 683
172 739
213 Entire page
214 116
214 117
244 127
Page Paragraph
255 174
256 179
256 180
266 260
266 261
297 81
Page
315—
315
326—
328—
344 —
396
427
430—
432
432
463
463 —
463—
465
466—
466
466—
468
(2) Volume 2
Paragraph Page
25 470
26 470—
145 471
153 471
226 471 —
54 471
43 471
54 472
63 473
64 473—
18 473
19 473—
20 473—
24 483—
25 534 —
26 563
27 567 —
38
Paragraph
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
15
18
19
20
21
22
51
40
168
187
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
335
(3) Volume S
Page Paragraph Page
805 176 889-
817 7 889-
818 8 911_.
850 149
Paragraph
16
17
38
(4) Volume 4
Page Paragraph
938 34
939 - 35
( c) Also the following parts of the “Findings” in Volume 4 :
Page 1191. Third paragraph (beginning with words “on 24. November” ) and
the despatch quoted therein.
Page 1192.
Page 1193.
Page 1194.
Page 1198.
Page 1199.
Page 1200.
Page 1201.
Page 1206.
Page 1207.
Page 1208.
Entire page.
Entire page.
First 3 lines.
Last paragraph.
Entire page.
Entire page.
First 2 lines.
Last paragraph.
Entire page.
First 7 lines.
Statement of Admiral Stark :
Paragraph 7.
Paragraph 8.
Statement of Admiral Kimmel :
Page 21. Last paragraph.
Page 22. First paragraph.
(d) All “Top Secret” exhibits, and the following exhibits listed in the index
to Volume 1 : 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 40, 57, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 76, 76, 77.
NOTE
The Top Secret Second Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl
Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 6 Nov. 1944 by the Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, was not published, however a
paraphrased copy of this endorsement was published.
TOP BECHET
[1] United States Fleet
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Navy Department
Washington 25, D. C.
FF1/A17-25.
Serial : 003224.
TOP SECRET.
6 Nov 1944.
SECOND ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OP INQUIRY
From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Oper-
ations.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed
forces on Pearl Harbor. Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered
by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.
336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of
Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge
Advocate General in the First Endorsement and to the following remarks.
2 . (a) As to Facts I and II (page 1156), the routine practice of rotating
units of the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two-thirds of its time
at sea and one-third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled
upkeep periods in port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good
mechanical condition, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation
to keep them from going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified
in having one task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter
which I discuss later on.
(b) In Fact III (page 1158) the Court points out that, because of consti-
tutional requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until
after a hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration
of war by Congress. The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous
enemy is obvious. This requirement made it impossible for Admiral Kimmel
and General Short to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and, therefore,
was a definite handicap.
[ 2 ] (c) Fact IV (page 1159) sets forth that the Commandant of the
14th Naval District (Admiral Bloch) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and
was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl
Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures con-
cerned with local defense.
(d) Fact V (page 1160) sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short
were personal friends; that they met frequently; that their relations were
cordial and cooperative in every respect; that they frequently conferred, and
invariably conferred when messages were received by either which had any
bearing on the development of the United States- Japanese situation, or on
their several plans in preparing for war. Each was informed of measures being
undertaken by the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all
useful purposes. This is important, in that it refutes the rumors which have
been prevalent since the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and
General Short did not cooperate with one another.
(e) Part VI (page 1160) sets forth the information that the Navy Department
and the War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the
defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to cope
with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secretary
of War, on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the im-
portance of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation
to meet a hostile attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the
concept that the base at Pearl Harbor should be capable of defense by local Army
and Navy forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the
safety of the base. It is further made clear that both the War and the! Navy
Departments had given full consideration to this matter and had been unable,
during 1941, to augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the
general state of unpreparedness for war.
[3] (f) Fact VII (page 1165) sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the Presi-
dent on 5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan
at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical
superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet. The
Court, also, points out that owing to security policies in the two countries, it was
easy for Japan to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed
a free opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions.
My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that
United States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war, or
actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a disadvantage
during the period of strained relations.
(g) Fact VIII (page 1167) stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base are
necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and oppor-
tunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of per-
sonnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval warfare to
require seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from hostile
action while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks
that this concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and
that the United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
337
is that this principle is sound enough, but it cannot be carried to an illogical
extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsi-
bility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in principle, this is not nor-
mally a Fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated
properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl
Harbor should have been strong enough for self defense. The [ 4 ] fact
that it was not strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the
employment of the Fleet, but, nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted the
necessity for, employing the Fleet in defensive measures.
(h) Fact IX (page 1169). This section of the Findings outlines the plans
made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor.
It points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for
distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69
patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him in case
of necessity. The Court remarks that the basic defect of this section of the plan
lay in the fact that naval participation in long range reconnaissance depended
entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this
circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the fundamental
requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent
of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effectiveness of
these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to
be expected within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral
Kimmel to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense
Officer (because rf his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the
demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My
comment is that the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only
patrol planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet In my opinion, it was sound
policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral Kimmel, whose
responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his disposal as best he could
between the Fleet and the base defense forces.
[5] (i) Facts X and XI (pdge 1171) set forth the states of readiness of the
forces at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of readiness
was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the assumption that a
declaration of war might be preceded by surprise attacks on ships at Pearl
Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a com-
bination of these two. The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included
local patrols, daily search of operating areas by air, certain extensive anti-
submarine precautions, the netting of the htfrbor entrance, and the maintenance
of “augmented Condition 3” on board vessels in port. “Condition of readiness
No. 3” provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and anti-
aircraft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this
state of readiness did permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes
attacked. Local Army forces were in “Alert No. 1” which provides for defense
against sabotage and uprisings, with no threat from without With respect
to this phase of the matter I offer the comment that “condition of readiness No. 3”
is normally maintained in port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this
condition enjoy a considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local
defense forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was
not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was well
known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was not aware
of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss further later
on. I also note from this section of thq Findings that Army and Navy aircraft
on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water, were not In condi-
tion to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane squadrons were In “day-off for
rest” status ; some patrol planes were In the air for local patrol and exercises :
50% were on 4 hours notice (page 669). This Is further indication of the lack
of appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of large
m numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the Findings, also,
points out that there were no longer range reconnaissance in effect on 7 December,
a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be noted that the last
paragraph of Fact XI (page 1176) reads :
“The Navy’s condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December
1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels
and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could
have added little, if anything, to their defense.”
338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur, for
reasons set forth later on.
(J) Fact XII (page 1170). The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft
can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the
launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier before
she can launch her planes, her location must be known and sufficient force must
be at hand. The Court points out that in this instance Japanese carriers sailed
at an unknown time from an unknown port, and that it is an established fact
that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received
from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their
way to Hawaii during November or December 1941. The Court deduces, and
states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circum-
stances then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I concur
that there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack force
was en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there was
information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an
attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within
fairly narrow limits.
[7] Fact XIII (page 1178) discusses the difficulty of long range recon-
naissanc with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out that
Admiral Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine
long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to have
been Admiral Kimmel’s feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used for
routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out and, therefore,
unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make
in this matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is not easy to
put one’s self in his place. However, after considering all of the information
that was at his disposal, it seems to me that he was not on entirely sound
ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as
the sitution became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding
the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not permit an
all-around daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of
carriers before planes could be launched. However, there were certain sectors
more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent. And
it would appear that such partial cover would have been logical in the circum-
stances as known to Admiral Kinimel in late November and early December.
A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Admiral Richardson was
Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaissance by patrol planes,
using the few at his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation.
He considered the arc between 170 and 850 to be of primary importance, and
believed the most probable direction of attack was from the southwest. These
patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before, Admiral Kimmel relieved
Admiral Richardson (pages 688, 1053, 1055).
(l) Fact XIV (page 1182). This section sets forth the fact that the Army
had assumed responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process
of installing radar and other [8] elements of the air warning system,
but that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in
condition to function. The system was partially in use for training, and it so
happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching Japanese planes
when they were about 130 miles away, and reported this fact to the Information
Center, where the only officer present was an officer under training, who assumed
the planes to be a flight of Army bombers known to be en route from the
United States. He made no report of the matter. My comment is that this
is indicative of the unwarranted feeling of Immunity from attack that seems to
have pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor — both Army and Navy. If there had
been awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and awereness
of Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic
as it was, could have been used to give at least an hour’s warning before the
air attack struck.
(m) Fact XV (page 1186) states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl
Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court
points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected against break-
through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no anti-torpedo baffles
within the harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been
assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely shoal
water of Pearl Harbor. The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
339
have been made by the Navy Department (page 1187). Proposals to use barrage
balloons and smoke were considered but rejected for technical reasons. It is
evident, in retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were
seriously underestimated.
(n) Fact XVI (page 1188). In this section of the Findings the Court traces
the deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain information
given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject. The more important items are as
follows :
[0] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that
a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet,
that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the
Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not
disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against Japan.
(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kim-
mel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the Japs
would attack the United States.
(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating
that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful and
that indications were that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction > in-
cluding attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
(o) Fact XVII (page 1193). In this section the Court sets forth certain in-
formation, which was known in Washington and which was transmitted to Ad-
miral Kimmel, which the Court holds to have established the fact that the at-
tack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy
Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that there
were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East,
rather than elsewhere. The summary of the information on which this is based is
as follows :
(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO
beginning with the words, “This despatch is to be considered a war warning/’ and
going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next
few days: [101] that there were indications of an amphibious movement
against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo ; and
directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.
(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War
Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated ;
that Japanese future action was unpredictable ; that hostile action was possible at
any time; and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act, in
case hostilities could not be avoided.
(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information Ad-
dressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directing him to
scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.
(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided
to relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.
(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the Depart-
ment was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor at the time.
(p) Fact XVIII (1196). This section of the Findings deals with information
that became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November.
It Is set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which had
been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, coming to
an end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information as to
Japanese Intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy De-
partment are set forth as follows :
[11] (1) A number of messages were received from informers during and
prior to this period in the Navy Department but were not sent to Admiral Kimmel.
These messages are summarized in the Addendum to the Court’s Finding of Facts
at the back of Volume 5 of the record. The text of the messages is set forth at
length in Volume 5, beginning at page 692. These messages indicate definite Jap-
anese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor, and mention, in some cases, a
desire to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral Stark testified
that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel these despatches, be-
cause to do so might jeopardize the secrecy which it was necessary to maintain
as to the ability of the Navy Department to obtain them. This contention has
some merit, in my opinion. It was Admiral Stark’s responsibility to protect the
sources of this Information. However, it was equally his responsibility to give
340 congressional investigation pearl harbor attack
Admiral Kimmel a general picture of the information contained in these mes-
sages. Admiral Stark says that he considered that the despatches he did send
to Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known and in-
ferred as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under “Opinions,” the Court
holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an* adequate
summary of the information at his disposal. I have to concur in this view.
(2) In addition to the foregoing the Court goes at length into the handling
of the ”14 part message”, originated in Tokyo and addressed to the Japanese
Ambassador in Washington. The first 13 parts were received in the Navy
Department on 6 December at 2100, on that date. They set forth the Japanese
views as to certain United States proposals for resolving matters under dispute
between the [12] countries, and leave no doubt that the United States
proposals were unacceptable to Japan, but do not come to the point of indicating
a break in relations. At or about 0700, 7 December, the 14th part of the message
was received. This part of the message said that the Japanese Government
had finally lost hope of being able to adjust relations with the United States
and that it was impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.
This part of the message was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 to the White House, and at
0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox. Secretary
Knox was conferring with Mr. Hull at the State Department.
(3) At about 1030 on 7 December, the so-called ”1:00 p. m. message” was
received in the Navy Department. It directed the Japanese Ambassador to
deliver the 14 part message to the Secretary of State at 1 : 00 p. m. on that day.
This message was of significance because 1 : 00 p. m. in Washington was dawn
at Honolulu. This message was delivered at once to the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, and immediately thereafter to the State Department, where
the official who received it was asked to point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. Hull
the significance of the “1 : 00 p. m. time of delivery”. In my opinion, the fore-
going indicates that at about 10 : 30 on 7 December (0500 Honolulu time) the
Navy Department, or at least, some officers therein, appreciated that the in-
formation just received pointed to the possibility — even to the probability —
of a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states that this message
came to his attention about 11 : 00 a. m., and that he immediately telephoned to
Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General Short that a break with Japan
was imminent, and that an attack against Hawaii would be expected soon.
Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the [73] need for sending this
message, but after brief consideration asked General Marshall to include in
his proposed despatch directions to pass the contents to naval commanders.
General Marshall sent a despatch to the effect that the Japanese were present-
ing ”what amounts to an ultimatum at 1:00 p. m., Washington time, on 7
December ; that Japanese are under orders to destroy their codes immediately ;
and that while the War Department does not know the significance of the hour
set for delivering the note, you are to be on the alert accordingly and to inform
naval authorities of this communication.” He sent this via commercial radio,
which was then the usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Depart-
ment. The despatch left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:47 a. m.
Honolulu time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m.
Honolulu time. This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time
the message had been decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was
already underway. The Court states that if the most expeditious means of
delivery had been used (plain language telephone) this information could
have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The
Court remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor means
available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which
could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome, since there was
already in effect a condition of readiness best suited to the circumstances attend-
ing vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor naval base, and the Fleet planes
at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go along with this reasoning of the Court.
Even two hours advance warning would have been of great value in alerting
planes and in augmenting the condition of readiness existing on board ship.
(4) On 3 December (the date is not specified in the Findings; it is stated in
Exhibit 20) Admiral Kimmel was [14] Informed that the Japanese had
instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington and London
to destroy most of their codes. Admiral Kimmel says (his statement, page 28)
that ”the significance of this despatch was diluted substantially by publication
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
341
of the Information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu,” and that he did not
regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to strike the United
States.
^5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch directing the de-
struction of secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those necessary
for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant destruction
in event of emergency (Exhibit 21). This was followed on 6 December by
authorization for outlying islands to destroy secret and confidential documents
“now or under later conditions of greater emergency”. (Exhibit 22.)
(q) Addendum to Court’s Finding of Facts (Volume 5). In this section the
Court sets forth matters which have already been discussed in the three pre-
ceding sub-paragraphs; and, in addition, touches on the matter of the so-called
“Winds message”. This Japanese message, originating in Tokyo on 19 November,
was received in the Navy Department on 28 November. It set forth that “in
case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)” certain
code words would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese short wave
news broadcast, and directed that when these words were heard codes were to
be destroyed. This message was received in various places, including Pearl
Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel had it. A monitor watch was set at various
places to look out for the expected “weather forecast”. On 4 and 5 December,
the Federal Communications Commission monitored the expected “weather fore-
cast” which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again
at 2130 on 5 December. The code words appearing in this implementing message
meant that Japanese relations with Russia were [15] in danger. These
two messages have been preserved in the files of the Federal Communications
Commission. In addition to this indication that the Japanese were about to
break relations with Russia, there is evidence (Volume 5, page 746) that
Captain Safford, on duty in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications,
saw on 4 December, a “yellow slip” on which was written a different version
of the implementing code, which meant that relations with the United States
and Great Britain were in danger. Captain Safford thinks that this message
was intercepted by an Bast Coast station, but he was not sure. No written
trace of the message referred to by Captain Safford could be found in the files
of the War Department or the Navy Department. There is considerable testi-
mony in the record as to what was done with the “Winds message.” Various
officers testified that the implementing despatches were transmitted to the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Naval Communica-
tions, but Admiral Stark and Admiral Noyes testified that they do not remember
hearing anything about them. It is an established fact that none of the im-
plementing messages icere ever sent to Admiral Kimmel. However, as noted in
paragraph 2 (p) (4) above, the Court finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel
was informed on 3 December that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and
consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London, to destroy certain
codes.
(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII on
page 1196) that on 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered
by the United States State Department to Japanese representatives. The
stipulations contained therein were drastic, and likely to be unacceptable to
Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note, nor
of its contents until after the attack. The Court points out that Admiral
Kimmel in May 1941 had particularly asked the Chief of Naval Operations to
keep him informed of the diplomatic situation in order that he might be “in-
formed of all important developments as they occur by the quickest secure
means available.”
[16] (s) Fact XEX (page 1200). The Court points out that it is a prime
obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied
with information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information in
hlg possession, during the critical perid from 26 November to 7 December,
failed to transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the
latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Wash-
ington. I am in thorough accord with this view of the Court
(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most imprtant phases
of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy information in
the Navy Department. In this connection it would seem essential to a thorough
exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval In-
telligence, who was largely responsible for handling information of the enemy.
342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then Director of
Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. I assume
that the Court believes that all essential information was obtained, despite
the fact that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify; however, it appears to me
that the failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.
3. I submit the following comment as to the Court’s Opinion :
(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II (page 1201), the Court expresses
the view that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl
Harbor on 7 December was necessary, and that the information available to
the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from
his operating and maintenance schedules. I do not entirely go along with
this opinion. Had all of the information available in the Department been
properly evaluated and properly disseminated, I am Inclined to believe that
Admiral Kimmel’s dispositions on the morning of 7 December would not have
been as they actually were on that occasion.
[17] (b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI (page 1202) the Court ex-
presses the view that deficiencies in personnel and materiel which existed in
1941 had an adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl
Harbor, on and prior to 7 December. I offer the comment that, obviously, the
Army and Navy were short of men and materiel at the time and that available
means were spread thin throughout the various areas of probable hostility.
The shortage of means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into con-
sideration. However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used the
means available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did not. The
fault lay in the fact that he was not fully informed by the Navy Department
of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of the tenseness
of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to some extent faulty and
that he did not fully appreciate the implications of that information which
was given to him.
(c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII (page 1202), the Court holds that
the defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the
Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th
Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only
to this extent. As I stated above, I think this is a narrow view of the weak-
ness of local defenses, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor
and the Hawaiian Islands in general.
(d) The Court holds (page 1203) that Admiral Bloch performed his duties
satisfactorily. I concur.
(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX (page 1203), the Court states that
naval defense plans were complete and sound in [18] concept, but con-
tained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the
availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and
that on the morning of 7 December, these plans were ineffective because they
necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowl-
edge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which
was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with this view. As I
have already stated, there could be no question that available aircraft had to
be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened. I doubt
that, with the forces available, it would have been possible to intercept and
destroy the Japanese carriers before they launched their planes, except by
lucky chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently
alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely due to his own fault This
had a bearing on the amount of damage that was incurred by the Fleet when
the Japanese did attack.
(f ) The Opinion, based on Fact X ( page 1204) , expresses the view that Admiral
Kimmel’s action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect
comprehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative of
his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and that the
steps taken were adequate and effective. I concur in this.
(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI (page 12(H), as to the effect that the
measures taken for the security in port were adequate and proper, and that only
had it been known in advance that the attack was to take place on 7 December,
could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have
been taken to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestions that
each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at
their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that
REPORT OP NAVY COURT OP INQUIRY
343
no such course of action could have been carried out as a matter of routine.
I concur in this. The question at issue is whether or not indications called for a
tightening up of precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.
[ID] (h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII (page 1207), the Court
holds that Admiral Kimmel was justified in not providing for routiqe long
range reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating that the
attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time.
I have already discussed this phase of the matter. I think that if all available
information had been placed at Admiral Kimmel’s disposal, and that if he had
evaluated it properly, he would have found it necessary to do something about
long range reconnaissance in the few days immediately preceding the 7th of
December.
(i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XVII (1207), the Court expresses the view
that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials in the State,
.War, and Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the
Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than else-
where. I concur that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation
of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese did begin to operate
in the Far East on 7 December. However, it was not illogical to suppose that
an attack on Pearl Harbor would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the
initial steps in a campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned
were aware of this possibility — a possibility that was strengthened by infor-
mation received in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.
(j) In the Opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX (page 1207), the Court
expresses the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment in that
he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from 26
November to 7 December, important information which he had received regarding
the Japanese situation, and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December
1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that information had been
[ 20 ] received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations
was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.
I note from the first endorsement that the Judge Advocate General takes excep-
tion to this Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark
and his principal advisers did not construe this message as indicating an attack
in the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the view of the Judge Advocate General
as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed upon the message in question,
nevertheless, I note that' Commander Kramer (attached to the Communications
Division of the Navy Department) did take steps to invite the attention of the
Secretary of the Navy to the fact that 1 :00 p. m. Washington time meant dawn
at Honolulu, and midnight in East Asia (page 14 of Top Secret Addendum’ to
the Findings). It, therefore, seems evident, though Admiral Stark did not
have his attention drawn to the possible significance of this message, nevertheless
the implications were appreciated by at least some officers of his office. The
Court further expresses the view that had this important information been con-
veyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would
have taken. I take no exception to this expression of opinion. However, it is
a fair conclusion that if Admiral Kimmel had been given all of the information
available at the Department, he would have been in a position to judge the situa-
tion better than he did.
4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation (page i208) the Court finds that
no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any
person or persons in the naval service, and recommends that no further pro-
ceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there is not adequate evidence to
support general court martial proceedings, but this does not bar administrative
action, if such action is found appropriate.
54 Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely
to restilt in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade
a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor [ 21 ] incident. That
disaster cannot be regarded as an “act of God”, beyond human power to prevent
or mitigate. It is true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in
ttoat the people were unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until
it was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively
with the attack that ushered In the war. It is true that the Army was responsible
for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been
done by the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral
Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to
examine the possible courses of action they might have taken.
344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily
concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States pos-
sessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands.
His attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situa-
tion became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel,
in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and
accurate information as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed
of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure
means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that
Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to
keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in
order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly moving
course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral
Kimmel an adequate summary of the information available in Washington, par-
ticularly in the following respects :
(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department’s note of 20
November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking
relations.
[22] (2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain
Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which
indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.
(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the “Winds
Message”. Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is
clear that it did reach Admiral Stark’s office. This, together with the handling
of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark’s
organization.
(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the “1:00 p. m.
message” received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications
were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this
message been handled by the quickest available means, and with due apprecia-
tion of its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable
him to make some last minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability
of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.
(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral
Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense
of intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.
(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to
keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing
tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the “war warning”
message on 27 November, the “hostile action possible at any moment” message
on 28 November, the 3 December message that Japanese had ordered destruction
of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December [23] concerning destruc-
tion of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands.
These messages must be considered in connection with other facets of the situa-
tion, and Admiral Kimmel’s statement on this phase of the matter must be given
due consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion
that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger
to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action
were open to him :
(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to con-
duct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not
this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is
problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.
(2) He could have rotated the “in port” periods of his vessel in a less routine
manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted
when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese
task less easy.
(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before
the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been
in the air during the early morning period, that ships’ batteries would have been
fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been fully
operational.
6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were
faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question,
they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command
commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable
inefficiency.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
345
[ 24] 7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence
adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation
of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may
not result in future errors.
8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my views
concerning how much of the record bears such a relation to present military
operations as to require high security classification.
E. J. King.
E. J. King.
Office of the Secretary
Memo for File:
This is Admiral King’s Second Endorsement, as paraphased, by the deletion
of the magic. This is the paraphrase that was made public because the public
interest required that the magic not be made public.
John Ford Baecheb, USNR,
Special Assistant to the Secretary.
COMINCH FILE
United States Fleet
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Navy Department
Washington 25, D. C.
[Copy]
FF1/A17-25.
Serial :
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.
Subject : Correspondence re Court of Inquiry Investigating Pearl Harbor.
Enclosure: (A) Subject correspondence.
1. The attached file copy and rough draft (which was published) is the para-
phrased version of my second endorsement to the record of proceedings of the
Court of Inquiry investigating Pearl Harbor.
/s/ E. J. King,
Fleet Admiral , U. S. Navy.
[ 1 ] COMINCH FILE
United States Fleet
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Navy Department
Washington 25, D. C.
Navy Court of Inquiry
SECOND ENDORSEMENT
From: The Commander in Chief, United Stated Fleet and Chief of Naval Oper-
tions.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire int othe attack made by Japanese armed
forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by
the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.
1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of
Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge Advo-
cate General in the First Endorsement and to the following remarks.
2. (a) As to Facts I and II, the routine practice of rotating units of the Fleet,
so that each vessel had approximately two-thirds of its time at sea and one-
third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled upkeep periods in
port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good mechanical condi-
tion, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep them from
346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
going stale. Whether or not Admiral Klmmel was Justified in having one task
force and part of another in port on 7 December to a matter which I discuss
later on.
(b) In Fact III the Court points out that, because of constitutional require-
ments, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until after a hostile
attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration of war by Con-
gress. The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous enemy te obvious.
This requirement made it impossible for Admiral Klmmel and General Short to
employ the offensive as a means of defense, and. therefore, was a definite handicap.
[2] (c) Fact IV sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District
(Admiral Bloch) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him
with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Admiral
Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures concerned with local
defense.
(d) Fact V sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal
friends ; that they met frequently ; that their relations were cordial and cooper-
ative in every respect ; that they frequently conferred, and invariably conferred
when messages were received by either which had any bearing on the develop-
ment of the United States- Japanese situation, or on their several plans in prepar-
ing for war. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other
in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposea This
is important, in that it refutes the remoirs which have been prevalent since the
Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not cooperate
with one another.
(e) Part VI sets forth the information that the Navy Department and the
War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the defensive
installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to cope with a car-
rier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secretary of War,
on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of
the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a
hostile attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that
the base at Pearl Harbor should he capable of defense by local Army and Navy
forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the safety of the
base. It is further made clear that both the War and the Navy Departments
had given full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to
augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general state of
unpreparedness for war.
[$] (f) Fact VII sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President on
5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that
time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority
of the Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet. The Court, also,
points out that owing to security policies in the two countries, it was easy for
Japan to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a
free opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions.
My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that
United States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war,
or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a disadvan-
tage during the period of strained relations.
(g) Fact VIII stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base are necessary
for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and opportunity
given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of personnel.
The Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval warfare to
require seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from hostile
action while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks
that this concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense,
and that the United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My
comment is that this principle is sound enough, but it cannot be carried
to an illogical extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses
were inadequate, the Comander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and
did not. evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in
principle, this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears from the record that
Admiral Klmmel appreciated properly this phase of the situation. His conten-
tion appears to be that Pearl Harbor should have been strong enough for self-
defense. The [4] fact that it was not strong enough for self-defense
hampered his arrangements for the employment of the Fleet, but, nevertheless.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 347
he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for, employing the Fleet in defen-
sive measures.
(h) Fact IX. This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by Admiral
Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It points out that
the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for distant recon-
naissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69 patrol planes
belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him In case of necessity.
The Court remarks that the basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the
fact that naval participation In long range reconnaissance depended entirely
upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this circum-
stance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the fundamental
requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent
of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effectiveness
cf these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to
be expected within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral
Kimmel to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense
Officer (because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the
demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My
comment is that the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only
patrol planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was
sound policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral
Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his disposal
as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense forces.
[5] (i) Facts X and XI set forth the states of readiness of the forces at
Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of readiness was
predicated on certain assumptions, which included the assumption that a decla-
ration of war might be preceded by surprise attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor
or surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a combination
of these two. The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local
patrols, daily search of operating areas by air, certain extensive anti-submarine
precautions, the netting of the harbor entrance, and the maintence of “aug-
mented Condition 3“ on board vessels in port. “Condition of readiness No. 3”
provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and anti-air-
craft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this state
of readiness did permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes at-
tacked. Local Army forces were In “Alert No. 1” which provides for defense
against sabotage and uprisings, gith no threat from without. With respect to
this phase of the matter I offer the comment that “condition of readiness No. 3“
is normally maintained in port. However, it Is prerequisite that vessels in this
condition enjoy a considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local
defense forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was
not enjoyed hy vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was
well known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was
not aware of the imminemce of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss
further later on. I also note from this section of the Findings that Army and
Navy aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water, were
not In condition to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane squadrons were
in “day-off for rest” status ; some patrol planes were in the air for local patrol
and exercises; 50% were on 4 hours notice. This is further indication of the
lack of appreciation of the Imminence of attack, and led to ‘the destruction of
large [ff] numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the Find-
ings, also, points out that there were no long range reconnaissance in effect on
7 December, a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be noted
that the last paragraph of Fact XI reads :
“The Navy’s condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 Decem-
ber 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the
vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readi-
ness could have added little, if anything, to their defense.”
This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur, for
reasons set forth later on.
(j) Fact XII. The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft can be
prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launch-
ing of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier before she
can launch her planes, her location must be known and sufficient force must be
at hand. The Court points out that in this instance Japanese carriers sailed at
an unknown time from an unknown port, and that it is en established fact that
348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received from
any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way
to Hawaii during November or December 1941 The Court deduces, and states
as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circumstances
then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I concur that
there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack force was
en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there was
information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an
attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within
fairly narrow limits.
[7] (k) Fact XIII discusses the difficulty of long range reconnaissance
with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out that Admiral Kim-
mel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine long range
reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to have been Ad-
miral Kimmel’s feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used for routine
reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out and, therefore, unavail-
able for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in
this matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is not easy to
put one’s self in his place. However, after considering al of the information
that was at his disposal, it seems to me that he was not on entirely sound
ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the
situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding
the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not permit an
all-around dally reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach
of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there were certain sec-
tors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent
And it would appear that such partial cover would have been logical in the
circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early Decem-
ber. A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Admiral Richardson
was Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaissance by patrol
planes, using the few at his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in
rotation. He considered the arc between 170° and 350° to be of primary im-
portance, and believed the most probable direction of attack was from the south-
west. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before, Admiral Kimmel
relieved Admiral Richardson.
(l) Fact XIV. This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed
responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of installing
radar and other [8] elements of the air warning system, but that the
whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in condition
to function. The system was partially in use for training, and it so happened
that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching Japanese planes when
they were about 130 miles away, and reported this fact to the Information Cen-
ter, where the only officer present was an officer under training, who assumed
the planes to be a flight of Army bombers known to be en route from the United
States. He made no report of the matter. My comment is that this Is indica-
tive of the unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have
pervaded all ranks at Pear Harbor — both Army and Navy. If there had been
awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of
Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic as
it was, could have been used to give at least an hour’s warning before the air
attack struck.
(m) Fact XV states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor re-
sulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft The Court points out
that though the harbor entrance was well protected against break-through by
enemy submarines or small craft, there were no anti-torpedo baffles within
the harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been assumed
that aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely shoal water
of Pearl Harbor. The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to have
been made by the Navy Department. Proposals to use barrage balloons and
smoke were considered but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in
retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously
underestimated.
(n) Fact XVI. In this section of the Findings the Court traces the deteriora-
tion of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain information given to
Admiral Kimmel on the subject. The more important items are as follows:
[0] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that
a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet,
REPORT OP NAVY COURT OP INQUIRY
349
that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the
Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not
disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against Japan.
(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral
Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the
Japs would attack the United States.
(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating
that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful
and that indications were that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction ,
including attack on the Philippines or Gaum, was a possibility.
(0) Fact XVII. In this section the Court sets forth certain information, which
was known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel,
which the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7 December
came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments,
and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that there were good
grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather
than elsewhere. The summary of the information on which this is based is as
follows :
(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO
beginning with the words, “This despatch is to be considered a war warning,”
and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the
next few days; [10] that there were indications of an amphibious move-
ment against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo ;
and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.
(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War
Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated ;
that Japanese future action was unpredictable ; that hostile action was possible
at any time; and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act,
in case hostilities could not be avoided.
(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information Ad-
dressee in a despatch to the Commander In Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directing him
to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.
(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided
to relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.
(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the De-
partment was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor at the time.
(p) Fact XVIII. This section of the Findings deals with information that be-
came available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November. It
is set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which had
been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, coming
to an end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information as to
Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy De-
partment are set forth as follows;
[11] (1) Information was received from trusted sources during and prior
to this period which was made available in the Navy Department but which was
not sent to Admiral Kimmel. This information indicates definite Japanese in-
terest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor and indicates a desire in some cases to
know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral Stark testified that
he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel this information, because
to do so might compromise the sources from which it was obtained. This
contention has some merit, in my opinion. It was Admiral Stark’s responsi-
bility to protect the source of this information. However, it was equally his
responsibility to give Admiral Kimmel a general picture of the information
which he was receiving. Admiral Stark says that he considered that the dis-
patches he did send to Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was
known and inferred as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under “Opinions,”
the Court holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an ade-
quate summary of the information at Admiral Stark’s disposal. I have to
concur in this view.
(2) In addition to the foregoing, the Court goes at length into the handling
of certain information which was received in the Navy Department on the 6th
of December, at 2100 on that date. The greater part of this information indi-
cated the Japanese views concerning certain United States proposals for re-
solving matters under dispute between the countries, and leaves no doubt that
the United States’ proposals were [12] unacceptable to Japan, but do
79716—46 — Bx. 167 28
350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At, or about, 0700, 7
December, further trustworthy information was received which indicated that
the Japanese Government had finally given up hope of being able to adjust
relations with the United States and that it was impossible to reach an agree-
ment through further negotiations. This information was delivered at about
0900, 7 December, to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930
to the White House, and at 0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and
Secretary Knox. Secretary Knox was conferring with Secretary Hull at the
State Department.
(3) At about 10 : 30 A. M. on 7 December, further reliable information was re-
ceived in the Navy Department. The substance was that the Japanese Am-
bassador was to deliver a note containing the information referred to in the pre-
ceding paragraph to the Secretary of State at 1:00 P. M. on that day. This
information was of significance because 1 : 00 P. M. in Washington was dawn in
Honolulu. It was delivered at once to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
and immediately thereafter, to the State Department, where the official who
received it was asked to point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. Hull its significance. In
my opinion, the foregoing indicates that at about 10 : 30 on 7 December (0600
Honolulu time) the Navy Department, or at least some officers therein, appre-
ciated that the information just received pointed to the possibility — even the
probability — of a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states that
this information came to his attention about 11 : 00 A. M. and that he immediately
telephone to Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General [IS] Short
that a break with Japan was imminent and that an attack against Hawaii could
be expected soon. Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the need for sending
this message, but after brief consideration, asked General Marshall to include in
his proposed dispatch directions to pass the contents to naval commanders. Gen-
eral Marshall sent a dispatch to the effect that the Japanese were presenting what
amounted to an ultimatum at 1 : 00 P. M. Washington time on 7 December ; and
that while the War Department did not know the significance of the hour set for
delivering the note, he, General Short, was to be on the alert accordingly and to
inform naval authorities of this communication. He sent this via commercial
radio, which was the usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Depart-
ment. The dispatch left Washington at 12 : 17 on 7 December (6 : 47 a. m. Hono-
lulu time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7 : 33 A. M. Honolulu time.
This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the message had been
decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was already underway. The
Court states that if the most expeditious means of delivery had been used (plain
language telephone) this information could have been received in Hawaii about
two hours before the attack began. The Court remarks that even in this event
there was no action open, nor means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could
have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing
upon its outcome, since there was already in effect a condition of readiness best
suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor
naval base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go along
with this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance warning would have
been of great value in alerting planes and in augmenting the condition of readiness
existing on board ship.
[14] (4) On 3 December Admiral Kimmel was told that there was every
reason to believe that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts
in the Far East, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes. Admiral
Kimmel says that “the significance of this dispatch was diluted substantially by
publication of the information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu,” and that
he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to strike the
United States.
(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch directing the destruc-
tion of secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those necessary for
current purposes, which were to be kept ready for Instant destruction In event of
emergency. This was followed on 6 December by authorization for outlying
islands to destroy secret and confidential documents “now or under later condi-
tions of greater emergency.”
(q) There was also available to the Navy Department on 28 November reliable
information, received from a trusted source, to the effect that certain code words
would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese short-wave news broadcast.
When these words were heard, codes were to be destroyed. This information
was available in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel had
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
351
it A monitor watch was set at various places to look out for the expected broad-
cast On 4 and 5 December, the Federal Communications Commission monitored
the expected broadcast which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 Decem-
ber, and again at 2130 on 5 December. Various officers testified that the imple-
menting broadcasts were transmitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Director of Naval Communications, but [15] Admiral Stark and
Admiral Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about them.
It is an established fact that these implementing broadcasts 1 were never sent to
Admiral Kimmel. However, as noted in paragraph 2 (p) (4) above, the Court
finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that the
Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washing-
ton, and London, to destroy certain codes.
(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII) that
on 28 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered by the United States
State Department to Japanese representatives. The stipulations contained therein
were drastic, and likely to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no
knowledge of the existence of such a note, nor of its contents until after the
attack. The Court points out that Admiral Kimmel in May 1941 had particularly
asked the Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of the diplomatic
situation in order that he might be “informed of all important developments as
they occur by the quickest secure means available.”
(s) Fact XIX. The Court points out that it is a prime obligation of command
to keep subordinate comanders constantly supplied with information, and that
Admiral Stark, having important information in his possession, during the
critical period from 26 November to 7 December, failed to transmit this informa-
tion to Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing
Japanese situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord with this
view of the Court.
(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important phases
of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy information in
the Navy Department. In this connection it would [16] seem essential
to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of
Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling information of the
enemy. It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then
Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. I
assume that the Court believes that all essential information was. obtained,
despite the fact that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify ; * however, it appears to
me that the failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.
[77] 3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion.
(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II, the Court expresses the view that
the presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on 7 Decem-
ber was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance
schedules. I do not entirely go along with this opinion. Had all of the infor-
mation available in the Department been properly evaluated and properly dis-
seminated, I am inclined to believe that Admiral Kimmers disposition on the
morning of 7 December would not have been as they actually were on that
occasion.
(b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI, the Court expresses the view that
deficiencies in personnel and material which existed in 1941 had an adverse bear-
ing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor, on and prior to 7 De-
cember. I offer the comment that, obviously, the Army and Navy were short of
men and material at the time and that available means were spread thin through-
out the various areas of probable hostility. The shortage of means available to
Admiral Kimmel must be taken into consideration. However, the pertinent
question is whether or not he used the means available to him to the best ad-
vantage. In my opinion, he did not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not
fully Informed by the Navy Department of what was known as to probable
Japanese intentions and of the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his
Judgment was to some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the
implications of that information which was given to him.
* Later investigations indicate that the vital Implementing broadcasts were not, in fact,
received by the Navy Department
* Admiral Wilkinson's testimony was later received but did not change any of the
opinions or facts established.
352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[18] (c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII, the Court holds that the de-
fense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that
the Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th Naval District,
and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. As I
stated above, I think this a narrow view of the question, and that Admiral Kimmel
was fully aware that, in view of the weakness of local defenses, the Fleet had to
be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general.
(d) The court holds that Admiral Bloch peformed his duties satisfactorily. I
concur.
(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX, the Court states that naval defense plans
were complete and sound in concept, but contained a basic defect in that naval
participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to
and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December, these
plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that
there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within nar-
row limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with
this view. As I have already stated, there could be no question that available
aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that
threatened. I doubt that, with the forces available, it would have been possible
to intercept and destroy the Japanese carriers before they launched their planes,
except by lucky chance. However, I do thing that Admiral Kimmel was not suffi-
ciently alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely due to his own fault.
This had a bearing on the amount of damage that was incurred by the Fleet when
the Japanese did attack.
[18] (f) The Opinion, based on Fact X, expresses the view that Admiral
Kimmel’s action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect
comprehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative
of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and that
the steps taken were adequate and effective. I concur in this.
(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI, as to the effect that the measures
taken for the security in port were alequate and proper, and that only had it
been known in advance that the attack was to take place on 7 December, could
there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken
to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestions that each day all
naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations,
and all anti-aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that no such course
of action could have been carried out as a matter of routine. I concur in this.
The question at issue is whether or not indications called for a tightening up
of precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.
(h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII, the Court holds that Admiral
Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine long range reconnaissance
in the absence of any information indicating that the attack was to be expected
in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time. I have already discussed
this phase of the matter. I think that if all available information had been
placed at Admiral Kimmel’s disposal, and that if he had evaluated it properly,
he would have found it necessary to do something about long range recon-
naissance in the few days immediately preceding the 7th of December.
[20] (i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XVII, the Court expresses the view
that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials in the State,
War, Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian
area, that hostilities would begin in the Far Bast rather than elsewhere. I
concur that the Far Bast was the most probable scene for the initiation of
Japanese operations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese did begin to operate
in the Far Bast on 7 December. However, it was not illogical to suppose that
an attack on Pearl Harbor would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the
Initial steps in a campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were
aware of this possibility — a possibility that was strengthened by information
received in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.
[21] (J) In the opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX, the Court ex-
presses the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound Judgment in that he
did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from 26
November to 7 December, important information which he received regarding
the Japanese situation, and especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December,
1941, he Idid not transmit immediately the fact that information had been received
which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent,
and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. I note from
the first endorsement that the Judge Advocate General takes exception to this
REPORT OP NAVY COURT OP INQUIRY
353
Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and his
principal advisers did not construe this information as indicating an attack in
the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the views of the Judge Advocate General
as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed upon the information in
question, nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer (attached to the Com-
munications Division of the Navy Department) did take steps to invite the atten-
tion of the Secretary of the Navy to the fact that 1 : 00 p. m. Washingon time
meant d%wn at Honolulu and midnight in East Asia. It, therefore, seems evident,
that though Admiral Stark dijd not have his attention drawn to the possible
significance of this information, nevertheless the implications were appreciated
by at least some officers of his office. The Court further expresses the view
that had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is
a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no excep-
tion to this expression of opinion. However, It is a fair conclusion that if
Admiral Kimmel had been given all of the information available at the Depart-
ment, he would have been in a position to judge the situation better than he did.
[ 22 ] 4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation the Court finds that no
offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any per-
son or persons in the naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings
be had in the matter. I concur that there is not adequate evidence to support
general court martial proceedings, but this does not bar administrative action,
if such action is found appropriate.
5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to
result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a
share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident. That disaster cannot be
regarded as an “act of God,” beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It
is true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people
were unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until it was too late to
repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack
that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local
defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by
the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark
and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine
the possible courses of action they might have taken.
(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily
concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States pos-
sessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands.
His attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situ-
ation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kim-
mel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early
and accurate information [ 23 ] as to the general situation, and that he
needed to be Informed of all important developments as they occurred by the
quickest and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized
the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to
use his initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the
situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture
of the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion. Admiral
Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information
available in Washington, particularly in the following respects :
(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department’s note of 20
November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking rela-
tions.
(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain information
available to the Navy Department concerning the disposition of ships inside
Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible
target.
(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the broad-
cast containing the code words. Admiral Stark says he never got this informa-
tion himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark’s office. This together
with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in
Admiral Stark’s organization.
( 4 ) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the information
which he received indicating that a message was to be given to the Secretary of
State at 1 : 00 p. m., which information Admiral Stark received on the morning of
7 December, althongh the implications were appreciated by at least one of his
subordinates. It appears that had this information been handled
by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance,
it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last
354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl
Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.
(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral
Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense
of intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.
(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to
keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing
tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the “war warning”
message of 27 November, the “hostile action possible at any moment” message
on 28 November, the 3 December information that the Japanese were destroying
their codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of
United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These
messages must be considered in connection with other facets of the situation,
and Admiral Kimmers statement on this phase of the matter must be given due
consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that
he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to
which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were
open to him :
(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to con-
duct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or
not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers
is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.
[25] (2) He could have rotated the “in port” periods of his vessels in a
less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have
predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the
Japanese task less easy.
(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before the
Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been in the
air during the early morning period, that ships’ batteries would have been fully
manned, and that damage control organizations would have been full operational.
6. The derelictions of the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were
faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question they
indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command com-
mensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than cupable
inefficiency.
7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced,
appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of
these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in
future errors.
8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my views
concerning how much of the records .bears such a relation to present military
operations as to require high security classification.
E. J. King.
E. J. Kino.
[Stamped:] 1 Dec. 1944.
THIRD ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed
forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered
by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944.
1. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion and recommendation of the
Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General, and the
Second Endorsement, of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, I find that the
evidence obtained to date indicates that there were errors of judgment on the
part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark. I am not satisfied, however, that the
investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence.
2. Further investigation into this matter will be conducted by an investigating
officer, and, In addition to the subjects recommended for further investigation by
the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet in the Second Endorsement, will include the
taking of the testimony of Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum, and
such other investigation as may appear to be necessary in order to ascertain all of
the relevant facts relating to the Japanese attack. Pending the completion of the
necessary further investigation into this matter, I withhold decision as to the in-
stitution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.
Forrkstal,
Secretary of the Navy.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
355
TOP SECRET
Office of the Secretary
Memo for File :
This is the Sec’ys 4th End that was not used because it contained magic;
instead the Secy signed the one of Aug 13, that the President made public Aug. 29,
from which the magic was deleted in the public interest.
John Ford Baecher, USNR,
Special Assistant to the Secretary
TOP SECRET
[1] FOURTH ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT
OF INQUIRY. AND FOURTH ENDORSEMENT TO ADMIRAL HEWITT’S REPORT TO
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY DATED 12 JULY 1945
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed
forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by
the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944, and further investigation by
Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on
2 May 1945.
1. Pursuant to Executive order dated 18 December 1941, a commission headed
by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into the facts sur-
rounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The commission reported its
findings on 23 January 1942. The commission concluded in part that :
“17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action,
transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and
the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint
cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of
each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning
and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required
by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each, that he was not
required to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures
undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such
other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the
part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and
inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and com-
manding general, Hawaiian Department.”
2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944,
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of witnesses
having knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack. Admiral
Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.
3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith
with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe,
and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might
Justify.
[ 2 ] 4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfln, U. S. N.,
(Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. N., (Retired), and Vice Admiral
Adolphus Andrews, U. S. N„ (Retired), with Commander Harold Blesemeier,
U. S. N., as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944. The Court was
directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the
purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by
Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941 : to
inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement
of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed
to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame
incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its
opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to
recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had.
5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and sub-
mitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Certain portions of the
record of proceedings before the Court, including the findings and opinion of the
Court, have been classified “TOP SECRET,” and the balance “SECRET.”
356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval
Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and by me, was
that the evidence secured by the Court did not warrant and would not support
the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.
7. In my Third Endorsement to the Record of Proceedings of the Pearl Harbor
Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, 1 found that the evidence obtained indi-
cated that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel and
Admiral Stark, but that the investigation had not gone to the point of exhaustion
of all possible evidence. Accordingly, I directed that further investigation would
be conducted by an investigating officer and that pending the completion of the
necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to the institution
of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.
8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cover every material
question, I directed that a thorough review be made of the prior investigations
and that an appropriate summary of all information developed in the prior Naval
investigations be prepared. Upon the completion of this review of prior investi-
gations and after examination of the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board,
dated 3 December 1944, I appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., as investi-
gating officer, and John F. Sonnett as counsel to examine such witnesses and
obtain such other evidence as might be necessary in order fully to develop the
facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further
investigation directed by my precept of f J] 2 May 1945 was completed on
12 July 1945 and the report by Admiral Hewitt was forwarded to the Judge
Advocate General and the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief
of Naval Operations for recommendation and comment.
9. In his Second Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt’s Report of further investiga-
tion, dated 10 August 1945, the Judge Advocate General advised, among other
things, that he did not believe that there was sufficient evidence to warrant con-
viction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to Naval law ; that
the evidence indicated that the officers in question lacked superior judgment
rather than being guilty of culpable inefficiency; and that ‘‘lack of superior judg-
ment” is not an offense triable by general court martial. The Judge Advocate
General further advised in his Second Endorsement that : “I am of the opinion
that any such court-martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan
is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further,
that any such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end
of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the Naval service.” Not-
withstanding the difficulties pointed out by him, the Judge Advocate General was
of the opinion, however, that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order
Admiral Kimmel tried by general court martial should Admiral Kimmel so
insist The Judge Advocate General recommended that Admiral Hewitt’s investi-
gation be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel; that Admiral
Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything contained In this
record and in prior records as soon as that may be done without prejudice to
the public Interests ; and that if Admiral Kimmel insists, a general court martial
should be convened to try him for any alleged offenses he may have committed on
or before 7 December 1941.
10. In the Third Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt’s report, dated 13 August
1945, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurred generally in the remarks
and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General and expressed the opinion
that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial of any
person in the Naval service in that it would not sustain the charges required
by the Articles for the Government of the Navy ; that with regard to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, the Commander in Chief,
U. S. Fleet was still of the opinion that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel,
although not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, never-
theless lacked the superior judgment necessary for exercising command com-
mensurate with their duties, and that appropriate action, consisting of the relega-
tion of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment might not
result in future errors, had been taken as to Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel,
and stated that no further action was recommended. The Commander in Chief,
U. S. Fleet, also advised, in the Third Endorsement, that in any event he con-
sidered it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark or Admiral Kimmel to trial prior
to the termination of hostilities with Japan because such proceedings would
almost certainly involve disclosure of Information which would be detrimental to
current military operations and to U] national security measures. He
REPORT OP NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
357
concurred in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General that the Navy Depart-
ment is morally obligated to ofder Admiral Kimmel to trial before a general
court martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist, but stated that this action
should not be taken until after the completion of hostilities with Japan. He
concurred in the further suggestions of the Judge Advocate General that Admiral
Hewitt’s investigation be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel
and that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything
contained in this record and in prior records as soon as that may be done without
prejudice to national security.
11. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commander In
Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsements to the
Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record, and in their endorsements to the report
by Admiral Hewitt, are approved subject to the following remarks :
(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II (1156). — This finding states, in substance,
that the presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and
the battleships of Task Force Two was necessary.
The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmel’s statement to the effect
that he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he anticipated an air
attack. The Second Endorsement indicates that the Commander in Chief, U. S.
Fleet, does not entirely “go along” with the opinion of the Court that the infor-
mation available to Admiral Kimmel did not require any departure from his
operation and maintenance schedules. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
states further in this connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the
“in port” periods of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it im-
possible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in
port, and that this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I concur in
the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding.
(b) Court of Inquiry Finding III (1156). — This finding states that, “Constitu-
tional requirements that war be declared by Congress . . .” make it difficult
to prevent an attack and precluded offensive action as a means of defense, and
that Admiral Kimmel had the responsibility of avoiding overt acts.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, comments that this gives an unscrupulous
enemy a great advantage, and that the Constitutional requirement preventing
offensive action as a means of defense was a definite handicap. It does not
appear that there was any proximate chusal relationship between the Constitu-
tional requirement and the instant disaster. The Constitutional inhibition and
the injunction as to overt acts did not preclude either long [5] distance
reconnaissance or a sortie by the Fleet. Further, it appears that prior to 7 De-
cember 1941, Admiral Kimmel did not regard this Constitutional provision or his
responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient to prevent the issuance of orders
to bomb unidentified submarines found in operating areas.
(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV (1159). — This states That Admiral Bloch was
subordinate to Admiral &immel, and was charged with the task of assisting the
Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently. Admiral Bloch had a
responsibility for naval measures concerned with local defense.
It should be noted in this connection that Admiral Hewitt found :
“75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. . The
only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific
Fleet patrol planes.
“76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral
Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were
operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved
by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The sched-
ules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant recon-
naissance from Oahu.”
(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V (1160). — The court here finds that relations
between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were friendly, cordial and cooper-
ative; that they invariably conferred when important messages were received,
and that each was sufficiently cognizant of the measures being taken by the other.
In this connection the following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt are approved :
“1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were
designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack, includ-
ing an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and
the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack.
The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war.
The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local com-
358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
manders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior
to the attack.
[6] “2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that
of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the
local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence
of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information
concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.
“3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise
of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of informa-
tion between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no
organized system to ensure such exchange.”
The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there were informal
arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the Army and Navy at Hawaii,
which included the transmission to the Army of some information concerning
Japanese ship movements. The evidence obtained both by Admiral Hewitt and
by the Naval Court of Inquiry indicates, however, that neither Admiral Kimmel
nor General Short was sufficiently informed of the degree of readiness put into
effect by the other. It appears that after receipt of the “war warning” and
prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred on
several occasions. They discussed the reenforcement of Midway and Wake. It
does not appear that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed in effect
or to be placed in effect, or the question or advisability of placing in effect air
reconnaissance. General Short testified before the Naval Court that after a
conference with Admiral Kimmel, he placed in effect Army Alert No. 1 (the
anti-sabotage alert). Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know what
alert the Army had in effect, and that he made no specific inquiry of General
Short in this connection.
That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears from the
evidence. Admiral Kimmel received dispatches after 27 November 1941 relating
to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to United States outlying
islands to destroy classified material. Te testified before the Naval Court that
he did not direct that these be furnished to General Short, and that he did not
know whether or not they were furnished to him. General Short testified that
he had not seen these dispatches.
In view of these facts, I cannot agree with the above finding by the Naval
Court of Inquiry. The system of mutual cooperation, of joint command, was not
working effectively — it failed. In this connection the following conclusion of
Admiral Hewitt is approved:
“War experience has shown that: The responsibility for final major
decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be unity of
command.”
However, in respect of the above conclusion of Admiral Hewitt, it is important
to point out that the experience of this war has conclusively demonstrated that
there is no inconsistency between the existence of two or [7] more sepa-
rate military or naval organizations as the functioning forces and an effective
exercise of unity of command in a theater or in an operation. Practically all of
the major operations of this war have been accomplished by two or more distinct
military organizations, some even belonging to diverse nations, but all acting
under a unified command. In such an operation, the commanders of the several
forces and their staffs must function in close physical proximity, usually in the
higher echelons sharing a common headquarters or command post.
I do not find, however, that Admiral Kimmel is open to criticism for having
failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a submarine contact had been
made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly prior to the air attack. The
evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt supports the following conclusion by him,
which is approved :
“20. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack
off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain
language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready
destroyer. This information was of no immediate interest to the Army
unless it in fact indicated immineney of an air attack, an assumption which
was not necessarily logical. In any event, confirmation was not received
until the air attack had commenced.”
(e) Court of Inquiry Finding VI (1160 ). — This states in substance that un-
avoidable deficiencies in personnel and material had a bearing on the effectiveness
of the local defense of Pearl Harbor.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
359
The Commander In Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out, however, that the pertinent
question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available to the best
advantage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII (1165). — The Court finds that Japan had
an initial advantage because of the Japanese Fleet’s numerical superiority, and
the superiority of Japanese espionage.
The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined to the
general statement that factors such as those referred to by the Court will always
place this nation at a disadvantage during a period of strained relations. This
finding, of course, in general was correct Nevertheless, as applied to the specific
issues here presented, it overlooks the fact that :
(1 ) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well known to Admiral
Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into account in the
war plans ;
(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a disadvantage
In restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and War Departments
were nevertheless not without important Intelligence advantages of their own
which were not availed of to the fullest extent.
(g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII (1167). — This states that it was the direct
^responsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that the
*Navy was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District.
[81 The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, is in agreement with “the funda-
mental concept of naval warfare” discussed by the Court, but takes a more realistic
view on this point. He points out that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that
in view of the weakness of local defense, the Fleet had to be employed to protect
Pearl Harbor. With this I concur. It is to be noted, moreover, that under
the defense plan the Navy was responsible for the maintenance of distant recon-
naissance.
(h) Court of Inquiry Finding IX (1169). — The Court finds that tbe air defense
plans were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon Flqpt aircraft
which could not be made permanently available for local defense.
The Second Endorsement states that the Court has over-stressed the fact
that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes ; that it was sound policy
to place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel’s disposal ; that it was his responsi
blilty to allocate the planes as best he could; that tbe available aircrft had
to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened ; that it
is doubtful whether with the available forces it would have been possible to
destroy the carriers before they launched their planes, except by a lucky chance ;
that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation, not entirely due
to his own fault ; and that this had a bearing on the amount of damage resulting
from the attack. I concur In the comments of the Commander In Chief, U. S.
Fleet, with respect to this finding.
(I) Court of Inquiry Findings IV (1159), VIII (1167), IX (1169).— Based on
these findings the conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Bloch satisfactorily
performed his duties.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is approved.
(j) Court of Inquiry Finding X (1171). — This holds adequate and effective
Admiral Kimmel’s provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.
(k) Court of Inquiry Finding XI (1178). — The substance of this finding is that
Admiral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called for
by the information available to him, and that a higher condition of readiness
would have added little to the defense.
f9] In the Second Endorsement it is pointed out that in fact the condition
of readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that condition
which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained on the assump-
tion that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the Fleet. Such was not the
case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, further states that he does not agree
with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of readiness would have
added little to the defense, and is of the view that the information available to
Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening up of the defense precautions as 7 Decem-
ber approached. With the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
I concur.
(l) Court of Inquiry Finding XII (1176). — The Court here finds that there
Fas no information Indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to
360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
attack Pearl Harbor, and that It was not possible to prevent or to predict that
attack.
The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point : “There
was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that
an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within
fairly narrow limits."
It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered In Admiral Hewitt’s
investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel, particularly
during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, concerning
the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. This information, which
consisted principally of dally radio intelligence summaries setting forth the results
of monitoring Japanese naval communications and estimates by the Fleet Intelli-
gence Officer, is set forth in some detail at pages 112-114, inclusive, of Admiral
Hewitt’s report. It there appears that there was an unusual change in Japanese
naval radio calls on 1 December 1941; that this was regarded as indicating an
additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale;
that on 2 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel conferred with his Fleet Intelligence
Officer as to the whereabouts of Japanese fleet units, and that during that confer-
ence Admiral Kimmel noticed and commented on the absence of information In
the Fleet Intelligence Officer’s written estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions*
1 and 2, which consisted of four carriers. (It has since been learned that those
four carriers were among the six carriers which in fact were then on the high
seas heading toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese carriers were located
by the Fleet Intelligence Officer [101 in his written estimate. In Japanese
home waters, with the exception of possibly one carrier In the Marshalls. In his
testimony before Admiral Hewitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer described his
conversation with Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941 as follows *
“Mr. Sonnett. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you
said, as best you recall it?
“Captain Layton. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, *What ! You
don’t know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?’ and I replied,
•No, sir, I do not. I think they are In home waters, but I do not know where
they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.* Then
Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern
countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, ‘Do you mean
to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn’t know it?*
or words to that effect. My reply was that, ‘I hope they would be sighted before
now*, or words to that effect" . . .
“Mr. Sonnett. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out
of your description of Admiral Kimmel’s twinkle in his eye when he spoke.
What I am trying to get at is this: as the discussion about the absence of
information concerning Cardlvs 1 and 2 a serious or a jocular one?
“Captain Layton. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said
‘Where are Cardlvs 1 and 2?’ and I said, T do not know precisely, but if I must
estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we
haven’t heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they fin-
ished operations only a month and a half ago,’ and It was then when he, with a
twinkle In his eye, said *Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond
Head?* or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my
complete ignorance as to their exact location.
“Mr. Sonnett. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about
those carriers?
“Captain Layton. This incident has been Impressed on my mind. I do not
say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement
to me In a way to point out to me that I should know where they are but
hadn’t so indicated their location."
It is to be noted further that, as set forth in Admiral Hewitt’s report, the
daily communication intelligence summaries received by Admiral Kimmel stated,
on December 3rd, that: “Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers
today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of informa-
tion. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since
the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recov-
ered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.” and that the daily sum-
maries delivered to Admiral Kimmel thereafter, and prior to the attack, indi-
cated that there was no Information as [ 11 ] to Japanese carriers.
In view of the foregoing, I do not approve the above finding by the Naval
Court of Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the Commander in Chief,
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
361
U. S. Fleet, concerning this finding. I am of the view that the information as
to the location and movements of the Japanese naval forces which was received
by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding the attack, coupled with all the
other information which he had received, including the “war warning*’ and
other messages from the Chief of Naval Operations, should have been inter-
preted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the
time of such an attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII {1178 ). — It is here stated that Admiral
KimineTs decision not to conduct daily long-range reconnaissance was sound;
that there were in sufficient planes for this purpose ; and that such use of avail-
able planes was not justified.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval
Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make
in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors to be con-
sidered. He states further, however, that after considering all of the informa-
tion that was at Admiral Kimmers disposal, it appears that Admiral Kimmel
was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long-range recon-
naissance, particularly as the situation become more and more tense in the
few days immediately preceding the Japanese attacks. This comment adds
that it is obvious that tne means available did not permit an all-around daily
reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before
planes could be launched, but that there were, however, certain sectors more
dangerous than others which could have bene covered to some extent, and that
such particular cover would have been logical in the circumstances known to
Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. Attention is called
to the fact that Admiral Richardson had maintained distance reconnaissance,
using the few patrol planes at his disposal, to cover the most dangerous sectors
in rotation, and that these patrols were discontinued when or shortly before
Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.
In addition to these comments, with which I concur, it may be noted that
Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long range patrol in the
summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received and reported by Admiral
Bloch at that time.
[2] The following findings by Admiral Hewitt in connection with the ques-
tion of air reconnaissance are approved :
“77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he
decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.”
“78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kim-
mel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the “war warning,”
as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from
Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been
discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the
Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant
warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion
with him.”
“87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the
attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily
for more than a few days.”
“89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available
at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least
several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of
about 700 miles.”
“90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the
most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the
Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.”
“91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27
November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors prob-
ably would have been searched.”
“101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200
miles due north of Oahu.”
(n) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV (1182 ). — This states in substance that the
Army radar detection system was ineffective.
The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding, which
it* made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the radar detection
system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic state, nevertheless,
even in its then condition it could have and should have served to give at least
362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
an hour's warning of the attack. I concur in this comment and also approve the
following conclusion by Admiral Hewitt :
“15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during
[IS] certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and,
although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of
the approach of Japanese aircraft."
(c) Court of Inquiry Findings XV (1186). — This states that the best pro-
fessional opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December
1941, was that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions of shoal water and
limited approach such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor, was not prac-
ticable, and that the Japanese attack was successful principally because of the
employment of a specially designed torpedo, which was a secret weapon.
The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: “It is
evident in retrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were ser-
iously underestimated." The principal point upon which the Court of Inquiry
seems to rest its finding is the further finding that it was not believed by American
and British naval authorities at that time that torpedoes could be successfully
launched from aircraft in waters as shallow as those at Pearl Harbor. As a
basis for this view the Court relies upon a letter by the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions early in 1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could not be successfully
launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of 75 feet (water at
Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that the Court also
refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval Operations in June,
1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict with the Court's finding.
This letter stated, among other things, that: “It cannot be assumed that any
capital or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of at-
tack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be
developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo." This letter also advised
that torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13-15
fathoms of water, although several may have been launched in 11-12.
The records of the Navy Department indicate that in April, 1941, there was
circulated in the Department an intelligence report which described the demon-
stration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this report that the
torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and that it required no
greater depth of water for its successful launching than the depth at which it
made its normal run.
It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the British
reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which torpedoes were
successfully launched in 42 feet of water.
Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year prior to
the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of an airplane torpedo
attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated. Secretary Knox’s letter of Janu-
ary, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second only to air bombing in order
of probability in a list of [14] the types of attack upon Pearl Harbor
which he considered likely. His letter had been previously cleared with Admiral
Stark, and was received in February by Admiral Klmmel.
In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not approved.
(p) Court of Inquiry Finding XVI (1188) . — The Court here finds that Admiral
Kimmel’s decision to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made after re-
ceiving the 24 November dispatch was sound in light (a) of the approval of the
steps which he had taken after the dispatch of 16 October which advised that
hostilities were possible, and (b) the information then available to him in-
cluding Admiral Stark’s letter of 17 October 1941 and the dispatch of 24
November, 1941, which stated that a surpise aggressive movement in any
direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
The Second Endorsement summarizes the Court’s finding and underscores
that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: “A surprise
aggressive movement in any direction , including attack on the Philippines or
Guam is a possibility . .
It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words “A
surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philip-
pines or Guam," meant to him that any attack other than on those two places
would be on foreign territory, but that the words also included the possibility
of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands.
The Court refers in its finding to a part of a personal letter sent by Ad-
miral Stark to Admiral Kimmel on 17 October, in which Admiral Stark stated:
Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
363
I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I tempered the message handed
me considerably.’* However, the letter also continued: “Perhaps I am wrong,
but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in the White House, it was
felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.”
To the letter was annexed a postscript, stating in part : “General Marshall just
called up and was anxious that we made some sort of reconnaissance so that
he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may
not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against
any such contingency, but that I felt it exeremely improbable and that, while
we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on
any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However,
we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to
worry.”
It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal [15] with the ques-
tion of the soundness of Admiral Kimmel’s decision to continue preparation of
the Fleet, in the light of the highly important information which he received
from the Chief of Naval Operations and otherwise during the critical period
after the “war warning” of November 27th.
(q) Court of Inquiry Finding XVII (1199). — The Court here finds that
there were good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the
Far East.
In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out
that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese
operations, and that they were In fact initiated there. He notes further that
all concerned recognized the possibility that such a commencement of hostilities
would be accompanied by an attack upon Pearl Harbor. He adds that this
latter possibility was considerably strengthened by information available at
Washington, all of which was not available to Admiral Kimmel.
It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt’s investigation that
the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would include an
attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by information received by
Admiral Kimmel on and after the war warning of November 27th. The esti-
mates that had been made in the War Plans, which had been approved by
Admiral Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the event of war with the
Japanese a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly possible. The
information received by Admiral Kimmel as to the location and movement of
Japanese naval forces was, at the least, consistent with these estimates. The
following conclusion of Admiral Hewitt in this connection is approved :
“23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of
forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probabil-
ity of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information
which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December
1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change
in Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information up to
December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of
four of Japan’s ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any
of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the
location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was pos-
sible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pa-
cific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should
have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce
the effectiveness of such an attack. . . .”
116] (r) Court of Inquiry Findings XVIII and XIX (1196). — These state
in substance that Admiral Stark’s failure from 26 November to 7 December 1941
to transmit to Admiral Kimmel Important information In his possession, obtained
from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages, and summarized in the adden-
dum to the Court’s findings of facts, constitutes a military error.
The comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding was
to the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in failing to give Admiral Kimmel
an adequate summary of information available in Washington.
The endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, on the Naval Court
of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, former
Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness.
It was noted that these findings, and the conclusions of the Court based thereon,
were concerned principally with the handling of enemy information in the Navy
364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Department, and that consequently, it would seem essential to a thorough explora-
tion of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence,
who was largely responsible for handling this information. It was concluded
that the failure to obtain this testimony was unfortunate.
With this commend by the Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet, I concurred. It
further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum, who was
assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who, according to other testimony
in the record, had important duties in connection with the handling of such
intercepted enemy information, would be most helpful. Captain McCollum was
also unavailable as a witness to the Court I ascertained that at the time both
Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum were actively engaged in
combat operations against the enemy, and would be so engaged until some
date in. the future. From the nature of the duties which these officers were
performing in their assignments, I determined that in view of the paramount
present needs of the war effort, their testimony in this matter could not then
feasibly be obtained.
During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the testi-
mony of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other testimony
bearing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. The following conclusions
of Admiral Hewitt in this connection are approved :
“5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United
States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning
the Japanese Government’s actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations
and its intention to wage war, by means of interception, decryption, and
translation of Japanese diplomatic messages."
[17] “6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the
War and Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully
exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department
as to Japanese naval movements was available to intelligence officers of
the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information
which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the
Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch
of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel,
concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk
and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the
number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown
because the special Army planes were not made ready." . . .
"8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted
Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the
Navy Department.
"9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests
that he be kept fully informed on subjects of Interest to the Fleet and as
to all Important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not
communicate to him important information which would have aided him
materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular,
the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th
and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, information of the
"1 p. m." message and its possible import, were unfortunate.
"10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient Information in his
possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that im-
portant developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent.
This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages
which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.
“11. The available information in the possession of the Commander-ln-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the “war
warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate
commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bel-
linger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was
at sea with a carrier and other units, were not Informed of this and other
important messages.”
[78] 12. The following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt concerning the intelli-
gence secured by tapping the wires of the Japanese Consulate General at Hawaii
and by intercepting cable messages of the Japanese Consulate General are
approved.
Conclusion 12: “Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone
linos of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that
various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information ^ras
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
365
obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese
attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages
were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.**
Conclusion 13: “Although various messages of the Japanese Consul Gen-
eral at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of
ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the
Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information was not
transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other
messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December 1941, indi-
cated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not decrypted or
brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack, apparenly because
the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such work.”
13. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds that
no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any
person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that no further proceed-
ings be had in the matter.
With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, I
concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement that
the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident,
and that the disaster cannot be regarded as an “act of God” beyond human power
*to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not it is true, as stated in the Second En-
dorsement, that the Country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people
were unwilling to take adequate measures for defense until it was too late to
repair the consequences of their failure so to do, it appears that the Navy as a
whole, although its ranking officers were fully informed of the most recent devel-
opments in the science of warfare, failed to appreciate the true significance of
those developments until their impact had been felt by a blow struck at a sub-
stantial portion of the Fleet. By the same token, although the imminence of
hostile action by the Japanese was known, and the capabilities of the Japanese
Fleet and Air Arm were recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile
action, these factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds of the
responsible officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel them to bring
about that implementation * [JO] of the plans that was necessary if the
initial hostile attack was to be repelled or at least mitigated.
That this is so is manifested in the case of the instant disaster in several
important respects.
(a) The destructive potentiality of air attack was not properly evaluated,
although there was ample information available on this subject in the reports of
action by and against the British. That this information was recognized
is shown by the inclusion in war and defense plans of appropriate provisions for
defense against this type of attack, but that it was not fully appreciated is shown
by the fact that these selfsame provisions were not put into effect until the
initial attack had been successful.
(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate
provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the fullest utili-
zation of all of the available resources of both the Army and the Navy ; in practice,
none of these measures came into being to any appreciable extent prior to the
attack.
(c) Within the Navy itself, the organization was such as to submerge the Chief
of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail pertaining to the procurement and
material programs incidental to the rapid expansion of the Navy. This precludued
him from giving to war plans and operations the undivided and continuing atten-
tion which experience has shown they require, and tended to dull his perception
of the critical significance of events.
In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage of
hindsight, nor do I overlook the fact that this war has proved that any carrier
strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost impossible to deflect. After
giving due consideration, however, to all these factors, I am of the opinion that
there were, nevertheless, areas in which sound military judgement dictated the
taking of action which, though it might not have prevented or defeated the attack,
would have tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack was able
to inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must center upon
the officers who had it in their power, each within his respective sphere, to take
appropriate action.
14. I concur, therefore, with the opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second
Endorsement to the Court of Inquiry record that it is pertinent to examine the
possible courses of action which Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, as the
7971Q — 46 — Ex. 157 24
366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
responsible officers, might have taken to lessen the success of the initial Japanese
blow.
1 20 ] (a) In paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement, it is pointed out that
Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of informa-
tion available in Washington, particularly in respect of:
(1) The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese,
which was regarded by the Japanese as an ultimatum ;
(2) The intercepted Japanese messages inquiring as to the disposition of
ships within Pearl Harbor ;
(3) The implementation of the “winds” message;
(4) In falling to appreciate the significance of the “one p. m. message”
it to Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available.
(5) Finally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement
that there is a certain sameness of tenor in the communications sent by
Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the sense of
intensification of critical relations between Japan and the United States.
I concur generally with these comments except as to (3) and (5). In connec-
tion with the failure of Admiral Stark to advise Admiral Kimmel of the imple-
mentation of the “winds” message, the following conclusion by Admiral Hewitt
is approved :
“7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic
messages a code, known as the “winds” code, to be used in radio broadcasts
in order to convey information to its representatives as to the status of
relations between Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted
prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States.”
Although there may be some basis for the comment that prior to 27 November
1941 there was a certain sameness of tone in the communication sent by Admiral
Stark to Admiral Kimmel, it should be noted that the message of November 27
was stronger than any message which Admiral Stark sent previously to Admiral
Kimmel. That message read as follows :
“This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with
Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased
and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X
The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of
naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the
Philippines (printed in ink, “Thai”) or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X
Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out
the tasks assigned in WPL 46 X Inform district and Army authorities X
A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Appropriate meas-
ures against sabotage.”
[ 21 ] Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U. S.
Fleet, it might be added that Admiral Stark’s omission consisted not only in the
failure to transmit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the available information,
but also in the failure properly and speedily to evaluate that information,
particularly on 7 December 1941.
The evidence shows that the State Department reaply to the Japanese of 28
November 1941 was in fact regarded by them as an ultimatum; that it was
known in the Navy Department before 1 December 1941 that the Japanese
regarded the reply as unacceptable ; that it was known, as early as 1 December
1941, that the Japanese proposed to strike without warning. It was further
known that subsequent to their receipt of the State Department’s note the
Japanese were directing their emissaries in the United States to do everything
in their power to allay any suspicion of a hostile Japanese move. Against this
background, there was received on 6 December 1941, in the Navy Department, an
intercepted Japanese message to their emissaries here, which stated that a 14-part
reply to the State Department’s note of 26 November 1911 was being transmitted,
and further that a specific time for delivery of this reply would be transmitted
from Tokyo by a separate message. This message, together with the first
thirteen parts of the Japanese reply were all available at the Navy Department
by 2100 hours of 6 December 1941. The language of the thirteen parts of the
Japanese reply then available Indicated that the reply constituted a final breaking
off of relations. All this pointed to the conclusion that a surprise attack was to
be simultaneous with the delivery of the Japanese message. Thus, while it was
not known on 6 December precisely when the attack was to be delivered, there
was ample evidence to base the conclusion that a surprise move was due within
narrow limits of time.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
367
On the morning of December 7th, by 10 : 30, Admiral Stark had all fourteen
parts of the Japanese reply, which in its entirety made explicit the breaking oft
of relations. He had as well the direction for the delivery of that reply at one
p. m. Eastern Standard Time, and there was information available to him that
this time corresponded to dawn at Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far
East. Although, as found by Admiral Hewitt, no one stated that this indicated
an air attack at Pearl Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed to the possibility
of such an attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would
have dictated at least a plain language telephone communication to Admiral
Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring about some
material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.
(b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph 5(b) of the Second
Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there stated fchat
Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed,
did have indications of the increasing tenseness of relations with Japan. In
particular, it is pointed out that he had the “war warning” message on 27 Novem-
ber, the “hostile action possible at any moment” message on 28 November, the
3 December message that the Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and
the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret
and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands.
[ 22 ] In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his
personal letters, which are a part of the record before the Court, and as well
in the war plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the possibility of attack
upon Pearl Harbor by air ; and, that the information received by Admiral Kimmel
concerning the location and movement of Japanese naval forces after 27 November
1941 should have been evaluated, as previously pointed out, as indicating the
continued and increasing possibility of such an attack. It is to be especially
noted that while Admiral Kimmel was directed in the war warning message of
27 November 1941, and again on 28 November when the Army message was relayed
to him, to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying
cut the tasks assigned in the Navy Basic War Plan, the chief action taken by him
was carrying forward the arrangements for the reenforcing of and continuing the
limited air patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28 November, the depth
bombing of submarine contracts in the Oahu operating area, and engaging in
unproductive conferences with General Short. He continued in effect the pri-
mary fleet activity of training and the lowest condition of readiness (Condition
III) of the fleet in port. He neither ordered long-range air reconnaissance from
Oahu to any extent nor advised his fleet air wing commander of the receipt of the
war warning message. His failure to take other and more effective action is
neither explainable nor excusable by any ambiguity in the meaning of or dis-
agreement as to what would constitute an “appropriate defensive deployment.”
Admiral Kimmel could have referred to the initial tasks stated in the war plan
of maintaining fleet security at bases and guarding against submarine attack by
Japan, and if he did not know what was meant by the phrase “appropriate de-
fensive deployment,” he should have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for
an explanation.
The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states that Admiral Kimmel
could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which
the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of action were open
to him, viz :
(1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct long-
range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, and thus made the Japanese
task more difficult, whether or not this would have resulted in the detection of
the approach of the Japanese carriers; (2) He could have rotated the “in port”
periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, and thus made it more difficult
for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port; (3)
He could have maintained a higher condition of readiness under which Naval
planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, ships’ batteries
would have been fully manned, and damage control organizations fully
operational.
Admiral Hewitt’s report concludes In part :
“The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers,
a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through
the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects
of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable pre-
368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which
reasonably were open to him were :
“(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most
probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent
basis, with available planes and crews.
[2S\ “(b) Establishment oi a higher condition of anti-aircraft readi-
ness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.
“(3) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by
ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.
“(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in
port.
“(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept
possible attack forces.
“(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry
into port at irregular intervals.
“(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and
aircraft warning installations.”
I concur with these comments as to the various course of action which Admiral
Kimmel could and should have taken. The evidence indicates clearly, however,
that his most grievous failure was his failure to conduct long-range air recon-
naissance in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week preceding the
attack. That this is so is manifest from the evidence obtained by Admiral
Hewitt and from his following conclusion, which is hereby approved.
Conclusion 14. “The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel
could have secured information, after the receipt of the ‘war warning,* as
to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service,
traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air recon-
naissance from Oahu.**
During the critical period after November 27 the limitations of the aircraft
warning service and of radio intelligence were evident; the only remaining
practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was entitled to rely for informa-
tion as to the Japanese naval movements was distant air reconnaissance which,
covering the most probable approach bearings, would as Admiral Hewitt con-
cluded have had a reasonable chance of success. The failure to detect the ap-
proach of the Japanese task force contributed more to the success of the Japa-
nese attack than did any other single factor.
In addition to the courses of action referred to by the Commander in Chief,
U. S. Fleet and by Admiral Hewitt, it was of course always open to Admiral
Kimmel also to take steps to increase cooperation between his organization and
the Army command, and to attempt to achieve effective joint command. That
conditions were ideal for his accomplishing such an objective is indicated by the
evidence in the record and the finding of the Court that the social relationship
between him and General Short was excellent The need for Admiral Kimmel
taking such measures existed from the time he took command of the Pacific
Fleet. It increased in urgency as the 7th of December, 1941, approached.
[24 ] 15- The Second Endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Fleet, to the N*ival Court record concludes that :
“6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel
were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in
question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exer-
cising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties,
rather than culpable inefficiency.
“7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence
adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the rele-
gation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior
judgment may not result in future errors.**
16. In his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt’s report the Commander-in-Chief,
U. S. Fleet, states in part:
“I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge
Advocate General as expressed in the second endorsement. In answer to*
the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions
are submitted :
“(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant
trial by court martial of any person in the Naval Service, in that the
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 369
evidence will not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the
Government of the Navy.
“(b) With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other
proceedings, I am still of the opinion, which I have previously expressed,
that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, though not culpable to a degree
warranting formal disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in
emergency, due to the lack of the superior Judgment necessary for exer-
cising command commensurate with their duties.
“(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of
these officers to positions in which lack of super ior strategic judgment
may not result in future errors. The action has been taken in the case
of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is
recommended.
“(d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General, I consider
it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, or either one
of them, to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, nor
are court [ 25 ] martial or other proceedings (prior to the termi-
nation of hostilities with Japan) advisable because such proceedings would
almost certainly involve disclosure of information which would be detri-
mental to current military operations and to national security measures.”
17. The Judge Advocate General in making his endorsement to Admiral
Hewitt’s report states in part:
1. “Subject report clarifies obscure points and supplies omissions in
the earlier investigations. It Is considered that this and former inves-
tigations, taken together, present as clear a picture of the pertinent facts
as will ever be adduced. With this report, therefore, I believe the in-
vestigation of the Pearl Harbor attack should be considered completed.
2. “Admiral Hewitt’s report brings out and confirms a distinction which
impressed me at the time of studying the earlier investigations, a dis-
tinction which does much to clarify thinking on the question of placing
responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster. It appears that there was no
lack of appreciation on the part of any of the responsible officers that war
was coming, and coming quickly, during the critical period immediately
preceding 7 December 1941. The point on which those officers failed to
exercise the discernment and judgment to be expected from officers oc-
cupying their positions, was their failure to appreciate, from the infor-
mation available to them, that Pearl Harbor was a likely target for aerial
attack and their failure to take the necessary steps to prevent or minimize
such a surprise attack. Each of these officers, in estimating the critical
situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategical planning, in that
he largely ruled out all possible courses of action by which the Japanese
might begin the war except through an attack in the Western Pacific.
3. “I do not believe that the lack of more complete understanding and
co-operation between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had
any great effect on the ultimate result; for it is abundantly shown that
they each entertained the same fallacious views, and closer understanding
would most likely merely have strengthened those views. Likewise, I
submit that the importance of information from Japanese sources has been
overemphasized; for had more basically sound principles been observed!
the Pearl Harbor disaster would not have occurred. The security of Pearl
Harbor was the very core of our Pacific strategy, a fact which did not
receive sufficient consideration in the strategic concept of responsible
officers.
[ 26 ] 4. “In answer to the specific questions asked in the first
endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:
(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b). It is not
believed that there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any of
the officers concerned of any offense known to naval law.
(b) Under the facts of this case, there are only two offenses which are
worthy of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty and (2) Culpable Inefficiency
in the Performance of Duty. Under either charge it would be necessary to
define the duty of the officer concerned, and to show that it was his duty
to follow a course of action other than the one he did. In my opinion
this would be impossible, as the acts of omission of these officers do not
rise above the status of errors of judgment. No clearly defined duty can
be established which was neglected or improperly performed. As stated
370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
by Fleet Admiral King, in his endorsement on the findings of the Court
of Inquiry, the evidence in the case boils down to the fact that the acta
of the officers in question “indicate lack of superior Judgment necessary
for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned
duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.” “Lack of Superior Judgment’’
is not an offense triable by general court-martial.
*******
(d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the Navy
and Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to the rank of
members of a general court-martial will make it most difficult to constitute
a court for the trial of the officers here concerned during war time or dur-
ing a period of six months after the cessation of hostilities. Many of the
officers of appropriate rank, both on the active and the retired lists, would
be disqualified because of interest in the subject matter, the probability of
being called as a witness, or by virtue of having been connected with one
of the Investigations into the matter. If more than one of the officers in
question are brought to trial, an entirely new court would be necessary in
each case, as members who had tried a former case arising out of the
Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to challenge. The summoning of
the necessary witnesses would result in temporarily removing from their
duty stations many of the key officers in the naval organization. For the
foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that any such court martial pro-
ceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and
would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that any such pro-
ceedings [27] during the six months immediately following the end
of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the naval service.”
*******
18. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommendation of the
Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General thereto,
and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, thereto;
the record findings and conclusions of Admiral Hewitt, and the Second
and Third Endorsements thereto; and on the basis of the foregoing comments,
I conclude that:
(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties
adequately.
(b) Then Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Admiral Harold R. Stark,
particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December 1941,
failed to demonstrate the superior Judgment necessary for exercising com-
mand commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties.
(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action should
be taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to active duty in
the future for any position in which the exercise of superior judgment
may be necessary.
(d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully acquainted
with the Navy’s investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of
the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in
these investigations, should be made as soon as such action can be taken
without injuring current military operations or the national security.
19. Accordingly, I direct:
(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold
any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of
superior judgment.
(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position
in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.
(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted
with the Navy’s investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of
the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in
these investigations, will be made as soon as such action can be taken
without injuring current military operations or the national security.
Secretary of the Navy,
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
371
NOTE
This endorsement released by President Truman 29 August 1945 — thereby
changing classification.
[I] 13 August 1945.
FOURTH ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF
INQUIRY
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed
forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered
by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944, and further investigation by
Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., ordered by the Secretary of the Navy
on 2 May 1945.
1. Pursuant to Executive order dated 18 December 1941, a commission headed
by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into the facts sur-
rounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The commission reported its
findings on 23 January 1942. The commission concluded in part that :
“17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate
action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December
7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for
joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the
part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the
meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of
defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each,
that he was not required to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in,
the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned
to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated
on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in
them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet,
and commanding general, Hawaiian Department.”
2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944,
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of wit-
nesses likely to have knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack.
Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.
3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith
with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe,
and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might
justify.
[ 2 ] 4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfln, USN
(Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral
Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN,
as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to
convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of
inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese
forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941 ; to inquire
thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of
the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to
state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame
incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case
its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to
recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had.
5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and sub-
mitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Certain portions of the
record of proceedings before the Court, including the findings and opinion of the
Court, have been classified “TOP SECRET” in the interest of national security,
and the balance “SECRET.”
The material which was classified “TOP SECRET” was so classified by the
Court of Inquiry and retained in that classification upon the recommendation
of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations because
of the extreme care which has been necessary to safeguard information in the
hands of the Navy Department and especially the sources of that information.
These sources were many, including the Intelligence Divisions of the Army and
Navy, the Office of Strategic Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and others.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations now
informs me that it is still in the public interest that, the sources of this infor-
372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mation be safeguarded. Accordingly, I have directed that all of the report of
the Court of Inquiry be made public except that part, publication of which in
the opinion of the Commander in Chef, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Opera-
tions would necessarily disclose the sources of secret information. To the same
end in the discussion of the report of the Court of Inquiry the evidence before
the Court and the additional evidence discovered by Admiral Hewitt’s investi-
gation herein I have avoided any reference which would disclose the sources of
secret information.
6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval
Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and by me was
that the evidence secured by the Court did not warrant and would not support
the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.
7. In my Third Endorsement to the Record of Proceedings of the Pearl Harbor
Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, I found that the evidence obtained
indicated that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel and
Admiral Stark, but that the inquiry had not gone to the point of exhaustion
of all possible evidence. Accordingly, I directed that further investigation would
be conducted by an investigating officer and that pending [S] the com-
pletion of the necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to
the institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.
8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cover every material
question, I directed that a thorough review be made of the prior investigations.
Upon the completion of this review of prior investigations and after examination
of the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 3 December 1944, I ap-
pointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, as investigating officer, to examine such
witnesses and obtain such other evidence as might be necessary in order fully
to develop and clarify the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor. The further investigation was completed on 12 July 1945.
9. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commander in
Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsements to the
Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record are approved subject to the following
remarks :
(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II. — This finding states, in substance, that the
presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and the battle-
ships of Task Force Two was necessary.
The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmers statement to the effect that
he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he anticipated an air
attack. The Second Endorsement indicates that the Commander in Chief, U. S.
Fleet, does not entirely “go along” with the opinion of the Court that the infor-
mation available to Admiral Kimmel did not require any departure from his
operation and maintenance schedules. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
states further in this connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the
“in port” periods of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it
impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels
in port, and that this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I concur
in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding.
(b) Court of Inquiry Finding III. — This finding states that, “Constitutional
requirements that war be’ declared by Congress ...” make it difficult to
prevent an attack and precluded offensive action as a means of defense, and
that Admiral Kimmel had the responsibility of avoiding overt acts.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, comments that this gives an unscrupu-
lous enemy a great advantage, and that the Constitutional requirement prevent-
ing offensive action as a means of defense was a definite handicap. Though, in
contrast with out Constitutional principles, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
was but a repetition of the historically treacherous Japanese method of inaug-
urating hostilities and commencing a war, yet it does not appear that there was
any proximate casual relationship between the Constitutional requirement and
the Instant disaster. The Constitutional inhibition and the injunction as to
overt acts did not preclude either long distance reconnaissance or a sortie by the
Fleet. Further, it [4] appears that prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral
Kimmel did not regard this Constitutional provision or his responsibility to avoid
overt acts as sufficient to prevent the issuance of orders to bomb unidentified
submarines found In operating areas.
(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV. — This states that Admiral Bloch was sub-
ordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and was charged with the task of assisting the
Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently, Admiral Bloch had a
responsibility for naval measures concerned with local defense.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 373
Upon the basis of till the evidence including Admiral Hewitt’s investigation,
it appears that :
(1) No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The
only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific
Fleet patrol planes.
(2) The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral
KJmmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were oper-
ated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him
at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules
stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnais-
sance from Oahu.
(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V - The Court here finds that relations between
Admiral Kimrnel and General Short were friendly, cordial and cooperative ; that
they invariably. conferred when important messages were received, and that each
was sufficiently cognizant of the measures being taken by the other.
In this connection upon all the evidence it appears :
( 1 ) The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were
designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack, includ-
ing an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and
the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack.
The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war.
The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local com-
manders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior
to the attack.
(2) .The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of
mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the
local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence
of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information
concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.
[5] (3) A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective
exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of
information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was
no organized system to ensure such exchange.
The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there were informal
arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the Army and Navy at Hawaii,
which included the transmission to the Army of some information concerning
Japanese ship movements. The evidence obtained both by Admiral Hewitt and
by the Naval Court of Inquiry indicates, however, that neither Admiral Kimrnel
nor General Short was sufficiently informed of the degree of readiness put into
effect by the other. It appears that after receipt of the “war warning” and
prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimrnel and General Short conferred on sev-
eral occasions. They discussed the reenforcement of Midway and Wake. It
does not appear that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed in effect
or to be placed in effect, or the question or advisability of placing in effect air
reconnaissance. General Short testified before the Naval Court that after a
conference with Admiral Kimrnel, he placed in effect Army Alert No. 1 (the anti-
sabotage alert). Admiral Kimrnel testified that he did not know which degree
of alert the Army had in effect, and that he made no specific inquiry of General
Short in this connection.
That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears from the
evidence. Admiral Kimrnel received dispatches after 27 November 1941 relating
to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to United States outlying
islands to destroy classified material. He testified before the Naval Court that
he did not direct that these be furnished to General Short, and that he did not
know whether or not they were furnished to him. General Short testified that
he had not seen these dispatches.
In view of these facts, I cannot agree with the above finding by the Naval
Court of Inquiry. The system of mutual cooperation, of joint command, was
not working effectively — it failed.
War experience has shown that : The responsibility for final major decisions
must devolve on one person ; that is, there must be unity of command. However,
it is important to point out that the experience of this war has conclusively
demonstrated that there is no inconsistency between the existence of two or more
separate military or naval organizations as the functioning forces and an effec-
tive exercise of unity of command in a theater or in an operation. Practically
all of the major operations of this war have been accomplished by two or more
distinct military organizations, some even belonging to diverse nations, but nU
374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
acting under a unified command. In such an operation, the commanders of the
several forces and their staffs must function in close physical proximity, usually
in the higher echelons sharing a common headquarters or command post
[6] I do not find, however, that Admiral Kimmel is open to criticism for
having failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a submarine contact had
been made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly prior to the air attack.
The evidence supports the conclusion that the attempt to obtain confirmation of
the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should
have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in send-
ing out the ready destroyer.
(e) Court of Inquiry Finding VI. — This states in substance that unavoidable
deficiencies in personnel and material had a bearing on the effectiveness of the
local defense of Pearl Harbor.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out, however, that the pertinent
question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available to the best ad-
vantage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet. .
(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII. — The Court finds that Japan had an initial
advantage because of the Japanese Fleet’s numerical superiority, and the su-
periority of Japanese espionage.
The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined to the gen-
eral statement that factors such as those referred to by the Court will always
place this nation at a disadvantage during a period of strained relations. This
finding, of course, in general was correct Nevertheless, as applied to the spe-
cific issues here presented, it overlooks the fact that :
(1) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well known to
Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into ac-
count in the war plans ;
(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a dis-
advantage in restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and War
Departments were nevertheless not without Important Intelligence advan-
tages of their own which were not availed of to the fullest extent.
(g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII. — This states that it was the direct re-
sponsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that the Navy
was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet is in agreement with “the fundamental
concept of naval warfare” discussed by the Court, but takes a more realistic view
on this point He points out that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that In
view of the weakness of local defense, the ships of the Fleet in port had to be
employed to protect Pearl Harbor. With this I concur. It is to be noted,
moreover, that under the defense plan the Navy was responsible for the mainte-
nance of distant reconnaissance.
[7] (h) Court of Inquiry Finding IX. — The Court finds that the air de-
fense plans were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon Fleet air-
craft which could not be made permanently available for local defense.
The Second Endorsement states that the Court has overstressed the fact that
the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes ; that it was sound policy to
place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel's disposal ; that it was his responsi-
bility to allocate the planes as best he could ; that the available airci^ft had to
be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened ; that it is
doubtful whether with the available forces it would have been possible to de-
stroy the carriers before they launched their planes, except by a lucky chance ;
that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation, not entirely
due to his own fault ; and that this had a bearing on the amount of damage re-
sulting from the attack. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief,
U. 8. Fleet, with respect to this finding.
(i) Court of Inquiry Findings IV. VIII, IX. — Based on these findings the
conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Bloch satisfactorily performed his
duties.
The Commander in Chief, U. 8. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is approved.
(J) Court of Inquiry Finding X. — This holds adequate and effective Admiral
KImmer8 provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea.
The Commander in Chief, IT. 8. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.
(k) Court of Inquiry Finding XI. — The substance of this finding is that Ad-
miral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called for by
the information available to him, and that a higher condition of readiness would
have added little to the defense.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
375
In the Second Endorsement It is pointed out that in fact the condition of
readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that condition
which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained on the assump-
tion that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the Fleet Such was not
the case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.
[8] The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, further states that he does not
agree with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of readiness would
have added little to the defense, and is of the view that the information available
to Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening up of the defense precautions as 7
December approached. With the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S.
Fleet, I concur.
(1) Court of Inquiry Finding XII . — The Court here finds that there was no
information indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to attack Pearl
Harbor, and that it was not possible to prevent or to predict that attack.
The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point : “There
was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that
an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within
fairly narrow limits.”
It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered in Admiral Hewitt’s
investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel, particularly
during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, concerning the
location and movements of Japanese naval forces. This information consisted
principally of daily radio intelligence summaries setting forth the results of
monitoring Japanese naval communications and estimates by the Fleet Intel-
ligence Officer. It appears that there was an unusual change in Japanese naval
radio calls on 1 December 1941 ; that this was regarded as indicating an addi-
tional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale; that
on 2 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel conferred with his Fleet Intelligence Officer
as to the whereabouts of Japanese fleet units, and that during that conference
Admiral Kimmel noticed and commented on the absence of information in the
Fleet Intelligence Officer’s written estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions
1 and 2, which consisted of four carriers. (It has since been learned that these
four carriers were among the six carriers which in fact were then on the high
seas heading toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese carriers were located
by the Fleet Intelligence Officer in his written estimate, in Japanese home waters,
with the exception of possibly one carrier in the Marshalls. In his testimony
before Admiral Hewitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Captain Edwin T. Layton,
U. S. N., described his conversation with Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941 as
follows :
“Q. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best
you recall it?
“A. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, ‘What ! You don’t know where
Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?’ and I replied, ‘No, sir, I do not. I
think they are [0] in home waters, but I do not know where they are.
The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.* Then Admiral
Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern counte-
nance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, ‘Do you mean to say
that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn’t know it?* or words
to that effect. My reply was that, ‘I hope they would be sighted before now,’ or
words to that effect.” ...
“Q. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your
description of Admiral Kimmel’s twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am
trying to get at is this : Was the discussion about the absence of information con-
concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or Jocular one?
“A. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said ‘Where are Cardivs 1
and 2?’ and I said, ‘I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say
that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven’t heard from them in a
long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month
and a half ago,’ and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, ‘Do
you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head?’ or words to that
effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to
their exact location.
“Q. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those
carriers?
“A. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote
him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to
376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their
location.”
It is to be noted further that the daily communication intelligence summaries
received by Admiral Kimmel stated, on December 3rd, that : “Almost a complete
blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has some-
what promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls
have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not
one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low
ebb” and that the daily summaries delivered to Admiral Kimmel thereafter, and
prior to the attack, indicated that there was no information as to Japanese
carriers.
[10] In view of the foregoing, I do not approve the above finding by the
Naval Court of Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the Commander in
Chief, U. S. Fleet, concerning this finding. I am of the view that the information
as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval forces which was received
by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding the attack, coupled with all the
other information which he had received, including the “war warning” and
other messages from the Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted
as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of
such an attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII . — It is here stated that Admiral Kiimnel’s
decision not to conduct daily long range reconnaissance was sound ; that there
were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that such use of the available
planes was not justified.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval Court
record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this
matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors to be considered.
He states further, however, that after considering all of the information that was
at Admiral Kimmel’s disposal, it appears that Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely
sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly
as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately pre-
ceding the Japanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious that the means
available did not permit an all-round daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary
to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched, but that there
were, however, certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have
been covered to some extent, and that such particular cover would have been
logical in the circumstances known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and
early December.
In addition to these comments, with which I concur, the following points may
be noted :
(1) Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long range patrol
in the summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received and reported by Ad-
miral Bloch at that time.
(2) Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided
on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.
[11] (3) There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral
Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the “war warning.”
as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu.
The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but
could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes,
who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified
that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.
(4) The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack
were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more
than a few days.
(5) There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at
Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several
weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700
miles.
(6) The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most
likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were
to attack Pearl Harbor.
(7) If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27
November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably
would have been searched.
(8) The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due
north of Oahu.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 377
( n ) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV . — This states in substance that the Army
radar detection system was ineffective.
The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding, which is
made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the radar deterction
system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic state, nevertheless,
even in its then condition it could have and should have served to give at least
an hour's warning of the attack.
(o) Court of Inquiry Finding XV . — This states that the best professional
opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December 1941, was
that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions [12] of shoal water and
limited approach such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor, was not prac-
ticable, and that the Japanese attack was successful principally because of the
employment of a specially designed torpedo, which was a secret weapon.
The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: “It Is
evident in retrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were
seriously underestimated.” The principal point upon which the Court of Inquiry
seems to rest its finding is the further finding that it was not believed by
American and British naval authorities at that time that torpedoes could be suc-
cessfully launched from aircraft in waters as shallow as those at Pearl Harbor.
As a basis for this view the Court relies upon a letter by the Chief of Naval
Operations early in 1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could not be
successfully launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of 75
feet (water at Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that
the Court also refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval
Operations in June, 1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict with the
Court's finding. This letter stated, among other things, that: “It cannot be
assumed that any capital or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from
this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit
an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.” This letter
also advised that torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general,
in 13-15 fathoms of water, although several may have been launched in 11-12.
The records of the Navy Department indicate that in April, 1941, there was
circulated in the Department an Intelligence report which described the demon-
stration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this report that
the torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and that it required
no greater depth of water for its successful launching than the depth at which
it made its normal run.
It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the British
reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which torpedoes were
successfully launched in 42 feet of water.
Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year prior
to the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of an airplane
torpedo attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated. Secretary Knox's letter
of January, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second only to air bombing in
order of probability in a list of the types of attack upon Pearl Harbor which [I $]
he considered likely. His letter had been previously cleared with Admiral
Stark, and was received in February by Admiral Kimmel.
In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not approved.
(p) Court of Inquiry Finding XVI . — The Court here finds that Admiral Kim-
mel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made after receiv-
ing the 24 November dispatch, was sound in light (a) of the approval of the
steps which he had taken after the dispatch of 16 October which advised that
hostilities were possible, and (b) the information then available to him including
Admiral Stark's letter of 17 October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November 1941,
which stated that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction. Including
attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
The Second Endorsement summarizes the Court's finding and underscores
that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: “A surprise
aggressive movement in any direction , including attack on the Philippines or Guam
is a possibility. . . .*'
It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words, “A
surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philip-
pines or Guam,” meant to him that any attack other than on those two places
would be on foreign territory, but that the words also included the possibility
of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands.
The Court refers in its finding to a part personal letter sent by
Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel on 17 October, in which Admiral Starts
378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
stated : “Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into ns and the
message I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I tempered the
message handed me considerably.*' However, the letter also continued : "Perhaps
I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in the White
House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates
the trend.** To the letter was annexed a postscript stating in part: "General
Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of recon-
naissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese
raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not
assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and
that, while we keep track of Japanese ships as far as we can, a carefully
planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to
detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him
was not to worry.**
It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal with the question of the
soundness of Admiral Kimmel’s decision to continue preparation of the Fleet, in
the light of the highly important information which he received from the Chief
of Naval Operations and otherwise during the critical period after the “war
warning** of November 27th.
[H] (q) Court of Inquiry Finding XVII . — The Court here finds that there
were good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the Far Bast.
In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out that
the Far Bast was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese opera-
tions, and that they were in fact initiated there. He notes further that all con-
cerned recognized the possibility that such a commencement of hostilities would
be accompanied by an attack upon Pearl Harbor. He adds that this latter pos-
sibility was considerably strengthened by information available at Washington,
not all of which was available to Admiral Kimmel.
It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt’s Investigation that
the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would Include an
attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by Information received by
Admiral Kimmel on and after the war warning of November 27th. The estimates
that had been made in the War Plans, which had been approved by Admiral
Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the event of war with the Japanese a
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly possible. The information re-
ceived by Admiral Kimmel as to the location and movement of Japanese naval
forces was, at the least, consistent with these estimates.
The Information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the south-
ward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks
on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received by Ad-
miral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, indicated, however, that
on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs; that,
on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could
be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was
no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive
information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement
which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of
the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should
have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the
effectiveness of such an attack.
(r) Court of Inquiry Findings XVIII and XIX . — These state in substance that
Admiral Stark’s failure from 26 November to 7 D?cember 1941 to transmit to
Admiral Kimmel Important Information f/5] in his possession constitutes
a military error.
The comment of the Commander in Chief. U. S. Fleet, as to this finding was to
the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in failing to give Admiral Kimmel an
adequate summary of information available in Washington.
The endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, on the Naval Court
of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, former
Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. It
was noted that these findings, and the conclusions of the Court based thereon,
were concerned principally with the handling of enemy information In the Navy
Department, and that consequently, it would seem essential to a thorough explo-
ration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence,
who was largely responsible for handling this information. It was concluded
that the failure to obtain this testimony was unfortunate.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
379
With this comment by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concurred. It
further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum, who was as-
signed to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who, according to other testimony
in the record, had important duties in connection with the handling of such infor-
mation, would be most helpful. Captain McCollum was also available as a wit-
ness to the Court. I ascertained that at the time both Rear Admiral Wilkinson-
and Captain McCollum were actively engaged in combat operations against the
enemy, and would be so engaged until some date in the future. From the nature
of the duties which these officers were performing in their assignments, I deter-
mined that in view of the paramount present needs of the war effort, their testi-
mony in this matter could not then feasibly be obtained.
During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the testimony
of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other testimony bear-
ing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. From this evidence the following
conclusions appear:
(1) Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States
Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japa-
nese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and Its Intention
to wage war.
[ 16 J (2) The information which was obtained in Washington by the War
and Navy Departments was fully exchanged. The information which was ob-
tained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available
to intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Depart-
ment had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval
forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War
Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Ad-
miral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over
Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the
number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown be-
cause the special Army planes were not made ready.
(3) The information obtained by the Navy Department was adequately dis-
seminated within the Navy Department.
(4) Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he
be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important
developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him impor-
tant information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the
seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State
Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expedi-
tious means certain information indicating the imminence of an attack by the
Japanese that was available at Washington on the morning of December 7th,
were unfortunate.
(5) Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his pos-
session to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important
developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This Included
the “war warning” message and similar important messages which were sent by
the Chief of Naval Operations.
(6) The available information in the possession of the Commander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the “war warning” mes-
sage, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose
cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the
patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other
units, were not informed of this and other important messages.
[17] 10. From the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt it appears that
prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu
were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu
but no information was obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the like-
lihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such
cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the
Hawaiian area.
11. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds that
no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any
person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that no further proceed-
ings be had in the matter.
With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, I
concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement that
the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident,
and that that disaster cannot be regarded as an “act of God” beyond human power
380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not it is true, as stated In the Second En-
dorsement, that the Country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people
were unwilling to take adequate measures for defense until it was too late to
repair the consequences of their failure so to do, it appears that the Navy, al-
though its ranking officers were fully informed of the most recent developments
in the science of warfare, failed to appreciate the true significance of those devel-
opments until their impact had been felt by a blow struck at a substantial por-
tion of the Fleet. By the same token, although the imminence of hostile action
by the Japanese was known, and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet and Air
Arm were recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile action, these
factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds of the responsible
officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel them to bring about that imple-
mentation [18] of the plans that was necessary if the initial hostile
attack was to be repelled or at least mitigated.
That this is so is manifested in the case of the instant disaster in several
important respects.
(a) The destructive potentiality of air torpedo attack was not properly evalu-
ated, although there was ample information available on this subject in the
reports of action by and against the British. That this information was recog-
nized is shown by the inclusion in war and defense plans of appropriate provi-
sions for defense against this type of attack, but that it was not fully appreciated
is shown by the fact that these selfsame provisions were not put into effect until
the initial attack had been successful.
(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate
provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the fullest
utilization of all of the available resources of both the Army and the Navy; in
practice, none of these measures came into being to any appreciable extent prior
to the attack.
(c) Within the Navy itself, conduct of the organization was such as to sub-
merge the Chief of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail pertaining to
the procurement and materiel programs incidental to the rapid expansion of the
Navy. This precluded him from giving to war plans and operations the undivided
and continuing attention which experience has shown they require, and tended
to dull his perception of the critical significance of events.
In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage of
hindsight, nor do I overlook the fact that this war has proved that any carrier
strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost impossible to deflect. After
giving due consideration, however, to all these factors, I am of the opinion that
there were, nevertheless, areas in which sound military judgment dictated the
taking of action which, though it might not have prevented or defeated the attack
would have tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack was able to
inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must center upon the
officers who had it in their power, each within his respective sphere, to take appro-
priate action.
12. I concur, therefore, with the opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of the
Second Endorsement to the Court of Inquiry record that it is pertinent to examine
the possible courses of action which Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, as the
responsible officers, might have taken to lessen tbe success of the initial Japanese
blow.
[J9] (a) In paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement on the Report of the
Naval Court of Inquiry, it is pointed out that Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral
Kimmel an adequate summary of Information available in Washington, partic-
ularly in respect of :
(1) The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese,
which was a definite step toward breaking relations;
(2) Certain information indicating Japanese interest as to the disposition
of the ships within Pearl Harbor;
(3) In failing to appreciate the significance of the information which he
received on the morning of 7 December indicating that a message was to be
given to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. and in failing to transmit it to
Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available ;
(4) Finally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement
that there is a certain sameness of tenor in the communications sent by
Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the sense of mount-
ing intensification of critical relations between Japan and the United States.
I concur generally with these.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
381
Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it might
be added that Admiral Stark's omission consisted not only in the failure to trans-
mit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the available information, but also in the
failure properly and speedily to evaluate that information, particularly on 7
December 1941. Although it was not known on 6 December precisely when or
where the attack was to be delivered, there was ample evidence to base the con-
clusion that a surprise move was due within narrow limits of time. On the morn-
ing of December 7 by 10 : 30 Admiral Stark had information indicating that a mes-
sage was to be given to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time,
and there was information available to him that this time corresponded to dawn
at Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far East. Although no one stated
that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed
to the possibility of such an attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the
situation would have dictated at least a plain language telephone communication
to Admiral Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring
about some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.
[ 20 ] (b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph 5 (b) of the
Second Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there stated
that Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully
Informed, did have indications of the increasing tenseness of relations with
Japan. In particular, it is pointed out that he had the “war warning" message
on 27 November, the “hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 No-
vember, the 3 December message that the Japanese had ordered destruction of
codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United
States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific islands.
In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his personal letters,
which are a part of the record before the Court, and as well in the war plans
approved by him, explicitly recognized the possibility of attack upon Pearl Harbor
by air; and, that the information received by Admiral Kimmel concerning the
location and movement of Japanese naval forces after 27 November 1941 should
have been evaluated, as previously pointed out, as Indicating the continued and
increasing possibility of such an attack. It is to be especially noted that while
Admiral Kimmel was directed in the war warning message of 27 November 1941,
and again on 28 November when the Army message was relayed to him, to execute
an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks
assigned in the Navy Basic War Plan, the chief action taken by him was carrying
forward the arrangements for the reenforcing of and continuing the limited air
patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28 November, the depth bombing
of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area, and engaging in unproductive
conferences with General Short. He continued in effect the primary fleet activity
of training and the lowest condition of readiness (Condition III) of the fleet in
port He neither ordered long-range air reconnaissance from Oahu to any extent
nor advised his fleet air wing and other commanders of the receipt of the war
warning message. His failure to take other and more effective action is neither
explainable nor excusable by any ambiguity in the meaning of or disagreement
as to what would constitute an “appropriate defensive deployment." Admiral
Kimmel could have referred to the initial tasks stated in the war plan of main-
taining fleet security at bases and guarding against surprise attack by Japan,
and if he did not know what was meant by the phrase “appropriate defensive de-
ployment," he should have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for an explanation.
The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states that Admiral
Kimmel could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger
to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of action
were open to him, viz :
(1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct
long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, and thus made the
Japanese task more difficult, whether or not this would have resulted in the
detection of the approach of the Japanese carriers ; (2) He could have rotated
the “in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, and thus made
it more difficult for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any
vessels in port ; (3) He could have maintained a higher condition of readiness
under which Naval planes wonM have been In the air during the early morn-
ing period, ships’ batteries would have been fully manned, and damage con-
trol organizations fully operational.
[ 21 ] The absence of positive information as to the location of the Jap-
anese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio
79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 25
382 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of
the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take
all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The
measures which reasonably were open to him were :
(a) Establishment of lon£ distance air reconnaissance,, covering the
most probably approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably
permanent basis, with available planes and crews.
(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at
least during the dangerous dawn hours.
(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by
ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.
(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in
port.
(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept pos-
sible attack forces.
(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry
into port at irregular intervals.
(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and
aircraft warning installations.
The evidence indicates clearly, however, that Admiral Kimmel’s most serious
omission was his failure to conduct long range air and/or sea reconnaissance
in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week preceding the attack.
That this is so is manifest from the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt.
The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured
information, after the receipt of the “war warning,” as to the approach of the
attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese
naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu.
During the critical period after November 27th, the limitations of the aircraft
warning service and of radio intelligence were evident; the only remaining
practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was entitled to rely for infor-
mation as to the Japanese naval movements was distant air and/or sea reconnais-
sance which, covering the most probable approach bearings, would have had
a reasonable chance of success. The failure to detect the approach of the Jap-
anese task force contributed more to the success of the Japanese attack than
did any other single factor.
[ 22 ] In addition to the courses of action referred to by the Commander
in Chief, U. S. Fleet,, it was, of course, always open to Admiral Kimmel also
to take steps to increase cooperation between his organization and the Army
command, and to attempt to achieve effective joint command. That conditions
were ideal for his accomplishing such an objective is Indicated by the evidence
in the record and the finding of the Court that the social relationship between
him and General Short was excellent. The need for Admiral King taking such
measures existed from the time he took command of the Pacific Fleet. It in-
creased in urgency as the 7th of December, 1941, approached.
13. The Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the
Naval Court record concludes £hat :
“6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel
were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in
question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising
command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather
than culpable inefficiency.
“7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence
adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation
of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may
not result in future errors.”
The first endorsement of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy states his
conclusion and recommendation that trial by general court martial is not war-
ranted by the evidence produced.
14. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommendation of the
Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General thereto,
and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, thereto;
and the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt, and on the basis of the fore-
going comments, I conclude that ;
(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties ade-
quately.
(b) Then Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Admiral Harold B. Stark,
particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December, 1941, failed
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 383
to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising command
commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties.
(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action should
be taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to active duty in
the future for any position in which the exercise of superior Judgment may
be necessary.
[g$] (d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully
acquainted with the Navy’s investigations into this matter, and public dis-
closure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained
in these investigations, should be made to the extent that such action can
be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.
15. Accordingly, I direct :
(a) Rear Admiral Husband B. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold
any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior
Judgment.
(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position
in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.
(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted with
the Navy’s investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts
concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investi-
gations, will be made to the extent that such action can be taken without
injuring current military operations or the national security.
(Signed) James Fobrestal,
Secretary of the Navy.
SECRET
[I] United States Fleet
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Navy Department
Washington 25, D. C.
[Copy]
3 Dec. 1944.
FF1/A17.
Serial : 003489.
SECRET.
From : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject : Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board — Comments concerning.
1. The following comments on the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
are submitted.
2. The Army findings as to the basic cause of the surprise are not at variance
with the findings of the Navy Court. In brief, they are that no one in authority
appreciated the danger to which Pearl Harbor was exposed and consequently
the Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii were preoccupied with training
activities to the exclusion of adequate alertness against attack.
3. There was general agreement between the Army Board and the Navy Court
in the following particulars as to lack of awareness of danger :
a. It was impossible for United States agents to get information in Japan,
while Japanese agents were given free rein in Hawaii and encountered little
difficulty in transmitting intelligence by cable.
b. The Information that did reach Washington was not correctly evaluated,
and vital parts of it either never were sent to Hawaii or else got there too late.
c. Estimates of Japanese intentions were based predominately on what the
Japanese were likely to do, rather than upon what they could do. All basic plans
contain the assumption that hostilities might be opened by an air attack on Oahu,
but this assumption was generally ignored during the period preceding the attack.
It Is of interest to note in this connection that AA batteries of ships in port were
ready to open fire when the Japanese planes came In. This is evidence ttfiat
Admiral Kimmel was less blind to the potential danger than was the Army
Command. [2] The Army forces had no ammunition at mobile guns and
384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
it was a matter of hoars before it could be distributed from the magazines 10
the anti-aircraft batteries.
d. The Army was in readiness against sabotage. The Navy condition of readi-
ness, though far from fully effective, was designed to meet air attack. In this
connection, the Army Board (Page 229 of the Record) observes that there was
conflict in the nature of the information sent to Hawaii, in that Navy Department
messages were predominate with warning of conflict while War Department mes-
sages were predominate with the idea of avoiding conflict and taking precautions
against sabotage and espionage.
6. The Army air warning system was usable, but was being used for training —
not for warning — when the Jap planes came in.
4. The Army Board finds that General Short established cordial relations
with the Navy, but did not accomplish fully the detailed working relationship
necessary for his full information in the performance of his mission. For ex-
ample, the Board points out that General Short was under the impression that
distant reconnaissance was being adequately provided by naval task forced in
connection with exercises (he apparently knew that no such exercises were in
progress on 7 December), that Admiral Kimmel failed to acquaint him with
certain messages he received from the Navy Department (there is conflict of
testimony as to some of these), that General Short hesitated to inquire as to
the details of naval arrangements, and that he was not informed of the fact
that a Japanese submarine had been attacked off Pearl Harbor in the early
morning of 7 December (the Naval Court explains that Admirals Kimmel and
Bloch withheld report of this attack until the contact could be verified, in view
of many false contacts that had occurred ; the air attack began before verification
was obtained). This finding of the A*my Board is in Conflict with the Navy
finding that relations — official as well as personal — were not only cordial but ade-
quate. I am inclined to agree with the Army Board for reasons discussed in
the next paragraph.
[ 3 ] 5. The Army Board criticises the command arrangements in Hawaii.
There was no unity of command, and no integrated staff to evaluate information
and to attend to the details of coordinating defense measures. Certain joint
plans had been prepared which were sound In concept, but defective in that
neither Service had the means to carry them out. Furthermore, for the most
part, these plans did not become effective until an emergency arose, and the
emergency came too suddenly to permit effective implementation. Unity of
Command could have been put into effect (but was not put into effect before the
7th of December) by the President, or by agreement between the Departments,
or by local arrangement. My comment on this is as follows :
o. Coordination by mutual cooperation, which was the system in effect in
Hawaii until after the attack, is a well recognized system of Command. Person-
ally, I consider it inferior to unity of Command in circumstances such as existed in
Hawaii, but it is a fact that this system has worked effectively elsewhere during
the current war. I think Kimmel and Short were at fault in not making the
system work better than it did.
ft. The lack of coordination in Hawaii was not in itself a disease, but a symptom
of the deeper ill — lack of awareness of danger. As stated by the Army Board,
local Commanders \*/re unwilling to put war measures into effect because they
would interfere with training.
6. The Army Board finds it difficult to understand the relations between the
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier,
the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the local Air Commander
(Rear Admiral Bellinger). The Board makes the comment “The Army had a
difficult time in determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch, or
Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility.” My comment as to
this is that there are some unavoidable complexities in the Command relation-
ships between a fleet, a frontier, and a fleet base in the frontier. [4] How-
ever, In this case, there was no possibility of misunderstanding the fact that all
naval forces were under Admiral Kimmel. He and General Short should have
been able to work out better arrangements for cooperation than they did. The
reasons why they did not have been discussed in paragraphs 4 and 5 above.
7. The Army Board stresses the point that General Short was dependent upon
the U. S. Navy for information as to what the Japanese Navy was doing and \
for estimates of what the Japanese Navy could do. This view is obviously sound.
It was a naval responsibility to keep not only General Short but also the War
Department fully acquainted with the estimate of the Japanese naval situation.
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
385
There was some failure to pass on to General Short and the War Department
information which should have been given to them by the Navy, but the basic
trouble was that the Navy failed to appreciate what the Japanese Navy could,
and did, do.
8v The Army Board reports on three matters which should be further investi-
gated by the Navy. These are :
o. It was stated that the War Department received information from some
naval agency that bn or about 25 November radio intercepts had located a
Japanese task force, including carriers, in the Marshall Islands. About 1
December it was reported that this force assumed radio silence. It is noted in
the Record that this information never got to General Short There is some
reference to this incident in the Record of the Naval Court, but it was not fol-
lowed up, presumably because the officer who was Director of Naval Intelligence
at the time was not called as a witness. The matter is probably not of impor-
tance, since even if there actually was a Japanese force in the Marshalls it
apparently had nothing to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, for
the sake of completing the naval Record, this matter should be pursued further.
b. The Army Board is of the opinion that Japanese midget submarines operated
freely inside of Pearl Harbor for several days prior to the 7th of December, for
the [J] purpose of obtaining information. This opinion is based on the
testimony of an official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who apparently
reached his conclusions by a study of certain captured Japanese charts which
were made available to F. B. I. by Naval Intelligence. So far as is known,
there is no real ground for the supposition that Japanese submarines were able
to roam around Pearl Harbor at will, but since the allegation is made in the
Army Record, it is advisable to clear up any doubt that may exist by further
naval investigation.
c. There is reference to the fact that information was obtained from naval and
F. B. I. espionage over telephones and cables in Hawaii, but no record of what
this information was. This should be cleared up.
9. The Army Board finds that the Chief of Staff of the Army was at fault in
that he failed to keep General Short informed of the International situation and
that he delayed in getting critical information to General Sfyort. In these
respects, the Army Report parallels the Naval Court findings as to the Chief of
Naval Operations. The Army Board further finds that General Marshall was at
fault and that he failed to keep his Deputies informed of what was going on,
so that they could act intelligently In his absence ; in that he did not take action
on General Short’s report on 28 November that he had established “Alert No. 1” ;
and in that he lacked knowledge of conditions of readiness in the Hawaiian
Command.
10. The Army Board finds that General Short was at fault in that he failed to
place his Command in an adequate state of readiness (the information which
he had was inqpmplete and confusing, but it was sufficient to warn him of tense
relations), in that he failed to reach an agreement with local naval officials for
implementing joint Army and Navy plans and agreements for joint action, in
that he failed to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance recon-
naissance being conducted by the Navy, and in that he failed to replace inefficient
staff officers.
11. I find nothing in the Record of the Army Board to cause me to modify
the opinions expressed in my endorsement on the [ff] Record of the Naval
Court of Inquiry, except in relation to the cooperation between Admiral Kimmel
and General Short. In view of the extensive and explicit discussion of this
phase of the matter by the Army Board, I am no longer of the opinion that coop-
eration between these two officers was adequate in all respects. The cordial, but
informal, contact which they maintained evidently was not sufficient to coordi-
nate the means at their disposal to the best advantage. However, as already
pointed out, this fault was part and parcel of the general blindness to Japanese
potentialities in the Central Pacific which was the basic cause of the Pearl Harbor
disaster. The many details discussed by the Army Board and the Naval Court
are useful in showing how this blindness redounded to our disadvantage, but
they do not, in my opinion, prove anything more than that the two naval officers
in the high commands concerned — Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel — failed
to display the superior judgment they should have brought to bear in analysing
and making use of the information that became available to them.
386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
12. 1 recommend that the Secretary of the Navy cause further Investigation to
be made in the matters referred to in paragraph 8 above; namely, the alleged
radio contact with a Japanese force in the Marshall Islands, the alleged presence
of Japanese midget submarines inside Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December, and
the substance of information obtained by naval and F. B. I. telephone and cable
intercepts. I do not think it necessary to reconvene the Court for this purpose.
The proposed investigation could be made by another Court, or by an investigat-
ing officer, for attachment to the Record of the original Court of Inquiry.
13. I find no reason to modify the recommendations I made in my endorsement
on the Record of the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.
/s/ E. J. King.
E. J. Kino.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
387
ENDORSEMENTS BY JAG, COMINCH AND SECNAV TO
ADMIRAL HEWITT’S REPORT
ITOP-SECRET3
United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D. O., IS Aug. 1945.
FF1/A17
Serial : 002008
Top Secret
Third endorsement to Adm. Hewitt’s Report to SecNav dated 12 July 1045.
From : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Report of Further Pearl Harbor Investigation by Admiral H. K.
Hewitt, U. S. Navy.
1. I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge
Advocate General as expressed in the second endorsement In answer to the
specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are
submitted :
(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant trial
by court martial of any person in the Naval Service, in that the evidence will
not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the
Navy.
(b) With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceed-
ings, I am still of the opinion, which I have previously expressed, that Admiral
Stark and Admiral Klmmel, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal
disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in emergency, due to the lack
of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with
their duties.
(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of these
officers to positions in which lack of superior strategic judgment may not result
in future errors. The action has been taken in the case of both Admiral Stark
and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is recommended.
(d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General, I consider it
impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, or either one of them,
to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, nor are court martial
or other proceedings (prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan) advisable
because such proceedings would almost certainly Involve disclosure of informa-
tion which would be detrimental to current military operations and to national
security measures.
2. I concur in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General that the Navy
Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel to trial before a
General Court Martial, should Admiral Kimmel so insist. However, this action
should not be taken until after the completion of hostilities with Japan.
3. I concur in the suggestion of the Judge Advocate that this record be made
available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel ; that Admiral Kimmel be informed
that he is free to make public anything contained in this record aDd prior records
as soon as that may be done without prejudice to security ; that if Admiral Kimmel
insists, a General Court Martial will be convened to try him for alleged offenses
he may have committed on or before December 7, 1941.
4. As to Admiral Hewitt’s deductions from war experience — paragraph 28.
page 180—1 am unable to concur fully with (a) thereof but do concur fully with
(b) thereof. Nor am I able to concur fully in his paragraph 29 (page 180) —
which parallels his paragraph 28 (a) — for the reason that he himself sets forth
in substance at various places in his “findings” and “conclusions”, namely, that
while the system of command was that of mutual cooperation it was, in reality,
incomplete and inadequate implementation of that system which was at fault.
388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
There is the further fact that, given the information which was available
in Washington, it is reasonable to assume that the system of mutual cooperation
would have been fully alerted and made to function effectively.
E. J. Kino.
Otis
Originated by F-00 (Adm. Edwards) 8/10/45.
Rewritten by F-0 (Adm. King) 8/13/45.
10 August 1945.
Top Secret
Second Endorsement .
From : The Judge Advocate General.
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Report of further Pearl Harbor investigation by Admiral H. K. Hewitt,
U. S. Navy.
1. Subject report clarifies obscure points and supplies omissions in the earlier
investigations. It is considered that this and former investigations, taken to-
gether, present as clear a picture of the pertinent facts as will ever be adduced.
With this report, therefore, I believe the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack
should be considered completed.
2. Admiral Hewitt’s report brings out and confirms a distinction which im-
pressed me at the time of studying the earlier investigations, a distinction which
does much to clarify thinking on the question of placing responsibility for the
Pearl Harbor disaster. It appears that there was no lack of appreciation on
the part of any of the responsible officers that war was coming, and coming
quickly, during the critical period immediately proceeding 7 December 1941. The
point on which those officers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment
to be expected from officers occupying their positions, was their failure to appre-
ciate, from the information available to them, that Pearl Harbor was a likely
target for aerial attack and their failure to take the necessary steps to prevent
or minimize such a surprise attack. Each of these officers, in estimating the
critical situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategical planning, in that
he largely ruled out all possible courses of action by which the Japanese might
begin the war except through an attack in the Western Pacific.
3. I do not believe that the lack of more complete understanding and co-oper-
ation between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had any great
effect on the ultimate result ; for it is abundantly shown that they each enter-
tained the same fallacious views, and closer understanding would most likely
merely have strengthened those views. Likewise, I submit that the importance
of Information from Japanese sources has been overemphasized; for had more
basically sound principles been observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would not
have occurred. The security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our Pacific
strategy, a fact which did not receive sufficient consideration in the strategic
concept of responsible officers.
4. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the
following opinions are submitted :
(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b), it is not believed
that there is sufficient evidence to warraht conviction of any of the officers con-
cerned of any offense known to naval law.
(b) Under the facts of this case, there are only two offenses which are worthy
of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty and (2) Culpable Inefficiency in the Per-
formance of Duty. Under either charge it would be necessary to define the duty
of the officer concerned, and to show that it was his duty to follow a course of
action other than the one he did. In my opinion this would be impossible, as the
acts of omission of these officers do not rise above the status of errors of judg-
ment. No clearly defined duty can be established which was neglected or im-
properly performed. As stated by Fleet Admiral King, in his endorsement on
the findings of the Court of Inquiry, the evidence in the case boils down to the
fact that the acts of the officers in question “indicate lack of superior judgment
necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their
assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency”. “Lack of Superior Judg-
ment” is not an offense triable by general court-martial.
(c) ’The charges and specifications for any court-martial proceedings must be
filed not later than a date “six months after the termination of hostilities in the
present war with Japan as proclaimed by the President or as specified in a con-
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
389
current resolution of the two Houses of Congress, whichever is the earlier”.
Public Law 77 — 79th Congress, approved June 7, 1945. There are serious doubts
as to the constitutionality of this and the earlier extensions of the Statute of
Limitations enacted by the Congress since 7 December 1941 and applicable to trials
arising out of the Pearl Harbor disaster as a violation of the Constitutional pro-
hibition against ex post facto laws. Admiral Kimmel has executed a waiver
of the Statute of Limitations for a period of six months past the end of the present
wf^r, and therefore the question of the validity of the Congressional extensions is
not controlling in his case. However, as it has become apparent since the time
that Admiral Kimmel was requested to execute this waiver that other officers
are also blameworthy, it is my opinion that the Navy Department would be
acting in an inequitable manner in instituting any proceedings against Admiral
Kimmel on his waiver, unless Admiral Kimmel himself so requests.
(d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the Navy and
Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to the rank of members of
a general court-martial will make it most difficult to constitute a court for the
trial of the officers here concerned during war time or during a period of six
months after the cessation of hostilities. Many of the officers of appropriate
rank, both on the active and the retired lists, would be disqualified because of
interest in the subject matter, the probability of being called as a witness, or
by virtue of having been connected with one of the investigations into the
mater. If more than one of the officers in question are brought to trial, an
entirely new court would be necessary in each case, as members who had tried
a former case arising out of the Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to
challenge. The Summoning of the necessary witnesses would result in tem-
porarily removing from their duty stations many of the key officers in the
naval organization. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that any
such court martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is
highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that
any such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end of
hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the naval service.
5. Notwithstanding the difficulties pointed out above, I am of the opinion that
the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel tried by
general court-martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist. In August 1943, Secretary
Knox sent Admiral Kimmel a memorandum from which the following is quoted,
”1 feel that it would be to the best interests of ail concerned if you should now
agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial upon my assurance
that the trial will be had at the earliest practicable date.” And in Admiral
Kimmei’s waiver he agreed, “I will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other
person on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by
General Court-Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may
be charged relating to the period on or before December (sic) 7th, 1941, should
my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter.”
6. I suggest that this record be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his
counsel ; that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public
anything contained in this record and prior records as soon as that may be done
without prejudice to the public interests; that if he insists a general court-
martial will be convened to try him for alleged offenses he may have committed
on or before December 7, 1941 ; and that his decision be abided.
T. L. Gatch.
25 July 1945.
First Indorsement.
To : The Judge Advocate General.
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Record of proceedings and Report of further Pearl Harbor investiga-
tion by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN.
1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.
2. The endorsement by the Judge Advocate General will include his opinion
(a) as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant court-martial or other pro-
ceedings, (b) as to the offense or offenses which might be made the subject of
court-martial or other proceedings, assuming the sufficiency of the evidence
concerning such offense or offenses, (c) as to the date prior to which any such
court-martial or other proceeding must be instituted, and (d) as to the prac-
ticability of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termina-
tion of hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the regulations concerning
390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the composition of a court and in view of the necessity of obtaining testimony
from witnesses engaged in operations against the enemy.
3. The endorsement by the Commander-In-Chief, United States Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations will include his opinion (a) as to the sufficiency
of the evidence to warrant court-martial or other proceedings, (b) as to the
practicability of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the ter-
mination of hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the regulations con-
cerning the composition of a court and in view of the necessity of obtaining
testimony from witnesses engaged in operations against the enemy, and (c) as
to the advisability of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the
termination of hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the possibility of
disclosure of information relating to current and prospective military opera-
tons and to national security.
Fobbestai*
12 July 1945.
From : H. Kent Hewitt, Admiral, U. S. Navy.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Report of further investigation into the facts surrounding the Japa-
nese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
Reference :
(a) Report of Commission appointed by the President to investigate and
report the facts relating to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
7 December 1941.
(b) Record of examination of witnesses having knowledge of the facts in
connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, conducted by
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Ret.).
(c) Public Law 339, 78th Congress.
(d) Precept appointing Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, 13 July
1944.
(e) Record of proceedings and, report of Naval Pearl Harbor Court of
Inquiry.
(f) First Endorsement, dated 2 November 1944, by the Judge Advocate
General, and Second Endorsement, dated 8 November 1944, by Com-
mander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, to record
of proceedings of Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.
(g) Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944.
(b) Letter 3 December 1944 from Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations, to the Secretary of the Navy, on report
of Army Pearl Harbor Board.
(i) Precept 2 May 1945 appointing H. Kent Hewitt, Admiral, U. S. Navy, to
conduct further Pearl Harbor investigation.
(j) Memorandum 18 May 1945, concerning the scope of the further investi-
gation and approval thereof by the Secretary of the Navy.
(k) Precept 6 July 1945 amending reference (i).
Enclosure :
(A) Report of further investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
(B) Record of proceedings of this investigation, and exhibits therein.
1. The precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 2 May 1945, reference (i)
as amended by reference (k), directed that Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, make
a study of the previous investigations, that such further investigation as might
appear to be necessary be then conducted, and, that upon completion of the
investigation a report be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy setting forth
the findings and conclusions reached.
Review of the previous investigations disclosed that various matters of im-
portance, principally concerning intelligence, had not been investigated thor-
oughly. The subjects proposed for further investigation were approved by the
Secretary of the Navy on 21 May 1945.
3. Counsel in this investigation was John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting were Lieutenant Commander Benjamin
H. Griswold, III, USNR, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR. The re-
porters were Ship’s Clerk Ben Harold, USNR, and Chief Yeoman Raymond E.
Reese, USNR. These men took a special oath to maintain the security of the
information developed during the investigation.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
391
4. During this proceeding, which commenced 14 May 1945, the testimony of 38
witnesses, some of whom had testified previously, was taken on 26 days, at Wash-
ington, D. C., at San Francisco, and at Pearl Harbor. 81 exhibits were received.
5. Delivered herewith are the report of this further investigation (Enclosure
A), and the record of proceedings and exhibits therein (Enclosure B). In pre-
paring this report, an effort has been made to present, in one document, the essen-
tial facts within the scope of this inquiry which have been developed by this
and preceding investigations.
H. Kent Hewitt.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY 393
REPORT BY ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT ON FURTHER
PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction. Prior Investigations and Scope of this Investigation.
A. The Roberts Commission 1
B. Admiral Hart’s Investigation 4
C. Naval Court of Inquiry 4
D. Army Pearl Harbor Report 11
E. Findings of the Secretary of the Navy and further investigation.. 14
F. Witnesses in this investigation. 15
G. Exhibits received in this investigation 18
Section I. The War and Defense Plans.
A. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five 23
B. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange
14ND-JCD-42 31
C. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan. 34
D. Joint estimate covering Army and Navy air action in the event of
sudden hostile action against Oahu. 35
E. Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 and Naval
Base Defense Air Force Plan 37
F. Pacific Fleet Letter on security of the fleet at base and in operat-
ing areas 39
G. Execution of Plans prior to 7 December 1941 41
H. Admiral Kimmel’s views as to the possibility of a surprise air
attack.. 42
I. Adequacy of forces to carry out tasks assigned 44
J. Command Organization 45
Findings 49
Section II. Japanese Espionage at Hawaii.
Espionage Reports 53
Findings 59
Section III. Naval Intelligence and Events Preliminary to the Attack.
A. The organization of Naval Intelligence in general; sources of infor-
mation, and relations with the Pacific Fleet 60
B. The approach of war; intercepted communications available at
Washington, and messages sent by CNO to Admiral Kimmel.
1. The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and October 16th
dispatch 62
2. Japanese messages concerning German attitude; Nomura’s
desire to resign 63
3. Action taken by Admiral Kimmel 64
4. The first Japanese deadline message; Japanese interest in
American ships 65
5. Arrival of Kurusu; Stark and Marshall recommendations
as to ultimatum 65
6. Further and final Japanese “deadline messages” 66
7. The November 24th dispatch to CincPac and others 67
8. Dispatches concerning reenforcement of Wake and Mid-
way 68
9. Intercepted Japanese communications of November 26th
and 27th 69
10. The State Department note of November 26th and
Japanese reaction thereto; the war warning of Novem-
ber 27th 70
394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Section III. Naval Intelligence — Continued
B. The approach of war — Continued I'w
11. The dispatch of November 28th 73
12. Intercepted diplomatic communications, November 29 to
6 December 1941 74
13. Intercepted Japanese espionage messages between 29
November and 6 December 1941 82
14. Intercepted message advising of fourteen-part reply by
Japanese and first thirteen parts of reply — 6 December
1941 82
15. Communications intercepted on 7 December 1941 83
16. Delivery of part 14 and the 1 p. m. message and action
taken 85
17. Messages sent to Admiral Kimmel between 29 November
and 7 December 1941 87
18. Admiral Kimmers failure to transmit information to
subordinate commanders 87
C. The interception of Japanese telephone and cable messages 88
D. The “winds” code and the alleged “winds” message.
1. Prior investigations 95
2. The basis of the previous findings that there was a “winds”
executive message prior to the attack 97
3. Evidence obtained in this investigation concerning “winds”
message 100
E. Information concerning the organization of the Japanese Navy.
1. ONI report of 25 July 1941 107
2. Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41 107
F. Information concerning the location and movements of Japanese
naval forces.
1. Information available at the time of the war warning 110
2. Admiral Kimmel’s source of information after the war
warning. 111
3. Information received by Admiral Kimmel after the war
warning 112
Findings , 125
Section IV. Reconnaissance.
A. The Responsibility for Long Distance Reconnaissance 134
B. Reconnaissance Conducted from Oahu 135
C. Proposed Army Reconnaissance to Jaluit 136
D. The Direction to Execute an Appropriate Defensive Deployment- 137
E. The Reconnaissance that could have been flown 137
F. The Sectors which would have been covered 139
Findings 140
Section V. The Attack on Pearl Harbor .
A. Japanese submarines on 7 December 1941 143
B. Suspicious submarine contacts prior to 7 December 1941 148
C. Detection of Aircraft by the Army Radar System 149
D. The Air Attack 149
E. Location of Pacific Fleet Units 151
F. Cordition of Readiness 153
G. Reaction to the Attack 153
H. Composition and Movements of the Attacking Force 155
I. The Casualties and Damage 156
Findings 157
Section VI. Findings and Conclusions.
A. Restatement of Findings 159
B. Conclusions 175
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
395
[i] Introduction
PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS AND SCOPE OF THIS INVESTIGATION
A. The Roberts Corrwiission.
Pursuant to Executive Order dated 18 December 1941, a Commis-
sion, headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts, conducted an investiga-
tion into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
The Commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942 and con-
cluded :
I. Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essential to suc-
cess in war and requires: First, the coordination of the foreign and military
policies of the Nation ; and, second, the coordination of the operations of the Army
and Navy.
Z The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War and
Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advis-
ing them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with
Japan.
3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obliga-
tions by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other
and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed
of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications
thereof.
4. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled their obliga-
tions by consulting and cooperating with each other, and with their superiors,
respecting the joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier; and each knew
of, and concurred in, the warnings and orders sent by the other to the responsible
commanders with respect to such defense.
5. The Chief of Staff of the Army fulfilled his command responsibilities by
issuing a direct order in connection with his warning of probable hostilities, in
the following words : “Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to under-
take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.**
6. The Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled his command responsibility by is-
suing a warning and by giving, a direct order to the commander in chief, Pacific
Fleet, in the following words :
“This despatch is to be considered a war warning.*’
and
“Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned.”
[2] 7. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area, in fulfillment
of their obligation to do so, prepared plans which, if adapted to and used for the
existing emergency, would have been adequate.
8. In the circumstances the responsibility of these commanders was to confer
upon the question of putting into effect and adapting their joint defense plans.
9. These commanders failed to confer with respect to the warnings and orders
issued on and after November 27, and to adapt and use existing plans to meet
the emergency.
10. The order for alert No. 1 of the Army command in Hawaii was not adequate
to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages.
II. The state of readiness of the Naval forces on the morning of December
7 was not such as was required to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning
messages.
12. Had orders issued by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations
November 27, 1941, been complied with, the aircraft warning system of the
Army should have been operating; the distant reconnaissance of the Navy,
and the inshore air patrol of the Army, should have been maintained ; the anti-
aircraft batteries of the Army and similar shore batteries of the Navy, as well
as additional antiaircraft artillery located on vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor,
should have been manned and supplied with ammunition; and a high state of
readiness of aircraft should have been in effect. None of these conditions was
in fact inaugurated or maintained for the reason that the responsible com-
manders failed to consult and cooperate as to necessary action based upon the
warnings and to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs
of the Army and Navy commands in Washington.
396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
13. There were deficiencies in personnel, weapons, equipment, and facilities
to majntain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time,
but these deficiencies should not have affected the decision of the responsible
commanders as to the state of readiness to be prescribed.
14. The warning message of December 7, intended to reach both commanders
in the field at about 7 a. m. Hawaiian time, December 7, 1941, was but an
added precaution, in view of the warnings and orders previously issued. If
the message had reached its destination at the time intended, it would still
have been too late to be of substantial use, in view of the fact that the com-
manders had failed to take measures and make dispositions prior to the time
of its anticipated receipt which would have been effective to warn of the
attack or to meet it.
[ 3 ] 15. The failure of the officers in the War Department to observe that
General Short, neither in his reply of November 27 to the Chief of Staff’s message
of that date, nor otherwise, had reported the measures taken by him and the
transmission of two messages concerned chiefly with sabotage which warned
him not to resort to illegal methods against sabotage or espionage, and not to
take measures which would alarm the civil population, and the failure to reply
to his message of November 29 outlining in full all the actions he had taken
against sabotage only, and referring to nothing else, tended to lead General
Short to believe that what he had done met the requirements of the warnings
and orders received by him.
16. The failure of the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the
commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to confer and cooperate with respect to the
meaning of the warnings received and the measures necessary to comply with the
orders given them under date of November 27, 1941, resulted largely from a sense
of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military and naval circles,
and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the
Far East. The existence of such a view, however prevalent, did not relieve
the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the Pacific Fleet and
our most important outpost.
17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action,
transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the
obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative
action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not
to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the
warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence
of hostilities. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform himself
of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry
out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans
then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the
responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander
in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department.
19. Causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were:
Disregard of international law and custom relating to declaration of war by
the Japanese and the adherence by the United States to such laws and customs.
Restrictions which prevented effective counterespionage.
Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive action in
the Far East, and on antisabotage measures.
f '/] Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the
antisabotage measures instituted by the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
partment.
Nonreceipt by the interested parties, prior to the attack, of the warning message
of December 7, 1941.
20. When the attack developed on the morning of December 7, 1941, the officers
and enlisted men of both services were present in sufficient number and were
in fit condition to perform any duty. Except for a negligible number, the use of
intoxicating liquor on the preceding evening did not affect their efficiency.
21. Subordinate commanders executed their superiors’ orders without ques*
tion. They were not responsible for the state of readiness prescribed.
B. Admiral Hart's Investigation.
Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 Febru-
ary 1944, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an
examination of witnesses having knowledge of facts in connection with
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY 397
the Japanese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on
15 June 1944.
C. Naval Court of Inquiry .
Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to pro-
ceed forthwith to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor
catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons
as the facts might justify.
A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN
(Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice
Admiral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Har-
old Beisemeier, USN, as Judge Advocate, was appointed by the Secre-
tary of the Navy on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene
on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose
of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by
Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 Decem-
ber 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its
findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established.
The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any
offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any
person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was
that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recom-
mend specifically what further proceedings should be had. The Court
of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and sub-
mitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944.
[5] The Court of Inquiry concluded:
Based on finding II, the Court is of the opinion that the presence of a large
number of combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December
1941, was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander- in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and
maintenance schedules.
Based on Finding III, the Court is of the opinion that the Constitutional re-
quirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may be
struck until after a hostile attack has been deUvered, prevented the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from taking offensive action as a means of de-
fense in the event of Japanese vessels or planes appearing in the Hawaiian
area, and that it imposed upon him the responsibility of avoiding taking any
action which might be construed as an overt act.
Based on Finding V, the Court is of the opinion that the relations between
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N., and Lieut. General Walter C. Short,
U. S. Army, were friendly, cordial and cooperative, that there was no lack of
interest, no lack of appreciation of responsibility, and no failure to cooperate
on the part of either, and that each was cognizant of the measures being un-
dertaken by the other for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the
degree required by the common interest.
Based on Finding VI. the Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in per-
sonnel and material which existed during 1941. had a direct adverse bearing
upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7
December.
Based on Finding VII, the Court is of the opinion that the superiority of the
Japanese Fleet over the U. S. Pacific Fleet during the year 1941, and the
ability of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial
advantage not attainable by the United States up to 7 December 1941.
Based on Finding VIII, the Court is of the opinion that the defense of the
Pearl Harbor Naval Base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the
Navy was to assist only with the means provided the 14th Naval District, and
that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. The
Court is further of the opinion that the defense should have been such as to
79716 — 40 — Ex. 157 20
398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
function effectively independently of the Fleet, in view of the fundamental re-
quirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured
demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided
for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the
security of the base, or for that of the vessels within its limits.
[tf] Based on Findings IV, VIII and IX, the Court is of the opinion that
the duties of Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. N., in connection with the
defense of Pearl Harbor, were performed satisfactorily.
Based on Finding XI, the Court is of the opinion that the detailed Naval
Participation Air Defense plans drawn up and jointly agreed upon were complete
and sound in concept, but that they contained a basic defect in that naval par-
ticipation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and
being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December these plans
were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there
would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow
limits of time, which was not the case on that morning.
The Court is further of the opinion that it was not possible for the Oommander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to make his Fleet planes permanently available to the
Naval Base Defense Officer in view of the need for their employment with the
Fleet.
Based on Finding X, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel’s action,
taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive
instructions for the security of the Pacific Fleet at sea and in the operating areas,
is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet,
and that the steps taken were adequate and effective.
Based on Finding XI, the Court is of the opinion that, by virtue of the informa-
tion that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which indicated neither the possibility
nor the imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and bearing in mind that he
had no knowledge of the State Department’s note of 26 November, the Navy’s
condition of readiness on the morning of 7 December, 1941, which resulted in the
hostile planes being brought under heavy fire of the ships’ anti-aircraft batteries
as they came within range, was that best suited to the circumstances, although
had all anti-aircraft batteries been manned in advance, the total damage in-
flicted on ships would have been lessened to a minor extent and to a degree
which is problematical ; and that, had the Fleet patrol planes, slow and unsuited
for aerial combat, been in the air, they might have escaped and the number of
these planes lost might thus have been reduced.
The Court is of the opinion, however, that only had it been known In advance
that the attack would take place on 7 December, could there now be any basis
for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects,
and that, beyond the fact that conditions were unsettled and that, therefore,
anything might happen, there was nothing to distinguish one day from another
in so far as expectation of attack is concerned.
[7] It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been
in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned.
The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is questionable when it is
considered that it could not be known when an attack would take place and that,
to make sure, it would have been necessary to Impose a state of tension on the
personnel day after day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules
of ships and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and
7 December.
Based on Finding XII, the Court is of the opinion that, as no information of
any sort was at any time either forwarded or received from any source which
would indicate that Japanese carriers or other Japanese ships were on their way
to Hawaii during November or December, 1941, tlie attack of 7 December at
Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable
and that when it would take place was unpredictable.
Based on Finding XIII, the Court is of the opinion that the action of the
Commander-in-Chlef, Pacific Fleet, in ordering that no routine, long-range recon-
naissance be undertaken was sound and that the use of Fleet patrol planes for
daily, long-range, all-around reconnaissance was not possible with the inadequate
number of Fleet planes available, and was not justified in the absence of any
information indicating that an attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area
within narrow limits of time.
Based on Finding XIV, the Court is of the opinion that the shore-based air
warning hystem, an Army service under the direct control of the Army, was
Ineffective on the morning of 7 December, in that there was no provision for
REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
399
keeping track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing
between those friendly and those hostile and that, because of this deficiency,
a flight of planes which appeared on the radar screen shortly after 0700 was
confused with a flight of Army B-17s en route from California, and that the
information obtained by Army radar was valueless as a warning, because the
planes could not be identified as hostile until the Japanese markings on their
wings came into view.
Based on Finding XV, the Court is of the opinion that by far the greatest
liortion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was
due to specially designed Japanese torpedoes, the development and existence of
which was unknown to the United States.
Based on Finding XVI, and particularly in view of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions’ approval of the precautions taken and the deployments made by Admiral
Kimmel in accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 Oc-
tober 1941, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel’s decision, made
[8] after receiving the dispatch of 24 November, to continue the prepara-
tions of the Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in the light of the information
then available to him.
Based on Finding XVII, the Court is of the opinion that, although the attack
of 7 December came as a surprise, there were good grounds for the belief on
the part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and on the
part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin
in the Far East rather than elsewhere, and that the same considerations which
influenced the sentiment of the authorities in Washington in this respect, sup-
port the interpretation which Admiral Kimmel placed upon the “war warning
message” of 27 November, to the effect that this message directed attention away
from Pearl Harbor rather than toward it.
Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral
Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the
operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him
in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander-In-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important
information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially,
in that, on the morning of 7 December, 1941, he did not transmit immediately
the fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a
break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian
area might be expected soon.
The Court is further of the opinion that, had this important information been
conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action
he would have taken.
Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion that no
offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any
person or persons in the naval service.
[ 9 ] Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, commented in detail
on tne findings of the Court of Inquiry in the Second Endorsement
thereto. He concluded, in part :
Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to
result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a
share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident. That disaster cannot be
regarded as an “act of God,” beyond human power to prevent or mitigate.
It is true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people
were unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until it was too late
to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the
attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for
local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done
by the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark
and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to ex-
amine the possible courses of action they might have taken.
(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was pri-
marUy concerned with its own possession, and the most important United States
possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands.
His attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific
situation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral
Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for
400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
early and accurate information as to the general situation, and that he needed
to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest
and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious
fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his
initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation,
and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture of the
rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark
failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information avail-
able in Washington, particularly in the following respects :
(1) Admiral Kimmel was not Informed of the State Department’s note of 26
November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking
relations.
(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain inter-
cepted Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl Har-
bor, which indicated a Japanese Interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.
(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the ‘‘Winds
message”. Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is
clear that it [10] did reach Admiral Stark’s office. This, together with
the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in
Admiral Stark’s organization.
(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the ”1:00 p. m.
message” received on the morning of 7 December, although the Implications were
appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this message
been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its
significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to
make some last minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the
ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.
(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark
sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense of
intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.
(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to
keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing
tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the “war warning”
message on 27 November, the ‘‘hostile action possible at any moment” message
on 28 November, the 3 December message that Japanese had ordered destruction
of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United
States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages
must be considered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral
Kimmel’8 statement on this phase of the matter must be given due consideration.
After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and
should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the
Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open
to him :
(1) He could have used patrol craft which were available to him to conduct
long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this
would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is
problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.
(2) He could have rotated the ‘‘in port” periods of his vessels in a less
rountine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have
predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the
Japanese task less easy.
[/I] (3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few
hours before the Japanese attack, it Is logical to suppose that naval planes would
have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships* batteries would
have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been
fully operational.
The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were
faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question,
they indicate lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising command com-
mensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable
inefficiency.
D. Army Pearl Harbor Report.
Pursuant to Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, an Army Board
conducted investigation into the Japanese attack, and on 20 October
1944 submitted its report to the Secretary of War. The Army report
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
401
discussed, among other things, various matters involving the Navy,
such as tne Navy’s command relationships at Hawaii, the “tapping”
of the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul in Hawaii by Naval
Intelligence, information secured by Navy radio intelligence as to the
location and movements of Japanese naval forces, the Navy’s responsi-
bility for long range reconnaissance (“The heart of the defense of
Oahu”), and the entrance of Japanese submarines into Pearl Harbor
on and allegedly prior to 7 December 1941. The Army report com-
mented critically as to (a) the Navv’s failure to conduct long range
reconnaissance, (b) the Navy’s failure to advise General Short of
the presence of a Japanese task force in the Jaluits in late November
1941, (c) the Navy’s failure to advise General Short of certain mes-
sages, relating to the destruction of codes by the Japanese during the
first week of December 1941, and (d) the Navy’s failure to advise
General Short of the sinking of a Japanese submarine on the morning
of 7 December 1941, prior to the air attack. The Army report included
a finding that relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel
were not satisfactory, as a practical matter, although cordial. Con-
cerning intelligence generally, the Army report stated, at page 232 :
The Japanese armed forces knew everything about us. We knew little about
them. This was a problem of all our intelligence agencies. This should not
come to pass again. Our intelligence service must be brought in line with the
part which we are to play in world affairs.
We must know as much about other major world powers as they know about
us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligent planning by those
charged with formulating our international policies and providing for our secur-
ity. Our intelligence service should be second to none in its efficiency. It
must not be inferred that this is the exclusive function of the M. I. D. It is
a national problem.
[ 12 ] In the past our Intelligence service has suffered from lack of funds,
lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be taken to
correct all of these.
After consideration of the Army Pearl Harbor Report, Fleet Ad-
miral King, in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 3 December
1944, stated in part :
The Army Board find it difficult to understand the relations between the Com-
mander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, the
Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the local Air Commander
(Rear Admiral Bellinger). The Board makes the comment “The Army had a
difficult time in determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch, or
Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility.” My comment as to
this is that there are some unavoidable complexities in the Command relation-
ships between a fleet, a frontier, and a fleet base in the frontier. However, in this
case, there was no possibility of misunderstanding the fact that all naval forces
were under Admiral Kimmel. He and General Short should have been able to
work out better arrangements for cooperation than they did. The reasons why
they did not have been discussed in paragraphs 4 and 5 above.
The Army Board stresses the point that General Short was dependent upon the
U. S. Navy for information as to what the Japanese Navy was doing and for
estimates of what the Japanese Navy could do. This view is obviously sound.
It was a naval responsibility to keep not only General Short but also the War
Department fully acquainted with the estimate of the Japanese naval situation.
There was some failure to pass on to General Short and the War Department in-
formation which should have been given to them by the Navy, but the basic trouble
was that the Navy failed to appreciate what the Japanese Navy could, and did, do.
The Army Board reports on three matters which should be further
investigated by the Navy. These are :
a. It was stated that the War Department received information from some
paval agency that pa or about 25 November radio intercepts had located a Jap-
402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
anese task force, including carriers, in the Marshall Islands. About 1 December
it was reported that this force assumed radio silence. It is noted in the Record
that this information never got to General Short. There is some reference to
this incident in the Record of the Naval Court, but it was not followed up, pre-
sumably because the officer who was Director of Naval Intelligence at the time
was not called as a witness. The matter is probably not of importance, since
even if there actually was a Japanese force in the Marshalls it apparently had
nothing to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, for the sake of com-
pleting the naval Record, this matter should be pursued further.
[13] b. The Army Board is of the opinion that Japanese midget sub-
marines operated freely inside of Pearl Harbor for several days prior to the
7th of December, for the purpose of obtaining information. This opinion is
based on the testimony of an official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who
apparently reached his conclusions by a study of certain captured Japanese charts
which were made available to F. B. I. by Naval Intelligence. So far as is known,
there is no real ground for the supposition that Japanese submarines were
able to roam around Pearl Harbor at will, but since the allegation is made
in the Army Record, it is advisable to clear up any doubt that may exist by
further naval investigation.
c. There is reference to the fact that information was obtained from naval
and F. B. I. espionage over telephones and cables in Hawaii, but no record of
what this information was. This should be cleared up.
The Army Board finds that the Chief of Staff of the Army was at fault in that
he failed to keep General Short informed of the international situation and that
he delayed in getting critical information to General Short. In these respects,
the Army Report parallels the Naval Court findings as to the Chief of Naval
Operations. The Army Board further finds that General Marshall was at fault
and that he failed to keep his Deputies informed of what was going on, so that
they could act intelligently in his absence; in that he did not take action on
General Short’s report on 28 November that he had established “Alert No. 1“ ;
and in that he lacked knowledge of conditions of readiness in the Hawaiian
Command.
The Army Board finds that General Short was at fault in that he failed to
place his command in an adequate state of readiness (the information which
he had was incomplete and confusing, but it was sufficient to warn him of tense
relations), in that he failed to reach an agreement with local naval officials
for implementing joint Army and Navy plans and agreements for joint action,
in that he failed to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance
reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy, and in that he failed to replace in-
efficient staff officers.
I find nothing in the Record of the Army Board to cause me to modify the
opinions expressed in my endorsement on the Record of the Naval Court of
Inquiry, except in relation to the cooperation between Admiral Kimmel and
General Short. In view of the extensive and explicit discussion of this phase of
the matter by the Army Board, I am no longer of the opinion that cooperation
between these two officers was adequate in all respects. The cordial, but in-
formal, contact which they maintained evidently was not sufficient to coordinate
the means at their disposal to the best advantage. However, as already pointed
out, this fault was part and parcel of the [14 ] general blindness to Jap-
anese potentialities in the Central Pacific which was the basic cause of the
Pearl Harbor disaster. The many details discussed by the Army Board and the
Naval Court are useful in showing how this blindness redounded to our disad-
vantage, but they do not, in my opinion, prove anything more than that the
two naval officers in the high commands concerned — Admiral Stark and Admiral
Kimmel — failed to display the superior judgment they should have brought to
bear in analysing and making use of the information that became available
to them.
I recommend that the Secretary of the Navy cause further investigation to
be made in the matter referred to in paragraph 8 above; namely, the alleged
radio contact with a Japanese force in the Marshall Islands, the alleged
presence of Japanese midget submarines inside Pearl Harbor prior to 7 De-
cember, and the substance of information obtained by naval and F. B. I. tele-
phone and cable intercepts. I do not think it necessary to reconvene the Court
for this purpose. The proposed investigation could be made by another Court,
or by an investigating officer, for attachment to the Record of the original Court
of Inquiry.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
403
E. Findings of the Secretary of the Navy and Further Investigation.
Upon review of the previous investigations, the Secretary of the
Navy found that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain
officers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Wash-
ington. The Secretary further found that the previous investiga-
tions had not exhausted all possible evidence and that the investiga-
tion directed by Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress should be con-
tinued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material
facts should be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted. The
Secretary stated that his decision would be reviewed when the in-
vestigation was finally completed, in the light of the evidence then at
hand.
The precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 2 May 1945, and
amended 6 July 1945, directed that Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN,
make a study of the previous investigations, that such further in-
vestigation as might appear to be necessary be then conducted, and
that upon completion a report be submitted to the Secretary of the
Navy setting forth the findings and conclusions reached.
Review of the previous investigations disclosed that various mat-
ters of importance, principally concerning intelligence, had not been
investigated thoroughly. The subjects proposed for further investi-
gation were approved by the Secretary of tne Navy on 21 May 1945.
Counsel in this investigation was John F. Sonnett, Special Assist-
ant to the Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting were Lieutenant
Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, III, USNR, and Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR. The reporters were Ship’s Clerk Ben
Harold, USNR, and Chief Yeoman Raymond E. Reese, USNR.
These men took a special oath to maintain the security of the infor-
mation developed during the investigation.
[7<5] F. "Witnesses in this Investigation.
At Pearl Harbor in 1941:
Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet.
(R. 182)
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, in charge of Communications
Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District. (R. 43; 541)
Vice Adrimal William W. Smith, USN, Chief of Staff, CincPac.
(R. 335)
Vice Admiral Charles H. McMorris, USN, War Plans Officer, CincPac.
(R. 293)
Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, USN, Assistant Chief of Staff,
Operations, CincPac. (R.163)
Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger, USN, Commander, Hawaiian
Based Patrol Wings, Commander, Patrol Wing Two, Commander,
Task Force Nine, Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor.
(R. 471)
Captain John B. Earle, USN, Chief of Staff, 14th N. D. (R. 451)
Mr. George Street, Manager, RCA, Honolulu. (R. 411)
Rear Admiral Irving H. Mayfield, USN, District Intelligence Officer,
14th N. D. (R. 554)
Captain Thomas H. Dyer, USN, Cryptanalytical and Decrypting,
Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet. (R. 418)
Captain Joseph Finnegan, USN, Translator, Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific
Fleet. (R. 424)
404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Wesley A. Wright, USN, Assistant Communications
Officer, CincPac, on temporary duty with Com 14 Communications
Intelligence Unit. (R. 442)
Lieutenant (jg) Famsley C. Woodward, USN, Cryptanalyst, Com-
munications Intelligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R. 541)
[id] Colonel Alva B. YaswelL USMC, Translator, Communica-
tions Intelligence Unit, 14th N. I). (R. 541)
Captain William W. Outerbridge, USN, Commanding Officer, USS
WARD. (R. 87)
Lieutenant Commander Monroe H. Hubbell, USNR, Commanding
Officer ,USS CONDOR. (R. 428)
Richard W. Humphrey, RM3c, USNR, Bishop’s Point Radio Station.
Lieutenant Oliver H. Underkofler, USNR, Communications Office,
14th N. D. (R. 465)
Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, USNR, District Intelligence Office, 14th
N. D. (R. 376)
Commander Harold S. Burr, USNR, Com 14 Liaison Officer at Gen-
eral Short’s Headquarters. (R. 376)
Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA, Signal Officer, Hawaiian
Department. (R. 387)
At the Philippines in 1941:
Captain Redfield Mason, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet.
R. 68)
Commander Rudolph J. Fabian, USN, Officer in Charge, Radio In-
telligence Unit, Corregidor. (R. 68)
At Washington , D. C. in 1941:
Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, USN, Director of the Office of
Naval Intelligence. (R. 389)
Captain Arthur H. McCollum, USN, In charge of Far Eastern Sec-
tion, Foreign Branch, ONI. (R. 10)
Captain Laurance F. Salford, USN, Communications Security Sec-
tion. (R. 97; R. 529)
Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN, ONI and Communications Security
Section. (R. 128)
Mrs. Dorothy Edgers. Research Analyst, ONI. (R. 511)
[77] Lieutenant Commander Francis M. Brotherhood, USNR,
Communications Security Section. (R. 143)
Lieutenant Frederick L. Freeman, USN, Communications Security
Section. (R. 149)
Lieutenant Commander Allan A. Murray, USNR, Communications
Security Section. (R. 433).
Lieutenant Commander George W. Linn, USNR, Communications Se-
curity Section. (R. 140)
Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, USNR, Communications
Security Section. (R. 148)
Other witnesses:
Captain William H. Smedberg, III, USN, Now Assistant Combat In-
telligence Officer, Staff, Cominch. (R. 4)
Lieutenant Commander Leo Reierstad, USNR, Now in charge of a
translating unit of Op-16-FE. (R. 158)
Lieutenant (jg) Joseph M. Conant, USNR, Translation sub-section
head in Op-16-FE. (R. 158)
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY 405
Commander Walter Karig, USNR, Lieutenant Welboum Kelley,
USNR, Authors of “Battle Report.” (R. 80)
Lieutenant Commander Gilbert E. Boone, USNR Head of Op-20-GL.
R. 554; R. 607)
[75] G. Exhibits Received in this Investigation.
Received in this investigation were the following exhibits:
Num-
ber
1
1A
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0
10
11
12
13
14A
14B
14C
14D
15
16
17
im
18
19
20
21
22
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
30 A
30B
31
31 A
32
m
32A
33
33A
34
35
36
36A
37
Description
Record
Page
Precept convening investigation
Modification of precept, directing report of findings and conclusions
Narrative statement by counsel of previous Navy investigations
CinCPOA Weekly Confidential Intelligence BuUetin of 8 December 1944, relating to the
attacking force
A translation of a captured Japanese submarine chart, showing courses and location of
U. 8. ships in Pearl Harbor
CinCPOA Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 20 October 1944, containing description
of Japanese midget submarines
ONI document “ONI 220- J, Japanese Submarines”
Berthing plan at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941 (Ex. 60 of Naval Court)
Photostatic oopies of Coml4 and Coml6 dispatch estimates of Japanese fleet location and
movements, 28 November 1941
ONI Bulletin of 1 December 1941. Japanese fleet locations
McCollum memorandum estimating situation as of 1 December 1941
“Battle Report”
FCC radio intercepts regarding “winds” code (Ex. 65 of Naval Court)
Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches
} Photostatic copies of captured Japanese submarine chart, showing courses and location of
U. 8. ships in Pearl Harbor
Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches (Ex. 63 of Naval Court)
Copies of dispatches sent from RI unit, Corregidor, regarding Japanese fleet movements. .
Photostat of captured Japanese submarine chart used for Plate V of “Battle Report”
1
575
2
5
8
9
9
9
12
17
21
22
31
56
60
66
75
83
Log of conversation between WARD and CONDOR on the morning of 7 December 1941...
Tentative oopies of Communication Intelligence Summaries, for 1 November*1941 to 6
December 1941, at Pearl Harbor
Message from Tokyo establishing the hidden word code
Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin of 27 November 1941 concerning composition of Japanese
Navy
Daily Communication Intelligence Summaries, 14 October 1941 to 5 December 1941, given
to Fleet Intelligence Officer (Captain Layton) for delivery to Admiral Kimmel
Memorandum of 1 December 1941 from Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral Kimmel, esti-
mating Japanese ship locations
November 24th dispatch from CNO to CincPac (Ex. 15 of Naval Court)
“War Warning” (Ex. 17 of Naval Court)
Layton Intelligence reports from 6 October 1941 to 2 December 1941
Paraphrased copies of dispatches from various intelligence agencies delivered to CincPac..
Memorandum from Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral Kimmel regarding proposed
Army aerial reconnaissance of Mandated Islands
Intercepted Japanese consular dispatches delivered to Fleet Intelligence Officer about
December 10th
Two Japanese panorama views of Pearl Harbor with Japanese log on reverse side, recovered
from submarine (returned to Captain Layton)
Photostat of Japanese log on reverse of exhibit 30
Translations of exhibits 30 and 30A
Panorama sketch of Pearl Harbor from position five miles south of Pearl Harbor, recovered
from submarine (returned to Captain Layton)
Photostats of exhibit 31
Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from Japanese midget submarine (re-
turned to Captain Layton)
91
103
135
185
194
211
238
247
259
264
266
272
279
279
280
280
280
281
Photostat of exhibit 32
Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from Japanese submarine, showing de-
fensive installations (returned to Captain Layton)
Photostatic copy of exhibit 33
Staff Instructions, CincPac. 1941
U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-l, Rainbow Five)
(WPPao-46)
Letter of 9 September 1941 from CNO to CincPac, approving Pacific Fleet Operating
Plan Rinabow Five
Letter of 25 July 1941 from CincPac to CNO, submitting Pacific Fleet Operating Plan
Rainbow Five
Photostatic oopy of schedules setting forth utilization of patrol planes of Pacific Fleet from
17 November to 31 December and approved 22 November 1941
281
290
291
293
295
297
297
368
406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Num-
ber
Description
Record
Page
38
30
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
40
Transcripts of intercepted telephonecalls of Japanese Consul and Vice Consul in Honolulu
from October to 2 December 1041 f (Consul’s marked 38A; Vice CorsuTs marked 38B) . . .
Copy of intercepted “Mori conversation"
ONI Summaries of messages sent by Japanese Consul in Honolulu from 1 December to
6 December 1041
File of work sheets on Jap diplomatic traffic (incorporated in other exhibit)
Paper showing part of decryptioiyjrooess of Japanese "PA" code
Duty Officer, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, information sheets
Extract from signal log of gate vessel of 7 December 1041
Extract from quartermaster’s log of gate vessel of 7 December 1041
Extract from log of Signal Tower, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, of 7 December 1041
Collection of documents, containing Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, to Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
Collection of dispatches regarding submarine contacts at Pearl Harbor in November and
December 1041 • ..
Bellinger "Estimate of Situation"
379
383
385
420
421
430
430
431
432
457
461
474
[*/]
50
50A
51
52
53
54
55
56
56A
57
57A
58
50
60
61
62
63
64
m
Letter from ComTaskFor 0. to CinC, 20 December 1041, on reconnaissance prior to attack. .
Dispatches cited in exhibit 50
ComTaskFor 0 letter of 22 October 1041, file 0026
ComTaskFor 0 letter of 16 January 1041
ComPatWing 2 letter to CNO, of 11 December 1040
Watch and duty schedules of Patrol Wings One and Two prior to attack.
RCA Communications, Inc., statement, listing certain Japanese cable messages from
Honolulu in November and December, 1041
Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, among those listed
in exhibit 55, received by Navy 5 December 1041
Pages 7 to 12 of exhibit 56, containing messages not decrypted until after the attack
Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, among those listed
in exhibit 55, received by Navy after the attack
Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, received by Navy
on night of 7 December and subsequently translated
Collection of dispatches from Naval Communication files relating to Japanese fleet move-
ments and locations during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941
Collection of Japanese plain language news broadcasts
Collection of memoranda relating to messages received at Naval Communications in va-
rious Japanese code systems
Memorandum of Naval Communications, surveying work sheets processed by Navy of
Japanese purple system
Report from DIO, 14th N. D., f to Director of Naval Intelligence, of 19 April 1942, relating
to coded dispatch traffic of Japanese Consul General, Honloulu
Certified collection of documentslrelating to anti-torpedo baffles for protection against
torpedo plane attacks.
Copy of ltr. from Secretary of War to Secretary of Navy, dated',7 February 1941, relating
to air defense at Pearl Harbor
481
482
483
484
488
496
542
544
600
550
601
555
555
556
557
569
602
603
65
66
67
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
CincPac secret letter of 7 August 1941 relating to the organisation of the Orange fleet
Map showing the location of ships present at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941
Telephone log of radio unit at Pearl Harbor, showing calls made and received on 7 De-
cember 1941 as to Jap fleet locations
Photostatic copies of memoranda relating to questioning of captain of Japanese captured
submarine -
Pacific Fleet Weekly Intelligence Bulletin for 11 June 1945, containing description of
midget submarines and method of transport to Pearl Harbor
Selected collection of Pearl Harbor dispatches, miscellaneous subjects, taken from CincPac
Headquarters
Collection of dispatches relating to proposed Army reconnaissance in November of 1941..
Collection of dispatches of December 7 and 8, 1941, from CinPcac
CincPac secret letter of 12 December 1941 reporting damage to ships at Pearl Harbor as
result of attack and other details.
Photostatic copy of War Diary of Com 14 from 7 December 1941 to 1 January 1942 _
War Diary of U8S WARD; War Diary of O-in-C, Net and Boom Defenses, 14th N. D.;
War Diary of USS CONDOR; excerpts from diary of O-in-C, Net and Boom Defenses,
14th N. D., WARD, and CONDOR
Photostatic copy of 1st and 2nd endorsements on Com 14 letter of 30 December 1941 re-
lating to early morning submarine contact on 7 December 1941
Collection of correspondence relating to combined operating center for Army and Navy...
Typewritten translation and copy of intercepted Japanese communication contained in
exhibit 20, and notes relating thereto
Photostatic copy of page 44 of volume containing translations of files of operations orders,
orders, memos, and serials dealing with Japanese Navy plans, recovered from Jap CA
NACHI
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theatre
Collection of photostatic copies of ONI memoranda dealing with organization and loca-
tions of Jap fiee^ as estimated during November and up to December 1, 1941
601
603
603
604
604
604
604
605
605
605
605
606
606
611
613
613
613
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
407
[23] I
The War and Deeense Plans
A. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five .
On 26 July 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five
(Exhibit 35) was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel.
This plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rain-
bow Five) in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were
concerned. It was approved 9 September 1941 by the Chief of Naval
Operations (Exhibit 36). The plan provided in part:
Introduction
CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION
0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually
mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl
Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet
can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobiliza-
tion. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on
which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated
throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will
he designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.
CHAPTER IX. ASSUMPTIONS
1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are :
a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the
British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Govern-
ments in Exile, China, and the ‘Free French’ are at war against the .Axis powers,
comprising either:
1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.
NOTE: As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and
the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the AlxIs
but not necessarily against Japan. . . .
[2J] CHAPTER m. INFORMATION
1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as foUows :
Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis
Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their
forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter
the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United
States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East
but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best
calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense
of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The
United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean
areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release he necesasry
forces for the Far East.
CHAPTER HI. INFORMATION
Section 3 . Estimate of Enemy Action
1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific wiU be
limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional
pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.
1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows :
a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia
( including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American
and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean,
and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.
408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.
d. The principal defensive efforts to be :
1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.
2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central
and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.
[25] 3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.
1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan’s initial action
will be toward:
a. Capture of Guam.
b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters,
and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of ad-
vanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval
forces In*these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas
area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light
naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval
forces.
f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying
United States positions.
1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows :
a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong
concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines,
and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position
(possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the
Mandates.
c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main
base in Halmahera).
d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces
in that area.
e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the
Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported
there.
f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and sub-
marines in the Hawaiian area.
[26] Part II. Outline of Tasks
CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN — MISSION
2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks
within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet :
a. SUPPORT THE FORCES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE
FAR EAST BY DIVERTING ENEMY STRENGTH AWAY FROM THE MALAY
BARRIER, THROUGH THE DENIAL AND CAPTURE OF POSITIONS IN
THE MARSHALLS, AND THROUGH RAIDS ON ENEMY SEA COMMUNICA-
TIONS AND POSITIONS ;
b. PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE
CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLAND AREA, AND TO ESTABLISH AN
ADVANCED FLEET BASE IN TRUK ;
c. DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DE-
STROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE
ENEMY;
d. SUPPORT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE
EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 155° EAST ;
e. DEFEND SAMOA IN CATEGORY “D” ;
f. DEFEND GUAM IN CATEGORY “F” ;
g. PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING AS REQUIRED
BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES ;
h. PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE
PACIFIC AREA AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY
POWER INTO THE EASTERN HEMISPHERE BY DESTROYING HOSTILE
EXPEDITIONS AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENY-
ING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
409
CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS
2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are
based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulat-
ing tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption al and
divides the. tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows :
[27] a. PHASE I. — Initial tasks — Japan not in the war.
b. PHASE IA. — Initial tasks — Japan in the war.
c. PHASE II, etc. — Succeeding tasks.
2202. Phase I tasks are as follows :
a. COMPLETE MOBILIZATION AND PREPARE FOR DISTANT OPERA-
TIONS; THEREAFTER MAINTAIN ALL TYPES IN CONSTANT READINESS
FOR DISTANT SERVICE.
b. MAINTAIN FLEET SECURITY AT BASES AND ANCHORAGES AND
AT SEA.
c. TRANSFER THE ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT, IF ORDERED.
d. TRANSFER THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, IF ORDERED.
e. ASSIGN TWELVE PATROL PLANES AND TWO SMALL TENDERS TO
PACIFIC SOUTHERN AND A SIMILAR FORCE TO PACIFIC NORTHERN
NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, ON M-DAY.
f. ASSIGN TWO SUBMARINES AND ONE SUBMARINE RESCUE VESSEL
TO PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER ON M-DAY.
g. PROTECT THE COMMUNICATIONS AND TERRITORY OF THE ASSO-
CIATED POWERS AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY
POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE BY PATROLLING WITH
LIGHT FORCES AND PATROL PLANES, AND BY THE ACTION OF STRIK-
ING GROUPS AS NECESSARY. IN SO DOING SUPPORT THE BRITISH
NAVAL FORCES SOUTH OF THE EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE
155° EAST.
h. ESTABLISH DEFENSIVE SUBMARINE PATROIiS AT WAKE AND
MIDWAY.
i. OBSERVE, WITH SUBMARINES OUTSIDE THE THREE MILE LIMIT,
THE POSSIBLE RAIDER BASES IN THE JAPANESE MANDATES, IF AU-
THORIZED AT THE TIME BY THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.
J. PROSECUTE THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEFENSE OF SUBSIDIARY
BASES AT MIDWAY, JOHNSTON, PALMYRA, SAMOA, GUAM AND WAKE,
AND AT CANTON IF AUTHORIZED.
k. CONTINUE TRAINING OPERATIONS AS PRACTICABLE.
l. MOVE THE MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE PORTION OF SECOND MARINE
DIVISION TO HAWAII FOR TRAINING IN LANDING OPERATIONS.
m. GUARD AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK BY JAPAN.
[ 28 ] Phase IA
2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows :
a. CONTINUE TASKS OUTLINED IN 2202 a,b,g,h, and k.
b. ACCOMPLISH SUCH OF THE TASKS IN 2202 e,d,e,f, and j AS HAVE
NOT BEEN COMPLETED.
c. MAKE AN INITIAL SWEEP FOR JAPANESE MERCHANTMEN AND
ENEMY RAIDERS AND TENDERS IN THE NORTHERN PACIFIC.
d. CONTINUE THE PROTECTION OF THE TERRITORY AND COM-
MUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS, AND OF THE NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, CHIEFLY BY COVERING OPERATIONS.
e. 1. MAKE RECONNAISSANCE AND RAID IN FORCE ON THE MAR-
SHALL ISLANDS.
2. IF AVAILABLE CRUISERS AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT,
MAKE CRUISER RAIDS AGAINST JAPANESE SHIPPING IN WATERS
BETWEEN NANSEI SHOTO AND NANPO SHOTO.
f. ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE SUBMARINE
PATROLS AGAINST JAPANESE FORCES AND COMMUNICATIONS NEAR
THE JAPANESE HOMELAND.
g. MAINTAIN AIR PATROLS AGAINST ENEMY FORCES IN THE AP-
PROACHES TO OAHU AND OUTLYING BASES.
h. ESCORT IMPORTANT SHIPPING, INCLUDING TROOP MOVEMENTS,
BETWEEN THE HAWAIIAN AREA AND THE WEST COAST.
i. ROUTE SHIPPING IN THE FLEET CONTROL ZONE WHEN ESTAB-
LISHED.
410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
j. AUGMENT THE LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES OF THE HAWAIIAN
NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AS NECESSARY.
k. MOVE FROM SAN DIEGO TO HAWAII THE REMAINING UNITS AND
EQUIPMENT OF THE SECOND MARINE DIVISION.
l. PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE
MARSHALL ISLAND AREA.
Part III. Task Assignment
CHAPTER I. PHASE I
Section J,. TASK FORCE NINE ( PATROL PLANE FORCE )
3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following para-
graphs of this section.
[29] 3142. ON W-DAY TRANSFER TWELVE PATROL PLANES AND
TWO TENDERS TO EACH OF THE PACIFIC SOUTHERN AND PACIFIC
NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS. CONTINUE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF THESE FORCES AND ROTATE DETAIL AT DISCRETION.
3143. PERFORM TASKS ASSIGNED IN THE PATROL AND SWEEPING
PLAN (ANNEX I)
“Part V. Special Provisions
CHAPTER IV. TENATTVE OPERATION PLANS
PHASES I AND IA
Section I. Phase I
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
• Place
Date
Operation Plan
No. 1-R5.” ....
1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III
of Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five.
2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea com-
munications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces
south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing train-
ing and guarding against attack by Japan
Annex I
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date
Patrol and Sweeping Plan ” ....
1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III
of this Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five. Latest Information of enemy disposi-
tions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished
by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.
[SO] 2. Phase I
This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communica-
tions of the Associated Powers by :
(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawai-
ian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific
westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit
(c) Covering.
(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
(e) Routing shipping. . . .
3. (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and
for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against
enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
411
(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At
discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of
Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities
thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.
(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three , to transfer one
patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South
Pacific.
(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.
(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.
(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval
Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.
[Jl] (7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged
in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.
(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Mar-
shall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1). . . .
B. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater , Orange
14ND-JCD-42.
The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Fron-
tier, Hawaiian Department and FOURTEENTH Naval District
(14ND-JCD-42), was signed and placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by
the Comanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Com-
mandant, fOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit 80). The plan
was based on the joint Army and Navy basic war plans, and was to
constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects,
joint operating {)lans, and mobilization plans would be based. The
methoa of coordination under the plan was by mutual cooperation
which was to apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy
would operate in coordination until and if the method of unity of
command were invoked. The tasks assigned were as follows :
14. TASKS.
a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control
and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces,
and against hostUe sympathizers; to support the naval forces.
c. NAVY ASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping
therein ; to support the Army forces.
The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone was defined as “The Hawaiian
Naval Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Coastal
Frontier” (Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were re-
quired for the defense of Oahu) .
The plan provided that the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
partment, and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District,
should provide for the following :
17. ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall
provide for :
a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with par-
ticular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces
present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHO-
FIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing im-
portance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.
[$2] b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.
e. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands con-
sistent with available forces.
d. Defense of Installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the
civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage,
except within naval establishments.
e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within
naval shore establishments.
412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU
D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18. a.), and
an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning
service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea
conducted within range of Army bombers.
h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor con-
trol post provided for in paragraph 18. e.
i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordi-
nated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed
joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile
intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be
governed by “Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940.”
j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather,
evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of
activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship
over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army
and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.
n. Supply of all Array and civil pdpulation in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
[ 33] o. Hospitalization of all Array and civil population in the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
р. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of
supplies for the civil population.
18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall pro-
vide for:
a. An inshore patrol.
b. An offshore patrol.
с. An escort force.
d. An attack force.
e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL
and HONOLULU HARBORS.
f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and
HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and
installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)
g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine
mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary
and practicable.
h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.
i. Distant reconnaissance.
j. Attacking enemy naval forces.
k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval
shore establishments.
l. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 t, a local
communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intel-
ligence.
m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship
over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army
and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.
n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for
the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.
o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.
[34 ] p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities
pertaining thereto.
C. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan.
Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan,
Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated 28
March 1941, and approved by Admiral Bloch and General Short
2 April 1941, (Exhibit 47), dealt with joint security measures and
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
413
protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base. It stated that in
order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the
Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile
raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before
a general mobilization for war, there were adopted the following
agreements:
Paragraph II, in respect of joint air operations, provided that
when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that
the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to
warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary
steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other
commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as cir-
cumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be con-
ducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks
upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical com-
mand of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the
immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical com-
mand of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long
distance patrol and search operations, and Anny aircraft were made
available, these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the
naval commander directing the search operations.
Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among
other things, that all information of the presence or movements of
hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu secured through Navy channels
would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army
Provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade arid the Aircraft Warning Serv-
ice Information Center; that subsequently, when the Army air-
craft warning service was established, provision would be made for
transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and
friendly aircraft, and special wire or radio circuits would be made
available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make
their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to
their respective organizations.
Paragraph IV related to joint anti-aircraft measures, the arrival
and departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, Marine Corps
anti-aircraft artillery, and Army Aircraft Warning Service. It
provided that the letter service was to be expedited in its installa-
tion and operation by the Army and, “during the period prior to the
completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar
and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of
hostile attacks as may be practicable.
[55] D. Joint Estimate Covering Army and Navy Air Action in
the Event of Sudden Hostile Action Against Oahu .
On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, Commander Naval Base
Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wi^g Two), and Major Gen-
eral 'F. L. Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint
estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sud-
den hostile action against Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area
(Exhibit 49).
Paragraph I of the estimate included a “Summary of the Situa-
tion,” which indicated that relations between the United States and
Orange were strained, uncertain, and varying; that in the past Orange
had never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war; that a suc-
79716 — 40 — Ex. 167 27
414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cessf ul sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu
might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western
Pacific for a long period ; that a strong part of our fleet was con-
stantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offen-
sive action : and, that it appeared possible that Orange submarines
and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters
with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service.
Paragraph II of the estimate embraced a “Survey of Opposing
Strengths, indicating, among other things, that Orange might send
into the Hawaiian area one or more submarines and one or more fast
raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers ; that
the most difficult situation to meet would be when several of the above
elements were present and closely coordinating their actions; and that
the aircraft available in Hawaii* were inadequate to maintain for any
extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to in-
sure that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over
Oahu as a complete surprise.
Paragraph III of the estimate dealt with “Possible Enemy Action.”
It stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise
submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on
Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combina-
tion of these two; that it appeared the most likely and dangerous form
of attack on Oahu would be an air attack, most likely launched from
one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300
miles. It was further pointed out that a single attack might or might
not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waitmg
to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the or-
iginal thrust; that: “(d) any single submarine attack might indicate
the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably
composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier;” and that in a dawn
air attack there was a high possibility that it could be delivered as a
complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using.
Paragraph IV of the estimate considered “Action Open to Us.” It
was stated that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as
possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively
. maintained with present personnel and material for a very short pe-
riod, and, as a practicable measure, could not therefore be undertaken
unless other intelligence [5d] indicated that a surface raid was
probable within rather narrow limits of time. Reference was made
to other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships
in the operating area or on the islands, and pointed out that none of
the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our .forces until
an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred.
Paragraph V contained “Decisions.” The primary decision was
that the Naval Base Defense Air Force would locate and attack
forces initiating hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in order to
prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack, and
to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory
measures. A number of subsidiary decisions were made, including
decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air
combat group, the assignment of missions to the groups, and defini-
tions of conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to
be under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force— Commander
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
415
Patrol Wing Two, and, in accordance with current conditions of read-
iness, included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment and recon-
naissance squadrons. .
[ 37 ] E. Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. l-AL, and
Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan.
Admiral Block, as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued his Operation
Plan No. 1-41, on February 27, 1941 (Exhibit 53 of the Naval Court).
The Task Organization prescribed was: (a) Destroyer Patrol (Com-
mander Inshore Patrol) consisting of two destroyers, a boom patrol, a
harbor patrol, and A/B boom and minesweepers, (b) Base Defense Air
Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two) in conjunction with the Army,
(c) Antiaircraft Defense (District Marine Officer) in conjunction with
the Army, (d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations Officer) in
conjunction with the Army. This plan directed attention, among other
things, to the Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, and
stated :
By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be
established as necessary for the joint protection of Pearl Harbor Base in order
to safeguard the Fleet.
In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval
Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) wiU arrange to
coordinate joint effort ; to set conditions of readiness ; to hold required drills ; to
make “alarm” and “all clear” signals.
Assumptions.
(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing condi-
tions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided na-
tionals of such powers may attempt:
(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.
(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction
in the channel.
(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.
(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by :
(1) A surprise, submarine attack on ships in base area — probable.
(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR— possible.
(3) A combination of these two — possible.
Annexed to Operation Plan 1-41 were : A detailed Inshore Patrol
Plan, called Annex “A a detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan,
called Annex “Baker;” a detailed Anti-aircraft Defense Plan, called
Annex “C;” a detailed Harbor Control Post Plan, called “D;” and a
detailed Communications Plan, known as Annex “Easy.”
Annex “Baker,” the detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan,
dated 9 April 1941, was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved
by Admiral Block. It divided the Task Organization into (a) Search
and Attack Group, consisting of patrol squadrons and other planes,
including Armv reconnaissance squadrons, and (b) an air combat
group. This plan was made in accordance with the Joint Estimate,
dated 31 March 1941, which is digested above. The Naval Base De-
fense Air Force was, according to this plan, to [38'] locate and
destroy hostile forces raiding against Oahu or Fleet units in the operat-
ing areas. The plan was effective upon receipt and became operative
without signal in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be
made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness,
E rescribed in Addendum Two to this plan, would be taken as directed
y the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units,
and by the Naval Base Defense Officer ( ComFOURTEEN ) for Navy
416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
units. The condition of material readines was to be signified by a
letter, such as “E,” signifying that all aircraft were conducting routine
operations and none were ready for the purpose of this plan, and the
condition of operational readiness by a number, such as “5,” signifying
that all types of available planes would be ready in four hours. It was
also required that a dispatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day, be
made by each unit assigned by this plan to a task group, stating the
number of planes and readiness.
[< 39 ] F. Pacific Fleet Letter on Security of the Fleet at Base and
in Operating Areas .
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No: 2CL-41, from the Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security
of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued in February,
1941 and reissued in revised form on 14 October 1941.
This order provided that the Security of the Fleet was predicated on
two assumptions :
(a) That no responsible foreign power would provoke war under
present existing conditions by attach on the Fleet or base, but that
irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers might attempt
(1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft,
(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction
in the channel,
(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl
Harbor*
(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise
attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack: on
ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.
Security measures were prescribed covering :
A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.
By Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and
an air patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to
10 miles from the entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours
prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or Task Force, (c) one destroyer
(READY DUTY) for screening heavy ships, other than during a
Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour’s notice. The
air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas, as directed
by Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, an air patrol to cover entry
or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force, an air patrol during entry or de-
parture of a heavy ship at other times. There also was to be a daily
sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.
C. Sortie and entry.
D. Operating areas.
E. Ships at sea.
F. Ships in port.
The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G),
described the principal Army anti-aircraft gun defenses of Pearl
Harbor and directed that Marine defense battalions would assist the
Army in manning them; and provided that in the event of a hostile
air attack, any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all fleet aviation shore
based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; it prescribed air
defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor. It further pro-
vided that the senior officer embarked, exclusively of CincPac, should
insure berthing so as to develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire;
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
417
and that ComFOUIlTEEN, as Naval [40] Base Defense
Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over
the defense against air attack, and take other action, including super-
visory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging through the
Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air
effort between the Army ana the Navy, and coordinate Fleet antiair-
craft fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Em-
barked (exclusive of CincPac) of the condition of readiness to main-
tain, ana by holding drills, etc.
Threee conditions of ilaval base defense readiness were prescribed.
Condition III read as follows :
Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship
in each sector manned and i^ady. (Minimum of four guns required for each
sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.
The procedure to be followed by the task forces in the event of an
air attack was also se forth : the Senior Officer embarked was to execute
an emergency sortie order, sending destroyers out andpreparing a car-
rier and neavy ships and submarines for sorties ; the Task Force Com-
mander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc. ; and the Naval Base
Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an attack was in
progress or imminent, inform the Task Force Commander at sea of
the attack and type of attacking aircraft, launch air search for enemy
ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.
The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area
was set forth. It was provided that the ship attacked was, among other
things, to originate a plain language dispatch containing the essential
details ; various actions were to be taken by other ships ; and the Patrol
Wings were to assume readiness for search and for offensive action,
to carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander, and to pre-
pare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from the scene of
attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight
period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes
over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which
case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would
have priority. It was further provided that “It must be remembered
that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more sub-
marines waiting to attack,” and “(3) it must be remembered too, that
a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable
surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a car-
rier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task
groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in
order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located
by air search or other means.”
m g. Execution of Plans Prior to 7 December 1941.
(1) The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow 5 provided that
the day of execution of the plan was to be designated as W-Day, and
that the day upon which hostilities opened with Japan would be J-Day,
which might or might not coincide with W-Day. Prior to the attack
on Pearl Harbor, W-Day had not been designated.
(2) The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan had been signed and
placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawai-
ian Department, and by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
4 It will be recalled that under this plan the method of coordination of
418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Army and Navy effort was “by mutual cooperation” and not “unity
of command.” It will be recalled further that under this plan the
Army task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air
forces, and against hostile sympathizers; and to support the Naval
forces; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone and
control and protect shipping therein ; and to support the Army forces;
and, that the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance.
(3) Annex VII, Section 6 of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, which provided for joint defensive measures for defense against
hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war
(including joint air operations and for the use of Army aircraft by
the Navy for long distance patrol when Navy forces were insufficient),
was to become effective when the Commanding General and Com-
FOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was
sufficiently imminent to warrant such action. No such agreement was
made prior to the attack on December 7th.
(4) The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, which provided
for an Inshore Patrol consisting of two destroyers, a boom patrol, a
harbor patrol ? and an A/B boom and minesweepers, a Base defense
air force, anti-aircraft defense, and a harbor control post, although
effective as to the inshore patrol was not in operation as to the base
defense air force.
(5) The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, dated 9 April 1941,
which was an annex to the Naval Base Defense Force Plan and which
had been made in accordance with the joint estimate of Bellinger
and Martin, dated 31 March 1941, was effective upon receipt. It was
to become operative without a signal in the event of a surprise attack
on Oahu and it might have been made operative by dispatch. It was
not made operative until the attack on 7 December 1941.
(6) The Pacific Fleet Letter on security of the Fleet at base and in
operating areas, which recognized the possibility of a surprise attack
on ships in Pearl Harbor and which set forth security measures
including patrols to be conducted both by destroyers and by aircraft,
was in effect during 1941, and in revised fonn after 14 October 1941.
[4£] H. Admiral KvmmeVs Views as to the Possibility of a Swrprixe
Air Attack.
It appears from the War and Defense Plans, above summarized,
that it was believed that prior to a declaration of war there might be
a surprise attack by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor or a sur-
prise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas. The possi-
bility of a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor had been ex-
pressed as early as 24 January 1941 by the Secretary of the Navy, in
a letter to the Secretary of War (Exhibit 64), a copy of which was
received by Admiral Rimmel shortly after he assumed command of
the Pacific Fleet. In that letter, the Secretary of the Navy wrote :
If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities
would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at
Pearl Harbor . . . The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and
probabilities are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo
plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombard-
ment by gunfire.
In his testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kim-
mel indicated some confusion as to his agreement with and his evalua-
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY 419
tion of the above letter by the Secretary of the Navy. He testified
that he had felt that the most probable form of attack on Pearl Har-
bor was by submarine, and that a bombing attack was the second most,
probable, but that he nad been of the view that there was no danger of
an air torpedo attack because the water was too shallow. He then
corrected his testimony, characterizing his previous testimony as er-
roneous, and stated that he had regarded an air attack as no more
than a possibility.
It appears clearly that Admiral Kimmel at all times during his
command of the Pacific Fleet was of the view that a surprise air
attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility. Thus, in a letter by Admiral
Richardson, prepared in collaboration with Admiral Kimmel, on 25
January 1941 (Exhibit 70, Naval Court), it was stated in part that
the security of the Pacific Fleet would be predicated on certain as-
sumptions, including an assumption that Japan might attack without
warning and the further assumption that Japanese attacks might be
expected against dripping, outlying position, or naval units, and that
surprise raids on Pearl Harbor were possible. Again, in a letter of
18 February 1941, concemingthe adequacy of local defense (Exhibit
30, Naval Court), Admiral Kimmel stated, “I feel that a surprise
attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possi-
bility.” And, as previously pointed out, the Fleet Security Letter,
reissued on 14 October 1941, predicated the security of the Fleet on
two assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might
be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor. This,
Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court, referred to a sur-
prise air attack.
In connection with Admiral Kimmel’s statement before the Naval
Court of Inquiry that he thought there was no danger of an air
( 4 ^] torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor because the water was too
shallow, several letters from the Chief of Naval Operations should
be noted *
On 15 February 1941 (Exhibit 49, Naval Court) , the Chief of Naval
Operations wrote to CincPac regaraing anti-torpedo baffles for protec-
tion against attacks on Pearl Harbor. This stated that the shallow
depth of water limited the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor
ana the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limited
the practicability of the present type of baffles. The letter indicated
that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet might be assumed necessary
successfuly to drop torpedoes from planes and that the desirable
height for dropping is 60 feet or less. There were various other
considerations stated. The recommendations and comments of the
Commander-in-Chief were especially desired. A similar letter was
sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of various
Naval Districts, including the Fourteenth, on 17 February 1941
(Exhibit 54, Naval Court).
The reply to the request for recommendations and comments was
made on 20 March 1941, in a letter by Admiral Bloch, stating that the
depth of water at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet, and for that and other
reasons, he did not recommend anti-torpedo baffles. CincPac agreed,
until such time as' a light efficient net were developed.
In June 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent another letter to
the Commandants of Naval Districts, copy to CincPac and others,
420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
referring to recent developments, and to experience at Taranto, which
stated that no minimum depth of water could be assumed safe as
regards torpedo attack if there were sufficient water arouftd a ship to
E ermit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo,
ut that such an attack in 10 fathoms or more was more likely than
in shallow water (Exhibit 55, Naval Court). The torpedoes at
Taranto, it was said, were launched in thirteen to fifteen fathoms
although some may have been in eleven.
Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspondence he based his
opinion that there was no chance of an air torpedo attack on Pearl
Harbor — and that even after the June letter, he did not think that
torpedoes would run in such shallow water. He pointed out that the
Navy made no effort to place such nets in Pearl Harbor. He later
stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo attack would be made
because he did not think such torpedoes would run in Pearl Harbor
and did not give this a great deal of consideration for that reason.
[44] I. Adequacy of Forces to Carry Out Tasks Assigned .
The adequacy of forces assigned to the Pacific Fleet for carrying
out the tasks assigned in the war plans was the subject of testimony
before both Admiral Hart and the Naval Court of Inquiry. From
the testimony it appears that although there were shortages con-
cerning which Admiral Kimmel had extensive correspondence with
the Chief of Naval Operations, there was general agreement by the
witnesses to the effect that the Fleet was considered adequate to
carry out the initial tasks assigned in the war plans. The initial
tasks, it will be recalled, were primarily defensive in nature. As
will appear subsequently in this report, the number of fleet patrol
planes in the Hawaiian area was not sufficient to enable a 360 degree
reconnaissance to be flown daily from Oahu for more than a few
days, but was sufficient for air reconnaissance of the more dangerous
sectors to have been flown for at least several weeks. To this extent,
therefore, the patrol planes assigned to the Pacific Fleet were a
limiting factor as to the Fleet’s ability to carry out one of the
initial tasks assigned in the war plans, namely, to “maintain air
patrols against enemy forces in the approaches oi Oahu . . .”
The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan stated that the Navy,
through ComFOURTEEN, would provide for distant reconnaissance
from Oahu. Admiral Bloch had no air forces assigned to him and
had to rely upon the Fleet planes, which were under the control of
Admiral Kimmel, for the accomplishment of this task. Thus naval
patrol planes could be and were used for long distance reconnaissance
from Oahu only when they were made available by Admiral Kimmel
for that purpose.
[45] J. Command Organization.
(1) Methods of Coordination Between Army and Navy Commands .
According to “Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935,” (Exhibit
6, Naval Court), the operations of Army and Navy forces were to be
coordinated by one of two methods :
(a) Mutual cooperation, or,
(b) The exercise of unity of command.
(2) Coordination Between Army and Navy Commands in Hawaii .
The command organization in the Hawaiian area was designed to
function through “mutual cooperation” between the Army and Navy.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
421
This was the normal method of coordination according to Joint Ac-
tion of the Army and the Navy (Exhibit 6, page 5) , and applied to the
defense of Pearl Harbor as well as the entire Hawaiian area.
(3) Desirability of Unity of Command . — (a) Unity of Command
for Hawaii considered in Washington . Admiral Stark testified be-
fore the Na # val Court that, prior to 7 December 1941, he had given much
thought to* the question oi unity of command in Hawaii but that no
satisfactory solution or decision had been reached as far as the Navy
Department was concerned. It had been the topic of many conversa-
tions with the Chief of Staff of the Army, but it was anticipated only
for amphibious operation (page 29, Naval Court) . He and the Chief
of Staff of the Army could have placed unity of command into effect
at Hawaii, subject to the approval of the Secretaries of War and of
the Navy (page 39, Naval Court). However, “Joint Action of the
Army and Navy” (Exhibit 6, Naval Court) does not indicate that the
approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy would
have been required.
(b) Unity of Command for Hawaii considered at Pearl Harbor .
Admiral Stark testified that Admiral Kimmel, as Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in mutual agreement with the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, could have placed unity of command
in effect in Oahu ( Naval Court, page 39 ; Exhibit 6, page 5 ) . Admiral
Kimmel testified (Roberts Commission, page 538; Naval Court, page
296) that he had never had any discussion with the Commanding Gen-
eral of the Hawaiian Department on the desirability of putting unity
of command into effect in the Hawaiian area, but did state that where
command is vested in one agency, much better results can be obtained
than when responsibility is divided.
Admiral Kimmel testified that so far as the authority of ComFOUR-
TEEN to accomplish unity of command was concerned, ComFOUR-
TEEN did not have the authority without reference to him and that
he would not have approved this nor accepted the responsibility for
Army action without reference to the Navy Department.
[#>] Under the Naval Base Defense Plan (Exhibit 53, NC), unity
of command was vested in the Commander Naval Base Defense Air
Force over all offensive air operations and under the Army Air Com-
mander for all defensive air operations, but only after the plan had
been activated.
(c) Weakness of “ Mutual Cooperation .”
(i) Air Command . — Admiral Bellinger testified that the weakness
of the air defense plan was that there was no one officer in command
until after the plan was activated. The Bellinger-Martin estimate
(Exhibit 49) he believed to be sound, but said that it lacked sanction
1 and that the missing sanction was unity of command.
(ii) Recommendation of Joint Commmnd Center . — In an endorse-
ment dated 6 December 1941 from the Director, Radio Liaison Divi-
sion, to the Director, Naval Districts Division, advocating a combined
operating center for the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor (which was
not established prior to the attack), Admiral Hooper stated “The
most perfect set-up for command is one in which the supreme com-
mander is exercised by one officer best equipped of any for the
task . . . Because our defense is* under two officers, Army and Navy,
we must try and arrange matters so that when component parts of the
422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
commands are interwoven these two can function as nearly as possible
as one.” (Exhibit 77).
The recommendation for a Joint Command Center in Hawaii was
originated by a dispatch from OpNav to ComFOURTEEN on 15
October 1941 (Exhibit 77), requesting that consideration be given
to the construction of a combined operating center sufficient in size and
facilities to accommodate in time of emergency staffs of all essential
operating activities of both Army and Navy in Hawaii. An informal
joint working committee had been formed in Washington to endeavor
to improve cooperation of Army and Navy shore defense activities by
the formation of joint command centers. A reply to the above-men-
tioned dispatch strongly recommending against such a move is con-
tained in a letter from ComFOURTEEN to CNO. via CincPac, enclos-
ing a letter from General Short to ComFOURTfiEN and an endorse-
ment by CincPac.
General Short stated that while he was strongly in favor of com-
bined operating centers for equivalent units of Army and Navy forces,
he did not believe that all of the operating centers should be combined
into one single building, because it was necessary that Army head-
quarters be located in separate command posts for efficiency of indi-
vidual operation. It was also undesirable from the communication
and security standpoint. He suggested that, as an alternative, addi-
tional space for Navy units be constructed adjacent to the existing
command posts for equivalent Army units.
[47] In the basic letter (Exhibit 77) ComFOURTEEN recom-
mended that no steps be taken to concentrate the Army and Navy
in a common building and believed that the best interests of the CinC
Pacific Fleet would be served by one building with only agencies of
the Fleet therein.
The CinCPacific Fleet in his endorsement to this letter stated that
the mission of the Army and the Fleet were considerably different, the
operation of one being defensive and local, while the operations ox the
other were offensive and far-flung. Strategic, rather than tactical,
cooperation was indicated and therefore the necessity for rapid re-
' ceipt and exchange of information and arrival, at quick decision was
of less importance. He was of the opinion that the establishment of a
combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii was not
only unnecessary, but definitely undesirable.
(4) Disagreement concerning Unity of Command at the Outlying
Islands . — The evidence in the previous investigations and in this inves-
tigation indicates that there was some consideration of unity of com-
mand at outlying islands during the critical period 27 November to 7
December 1941. This occurred as a result of dispatches by the Chief
of Naval Operations to CincPac on 26 November 1941 (Exhibits 18 and
40, Naval Court) , in which it was advised that the Army had agreed
to reenforce Midway and Wake with Army personnel and to station
25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and 25 at Wake provided that
Admiral Rommel considered this feasible and desirable. It was stated
that it would be necessary for Admiral Kimmel to transport these
planes and ground crews from Oahu to Midway and Wake on aircraft
carriers, that the planes would be flown off at destination and that the
ground crews would be landed in boats. Admiral Kimmel was di-
rected to confer with the Commanding General concerning this mat-
ter, and to advise as soon as practicable.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
423
It appears that this subject was considered at some length in con-
ferences held by Admiral Kimmel on and after 27 November 1941.
The discussion of unity of command as to these islands was smnmar-
ized by Vice Admiral Smith in his testimony in this investigation.
He said that Admiral Kimmel asked the Army what he could expect
of Army fighters at Wake, and that General Martin of the Army Air
Force replied that the Army did not allow such planes to go more than
15 miles offshore. Admiral Kimmel then stated that the Army planes
were, therefore, no good to him.
General Short stated that if he manned those islands, he must com-
mand them and “Kimmel replied, ‘Over my dead body. The Army
should exercise no command over Navy bases.’ General Short replied,
‘Mind you, I don’t want these islands. I think they are better manned
by Marines. But if I must put planes and troops on them, then I must
command them.’ ” (Page 352, record of this investigation) . •
[48] Admiral Kimmel’s concern over the question of command
at the outlying islands was indicated by his dispatch of November
28th to the Chief of Naval Operations, advising of the proposed reen-
forcement of Midway and Wake with Marine fighter planes and that
he would investigate more thoroughly the feasibility and practica-
bility of relieving them with Army planes. In this dispatch he
stated, “All outlying forces must be exclusively under Naval com-
mand ” ( Exhibit 76, Naval Court) . Similarly, in a letter of 2 December
1941 to Admiral Stark (Exhibit 50 of the Naval Court) , Admiral Kim -
mel advised that the dispatches in regard to the use of Army personnel
were being given earnest consideration, that he believed Admiral
Stark would subscribe to the principle that all these outlying islands
must be under Navy command and the forces there subject to the
orders of the Commander-in-Chief without any qualifications what-
soever, and that he expected some difficulties along this line when
Army personnel were injected into the picture unless a very clear
directive were issued jointly by the War and Navy Departments.
It appears that Midway and Wake were reenforced with squadrons
of Marine planes, and that therefore, unity of command under the
Navy, actually existed at those islands. No solution of the command
problem, in the event of possible future inclusion of Army forces, was
reached.
[ 49 ] FINDINGS
1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the
United States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers,
either including or excluding Japan.
2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various
offensive tasks to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions
in the Marshalls and raids on enemy sea communications and positions,
and various defensive tasks, including the task of protecting the terri-
tory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and -preventing the
extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by
destroying hostile expeditions.
3. TTie Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the
Fleet various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security
at the bases, at anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communi-
cations and territory of the Associated Powers by patrolling with light
forces and patrol planes, the establishment 0* defensive submarine
424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
patrols at Wake and Midway, and guarding against surprise attack by
Japan.
4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes
included among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes
the maintenance of the maximum patrol plane search practicable in
the approaches to the Hawaiian area.
6. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on
W-day, which, it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day
that hostilities opened with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to the
attack.
6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was
based on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted
the basis of subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans,
and mobilization plans. The method of coordination under the plan
was to be by mutual cooperation until and unless unity of command
were invoked.
7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army’s task
was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and
against hostile sympathizers, and to support the naval forces. The
Navy’s task was to patrol the coastal zone (whidi included Oahu and
such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of
Oahu) , and to patrol and protect shipping therein, and to support the
Army forces.
8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Co astal
Frontier Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH
Naval District, should provide for distant reconnaissance.
[60 J 9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in
effect on. 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
- partment, and ov the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.
10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier De fense
Plan was an agreement between the Commandant, FOURTEENTH
Naval District, and the Commading General, Hawaiian Department,
as to joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for
the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hostile raids or air attacks
delivered prior to a declaration of war.
11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan provided, among other things, for joint air operations and
provided that when naval forces were insufficient for long distance
patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available,
the latter would be under the tactical control of the naval com-
mander directing search operations.
12. Annex VH, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, also provided that the Army was to expedite the installation
of its aircraft warning service, and that prior to the completion of
that service, the Navy, through the use of radar and other appropriate
means, would endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as
might be practicable.
13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOUR-
TEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was suffi-
ciently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take
steps to make available to the other the air forces at his disposal, in
order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with
the plan.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
425
14. The Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN did not
effect any agreement prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile
raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant placing Annex
VII, Section VI, in operation.
15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided,
among other things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction
with the Army. One of the assumptions was that it was possible
that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise air attack
on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable that there might be a
surprise submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a com-
bination of both forms of attack was possible.
16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin
stated, among other things, that the most likely and dangerous form
of attack on Oahu would be an air attack that would most likely be
launched from carriers which would probably approach inside of
three hundred miles. The estimate also stated that any single sub-
marine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undis-
covered surface forces, probably composed of [61] fast ships
accompanied by a carrier. This Estimate came to the attention of
Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.
17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by
Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan,
which was designated Annex “Baker” to the Naval Base Defehse
Force Operation Plan, made specific provision for joint air opera-
tions by the Army and Navy. The Plan was effective upon receipt.
It was to become operative without signal in the event of a surprise
attack, or might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime
conditions of readiness of aircraft were to be as directed by the Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by
ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, for Navy units.
18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and
in operating areas, which was reissued By Admiral Kimmel in re-
vised form on 14 October 1941, provided that the Fleet’s security
was predicated on several assumptions, one of which was that a
•declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise atthck on ships
in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operat-
ing areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that
a single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a consider-
able surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by
a carrier.
19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures,
including provisions for defense against air attack. It provided,
among other things, that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense
Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over
the defense against air attack and that he should take other action,
including supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, and
arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordina-
tion of the joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.
20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures
were to include intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer off-
shore patrol, and an air patrol. The air patrol was to consist of
daily search of fleet operating areas as directed by Aircraft Scouting
Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, ana
one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.
426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to
the attack of 7 December 1941 were, the Joint Coastal Frontier De-
fense Plan, under which the Navy was obliged to provide distant
reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet security Tetter, under which the
only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet operating
areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, ana
during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.
[52 J 22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), ap-
proved by the Chief of Naval Operations, in estimating probable
enemy (Japanese) action, visualized that one of the enemy defensive
efforts would be “destruction of threatening naval forces”; that initial
action would include “possible raids or stronger attacks on Wake,
Midway, and other outlying United States positions and that the
inital Japanese deployment would include “raiding and observation
forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and that submarines in the
Hawaiian atfea . . . .” (Italics supplied.) The possibility of an at-
tack on Hawaii was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized.
23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of
command of the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl
Harbor was a possibility. Neither he nor the key members of his staff
appear to have considered it as a serious probability.
24. The method of command established in the local plans was that
of “mutual cooperation.” The relations between the responsible com-
manders were cordial. However, there was not in existence, prior to
the attack, any permanent operating setup which could ensure the
constant and timely exchange of information, decisions, and intended
courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of joint operations,
particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the es-
tablishment of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of
adverse recommendations by the responsible local commanders, both
Army and Navy.
25. In accordance with “Joint Action,” unity of command for the
defense of Oahu could have been placed in effect' by local agreement
between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and
the Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. The latter,
however, would naturally not make such an agreement without the
approval of his immediate superior, the Commander-in-Chief, Pa-
cific Fleet. The question of unity of command for outlying islands
was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in con-
nection with a proposal for reenforcement of Wake and Midway by
Army planes. General Short’s position was that if Army forces were
involved, the command must be his. Admiral Kimmel maintained that
the command of naval bases must remain with the Navy. The islands
were reenforced with Marine planes.
[ss] n
Japanese Espionage at Hawaii
The center of Japanese espionage at Hawaii was the Japanese Con-
sulate General located in Honolulu. As a matter of regular routine,
information was collected by the Consulate General concerning the
location and movements of United States ships in and around Pearl
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
427
Harbor and concerning defense preparations. This information was
forwarded by the Japanese Consulate General to Tokyo and elsewhere
in coded messages sent via commercial communication companies.
A collection of such messages, which has been decrypted and trans-
lated, appears in Exhibit 13 of this investigation ana in Exhibit 68
of the Naval Court. This collection of messages does not include every
such message, but does fully illustrate the type of espionage reports
which were made. Subsequent to the attack, the incoming and out-
going message log of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu
was recovered and translated. These logs indicate the nature of all
of the communications to and from the Japanese Consulate General
and show the frequency with which espionage reports were sent by
the Consul during 1941. A copy of the log is set forth in Exhibit 62.
It is to be noted that the espionage reports submitted during 1941
by the Japanese Consulate General became increasingly more detailed
and, in the first week of December, 1941, indicated the likelihood of
a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The possession of all of those
messages by the American intelligence services prior to the attack
would have been of inestimable value. Some of them, as will appear
later, were obtained prior to the attack. Those obtained, however,
although indicating Japanese interest in the. location and movements
of ships in and from Pearl Harbor, did not include those messages,
particularly during the first week of December, 1941, which indi-
cated the likelihood of an air attack. It may also be noted at this
B iint that those Consulate messages which were obtained prior to 7
ecember 1941 were decrypted and translated in Washington but
not at Pearl Harbor.
Illustrative of the type of message sent earlier in 1941 is a report
from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 10 March 1941, which describes various
vessels seen in Pearl Harbor (Translated by Navy, April 5 — Docu-
ment 1, Exhibit 13). The Japanese interest in the location of ships
in partciular areas of Pearl Harbor is demonstrated by a dispatch from
Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 24 September 1941, requesting reports of
vessels in five sub-areas of Pearl Harbor, and requesting reports of
warships and aircraft carriers at anchor and tied up at wharves,
buoys and docks. Particular request was made for mention of the
fact when there were two or more vessels alongside the same wharf
(Army translation, October 9 — Document 2, Exhibit 13). The Jap-
anese Consul at Honolulu established a code to refer to the location
of vessels in particular areas (Navy translation, October 10 — Docu-
ment 3, Exhibit 13). Tokyo on 18 November 1941 requested a report
on vessels anchored in certain areas and it directed that the investi-
gation be made with great secrecy (Army translation, December 2 —
Document 9, Exhibit 13) . A report was sent by Honolulu to Tokyo
on 18 November 1941 setting forth the warships in the harbor in
certain areasj commenting on the [£.£] presence or absence of
aircraft carriers, and describing in detail the course of certain de-
stroyers which were observed entering the harbor (Army transla-
tion, December 6 — Document 10, Exhibit 13). On November 20th,
Tokyo requested a comprehensive investigation of the Fleet bases
in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation (Army
translation, December 6 — Document 7, Exhibit 13) .
428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On 24 November 1941, Honolulu reported to Tokyo concerning
the Fleet practice of leaving Pearl Harbor, conducting maneuvers, ana
returning ; that the Fleet had not remained for a long period of time
nor conducted maneuvers at Lahaina Road; that destroyers and sub-
marines were the only vessels anchored there ; that battleships seldom
entered the port of Hilo, Hanalei or Haneo ; that virtually no one had
observed battleships in maneuver areas; and, stated that the Fleet
maneuvered for one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the
southwest and pointed out that aircraft carriers maneuvered by them-
selves. This also mentioned the times when cruisers and other ships
left Pearl Harbor and how long they were* away, and generally how
long they remained at Pearl Harbor when anchored there (Army
translation, December 16 — Document 23, Exhibit 13) .
On November 28th, Tokyo requested intelligence, which was de-
scribed as being of major importance, concerning the movements of
battleships out of the harbor, pointing out that if such movements
were reported but once a week, the vessels could have traveled far,
and that Honolulu was to use its own judgment in deciding on reports
covering such movements. As to capital ships, it was requested that
reports of the entrance or departure ahd length of time at anchor
from the time of entry into port until departure be made (Army
translation, December 8 — Document 13, Exhibit 13) . On November
28th, Honolulu reported to Tokyo concerning the B-17 planes at Mid-
way and range of anti-aircraft guns, observations of maneuvers by
troops, prospective reinforcements of troops at Honolulu during De-
cember or January, and advised of the presence of a cruiser usually
about 15,000 feet south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers
at the entrance of the harbor (Army translation, December 8 — Docu-
ment 16, Exhibit 13) .
The messages sent by the Japanese Consul during the week of 1
December to 7 December 1941, are of particular significance. A mes-
sage of December 1st reported on ship maneuvers and described the
place where maneuvers were held as about 500 nautical miles south-
east of Oahu, and stated the reasons why that conclusion had been
reached. This message set forth the “usual” schedule for departure
and return of the battleships and stated that they left on Tuesdays
and returned on Fridays, or left on Friday and returned on Saturday
of the following week, and that all ships stayed in port about a period
of one week. In view of their importance, five other messages sent
during the first week in December, 1941, are quoted in full :
From : Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 2, 1941 (translated by Army 30 December 1941)
J-19
#123 (Secret outside the department)
In view of the present situation, the presence In port of warships, airplane
carriers and cruisers is of [55] utmost importance. Hereafter, to the
utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether
or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any
indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the
warships are provided with antimine nets.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
429
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941. (Translated by Navy 11 December 1941)
(PA-K2)
#245 (in 2 parts, complete) (Military Secret).
From Ichiro Pujii to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.
1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following :
I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows :
Meaning
Signa
Battleship divisions including scouts
Preparing to sortie
1
and screen units.
A number of carriers
Preparing to sortie
2
Battleship divisions
All departed between 1st and 3rd.
3
Carriers
Several departed between 1st and 3rd
4
Carriers
All departed between 1st and 3rd
6
Battleship divisions
All departed between 4th and 6th. .
6
Carriers
Several departed between 4th and 6th
7
Carriers
All departed between 4th and 6th _
8
2. Signals.
I. Lanikai Beach House will show lights during the night as follows :
Signal
[56] One light between 8 and 9 p. m 1
One light between 9 and 10 p. m 2
One light between 10 and 11 p. m 3
One light between 11 and 12 p. m 4
n
Two lights between 12 and 1 a. m 5
Two lights between 1 and 2 a. m 6
Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m 7
Two lights between 3 and 4 a. m 8
(Part 2)
III. Lanikai Bay, during daylight
If there is a “star” on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates
signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.
If there is a “star” and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.
IY. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House will indicate the following :
Times Signal
1900-2000 3
2000-2100 * 4
2100-2200 5
2200-2300 6
2300-2400 7
0000-0100 8
V. K. G. M. B. Want Ads.
A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.
B. CHIC. . CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.
C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.
3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from
Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium at a
point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20°40'
N., longitude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest
of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX
signal is received :
[57] Time Signal
From 7 — 2 3 or 6
From 8 — 9 4 or 7
From 9 — 10 5 or 8
79716 — 40— Ex. 157 28
430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
5 December 1941 (Translated by Navy 10 December 1941)
(PA-K2)
#252
(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my
message #239 arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.
(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.
(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th :
8 battleships.
3 light cruisers.
16 destroyers.
Four ships of the Honolulu class and were in dock.
From: Honolulu
To : Toyko *
December 6, 1941 (Translated by Army 8 December 1941)
PA-K2
#253 Re the last part of your #123.
1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage
balloons troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four
or five hundred ballons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of
these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is
concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl
Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the
troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for
the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are
no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that
they have actually any. However, even though they have actually [58]
made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land
runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa,
there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbqr. I imagine that in all
probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise
attack against these places.
2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are
not known. I will report the results of my investigation.
From : Honolulu.
To : Tokyo
December 6, 1941 (Translated by Army 8 December 1941)
PA-K2
#256
1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were
and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at
anchor on the 6th :
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addi-
tion there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers
and airplane carriers -have all left) .
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.
[ 59 ] FINDINGS
26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and. particu-
larly during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941,
resulted in the frequent transmission to Japan of information of great
importance concerning the Pacific Fleet, the movements and locations
of ships, and defense preparations.
27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a com-
mercial communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding
the attack indicated the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.
28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent
by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
431
the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by.
Army and Navy radio intercept stations and were decoded in Wash-
ington, D. C., prior to the attack; that others which were obtained
at THonolulu by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack were, with the
exception of a few unimportant messages, in a code which could not
be decrypted there before December 7th; and, that three messages
intercepted by Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at
San Francisco, which indicated the likelihood of an air attack, were
forwarded to the War Department for decryption but were either not
received there prior to the attack or were not decrypted prior to the
attack. If the United States intelligence services had been able to
obtain and to decode and translate promptly all of the espionage re-
ports sent by the Japanese Consul General during the period 27
November to 7 December 1941, the information so obtained would
have been of inestimable value.
hi
Naval Intelligence and Events Preliminary to the Attack
[60] A. The Organization of Naval Intelligence in General;
Sources of Information , and Relations vnth the Pacific
Fleet.
The Office of Naval Intelligence, which was under the Chief of
Naval Operations, consisted of two main branches — Domestic and
Foreign. The Domestic Branch had to do with internal espionage
and other subversive activities of foreign nationals or organizations
inimical to national and particularly naval welfare. It maintained
branch offices in various of the principal cities of the United States,
including Honolulu. The Foreign Branch was organized into a num-
ber of sections, of which one was the Far Eastern Section. The
Director of Naval Intelligence was Bear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Jr.
The officer in charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Branch
was Commander Arthur H. McCollum.
The primary sources of information which the Far Eastern Section
had were Naval Attache reports from Japan and China, observers’
reports from various ports in the Far East, reports from the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet and from the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet, including reports as to radio intelligence,
and reports of investigations conducted by the domestic branch oi
ONI, particularly from Honolulu, and State Department reports at
Washington. A most important part of the information provided to
the Far Eastern Section was supplied by a unit at Washington known
as OP-20-G. This was under the command of Commander Laurence
F. Safford and supplied information obtained from communication
or radio intelligence. This section was staffed both by Communica-
tions officers and Intelligence officers. The information received by
OP-20-G was supplied to Lt. Comdr. Alvin D. Kramer of ONI, who
was working with that section, and was transmitted by him to the
head of the Far Eastern Section and to the Director of Naval Intel-
ligence.
The section known as OP-20-G was concerned with the interception,
decryption, and translation of Japanese messages. In addition it was
432 ' CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
responsible for furnishing the Navy’s own codes and ciphers and for
the supervision of the security of the Navy’s own communications.
Japanese messages were intercepted by various methods, including
radio interception by a number of radio intercept stations located in
the United States, which transmitted the Japanese communications,
ns intercepted by them, to OP-20-G for decryption and translation.
Tn addition to reports from intercept stations located in the United
States, this section received reports from communication intelligence
units located at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. This unit was
concerned with the plans and intentions of foreign governments, prin-
cipally Japan, and with intelligence relating to naval operations in the
Atlantic. The communications intelligence organization at Pearl
Harbor, which had subsidiary stations at Oahu, Midway, Samoa, and
Dutch Harbor, was concerned primarily with the dispositions and
[tfl] plans of naval forces in the Pacific and with surveillance of
Japanese naval communications. The communications intelligence
unit in the Philippines, which was located at Corregidor, was con-
cerned with Japanese naval communications and Japanese diplomatic
communications. The Officer in Charge of the communications intel-
ligence unit at Pearl Harbor was Lt. Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort.
The officer in charge of the communications intelligence unit at Cor-
regidor until September, 1941 was Lt. Comdr. Rudolph J. Fabian.
He remained thereafter assisting that unit.
Japanese diplomatic communications were in various codes, such
as the code known as the “purple” code, the “red” code, the “J-19”
code, the “PAK 2” code, and the “LA” code. The so-called “purple”
code contained the most important Japanese diplomatic messages.
Messages in this and in other diplomatic codes were intercepted and
read “at the Philippines primarily for the purpose of local informa-
tion. They were sent, as intercepted, to the Navy Department in
one of the 'Navy’s own codes. All intercepted diplomatic traffic was
sent to Washington whether or not it was deciphered and read at
the Philippines. None of this information was sent from the Phil-
ippines to Pearl Harbor. The unit at Pearl Harbor was intercepting
and decrypting no Japanese diplomatic traffic. It had been directed
to concentrate on Japanese naval systems. The unit at Washington
was charged with the general control of the units at Corregidor,
Pearl Harbor, and at Washington, and handled the Japanese diplo-
matic systems and also handled some Japanese naval systems.
Intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic received by the Washing-
ton unit was pooled with similar traffic intercepted by the Army and
was decrypted and translated by the Navy and the Army on an
alternate bay basis. The resulting information was distributed daily
by ONI to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to others in the Navy
Department. The President and the State Department similarly
were furnished this information daily.
It appears that, although the Navy enjoyed considerable success
in decrypting Japanese diplomatic communications, the Japanese
naval codes were not being read. Information obtained by radio in-
telligence, therefore, from Japanese naval traffic was based almost
entirely on so-called “traffic analysis” and not upon reading of the
messages themselves.
The units at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines advised the Wash-
ington unit of the results of their traffic analysis of Japanese naval
REPORT OF JBCEWITT INQUIRY
433
communications, and of the estimated location and movement of
Japanese naval forces, and also exchanged information with one
another on that subject. The units also exchanged information on
technical subjects, that is, pertaining to codes and ciphers and keys
for decyphermg codes.
Information developed from the reading of the “purple” messages
was not sent to the Pearl Harbor unit as such. It does appear, how-
ever, that various of the warning messages and other dispatches sent
by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, were based upon information derived from the Japanese diplo-
matic messages. [62] Thus it appears that the knowledge of
the Commanaer-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as to the status of diplo-
matic relations with Japan depended primarily upon the messages
sent to him by the Chief of Naval Operations. The information re-
ceived by the radio intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor as to the loca-
tion ana movement of Japanese naval forces was, however, brought
directly to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet daily by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, as was other material of
an intelligence nature.
B. The Approach of War: Intercepted Communications Available at
Washington, and Messages Sent by CNO to Admiral Kimmel .
It should be noted that the Japanese communications which were
intercepted and decoded and .translated by the War and Navy De-
partments, as set forth in this section, were not sent to Admiral
Kimmel. Various of the messages sent to Admiral Kimmel by the
Chief of Naval Operations were based on these Japanese communi-
cations.
(1) The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and October 16th
dispatch.
On 16 October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch
to Cinclant, CincPac and CincAF (Exhibit 13, Naval Court), reading
as follows :
The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X
If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti
American X If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will
operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the
US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong pos-
sibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her
present desparate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack
these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precau-
tions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic
intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third
adees inform appropriate Army and Navy district authorities X Acknowledge
On 17 October 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel
(Exhibit 38, Naval Court). In this letter, Admiral Stark advised
that things had been “popping” here for the last twenty-four hours,
but from the dispatches Admiral Kimmel knew about all that they
did. He said, “Personally, I do not believe the Japanese are going
to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the ‘possibility y
in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably. Perhaps
I was wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in
the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until
something indicates the trend.”
[68] Admiral Stark continued that Admiral Kimmel would re-
call that in an earlier letter, when War Plans was forecasting a Jap-
434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
anese attack on Siberia in August, Admiral Stark had said that his
own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction
until the Bussian situation showed a definite trend. In this letter he
said that he thought this whole thing worked' up together. He stated
that efforts would be made to maintain the status quo in the Pacific.
How long it could be kept going, he did not know, but the President
and Mr. Hull were working on it. To this letter was annexed a post-
script, stating in part, “General Marshall just called up and was
anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel
assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be
in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against
any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that,
while we keep track of Japanese ships as far as we can, a carefully
planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be
difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability,
and my advice to him was not to worry.
Also annexed was a memorandum of 17 October 1941, by Bear Ad-
miral Schuirmann, estimating the importance of changes in the Jap-
anese Cabinet. The substance of this analysis was that the military
would determine Japanese action whether to attack Bussia or move
southward, and would make that decision on the basis of opportunity
and what they could get away with, and that it would not oe deter-
mined by the cabinet in power.
(2) Japanese messages concerning' German attitude ; Nomura’s
desire to resign.
On 18 October 1941, the Navy translated an intercepted Japanese
communication from Berlin to Tokyo, dated 1 October 1941, which
stated that the Germans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with
Japan’s position, particularly because Japan was not advising Ger-
many of the negotiations with the United States, although the United
States was advising England (Document 4, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).
A Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 16 October
1941, was intercepted and translated on 17 October 1941. In this
Toyoda advised Nomura that although he had been requested by both
the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confiden-
tial information on the Japanese-United States negotiations, he had,
in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do
so. However, early in October, following the German attacks on
American merchant ships and the consequent revival of the movement
for revision of the neutrality act, the German authorities demanded
that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a
message that if the Boosevelt Administration continued to attack the
Axis powers, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between
Germany, Italy, and the United States, which, under the Three-Power
Agreement, might lead Japan to join immediately the war against the
United States. It was indicated that such a message was being con-
sidered and there were reasons which would not permit of postpone-
ment (Document 3, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) .
On 22 October 1941, Nomura sent a message to Tokyo which
was intercepted and translated on 23 October 1941, in which he said
that he was sure that he, too, should go out with the former cabinet;
that he knew that the Secretary of State realized how sincere he was
and yet how little influence he had in Japan ; that there were some
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
435
Americans who trusted him and who said that things would get better
for him, but that their encouragement was not enough ; that among his
confreres in the United States there were some who felt the same
way, but they were all poor deluded souls; that the instructions could
be carried out by Wukasugi; that Nomura did not want to be the bones
of a dead horse; that he did not want to continue w this hypocritical
existence, deceiving other people ;” that he was not trying to flee from
the field of battle, but as a man of honor, that was the only way open
for him to tread; and that he sought permission to return to Japan
(Document 5, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) .
On 23 October 1941, a message from Tokyo to Washington of the
same date was intercepted and translated, which stated that the efforts
Nomura was making were appreciated; that, as. he was well aware,
the outcome of those negotiations had a great bearing upon the de-
cision as to which road the Imperial Government would proceed;
that as such it was an exceedingly important matter; that they were
placing all of their reliance on Nomura’s reports for information on
this matter; that for these reasons they hoped that he would see fit
to sacrifice his personal wishes and remain at his post (Document 6,
Exhibit 63, Naval Court).
(3) Action taken by Admiral' Kimmel.
Admiral Kimmel advised, in a letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 14,
Naval Court), that the action taken included maintaining two sub-
marines for patrol at Midway, dispatching twelve patrol planes to
Midway, preparing to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake,
and to replace the six at Midway from Pearl Harbor, sending two
submarines to Wake, and sending additional Marines and stores there,
dispatching additional Marines to Palmyra, placing Admiral Pye
and his ships on twelve hours notice, getting six submarines ready to
depart for Japan on short notice, putting some additional security
measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.
On 7 November 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel
(Exhibit 74, Naval Court) in reply to Admiral Kimmel’s letter of
October 22na. He stated, among other things, “O. K. on the disposi-
tions which'you made in connection with recent change in the Jap-
anese cabinet. The big question is — what next?!” Also, “Things
seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when
it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all
is what I have written you before; it continually gets ‘worser and
worser’ ! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcil-
able policies cannot go on forever — particularly if one party cannot
live with the setup. It doesn’t look good.”
[65] (4) The first Japanese deadline message: Japanese interest
in American ships.
On 5 November 1941, the Navy translated a message from Tokyo
to Washington, reading as follows :
{Of u tm ost 8€&?ccy)»
Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrange-
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.
I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an
unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem
of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition.
Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.
This Information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.
436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
During the first half of November, there were translated in Wash-
ington various intercepted Japanese communications concerning ships
and planes at Manila and Seattle (Documents 1-8, Exhibit 68, Naval
Court). According to one of these messages, which was dated 5
November 1941, the Navy General Staff wanted investigation done
at Manila as to the conditions of airports, types of planes and num-
bers of planes there, warships there, machinery belonging to land
forces, and the state of progress being made on all equipment and
establishments.
(5) Arrival of Kurusu; Stark and Marshall recommendations as
to ultimatum.
The situation existing early in November was summarized by
Nomura, in a report to Tokyo, dated 10 November 1941, intercepted
on November 12th (Document 8, Exhibit 63, Naval Court by refer-
ence to a report from the legal adviser to the Japanese Embassy, who
had conferred with Senator Thomas and Secretary Hull, that the
United States was not bluffing, that if Japan invaded again, the
United States would fight with Japan, that psychologically the Amer-
ican people were ready, that the Navy was ready and prepared for
action. Nomura also reported that he nad a conversation with “a cer-
tain Cabinet member” who had said that Nomura was indeed a dear
friend, that he would tell him alone this : that the American govern-
ment was receiving reports that Japan would be on the move again
and did not believe that Nomura’s visit to the President, or coming
of Kurusu, would have any effect on the general situation. Nomura
said that he had explained how impatient the Japanese had become
since the freezing, how eager they were for a quick understanding, how
they did not desire a Japanese- American war, and how they noped
for peace until the end. The Cabinet member replied, however, tnat
the President and Secretary of State believed “those reports.” [fft?]
Nomura also said that his friend had stated that the United States
could not stop because if Japan moved, something would have to be
done to save the “face” of the United States.
Admiral Stark was not hopeful that anything in the way of better
understanding between the United States and Japan would come from
Kurusu’s visit. His opinion was that it would be impossible tp recon-
cile the Japanese and American views. Admiral Stark so advised
Admiral Kimmel by letter dated 14 November 1941 (Exhibit 39. Naval
Court). With this letter, Admiral Stark also sent to Admiral Kim-
mel a copy of a memorandum, dated 5 November 1941, by Admiral
Stark and General Marshall, for the President. This was concerned
with the belief of Cliiang-Kai-Shek that a Japanese attack on Kum-
ming was imminent and that outside military support was the sole
hope for the defeat of that threat. The memorandum considered
whether the United States would be justified in undertaking offensive
operations against the Japanese to prevent her from severing the
Burma Road. The memorandum stated that the Fleet in the Pacific
was inferior to the Japanese Fleet and could not undertake an un-
limited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. It pointed out that
by the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine
strength in the Philippines would become a positive threat to any
Japanese operations south of Formosa. The recommendations were
in general tnat all aid short of war be given to China and that no ulti-
matum be given to Japan.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
437
(6) Further and Final Japanese “ deadline messages .”
At this time, information was received in Washington that the
Japanese Government had established a further and final deadline
for the completion of diplomatic negotiations. This consisted of two
messages from Tokyo to Washington, which were intercepted and
translated by the Army, as follows :
(a) A translation on 17 November 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 63,
Naval Court), of a dispatch, dated November 16th, the highlights of
which were :
* * * The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days,
so please fight harder than you ever did before.
What you say is of course so * * ♦ but I have only to refer you to the
fundamental policy laid down in my #725 (in which Togo says that conditions
within and without Japan will not permit any further delay in reaching a
settlement with the United States) * * * try to realize what that means.
In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain
patient * * * the situation renders this out of the question. I set the dead-
line for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change.
Please try to understand that. You see how 167 ] short the time is ; there-
fore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations
any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do
your best to bring about an immediate solution.
(b) On 22 November 1941 (Document 11, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) ,
a translation of a dispatch of the same date, reading in substance :
To both you Ambassadors.
It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.
You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our
fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the
solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we
wanted to settle Japanese- American relations by the 25th, but if within the next
three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if
the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you — twenty-
ninth) ; if the pertinent notes can be exchanged ; if we can get an understanding
with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be
finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it; that
the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically
going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work
harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of
you two Ambassadors alone.
(7) The Nav ember 2bth dispatch to CincPac and others .
On 24 November 1941 (Exhibit 15), a dispatch (which before the
Naval Court Admiral Stark said was based in part on the “deadline”
intercept — page 775), was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to
CincAF, CmcPac, ComELEVEN; ComTWELVE, ComTHIRTEEN,
and ComFIFTEEN for action, reading:
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a pos-
sibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action
addresses to inform senior army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary
in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese
action X Guam will be informed separately
[68] On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 47, Naval Court), Admiral
Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel in response to his letter of 17 Oc-
tober 1941, on the inadequacy of local defense forces in Hawaii
(Exhibit 46, Naval Court). Admiral Stark stated that CincPac had
taken cognizance of his responsibilities in connection with tasks per-
438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
taining to the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and that the forces avail-
able in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and local defense forces, and
the actual operations of our own and hostile forces would indicate the
numbers of Fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local
defense tasks. Admiral Stark’s letter continued by summarizing the
situation in regard to increasing the local defense forces and, among
other things, pointed out that the Department had no additional air-
planes available for assignment to the FOURTEENTH Naval Dis-
trict. A marginal note on a copy of this letter, apparently written in
Hawaii, stated, “In other words, look to the Fleet. They seem to
forget that the Fleet has offensive work to do.”
On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 16, Naval Court), Admiral Stark
also wrote a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel stating, among other
things, that Admiral Stark agreed with Admiral Kimmel that, for
example, to cruise in Japanese home waters, Admiral Kimmel should
have a substantial increase in the strength of his fleet, but pointed out
that neither ABC-1 nor Rainbow-5 contemplated this as a general
policy j after the British strengthened Singapore, and under certain
auspicious occasions, opportunity for raids m Japanese waters might
present themselves, but this would be the exception rather than the
rule. A postscript to this letter stated that both Mr. Hull and the
•President confirmed the gravity of the situation indicated by the
message which Admiral Stark sent a day or two before. It stated
further that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised
over a Japanese surprise attack; that from many angles an attack
on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could
happen to us: and there were some who thought it likely to occur.
Admiral Stark further stated : “I do not give it the weight others do,
but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people.
You know I have generally held that it was not the time for the Jap-
anese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look
for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the
most likely. ... I won’t go into the pros and cons of what the
United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did.
The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that’s
the only thing I know to be prepared for ; or we may do nothing — I
think it is more likely to be anything.”
(8) Dispatches concerning reen for cement of Wake and Mid/way .
On 26 November 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 40, Naval Court) was
sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac stating that the
Army had offered to make available some units of infantry for reen-
forcing defense battalions now on station, if Admiral Kimmel consid-
ered that desirable; also, that the Army proposed to prepare, in
Hawaii, garrison troops for advance bases which Admiral Kimmel
might occupy, but was unable to provide any antiaircraft units.
Admiral Kimmel was instructed to take this into consideration
and [69] advise when practicable the number of troops desired
and recommended armament.
Also on 26 November 1941, another dispatch (Exhibit 18) was sent
to CincPac, which stated that in order to keep the planes of the Second
Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use, OpNav had
requested the Army, and the Army had agreed, to station twenty-five
Army pursuits at Midway and a similar number at Wake, provided
CincPac considered this feasible and desirable; that it would be neces-
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
439
sary for CincPac to transport these planes and ground crews from
Oahu to these stations on aircraft carriers, and that the planes would
be flown off at destination ; that ground personnel would be landed in
boats and essential spare parts, tools and ammunition would be
taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels;
that the Army understood that these forces must be quartered in
tents ; that the Navy must be responsible for supplying water and sub-
sistence and transporting other Army supplies; that the stationing
of these planes must not De allowed to interfere with planned move-
ments of Army bombers to the Philippines; and, that additional
parking areas snould be laid promptly if necessary. A question was
raised as to whether or not Navy bombs at outlying positions could
be carried by Army bombers which might fly to those positions in
order to support Navy operations. CincPac was directed to confer
with the Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable.
(9) Intercepted Japanese communications of November 26th and
27th.
On November 26th and 27th, there were available in Washington
additional intercepted Japanese messages, all of which had been sent
from Tokyo, as follows : '
(a) A Navy translation on 27 November 1941 ( Document 14, Ex-
hibit 63, Naval Court) of a message to Nanking, aated 15 November
1941, in the so-called “Purple” code, addressed to “Naval authorities”
which stated :
We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an
agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a
while
(b) A Navy translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 13, Ex-
hibit 63, Naval Court) of a message to Washington, dated 19 Novem-
ber 1941, stating that :
When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the fol-
lowing at the beginning and end of our geberal intelligence broadcasts :
(1 If it is Japan-U. S. relations, “HIGASHI”.
(2) Japan-Russia relations, “KIT A”.
(8) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), “NISHI”.
[70] The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and
end. Relay to Bio de Janerio, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.
(c) An Army translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 9, Ex-
hibit 68, Naval Court), of a message to Manila, dated 20 November
1941, in the “purple” code, marked “Strictly Secret” and stating:
Please advise Immediately the results of your investigations as to the type
of draft ~- presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay. (Near Manila,
P. I.)
Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well'as to
Tokyo.
(d) An Army translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 12, Ex-
hibit 63, Naval Court) of a message to Washington, dated 26 November
1941, in the “purple” code, which stated :
To be handled in Government Code.
The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too
long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotia-
tions to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the Ameri-
can Bureau on the telephone and make your request to him. At that time
we will use the following code : (Codes were then set forth.)
440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK:
(10) The State Department note of November 26 th and Japanese
reaction thereto: the war warning of November 27th.
The diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese representatives, No-
mura ana Kurusu, came to a head on 26 November 1941. At that
time, the State Department presented a proposal to the Japanese
and that Department reported to the Navy Department, among others,
that it had no further hopes of composing matters with the Japanese.
The Japanese reaction to this proposal appears from dispatches which
were subsequently decrypted and translated. They are as follows:
(а) An Armv translation (Document 17, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
of a message from Washington (Nomuru) to Tokyo, dated 26 No-
vember 1941, in the “purple” code and marked “Extremely urgent,”
which stated :
At 4 : 45 on the afternoon of the 2Cth I and Ambassador KURUSU met with
Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.
HULL said, “For the last several days the American Government has been
getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the
nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on
[7i] the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to teU you that we cannot agree
to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and with-
out commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of
June 21st and yours of September 25th.” So saying, he presented us with the
foUowing two proposals :
A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called ‘four principles.*
B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggressive treaty between Tokyo,
Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands,
China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of eco-
nomic treatment in French Indo-China.
(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French
Indo-China.
(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime
in China but that of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK.
(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.
(б) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United
States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.
(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.
(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.
(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has
contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties
will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the main-
tenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the
Three-Power Pact.)
In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we
could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued
back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States
have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands, and
China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit
helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have
been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there
have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete
control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard pro-
posals, or we think so.
[72] (b) An Army translation (Document 16, Exhibit 63,
Naval Court) of a message from Washington to Tokyo, dated 26
November 1941, in the “purple” code and marked “Extremely urgent,”
Message #1180, reading:
From NOMURA and KURUSU.
As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having
them consider our “B” proposal In toto. On the other hand, If we let the
situation remain tense as it Is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
441
will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our
failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving
the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first,
that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes
that Japan and the United States will cooperate in the maintenance of peace
in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will
negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you
in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere,
but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and
the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their
protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we
should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-
China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President
ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)
We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily
mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we
said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England
and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would
be inevitable. Now, the question' is whether or not Germany would feel duty
bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would.
Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait
until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.
In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to
express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the
Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire back
instantly.
(c) An Army translation (Document 18, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
of a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 28 November 1941, in
the “purple” code, reading:
178 ] Re your #1189.
Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of
this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal.
This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government
can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of
the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will
send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured.
This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the
negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instruc-
tions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to
you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made
just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific.
Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude,
but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it
impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this
pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under
the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on
do the best you can.
(Note : The man is the Navy Minister.)
On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from
CNO, which has been termed the “war warning.” It read :
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning x negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an ag-
gressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days x the number
and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink,
“Thai”) or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo x execute an appropirate defensive
deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 x inform
district and Artoy authorities x a similar warning is being sent by War Depart-
ment x spenavo inform British x continental districts Guam Samoa directed take
appropriate measures against sabotage.
(11) The dispatch of November 28th:
442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a
dispatch to CincPac for information which was received on November
29th (Exhibit 19, Naval Court) , which repeated a dispatch which had
been sent by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as
follows :
[74] Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical pur-
poses with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come
back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile
action possible at any moment X If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X This policy should
not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might
jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but
these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population
or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate message is being sent to
G-2 Ninth Corps area re subversive activities in the United States X Should
hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as
they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of tljis highly secret information to
minimum essential officers
The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to
the Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as
then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier.
It stated further:
“Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X Be
prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in
case hostilities occur.
(12) Intercepted diplomatic communications , November %9 to De-
cember 6, 1491.
On 30 November 1941, there was a Navy translation of a message
from Tokyo to the Japanese emissaries in Washington, dated 29 No-
vember 1941 (Document 19, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), requesting that
they make one more attempt to discuss the situation with the United
States, and to state that the United States had always taken a fair posi-
tion in the past; that the Imperial Government could not understand
why the United States was taking the attitude that the new Japanese
proposals could not be the basis of discussion, but instead had made
new proposals which ignored actual conditions in East Asia and which
would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government; that
the United States should be asked what had become of the basic
objectives that the United States had made as the basis for negotiations
for seven months ; and that the United States should be asked to reflect
on the matter. The emissaries were directed in carrying out this in-
struction to be careful that this did not lead to anything like a break-
ing off of negotiations.
\75\ Also on 30 November 1941, there was a Navy translation
of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation from Kurusu in
Washington to Yamamoto in Tokyo, in which a telephone code was
used (Document 20, Exhibit 63, Naval Court). This indicated that
Kurusu expected a long message (“probably Tokyo’s reply to Mr.
Hull’s proposals”) ; that the President was returning apparently be-
cause of the speech of the Japanese Premier which Kurusu said was
having strong repercussions here; that Kurusu said that unless the
Premier and others used greater caution in speeches, it would put the
Japanese emissaries here in a very difficult position ; that care should
be exercised, that Yamamoto said that they were being careful; that
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
443
Kurusu wanted the Foreign Minister told that the emissaries here
had expected to hear something different — some good word — but in-
stead got this (the Premier’s speech) ; that the Japanese- American
negotiations were to continue; that Yamamoto wanted them to be
stretched out; that Kurusu needed Yamamoto’s help to do this, and
that both the Premier and the Foreign Minister would need to change
the tone of their speeches and that all would have to use some dis-
cretion; that Yamamoto said the real problem that the Japanese
were up against was the effect of happenings in the South.
There were four significant Japanese communications intercepted
on 1 December 1941, as follows:
(a) Navy translation — (Document 21, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
1 December 1941
(Purple CA)
#865 Re my #857
1. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States
from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others
that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United
States, the negotiations are* continuing. (The above is for only your infor-
mation.)
2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. % S. Ambassador
to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124. Please make
the necessary representations at your end only.
3. There are reports here that the President’s sudden return to the capital
Is an effect of Premier Tojo’s statement. We have an idea that the President
did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please
make investigations into this matter.
[76] (b) Army translation — (Document 22, Exhibit 63, Naval
Court)
From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941
Purple
#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2)
(Secret outside the Department)
1. Japan-Amerlcan negotiations were commenced the middle of April this year.
Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the
Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the corner-
stone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international
situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the
United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope
of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from par-
ticipating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these
negotiations.
2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view
of defending the Empire’s existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis,
has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and
ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations
rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French
Indo-China), were completely In opposition to each other.
Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first
came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with Its traditional
idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her
fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried
on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive
of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the
establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in
the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as
444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be
no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was
the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a
tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite
Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has
only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually
more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer [77]
continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a
continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
(Part 2 of 2)
3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude
of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that
no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will
not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty,
namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the
Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European
war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to
Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others,
makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations.
What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred
with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China — they did so repeatedly.
Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those na-
tions and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an
enemy.
(c) On 1 December 1941, the Armv translated an intercepted mes-
sage from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, dated 30 No-
vember 1941 (Document 6, Exhibit 13), which in substance stated:
The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say
rvery secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that tl^ere is extreme danger that war
may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan, and that
the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anybody dreams.
We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being would
prefer to refrain from any indirect moves on the north. . . . Impress on the
Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.
(d) Army translation — (Document 23, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From: Washington (Nomura)
To : Tokyo
November 28, 1941
Purple
#1214 To be handled in Government Code.
Re my #1190.
So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United
States ; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and head-
lines like [78] this are appearing in the papers: “Hull Hands Peace Plan
to Japanese’*, and “America Scorns a Second Munich.” The papers say that it
is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles,
or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.
This we must carefully note.
On 3 December 1941, there was available the Army translation of
a report by Kurusu and Nomura to Tokyo, dated 2 December 1941
(Document 25, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which stated :
Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Sec-
retary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that
it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned
over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. Thereupon we said : “Since
we haven’t been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in
French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to
our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a
thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20.” The
Under-Secretary then said : “I want you to know that the stand the United States
takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world.” Thereupon
we replied: “The United States and other countries have pyramided economic
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
445
pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. ( I made the statement that
economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven’t the
time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights or wrongs. The
people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that
we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the
chains that it invokes. We want you to realize this as well as the situation in
which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in
China ; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation. Fur-
thermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American pro-
posals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to
this important question which has to do with our national destiny.” Under-Sec-
retary WELLES said : “I am well aware of that.” I continued : ‘‘We cannot over-
emphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible
for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals
prof erred on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25 th, representing
our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of
the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught.
At this late Juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals cer-
tainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations.
Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in [75]
the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of
a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental
questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dis-
solve.” The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said : “The Amer-
ican proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the
position of the United States because of the internal situation here.” Then he
continued : ‘‘In regard to the opinion that you have expressed, I will make it a
point immediately to confer with the Secretary.” I got the impression from the
manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American pro-
posals of the 26th would leave this much room. Judging by my interview with
Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that
the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situa-
tion. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement.
Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations our reply to
the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1283.
There were various intercepted Japanese communications of interest
available on 4 December 1941, as follows :
(a) Navy translation (Document 26, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From : Tokyo
To: Hsinking
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#803
... In the event that Manchuria participates in the war ... in view of various
circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in
which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America
that this country will take in case war breaks out.
A summary follows :
1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as
having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code
telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden.). However it is
desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be
comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries
resident in Japan.
[85] 2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property,
private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that
accorded by Japan.
3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular
offices and interests will not be recognized.
However, the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable
and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.
4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform
to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be
exercised not to antagonize Russia.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 29
446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) Navy translation (Document 27, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From : Washington
To: Tokyo
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#1227
(This raised the question of a possibility of a conference between persons in
whom the leaders have confidence to have the make one final effort to reach
some agreement. The meeting to be held at some midway point, such as Hono-
lulu. . . It was said that this last effort might facilitate the final decision as
to war or peace.)
(c) Navy translation (Document 29, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#875 Chief of Office routing.
Re your #1232
Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:
There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French
•Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been
an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-
French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have [81] increased our
forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some
movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that
the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In
doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-
French joint defense agreement.
(d) Navy translation (Document 31, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1243
If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected
that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration
should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the
consuls.
On 5 December 194:1, there were available translations of additional
intercepted Japanese communications dealing with the diplomatic
negotiations, as follows :
(a) Army translation (Document 33, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1243
Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between
Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is
a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.
(b) Navy translation (Document 34, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
1 December 1941
( Purple)
#1225
(This is a report of conversations held by Japanese representatives with
Secretary Hull on December 1st, which referred to the Japanese Premier’s speech,
the President’s return, Japanese troop movements, and apparent agreements
as to the impossibility of reaching an agreement.)
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY 447
[82] (13) Intercepted Japanese espionage messages between 29
November and 6 December 1941 .
During this period there were available to the Navy and to the
Army in Washington translations of intercepted Japanese espionage
reports concerning Manila, San Francisco, and Honolulu. From
these it appeared that the Japanese were interested in the movements
of ships to and from those ports. The messages relating to Honolulu
were as follows :
(a) On December 3rd, the Navy Department translated a com-
munication from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 15 November 1941 (Docu-
ment 24, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which stated that since relations
between Japan and the United States were most critical, the “Ships
in the harbor report” should be made irregularly but at the rate of
twice a week and that extra care should be taken to maintain secrecy.
(b) On December 5th, there was available at the War Department
a translation of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 18 Novem-
ber 1941, requesting reports on vessels in certain areas of Pearl Harbor,
and directing that the investigation be made with great secrecy
(Document 37, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) .
(c) Also available on December 5th at the Navy Department was
a translation of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 29 Novem-
ber 1941, stating that reports had been received on ship movements,
but in the future Honolulu was also to report even when there were
no movements (Document 36, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).
(d) On December 6th, there was available at the War Department
a translation of a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 18 Novem-
ber 1941, (Document 40, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), reporting on ships
anchored in Pearl Harbor and in certain areas of the harbor, and
pointing out that the Saratoga was not in harbor and that the Enter-
prise or some other vessel was in a particular area. This message also
reported on the course of certain destroyers which had been observed
entering the harbor.
(14) Intercepted message advising of fourteen-part reply by
Japanese and first thirteen parts of reply — 6 December 1941.
On 6 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted Japanese
communication (Document 38, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) , from Tokyo
to Washington, which read :
1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the
26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the
United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).
[85] 2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen
parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure.
The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to
keep it secret for the time being.
3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States,
I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime
to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to
the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.
Also on 6 December 1941, the Navy translated the first thirteen
parts of the Japanese reply (Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court),
which had been sent from Tokyo to Washington in the Japanese
diplomatic code. It may be noted that the translations of parts 8
and 9 of the reply which were originally indicated as Navy trans-
lations were corrected so as to indicate that they were translated by
the Army. These 13 parts which are not set forth here, but particu-
larly part 13, disclosed that the Japanese were of the view that the
448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
American proposal, viewed in its entirety, could not be accepted by
the Japanese as a basis of negotiations.
The message concerniftg delivery of the Japanese reply, and the
first thirteen parts of that reply, were received in the Navy Depart-
ment by 3 p. m. on 6 December 1941. After decryption and transla-
tion by about 9 p. m. on December 6th, they were distributed by Lt.
Comdr. Kramer to the White House and to the Secretary of the
Navy. The Secretary of War and Secretary of State apparently
also received copies and a meeting was called of the three Secretaries
for ten o’clock on the following morning.
(15) Communications intercepted on 7 December 191+1.
The Japanese communications which were translated and avail-
able on the morning of 7 December 1941 included the following :
(a) From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
December 3, 1941
Purple ((Urgent)
#1256. Re your #875
I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was
a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Gov-
ernment is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since
the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the
journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war
or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what
the United States Government will take a bold step depending [&$] upon
how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to
arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither
satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to — even if your
reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. There-
fore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted
to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a
clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider
this question with this in mind and wire me at once.
(b) From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1272
In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL,
we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close
relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because
of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly
secret) . Up until this moment we have the following to report :
(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan “A” dined with the President and ad-
vised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the “intro-
ducing” at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not
make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the
President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters
with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the
advice of these individuals.
(2) Those carrying on Plan “B” included all of our proposal of November
20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the
United States proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advan-
tageous to us (Message Incomplete)
(c) From: Budapest
To: Tokyo
December 7, 1941
LA
#104 Re my #103
On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country
a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break
out on the 7th.
Relayed to Berlin.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY 449
[85] (d) Navy translation (Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval
Court)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
7 December 1941
(Purple-Eng)
#902 Part 14 of 14
(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part,
appeared the plain English phrase “VERY IMPORTANT**)
7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s efforts toward the estab-
lishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and espe-
cially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and
China at war. This Intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the
present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to
adjust Japanese- American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of
the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been
lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot
but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotia-
tions.*'
(e) Army translation (Document 41, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
E>ecember 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent — Very Important)
#907 To be handled in government code.
Re my #902.
WiU the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if pos-
sible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1 : 00 p. m. on
the 7th, your time.
(16) Delivery of Part H and the 1 p. m. message and action taken.
The evidence indicates that Part 14 of the Japanese reply, which
required decoding but not translation, was received between 0305 and
0700 on 7 December 1941, and that it and the first 13 Darts were dis-
tributed [86] by Lt. Comdr. Kramer to Admiral Stark’s
office between 0900 and 0930, and then to the White House and to the
State Department. The “1 p. m. delivery message” was not distributed
at this time. Kramer testified that he returned to the Navy Depart-
ment at about 10 : 20 and found that message and certain other mes-
sages, such as a message which directed the destruction of Japanese
codes, still on hand and another which thanked the Ambassador for
his services. This material, Kramer testified, was delivered to Admiral
Stark at about 10 :30, and then to the White House and to the State
Department.
The evidence indicates that the “1 p. m. message” was decrypted
and was available in Japanese in the Navy Department prior to 0700
on 7 December 1941, and that because there was no Japanese translator
on duty it was sent to the Army for translation at about 0700. It is not
clear when the Army returned the translation of that message. Kra-
mer stated that it was not in the Navy Department when he left to dis-
tribute the fourteen-part reply between 0900 and 0930 that morning,
but that he found it upon his return to the Navy Department at about
10 : 20. It would appear, therefore, that the Army returned its trans-
450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lation of the “1 p. m. message” some time between 0900 and 1020 on
7 December 1941. It further appears that several hours’ advance
notice of the contents of that message may have been lost because there
was no Japanese translator on duty at tne Navy Department on that
Sunday morning, and because it was necessary to wait for an Army
translation.
Prior investigations developed the fact that, after consultation with
Admiral Stark that morning, General Marshall sent a message to
various Army commands, including the Commanding General, Hawai-
ian Department. The message read :
Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts
to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine im-
mediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know
but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.
The prior investigations also developed the fact that the Army radio
was unable to raise Hawaii that morning and accordingly sent that
message by commercial cable in code. The message, according to
General Short’s prior testimony, was received by the Signal Officer
at Hawaii at 1145, and decoded some four hours after the attack.
Whether or not the Army message would have reached the Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Department, prior to the attack if a
Navy translator had been on duty on the morning of 7 December
1941, or if the Army had immediately translated and returned the
“1 p. m. message,” is speculative. It is, morever, also speculative as
to what action might have been taken by General Short or Admiral
Kimm6l had they received that Army message prior to the attack.
[57] (17) Message* sent to Admiral Kim/mel between 29 November
and 7 December 1941.
The messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral
Kimmel during this period dealt primarily with the destruction of
codes by the Japanese and with the advisability of destruction of
United States codes at Guam. The messages are discussed subse-
quently in this report.
(18) Admiral KimmeVs failure to transmit information to subordi-
nate commanders.
It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart in his in-
vestigation that Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor on 5 December
1941 with a powerful force consisting of the Lexington, Chicago, Port-
land, and five destroyers, to deliver a squadron of planes to Midway.
He testified that on that mission he gave no special orders regarding
the arming of planes or regarding preparation for war, other than
the ordinary routine. He said that he never saw, nor was he ever in-
formed of the contents of the October 16th dispatch concerning the
resignation of the Japanese cabinet, of the November 24th dispatch
advising of the possibility of a surprise aggressive movement by the
Japanese in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or
Guam, or the November 27th war warning. He said that except for
what he read in the newspapers, he did not learn anything during the
period November 26th to December 5th which indicated tne increased
danger of hostilities with Japan.
Admiral Bellinger, who was commander of Task Force Nine, con-
sisting of the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified in this investi-
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
451
gation that he never saw nor did he learn the contents of the October
16th, November 24th, or November 27th dispatches from the Chief of
Naval Operations.
[55] C. The Interception of Japanese Telephone and Cable
Messages.
It appears that in Washington, D. C., the Navy was receiving
information obtained from intercepted Japanese telephone and cable
messages. For example, on 30 November 1941, the Navy decrypted and
translated a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation in code be-
tween Kurusu in Washington and Yamamoto in Tokyo (Document
20, Exhibit 63, Naval Court). And, on 10 October 1941, the Navy
decrypted and translated a cable message from Honolulu to Wash-
ington, in which a code was established for reporting the location of
vessels in Pearl Harbor, which message had been photographed in
the cable office in Washington and thus obtained by the Navy (Docu-
ment 3, Exhibit 13).
For many months prior to the attack, the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence at Honolulu had been tapping the telephone wires of the Jap-
anese Consul and of the Japanese Vice Consul. For a period of time
also the home telephones of these officials had been tapped. The taps
on the lines of the Consulate were removed on 2 December 1941 by
direction of Captain Mayfield, who was then the District Intelligence
Officer. The evidence indicates that he took this action because he
was fearful that the existence of such telephone taps would be dis-
covered by the Japanese Consul. His fear arose fro m th e fact that an
FBI tap on the lines of a Japanese official of the NYK had been de-
tected by a telephone company employee who had advised the District
Intelligence Office of this. A representative of the District Intelli-
gence Office subsequently had informed the local FBI office. It was
learned that the FBI office had complained to the telephone company
concerning the disclosure of its tap. In light of this situation, Captain
Mayfield directed that the Navy taps be removed.
It appears that no important military information was intercepted
by means of the Navy Intelligence taps on the lines of the Japanese
Consulate General. Exhibits 38A and 38B of this investigation con-
sist of photostatic copies of the notes made of the telephone conversa-
tion over the Japanese Consul General’s line and the Japanese Vice
Consul’s line during the period 1 October 1941 to 2 December 1941.
Subsequent to 2 December 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion apparently continued its telephone taps and in this fashion on or
about 5 December 1941 learned the contents of a telephone conversation
between a man named Mori in Hawaii and a person in Japan. The
fact of this conversation was brought to the attention of the District
Intelligence Officer, and on 6 December 1941, a transcript of the con-
versation was furnished to him and arrangements were made for a
representative of the District Intelligence Office to listen to the record-
ing of the telephone conversation ; this, however, was not done until
after the attack. A transcript of the telephone conversation, with
marginal notes made by the District Intelligence representative after
the attack, is Exhibit 39 of this investigation. It may be noted that it
452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
appears from prior investigations that this conversation was brought
to the attention of General Short [SP] on the evening of 6
December 1941, and apparently nothing could be made out of it and
no action was taken concerning it. There is no evidence indicating
that this telephone conversation was brought to Admiral Kimmels
attention prior to the attack.
In the conversation, there was mention of the flights of airplanes
daily, the number of sailors present, the attitude of local Japanese,
the local construction projects, the size of the local population, the
precautionary measures taken at night time, the use of searchlights
at night, the emphasis in Honolulu newspapers on the southern ad-
vance of Japan into French Indo-China, the visit of Kurusu, the
local climate, the visit of Litvinoff, the Russian Ambassador, the
recent return of a Japanese from Honolulu to Japan, and the number
of Japanese in the United States Army. The person in Japan in-
quired for information about the United States Fleet. Mon stated
tnat he knew nothing about the Fleet, and that since they tried to
avoid talking about such matters they did not know much about the
Fleet. He said he didn’t know whether all of the Fleet had gone,
but that the Fleet present seemed small, and it seemed that the Fleet
had left. The person in Japan then inquired whether that was so
and what kind of flowers were in bloom in Hawaii. Mori stated that
the flowers in bloom were the fewest out of the whole year, however
that the hibiscus and the poinsettia were in bloom. He later stated
that the Japanese chrysanthemums were in full bloom.
There is some reason to believe that the statements concerning
flowers in the Mori telephone conversation were the use of code words
indicating the absence of presence of ships in Pearl Harbor. In this
connection, the Operation Order for the Japanese task force which
attacked Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 3) provided for the use of a radio
broadcast code in which the statement “the cherry blossoms are in all
their glory” would signify that there .were “No warships in Pearl
Harbor.” This lends support to the theory advanced by representa-
tives of the District Intelligence Office in their testimony to the effect
that the primary purpose of the Mori telephone conversation over the
trans-Pacific radio was to provide information to Japanese Fleet
units which would be listening in on that frequency.
The espionage reports submitted by the Japanese Consul at Hono-
lulu have been previously discussed. It will be recalled that in those
coded messages considerable information was given of the movement
of ships and location of ships in Pearl Harbor and of defense prepa-
rations at Oahu. Certain messages sent during the first week of
their glory” would signify that there were “No warships in Pearl
Harbor. The Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu transmitted
its messages via commercial companies using the various communi-
cations companies alternately. During the month of November, the
McKay Radio Company handled the messages primarily, and during
the month of December, 1941, RCA was transmitting the messages.
[90] Prior to December, 1941, efforts had been made by the
District Intelligence Officer to get access to the files of the communica-
tions companies and thus to secure copies of the Japanese Consul Gen-
eral’s messages. These efforts were without success, in view of the
legal prohibitions against the disclosure of such messages. During a
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
453
visit by Mr. Sarnoff, President of RCA, the District Intelligence
Officer requested him to cooperate with the Navy by making such mes-
sages available, and pointed out the importance to the country of giv-
ing the Navy access to such messages.
On 5 December 1941, RCA Communications, at Honolulu, turned
over to Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer, copies of
some messages which had been sent by the Japanese Consul via RCA
on the third and fourth of December. These messages, with the ex-
ception of a few unimportant plain language messages, were in eode.
Captain Mayfield turned them over to the FOURTEENTH Naval Dis-
trict Communication Intelligence Unit, headed by Lieutenant Com-
mander ‘Rochefort, for decryption and translation. That organiza-
tion had not been working on Japanese diplomatic traffic. Efforts
were immediately made to decrypt and to translate those messages.
The messages so received by Captain Mayfield and turned over to the
FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit
for decryption and translation were not identified in any record made
at the time. Lieutenant Woodward, who did the decryption of them,
has identified, to the best of his recollection, the messages received on
December 5th as those set forth in Exhibit 56 and at pages 7-11 of
Exhibit 56A of this investigation.
Various Japanese codes were used in the messages, including the
“LA” code, which was the simplest and evidently the least important.
The messages in that code, and the plain language messages, were
decoded and read prior to the attack. The “LA” code messages so read
are pages 1-5 of Exhibit 56. They contained no important military
information. One, for example, reported the departure of a trans-
port and another related to the cost of sending families home to Japan.
The testimony of Lieutenant Woodward, who decrypted the message,
of Colonel Lasswell and Captain Finnegan, who translated various of
the messages, of Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the unit,
and of Admiral Mayfield, who was District Intelligence Officer, in-
dicate that no information of military importance was obtained prior
to the attack from any of the Japanese Consulate’s messages. It has
been testified that various of the other messages received on 5 De-
cember 1941 were in a Japanese code known as the “PA” or “PA-
K2” system and that efforts to decrypt these were not successful until
after the attack. These messages, as identified by Lieutenant Wood-
ward, will be found at pages 6-23 of Exhibit 56 (supplied by the Radio
Intelligence Unit) and at pages 7-12 of Exhibit 56 A (supplied by the
District Intelligence Office). They were as follows :
(1) December 3rd to Tokyo— Advising that a freighter in military
service departed on the second and that a named ship arrived on the
third (p. 10, Exhibit 56A).
(2) December 3rd to Tokyo — Advising that the WYOMING and
two seaplane tenders left port. The balance of the message was not
recovered (p. 8, Exhibit 56A).
[0J] (3) December 3rd to Tokyo — In connection with the
handling of expenses for steamer passage to Japan.
(4) December 3rd to Tokyo — Advising of a change in method of
communicating by signals, so that each of the numbers one to eight
had a certain meaning as to departures and dates of departure of
ships, which numbers were to be communicated by lights in beach
454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
houses, by the use of a sailboat, by certain want ads to be broadcast
over a local radio station, and by bonfires at certain points if the
previous signals could not be made (p. 12, Exhibit 56) .
( 5 ) December 3rd to Tokyo and elsewhere — Regarding money taken
in for sale of tickets (p. 16, Exhibit 56).
(6) December 3rd to Tokyo— Advising that the WYOMING and
two seaplane tenders departed the third (p. 22, Exhibit 56).
(7) December 3rd to Tokyo and San Francisco — Advising that a
transport had sailed for the Mainland and that a ship had arrived
from San Francisco (p. 20, Exhibit 56).
A photostatic copy of the December, 1941, bill of RCA Communica-
tions at Honolulu, covering the Japanese Consul General’s messages
in November and December, 1941, was received from the District
Intelligence Office at Honolulu (Exhibit 55). This indicates that
there were four radiograms sent oil November 2nd, two on November
13th, four on December 1st, and twp on December 2nd. The testimony
concerning these is to the effect that they were not received or read
prior to tne attack, that they were received later and were thought to
be in more complex codes, probably machine codes, as there were
no indicators by which they could be identified.
It further appears from Exhibit 55 that there were various other
radiograms charged to the Japanese Consul General for December
4th and 5th, and three for December 6th. The testimony concerning
these indicates that none was obtained prior to the attaclc.
The two messages listed on the RCA bill for December 4th, accord-
ing to Lieutenant Woodward, were among a group of messages re-
ceived on the night of December 7th (p. 4-5, Exhibit 56A). It was
later learned that one advised Tokyo that an English gunboat arrived
on the third and departed and that the sailors nad come ashore and
had received mail at the British Consulate; the other advised that a
light cruiser had departed hastily on the fourth (Exhibit 57).
The five radiograms listed on the RCA bill for December 5th were
received after the attack and were actually two messages to Tokyo,
the second having been sent also to San Francisco, Seattle, and Wash-
ington, D. C. The first message reported the arrival on the morning
of the 5th of three battleships, which had been at sea for eight days,
also that the LEXINGTON and five cruisers had left the same day,
and that eight battleships, three cruisers, and sixteen destroyers were
in port. 'Hie second message has not been translated. It relates to
funds of the Consulate General (Exhibit 57).
[9£] The three radiograms charged for December 6th were
actually two messages in “PA-K2” code ( Exhibit 57 ) . The first, which
was translated after the attack, was sent to Tokyo and to Washington
at 6 : 01 p. m. on 6 December 1941. It set forth the ships observed at
anchor on the sixth and stated :
. . .9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and
in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy
cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air
arm.
The other message of December 6th, which was filed at 12 : 58 p. m.
that day, was, after decryption, translated by Joseph Finnegan, now
a Captain, U. S. N., who reported for duty in the radio intelligence
RESPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY 455
unit on the 9th or 10th of December, 1941. He translated that mes-
sage (Exhibit 57) as follows:
From: KITA
To : F. M. TOKYO 6 Dec. 41.
Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123.
1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis,
N. C. on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the prac-
ticability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investi-
gation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their
use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or
personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would
be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with
operations at nearby Hickam Field, EWA Field and Ford Island. The whole
matter seems to have been dropped.
2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the nonuse of nets for torpedo
defense of battleships and will report further.
Captain Finnegan admitted in his testimony that the last sentence
of the first paragraph of his translation was an incorrect translation.
As appears from an Army translation of that message (Exhibit 57),
that sentence, correctly translated, was as follows :
I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take
advantage for a surprise attack against these places.
As previously noted, among the messages turned over to the Dis-
trict Intelligence Officer and to ComFOURTEEN Communication In-
telligence Unit for decryption and translation on 5 December 1941,
was the [93] message from Honolulu to Tokyo dated 3 Decem-
ber 1941, which established a system of signals to b!e used from Oahu
by means of lights at beach houses, the use of a sailboat, by wants ads on
a radio station, and bonfires. This message was in the possession of
the Radio Communications Intelligence Unit from 5 December to 10
December 1941, at which time it was successfully decrypted and trans-
lated. The Japanese Consul General’s signal message of December
3rd was not only in the possession of the Navy at Pearl Harbor prior
to the attack, but was also in the possession of the Navy Department
at Washington prior to the attack. A copy of that message as con-
tained in the Op-20-G files at the Navy Department, indicates that it
was translated on 11 December 1941, and that it had been intercepted
by any Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Va. (Document
22, Exhibit 13). In fact, however, that message was decrypted and
translated in rough form prior to 1 p. m., 6 December 1941, by Mrs.
Edgers, a translator assigned to the Op-20-G Unit, Navy Department.
She testified that she believed that it was shown that afternoon to
Kramed and that he examined it in rough form. Kramer did not re-
call this but did recall going over the message thoroughly on December
8th. Evidently further work on this message was deferred on De-
cember 6th because of the pressure of work on the thirteen parts of the
Japanese fourteen-part reply which were being decrypted that after-
noon and evening.
It should be noted that a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated 2
December 1941, was intercepted by the Army radio intercept unit at
Fort Shafter, Hawaii (Document 24, Exhibit 13). This message
stated that in view of the present situation the presence of warships,
airplane carriers and cruisers was of utmost importance, that there
should be daily reports, that there should be reports whether or not
there were observation balloons above Pearl Harbor, or an indications
456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that they would be set up, and whether or not the warships were pro-
vided with anti-mine nets. The message apparently was forwarded
from Fort Shafter by mail to the Army. The Army translation of the
message bears a note that the message was received on December 23rd
and translated on 30 December 1941, by the Army. It has been testified
by Brigadier General Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department,
that no decryption was done at Port Shafter, but that all intercepted
traffic was forwarded to Washington for decryption and translation.
Finally, it appears that the two highly significant messages sent by
the Japanese Consul General during the afternoon of December 6tn
were both intercepted by the Army intercept station at San Francisco
and forwarded to the Army in Washington by teletype (Docs. 14, 15,
Exhibit 13). Both of these were in the Japanese code known as the
“PA-K2” code and are indicated to have been translated by the
Army on Monday, December 8. 1940, According to Captain Salford, the
longer message, stating that there was “considerable opportunity left
to take advantage for a surprise attack” against Pearl Harbor, and
that the battleships did not have torpedo nets, could have been de-
crypted in about an hour and a half ; and the shorter message, which
stated in part that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the
Fleet air arm, could have been decrypted in less than an hour.
|&£] D. The “Winds Code ” and the Alleged “ Winds Message .”
In the latter half of November, 1941, the Japanese Government by
messages to Washington and elsewhere established two codes to be
used for communication between Tokyo and elsewhere. The first has
been referred to as the “winds code.” In that code certain Japanese
words were to be added in the middle and at the end of the daily Jap-
anese language short-wave news broadcasts and could also be used in
Morse code messages, which words would apparently be weather re-
ports. Thus, the Japanese words “HIGASHI NO KAZEAME”
which meant “East wind rain,” would actually mean that Japan-
United States relations were in danger. Words were also supplied
for Japan-Russian relations and for Japan-British relations. The
existence of this code was brought to the attention of the Navy De-
partment late in November through the interception and decryption of
Japanese messages establishing the code, and also through informa-
tion to the same effect received from other sources such as the United
States Naval Attache at Batavia. It appeared that the use of the
code words would indicate a breaking off of diplomatic relations or
possibly war between the countries designated.
The Japanese also established, late in November, 1941, a code sys-
tem which has been referred to as the “hidden word code.” This code
was not discussed in previous investigations. The establishment of
the code was first learned through the interception and decryption in
Washington, D. C. of several Japanese diplomatic communications
which had been sent from Tokyo on and after 2 December 1941 (Doc-
uments 6, 8, 12, 17 and 20, Exhibit 13) . This code was intended to be
used, when telegraphic communications might be severed, as a means
of informing Japanese diplomats of the situation concerning the coun-
try in which they were located. Thus the word “KODAMA” meant
Japan, the word “KOYANATI” meant England, the word “MIN-
AMI” meant United States, and the word “HATTORI” meant that
relations between Japan and another country, to -be identified by a
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
457
code word, were not in accordance with expectations. It may be
noted that the meaning of the last word, as set forth in the Navy
translation of the “hidden word code,” differs from the meaning which
the War Department cryptanalyst testified should have been given to
the word. According to his testimony, the word should have been
translated as meaning that relations were on the verge of crisis or that
hostilities might commence.
Prior investigations conducted by the Army Pearl Harbor Board
and the Naval Pearl Harbor' Court of Inquiry resulted in findings
that prior to 7 December 1941 there had been a “winds code message”
by the Japanese in which the code words relating to the United States
were used, and that this message had been intercepted by the Navy
Department prior to the attack and communicated to the Army, but
that no copy of it could be found in the Army or Navy files. It ap-
pears that these findings were based primarily on the testimony of
Captain Salford and of Captain Kramer of the Navy Department.
It should be noted that a Japanese message using the “winds code”
words relating to the United States, if received on 3 or 4 December,
or at any other time prior to 7 December 1941, would have conveyed
no information of importance which the Navy and War Departments
did not already possess. Such a message would have indicated either a
break in diplomatic relations or possibly war with the United States.
That both the Navy Department and the War Department, and
Admiral Kimmel as well, were already aware that a break in diplo-
matic relations or war with the United States was imminent, is clearly
established by the [95] November 27th “war warning” to Ad-
miral Kimmel, and by the repetition on November 28th by the Navy
of the Army’s warning dispatch to General Short.
In view, however, of the findings by the Naval Court of Inquiry
and the Army Pearl Harbor Board that a “winds message” relating
to the United States was received about 3 December 1941, and that no
copy of it could be found, further investigation on this point was
deemed necessary.
fl) Prior investigations .
(a) The Naval Court of Inquiry:
In the “Addendum” to its findings, the Naval Pearl Harbor Court
of Inquiry stated concerning the “Winds Code” as follows:
From 26 November to 7 December, 1041, there was much diplomatic dispatch
traffic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington
which had a bearing on the critical situation existing and which was not trans-
mitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. A message dated 19 November,
1941, Tokyo to Washington, translated on 28 November, 1941, and referred to as
“The Winds Code” was as follows :
“Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
“In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and
the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be
added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.
“(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME. 1
“(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KOTANOKAZE KUMORI. 2
“(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE. 3
“This signal will be given in the maddle and at the end as a weather forecast
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy
all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
“Forward as urgent intelligence.”
1 East wind rain.
3 North wind cloudy.
* West wind clear.
458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[Pfl] The Comiuander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 November, 1941, sent to
the Chief of Naval Operations, information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet ; Commandant 16th Naval District ; and Commandant 14th Naval District,
substantially the same information as outlined above. On 5 December, 1941,
the United States Naval Attache, Batavia, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations
substantially the same information. These messages stated that at some future
date information would be sent by Japan indicating a breaking off of diplomatic
relations or possibly war between countries designated.
All officers of the Communication and Intelligence Divisions in the Navy
Department, considering the expected information most important, were on
the lookout for this notification of Japanese intentions. On 4 December an
intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the Navy
Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations,
either a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United
States, or war, this Information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat
It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific
and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and ap-
parently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the
execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth
this message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made
by the Navy Department to ascertain whether this information had been ob-
tained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat.
Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, although Admiral Turnei
stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that Admiral Kinunel
had it This message cannot now be located in the Navy Department.
(b) The Army Pearl Harbor Board:
The “Top Secret” and separateportion of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board’s report referred to the * ‘Winds Message.” The report stated
that a winds execute message reading “War with the United States,
war with Britain, including the Netherlands East Indies, except peace
with Russia” had been received in the Navy Department on 3 December
1941 ; that the Navy admitted that that message was received prior to
December 6th; and, that the War Department files contained no copy
of the message. The report referred in this connection to testimony
by Captain Safford, who stated that such message had been received
by Commander Kramer, who had been [97] notified by Broth-
erhood of its receipt, and that it had been seen by Safford at 8 : 00 a. m.
on December 4th. Safford stated that no copy of the message could be
found in the Navy Department files.
The Army report further stated that on December 5tli, Admiral
Noyes called Colonel Sadtler, at 9 : 30 a. m., saying : “Sadtler, the mes-
sage is in.” Apparently based on Sadtler’s testimony, the report also
stated that Sadtler did not know whether this meant war with the
United States, but believed it meant war with either the United States,
Russia or Great Britain ; that he discussed it with his superiors and
was instructed to confer with Admiral Noyes; and that he telephoned
Admiral Noyes, who said that he was too busy and would have to confer
with Sadtler later. Sadtler then saw various officers in the War De-
partment, all of whom did not think that any further information
should be sent to Hawaii.
It also appeared that the Army Board had received testimony on
this matter from Colonel Bratton, who said that Sadtler, acting on
behalf of Colonel Bratton, had arranged for the FCC to monitor Jap-
anese broadcasts. Apparently Bratton testified that no information
reached him before December 7th which indicating a break in relations
with the United States and that he did not think that any such infor-
mation had reached anyone else. He referred to an FCC intercept
which was not the message for which they had been looking.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY 459
(2) The basis of the 'previous findings that there was a Winds Exe-
cute message prior to the attack .
The basis for the Army Pearl Harbor Board finding that a “winds
message” relating to the United States had been received appears, to
the extent known by the Navy, in the above summary of the top secret
portion of the Army Board’s report. That indicates that primarily
the basis for the finding was the testimony of Captain Sanord. In
addition to Safford’s testimony, there was apparently testimony by
Sadtler of a conversation with Admiral Noyes in which he referred to
a “winds message” but not to the contents of that message.
Captain Safford testified before Admiral Hart and before the Naval
Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry. His testimony was the primary basis
for the Naval Court of Inquiry’s findings that a “winds message” relat-
ing to the United States had been received. In addition to nis testi-
mony, the Naval Court of Inquiry had testimony from Captain
Kramer bearing on this subject which tended to support the finding.
In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford said :
On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning
message to the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summariz-
ing significant events up to that date, quoting the “Winds Message”, and ending
with the positive warning that war was imminent Admiral Wilkinson approved
this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my [98] presence.
I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about
three p. m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked,
“What do you think of the message?” Admiral Noyes replied, “I think it is an
insult to the intelligence of the Commander in Chief.” Admiral Wilkinson stated,
“I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of
things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do.
I think it only fair to the Commander in Chief that he be given this warning
and I intend to send it if I can get it released by the front office.” Admiral Wil-
kinson then left aocLI left a few minutes later. At the time of the Japanese
attack on Pearl HUrbor, I thought that this message of warning had been sent,
and did not realize until two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very
carefully, that McCollum’s message had not been sent. In order to clarify the
above statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to explain
what is meant by the “Winds Message”. The “Winds Message” was a name
given by Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence duties to iden-
tify a plain-language Japanese news broadcast in which a fictitious weather re-
port gave warning of the intentions of the Japanese Government with respect to
war against the United States, Britain (including the N. E. I.), and Russia. We
received a tip-off from the British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which
was immediately forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander in Chief,
U. S. Asiatic Fleet, with an information copy to the Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet. We also received a tip-off from the Dutch in Java through the American
Consul General and through the Senior Military Observer. The Dutch tip-off
was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the State Department,
War Department, and Navy Department. The Director of Naval Intelligence
requested that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the “Winds
Message” when it should be sent, and this was done. From November 28 until
the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored by about
12 intercept stations, as follows: N. E. I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S.
Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corrigedor, Hawaii, Bremer-
ton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept
stations in the continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo
plain-language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of
sixty dollars per day for this material alone. The ‘Winds Message” was actually
broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington Time), which
was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of fre-
quency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the “Winds Message”
was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only
one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it. The other nations
and other Navy C. I. units, not hearing the “Winds Message” themselves and
not receiving any word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed [99]
460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that the “Winds Message" had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese Govern-
ment was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese at-
tacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java, and the Ameri-
cans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and
Army posts in Hawaii. It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy
Department, failed to send out information that the “Winds Message" had been
sent by Tokyo. The “Winds Message" was received in the Navy Department
during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M.
Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in Brother-
hood’s mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different
form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Com-
mander Kramer, who came down that evening and identified the message as the
“Winds Message" we had been looking for. The significant part of the “Winds
Message" read: “HIGASHI NO KAZEAME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The
negative form of KITA NO KAZB KUMORI". The literal translation of these
phrases Is: “BAST WIND RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH
WIND NOR CLOUDY." The meaning of this message from the previously men-
tioned tip-off was: “War with the United States. War with Britain, Including
the N. E. I., etc. Peace with Russia." I first saw the “Winds Message" about
8 : 00 a. m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R.,
came into my office with a big smile on his face and piece of paper in his hand
and said, “Here It Is!" as he handed me the “Winds Message." As I remember,
it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant “Winds” under-
scored and the meaning in Kramer’s handwriting at the bottom. Smooth copies
of the translation were immediately prepared and distributed to Naval Intelli-
gence and to S. I. S. in the War Department. As the direct result of the “Winds
Message," I prepared a total of five messages, which were released between 1200
and 1600 that date, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret'
and confidential papers by certain activities on the Asiatic Station. As a direct
result of the “Winds Message," McCollum drafted the long warning message,
previously referred to, which was disapproved by higher authority, but which
the Navy Department C. I. Unit believed had been sent. Both Naval Intelligence
and the Navy Department C. I. Unit regarded the “Winds Message" as definitely
committing the Japanese Government to war with the United States and Britain,
whereas the information of earlier dates had been merely statements of intent.
We believed that the Japanese would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by
Sunday (December 7) at the latest The following officers recall having seen
and having read the “Winds Message" : Captain L. F. Salford, U. S. N., Lieutenant
Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Mur-
ray, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant ( jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The following of-
ficers knew by hearsay that the “Winds Message" had been Intercepted but did
not actually see It themselves: Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N. ; Lieutenant
Commander G. W. Linn. U. S. N. R. ; Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N. ; Major F. B.
Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve. * * *
[100] The “Winds Message" was last seen by myself about December 14,
1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were as-
sembled by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of
Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, ac-
cording to my understanding at the time.
Before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Captain Safford repeated in
substance his prior testimony and stated that Lieutenant Murray or
possibly Kramer brought him the message ; that he couldn’t determine
from what Navy intercept station the message had come: that he had
a vague recollection of a second “Winds Message”, but had been unable
to find any trace of it until he testified before Admiral Hart; that
since that time he learned that the FCC had intercepted a “Winds
Message” at Portland, but that he did not recognize that message.
He did not recall any of the FCC intercepts contained in Exhibit 65
of the Naval Court of Inquiry, none of which indicated a break with
the United States. He stated further that despite repeated search
since November, 1943, no copy of the “Winds Message” could be found
in the files; that Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood had told him
that he knew the disposition of them, but did not care to tell Safford.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
461
Also Safford said that he knew what had happened to the Anny
copies of that message through very “second hand and devious
sources.” He also repeated his prior testimony to the effect that about
the middle of the first week in December, 1944, Commander McCollum
had drafted a long dispatch which included information about the
“Winds Message,” and which dispatch had not been sent out.
Commander Kramer in his testimony before the Naval Court, said
that on December 3rd or 4th he had been shown a “Winds Message”
by the watch officer and took it immediately to Captain Safford, who
took it to Admiral Noyes. This was a plain-language message and,
as shown to him, contained the phrase translated as “East Wind Rain”
which meant strained relations or a break with the United States.
The message had been on teletype paper and indicated that it had
come through an USN intercept station.
Among the witnesses before the Naval Court of Inquiry who testified
that so far as they knew there had never been a “Winds Message”
relating to the Umted States were Admiral Stark, General Marshall,
and Admiral Noyes. Neither Admiral Wilkinson nor Commander
McCollum, who were alleged by Safford to have had knowledge of
the “Winds Message,” was a witness before the Naval Court of In-
quiry, as both were at the time actively engaged in combat operations.
(3) Evidence Obtained, in this Investigation Concerning “Winds
Message.”
(a) Testimony of Captain Safford:
Captain Safford testified that in the Fall of 1943 it appeared that
there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel.
He realized that he would be one of the important witnesses and
that his memory was vague. Accordingly, he began looking around
to get [101] information in order to prepare a written state-
ment which he could use in his testimony. He noticed that in the
Roberts report there was no reference to the “Winds Message” or
to the dispatch which McCollum had drafted. Safford then Degan
talking to everyone who had been around at the time to see what
they could remember, and to see if they could give him leads so that
it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory. He talked
the thing over with various of the Army people.
Safford testified that he had written to Brotherhood and that
Brotherhood had written back saying that he didn’t care to tell
Safford about the disposition of the copies of the “Winds Message,”
but when Brotherhood returned to the United States, Safford awed
him about it and found out that there had been a misunderstanding.
Brotherhood had been referring to the false “Winds Message” (Docu-
ment 2 of Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court) , which apparently related
to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast.
Safford stated that he had information “third hand” concerning
the Army’s copies of the “Winds Message,” and that he thought it
might be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadtler before the
Army investigation. He stated that his information from the Army
came through W. F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst in the War Depart-
ment, and mat the information was that the copies of the “Winds
Message” had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel
Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall. Safford also stated
that Colonel Bratton of the War Department had had some question
79716 — 16— Ex. 167 30
462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
about the message and had asked Admiral Noyes by telephone for
a copy, of the original of the “Winds Message,” but that Admiral
Noyes had refusea to comply on the grounds that the Navy transla-
tion was correct. This, he said, should appear in Colonel Bratton’s
testimony before the Army investigation. He also stated that a Cap-
tain Shukraft of the Army knew that the “Winds Message” had been
received.
Salford testified that he had talked with Kramer shortly before his
testimony during this investigation, and that contrary to his earlier
impression, Kramer told him that the “Winds Message” and various
other intercepts relating to Japan had not been turned over to the
Roberts Commission, but about 9 December 1941 had been collected
and shown to Under Secretary Forrestal, during the absence of
Secretary Knox. He also said that Kramer told him that he did not
recall the “Winds Message” specifically. Salford also stated that the
reference in McCollum’s message to tne “Winds Message” was very
short and was the last item in McCollum’s draft dispatch.
Salford testified that it now appears more likely that the “Winds
Message” was received early in tne morning of December 4th, Wash-
ington time, rather than the night before, Decause the watch officers
who were on d uty recollected only the false “Winds Message,” and
not the “true ‘Winds Message.’” The vagaries of high frequency
radio, he said, resulted in the message being intercepted only on the
East Coast of the United States, and that such conditions were not
unusual. He pointed out that they had to call on Corrigedor to cover
the Tokyo-Berlin circuits because the combined efforts of intercept
stations on the East Coast, [1021 West Coast, Hawaii and Eng-
land could not provide better than about fifty percent coverage. Al-
though he had no knowledge as to which Naval station allegedly in-
tercepted the message, his first guess was the station at Cheltenham,
Maryland, and his second guess was Winter Harbor, Maine. He
stated that the logs of those stations and of the Navy Department
had been destroyed during one of the numerous moves and no record
had been kept.
Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Lieutenant
Commander Brotherhood at 9 : 05 p. m. on December 4th (Exhibit
65, Naval Court) , he said that this was the “false” message which ap-
peared on the surface to use the “winds” code words relating to Rus-
sia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast. This message, he
said, Brotherhood telephoned to Admiral Noyes and later Kramer
took one look at it and said it was not what was wanted and threw
it into the waste basket. He said that that message was received twelve
hours or more after what he referred to as the “true winds message.”
Salford identified Document 4, Exhibit 65, as a true “winds” mes-
sage relating to England, which was intercepted on 7 December 1941
after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Salford testified that he had been advised that the Dutch had been
monitoring for a “winds” execute message, but that prior to the at-
tack they had intercepted no such message.
(b) Captain Kramer’s Testimony :
Captain Kramer said that he had testified previously concerning
the “winds” message but wanted to go over that previous testimony
in the light of thinking it over since that time. He said that lie had
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
463
had no recollection of a “winds” message at the time it was first men-
tioned to him, the spring of 1944, but after receiving from Safford
some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, he did recall
a message some days before 7 December 1941, about the middle of the
week, and did recall being shown such a message by the watch officer
and walking with him to Captain Salford’s office and being present
while he turned it over to Captain Safford. Captain Kramer thought
that that message had been a “winds” message, but did not recall the
wording of it. He said it might have been one using the code words
referring to the United States, as he previously testified, but he was
less positive of that now that he had been at the time of his previous
testimony. The reason for this revision of his view was that on think-
ing it over, he had a rather sharp recollection that in the latter part
of the week preceding the attack there was still no specific mention
of the United States in any of the Japanese traffic. For that reason
he was under the impression when he testified during this investiga-
tion that the message referred to England and possibly to the Dutch
rather than to the United States, although it may have referred to
the United States, too. He just didn’t recall.
Captain Kramer testified that on the morning of December 7th, a
Japanese “hidden word” code message was received and was hur-
riedly translated by him as he was about to leave the Navy Depart-
ment to deliver other messages. The message as translated by
Kramer was, “Relations between Great Britain and Japan are not in
accordance with expectations” (Exhibit 20). In his \_103\
haste, Kramer overlooked the word “MINAMI” which was contained
in tiie Japanese Message and which referred to the United States.
He testified that after he returned to the Navy Department and
shortly before 1 p. m. on December 7th, he discovered his mistake
and made a penciled correction on the file copy of the translation.
He testified further that he believed that he made several telephone
calls about fifteen minutes before the attack and advised the officer
in charge of the Far Eastern Section of ONI and an officer of G-2
of the War Department. The copies of the translation in the Navy
Department’s files do not disclose any correction of the translation
(Exhibit 20). Kramer testified concerning this that a number of
copies of the translation were made at the time, and that undoubtedly
his correction was made on another copy which has since been
discarded.
Captain Kramer also stated that he had been under the impression
until he testified before this investigation that the “hidden word
message” of 7 December 1941 had been a “Winds Message,” but now
recognized it as a “hidden word message.” He stated that he thought
that the “hidden word message”, which he identified as having been
received on 7 December, was among the group of messages shown
to Mr. Forrestal about 9 December 1941, when he hastily reviewed
a folder of that traffic for Mr. Forrestal. This was done, he said,
because of the fact that previously Mr. Forrestal had not seen such
material.
(c) Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood 's Testimony:
Lt. Comdr. Brotherhood testified that he was one of the four watch
officers who were on watch in Captain Safford’s section during the
464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
first week of December, 1941. He said that he had never received
an intercept or message wherein the “Winds Code” words relating to
the United States were used. He said that about December 4th, he
received a telephone message from the FCC in which the words ap-
parently relating to Russia were used ; that he called Admiral Noyes,
who commented that the wond was blowing from a “funny” direction,
and that he, Brotherhood, did not think at the time that it was an
actual “Winds Message.” Brotherhood stated that shortly before
he testified in this investigation, he had had a conversation with
Safford who stated that Brotherhood had called him about Decem-
ber 4th or 5th and had told him that such a message had arrived.
Brotherhood said he did not recall the telephone conversation and
that he believed, therefore, that he had called Captain Safford at
that time.
(d) Lieutenant Commander Linn's Testimony:
Linn testified that a 24-hour watch was maintained in Captain
Salford’s section; that he was senior officer of that watch, and was
one of the four officers who stood that watch during the first week in
December, 1941. Any intercept which had come into that section,
he said, would have had to come through one of the four watch officers.
He was familiar with the “Winds Code” and he never saw any intercept
[10Jf\ prior to 7 December 1941 in which the “winds” code words
relating to the United States were used.
(e) Lieutenant Commander Penny's Testimony:
Pering testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing
watch during the first week of December, 1941, in Captain Salford’s
section. He Knew of the existence of the “winds” code and he never
saw any intercept using the code words relating to the United States.
(f) Lieutenant Commander Murray's Testimony:
Murray testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing
a twenty-four hour watch in Captain Salford’s section during the
first week in December, 1941. He testified that no “winds” code exe-
cute relating to the United States ever came to his attention during
that week. He said that after the attack, Linn had told him that a
“winds” message had come in on 7 December 1941.
(g) Lieutenant Freeman's Testimony:
Freeman testified that he was in a section which disseminated to
ONI intelligence received from the field radio intelligence units ; that
his unit worked very closely with Captain Salford’s unit, and that
every effort was made to monitor for a “winds” message.” Freeman
was one of the officers mentioned by Captain Safford, in his testimony
before Admiral Hart, as having personal knowledge of the receipt of
a “winds” message relating to the United States. He testified that he
never knew of any intercept of a “winds” message relating to the
United States.
(h) Captain McCollum's testimony:
Captain McCollum testified that he had been familiar with the
“winds” code ; that he had no knowledge of any message transmitted
which contained the words relating to the United States; that the
message which contained the words apparently relating to Russia
had been received during the first week of December, 1941, but that
in his opinion that was a bona fide weather report. He said further
that during the first week of December, 1941, he drafted a dispatch
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
465
summarizing the situation which he wanted to have sent out; that he
remembered no reference to any “winds” message in that dispatch;
and, that the dispatch was based on a memorandum of his dated 1
December 1941 which did not refer to a “ winds” message (Exhibit 10) .
He did not know whether or not his draft dispatch had been sent out.
It had been submitted to Admiral Wilkinson.
(i) Admiral Wilkinson's Testimony:
Admiral Wilkinson testified that his only recollection of the
“winds” code was that some time after the attack, some one, possibly
Commander McCollum, had mentioned to him that a message using a
“winds” code had been received. Possibly, he said, it was the message
received on the 7th using the words relating to England. He did not
recall anything about the long dispatch which McCollum had drafted
and which [705] Captain Salford had testified Admiral Wilk-
inson had endeavored to have sent out.
(j) Captain Mason's and Commander Fabian's Testimony:
Camptain Mason, who was Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet,
and Commander Fabian, who was in the Radio Intelligence Unit at
Corregidor, both testified that intensive efforts had been made there
to monitor for any Japanese broadcasts using the “winds” code, and
that nothing was received wherein the words relating to the United
States were used. In this connection, it should be noted that it was
the view of the Navy Department that the unit at Corregidor, because
of its geographical location, was in a much better position to intercept
Japanese radio broadcasts than were the units at Pearl Harbor or
Washington (see Exhibit 8).
They also testified that close liaison was maintained with British
Intelligence services in the Philippines, that the British had been
monitoring for a “winds” message also, and that had such a message
been received by the British, they most certainly would have been
advised of its receipt, but that they received no information from
the British as to the receipt of a “winds” message prior to the attack.
(k) Captain Layton's Testimony:
Captain Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that
he had been familiar with the “winds” code ; that efforts were made
to monitor for the use of that code; and all available Japanese lan-
guage officers were placed on continuous watch on several circuits and
were to cover all known news broadcasts emanating from Japan;
that he checked up each day with Commander Rochefort and that
no “winds” intercept was received prior to 7 December 1941, nor did
they receive any dispatch from any source stating that such an inter-
cept had been heard.
( l ) Captain Safford recalled :
Captain Safford was recalled and testified that he never had a
conversation with Colonel Sadler concerning the existence of a
“winds” message. He stated that he could not recall distinctly whether
or not he received a call from Brotherhood about December 4th in
which Brotherhood advised of the receipt of a message apparently
using the Russian “winds” code words. He had had a vague idea
that there was another “winds” message, and, he said, the FCC inter-
cept seemed to fill the bill. He said further, however, that until
1944 he did not recall having seen, or knowing of the FCC intercept
in which the words relating to Russia were used.
466 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(m) Mr. Friedman's Testimony:
Mr. Friedman, a cryptanalyst of the War Department, stated that
prior to 7 December 1941 he had no information as to whether or
not a “winds” message had been intercepted. He said that he had
had several conversations with Captain Safford concerning the sub-
ject, the first one about a year and a half ago, and none later than
six months prior to his [705] testimony in this investigation.
He said that Safford had indicated in the course of the early con-
versations that there had been a “winds” message, but that no copies
could be found in the Navy’s files, and that his theory was that it
had been intercepted by a Navy East Coast station. Mr. Friedman
also testified that about a vear and a half ago he had a conversation
with Colonel Sadler, who had indicated that a “winds” message had
come in on the 4th or 5th of December; that he had been notified
either directly or by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes,
that the message was in; that there had been some question about
the exact Japanese words which had been used, and that Sadler had
not seen the message himself, and Mr. Friedman thought that Colonel
Sadler also told him that they had tried to get a verification from
Admiral Noyes but had not been successful, whereupon the G-2
authorities simply passed the matter over since there was apparently
nothing to substantiate the existence of the message. Mr. Friedman
said that he had asked Sadler whether he had ever seen a copy of
that message, and Colonel Sadler said that he had not, but that he
had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or
directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Mr. Friedman tes-
tified that he regarded this as highly inconceivable, but that in con-
versation with Captain Safford he probably just passed that out as
one of those crazy things that get started, and that he had no idea
that Safford would repeat that statement. Mr. Friedman had no
knowledge, directly or indirectly, concerning the existence of a “winds”
message relating to the United States, apart from his conversations
with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler.
(n) Captain Rochefort's Testimony:
Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Radio Intelligence
Unit at Pearl Harbor, testified that they monitored for any “winds”
code message, covering all known broadcasts from Tokyo on a twenty-
four hour basis, and that results were nil. - He testified further that
he had made an exhaustive search into all available Navy records
and could find no trace of any “winds” message prior to 7 December
1941.
[757] E. Information Concerning the Organization of the Jap-
anese Navy.
( 1) ONI Report of 29 July 1941-
On July 29th, the Office of Naval Intelligence issued a revised re-
port, which had been prepared by Commander McCollum, dealing
with the organization of the Japanese Navy. This stated that, as
a result of information which had been received, it was possible to
give a much more complete picture of the organization of the Jap-
anese Navy. It stated that the Japanese naval forces afloat were
organized into two main commands — the Combined Fleet and the
Japanese Naval Forces in China. The Combined Fleet included:
( a) First Fleet, or Battle Force.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
467
(b) Second Fleet, or Scouting Force.
(c) Third Fleet, or Blockade and Shipping Control Force.
(d) Fourth Fleet, or Mandated Islands Defensive Force.
(e) Submarine Force (also called the Sixth Fleet).
The Combined Fleet and First FUet. under the command of Admiral
Yamamota, consisted of various BatjDivs, a CruDiv, three CarDivs
and two destroyer squadrons. BatDiv 3 (KONGO, HIYEI, KIRI-
SHIMA, HARUNA) was included. The carrier divisions were Car-
Div 3 (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU) ; CarDiv 5 (RYUJO, HOSHO) ;
and CarDiv 7 (CHITOSE, CHIYODA, MIZUHO).
The Second Flet } under the command of Vice Admiral Koga, in-
cluded various cruiser divisions, two carr ier divisions and two de-
stroyer squadrons. CruDiv 8 (CHIKUMA and TONE) was in-
cluded. The carrier divisions were: (CarDiv 1 (AKAGI and
KAGA), and CarDiv 2 (SORYU and HIRYU).
The Third Fleet included CarDiv 6 (NOTORO and KAMIKAWA
MARU) and various minelayer and minesweeper divisions, a base
force and sub-chaser squadrons.
The composition of the Fourth Fleet or Mandates Fleet, and of the
Submarine Fleet and of the Japanese Naval Forces in China was also
given. ( Exhibit 81 )
(2) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number 15-41.
On 27 November 1941 (when the “war warning” was received), the
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, distributed Pacific Fleet Intel-
ligence Bulletin Number 45-41 (Exhibit 21). This bulletin dealt
with the organization of the Japanese Navy and with Japanese Forces
and installations in the Mandated Islands. It was a revision of the
ONI bulletin above summarized and replaced that bulletin on the
subject of the Japanese Fleet. This stated :
The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet com-
mands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane
tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in
connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has
resulted in a notable [108] specialization within the various commands,
as shown below :
Major Fleet Commands
1. First Fleet (Battle Force) 8 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 Des-
rons.
2. Second Fleet (Scouting Force) 4 Crudivs, 2 Desrons, etc.
8. Third Fleet (Blockade & Transport Small Craft.
Force)
4. Fourth Fleet (Mandate Defense Force)-. 1 Desron, 1 Subron, and
many small units.
5. Fifth Fleet (?) (?).
6. Sixth Fleet (Submarine Fleet) 6 Subrons.
7. Carrier Fleet (Aircraft Carriers) 5 Cardivs.
8. Combined Air Force (Seaplane tenders, 4 Airrons, & shore based
etc.) planes.
II. Japanese Naval Forces in China (Staff Head* 1 PG and 3 DD’s.
quarters).
1. First China Exped. Fleet (Central China) Gunboats.
2. Second China Bxped. Fleet (South China) 1 CA, 1 CL and small craft.
8. Third China Bxped. Fleet (North China)- Torpedo Boats, etc.
4. Southern Bxped. Fleet (Saigon) 1 CL, transports and mine
craft
The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever be-
fore. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line be-
tween merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter aU the time. The base
468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly Increased
the strength of the Navy, which is on full-war-time footing.
The Combined Fleet and First Fleet as listed in this bulletin in-
cluded three BatDivs, among which was BatDiv 3 (HIYEI, KON-
GO, KIRISHIMA and HARlJNA — as to the latter it was stated that
it had been inactive during 1941 and was probably undergoing major
repairs). Also included was a cruiser division and two destroyer
squadrons.
The Second Fleet included four CruDive and two destroyer squad-
rons. One of the CruDiv was CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA) .
The composition of the Third, Fourth and Sixth (Submarine)
Fleets was given in some detail in this bulletin. As to a Fifth Fleet ,
it stated “The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. The
flagship has been reported at Maizuru.”
[109 \ The composition of the Carrier Fleet , with the KAGA as
flagship, and consisting of ten carriers and sixteen destroyers, was
listed as follows :
CarDiv 1: AKAGI, KAGA (F) and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 2: SORYU (F) and HIRYU and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 3: RYUJO (F) and HOSHO and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 4 : ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU and a destroyer division.
CarDiv—: KORYU and KASUGA (MARU).
As will appear subsequently, the forces which attacked Pearl Har-
bor on 7 December 1941 included six carriers, the KAGA and AKAGI
(CarDiv 1), the SORYU and HIRYU (CarDiv 2), and the ZUIKA-
KU and SHAKAKU. The latter two carriers had been identified as
CarDiv 4 in the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin, as CarDiv 3 (an-
nexed to the First Fleet) in the earlier ONI bulletin, and as CarDiv 5,
in Exhibit 3, which sets forth the composition of the attacking force.
Also included in the attacking force were the HIYEI ana KIR-
ISHIMA (two of the battleships of BatDiv 3) which had been listed
in the intelligence bulletins as assigned to the Combined Fleet and
First Fleet, and the TONE and CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8) which had
been listed in the Intelligence bulletins as assigned to the Second
Fleet.
[110] F. Information Concerning the Location and Movements
of Japanese Naval Forces
The evidence indicates that there were no formal arrangements
whereby the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the loca-
tion and movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far
Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to
charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval
Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio in-
telligence information available in the Navy Department, and the
situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence
officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general information
concerning Japanese movements, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.
(1) Information available at the time of the “War Warning.”
The procedure for handling radio intelligence information con-
cerning Japanese movements was set forth in a dispatch of 24 Novem-
ber 1941 from OpNav to CincAF, information ComSIXTEEN.
CincPac, ALUSNA Chungking, AST ALU SNA Shanghai, and
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
469
ALUSNA Tokyo (Exhibit 81. This dispatch stated that Japanese
naval movements as reported by the individual information addresses
were often conflicting because of their necessarily fragmentary nature
and that since ComSIXTEEN intercepts were considered most re-
liable, it was suggested that other reports be carefully evaluated and
sent to ComSIXTEEN for action and to OpNav for information and,
that after combining all incoming reports, ComSIXTEEN was to
direct dispatches to OpNav, info CincPac, based on all information
received and indicating the ComSIXTEEN evaluation.
The Japanese naval situation as estimated by ComFOURTEEN on
26 November 1941, was set forth in a dispatch of that date to OpNav,
information CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN. This dispatch
stated that for the past month the Commander of the Second Fleet
had been organizing a task force consisting of Second Fleet and other
units and, after discussing various other units, stated : “There is be-
lieved to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the
Marshalls which comprise Airon 24, at least one carrier division
unit, plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. Evaluate above
to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in southeastern
Asia while component parts ma y ope rate from Palao and Marshalls.”
On the same day, ComSIXTEEN sent a dispatch to CincPac,
OpNav, ComFOURTEEN and CincAF, discussing in considerable de-
tail the estimate of ComSIXTEEN concerning the location and prob-
able movements of Japanese Fleet units (Exhibit 8). This stated
that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated that the
Commander-In-Chief of the Second Fleet was directing some units
of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Fleets in a loose-knit task
force organization that apparently would be divided into two sec-
tions. One section expected to operate in the South China area, was
referred to in the dispatch as the “first section.” The “first section”
was estimated to consist of CruDiv 7, AirRon 6, Defense Division 1,
Desron 3, and Subron 6. The “second section” consisted of units
expected to [HI] operate in the Mandates. The “second sec-
tion” was believed to include Crudiv 5, Cardiv 3, RYUJO and one
MARU. It was indicated that BatDiv 3 might be included in the
“second section,” but that this could not be clarified yet. The dispatch
further stated: “Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and sub-
marines in force are in the Mandates X Our best indications are that
all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sesebo-Kure area.”
The evaluation was considered to be reliable.
During this time, the Office of Naval Intelligence was issuing fort-
nightly summaries of current nationl situations. The summary for
1 December 1941 (Exhibit 9) was distributed by air mail. The state-
ments therein as to the Japanese naval situation, which portion was
prepared by the Far Eastern Section of ONI, were based upon infor-
mation which had been received at least three or four days prior to
the date of the document. This stated :
Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that exten-
sive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop trans-
ports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern
China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan
ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individ-
ual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated,
will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force,
470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be
subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the South-
east Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking
force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and
submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned,
the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest
portion of the carriers.
The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing
boats in considerable numbers. Activities in the Mandates, under naval control,
consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but
also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.
(2) Admiral KimmeVs sources of information after the “war
warning .”
The ComFOURTEEN communication intelligence unit continued
the practice, which had been followed for some time past, of preparing
daily communications intelligence summaries for submission to Ad-
miral Kimmel via Lt. Comdr. Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer.
Photostatic copies of the communication intelligence summaries from
14 October to 14 December 1941, [ 112 ] constitute Exhibit 22
of this investigation. Lieutenant Commander Layton, who presented
these summaries to Admiral Kimmel, also prepared daily intelligence
reports which were distributed to various members of CincPac’s staff.
The intelligence memoranda were not given to the Admiral or Chief
of Staff because they saw the basic material upon which the reports
were based. The intelligence reports by Layton for the period 6
October to 2 December 1941, constitute Exhibit 26. None was pre-
pared after December 2nd, according to Layton.
The daily communication intelligence summaries together with the
dispatches received by Admiral Kimmel from other organizations
during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, constituted the
only sources of information which he had during that period concern-
ing the location and movements of Japanese naval forces.
(3) Information received by Admiral Kimmel after the “war
warning
The critical period commenced on 27 November 1941, when the
Japanese force, which was to attack Pearl Harbor, secretly left Tan-
kan Bay, Etorofu Island and, in radio silence, proceeded undetected
toward Pearl Harbor. The Japanese force, which included three of
Japan’s Carrier Divisions, CarDiv L AKAGI, KAGA; CarDiv 2,
HIRYU, SORYU; CarDiv 5, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU; BatDiv 3,
first section, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA ; CruDiv 8, CHIKUMA; and
other lighter vessels, cruised for ten days to a point 200 miles north
of Oahu, where the planes were launched for the attack on Pearl
Harbor.
It will be recalled that the November 24th dispatch from CNO in
5 art had stated that the diplomatic situation and statements of the
apanese Government and movements of their naval and military
forces indicated that a surprise aggressive movement in any direc-
tion, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
The “war warning” of the 27th had stated that an aggressive move
by Japan was expected within the next few days and that the number
and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval
task forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either the
Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
471
The information which Admiral Kimmel subsequently received
as to the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was as
follows :
28 November 1941:
The Naval Attache at Shanghai reported in his dispatch 270855
the sightings by the master of a foreign vessel, which had left
Hong Kong en route to Shanghai, of many transports proceed-
ing south singly or in small groups.
[113] The November 27th ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence
summary delivered on November 28th, stated that in general traffic
volume was a little below normal, due to poor signals on certain fre-
quencies and that the Tokyo-Takao circuit was unreadable on mid-
watch. Some tactical traffic was heard, intercepted from carriers.
Bako, Sama and Saigon were active as originators. The main Tokyo
originator was the intelligence activity which sent five dispatches to
the major commanders. The direction finder activity was very high.
As to the Combined Fleet, it was said that there was still no evidence
of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of
Staff of the Combined Fleet originated several messages of general
address; he had been farily inactive as an originator. The Com-
mander in Chief, Second Fleet, originated many messages to the Third
Fleet and other units. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that there
was nothing to indicate any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Com-
mander, it was said that he frequently addressed dispatches to the
defense forces in the Mandates, and also that there was no further
information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates.
The Commander Submarine Force, it was stated, was still in the Chi-
chijina area. Concerning air forces in general, it was indicated that
an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU
and SHOKAKU and that “Carriers are still located in home waters.”
This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.
It appears, therefore, that as of this time the ComFOURTEEN,
ComSIXTEEN, and Washington radio intelligence units were of the
opinion that the major portion of the Japanese carriers were in “home
waters;” that ComFOURTEEN was of the opinion that a carrier
unit was in the Marshalls, and that ComSIXTEEN expected CarDiv
3 to operate in the Mandates. The evidence disclosed that the term
“home waters” was understood differently by the Far Eastern Section
of OWI, which prepared the 1 December 1941 ONI estimate, and by
the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet. Captain McCollum testi-
fied that the term meant the normal cruising grounds of the Japanese
Fleet, roughly west of the 180 meridian of longitude and north of the
southern end of Formosa, and included the Kurile Islands but not the
Aleutians. Captain Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified
that “home waters” meant to him, and was understood by Admiral
Kimmel to mean, the drill grounds of the Inland Sea and approaches
to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei Bay Area ; in general the
waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, but not including
northern Japan and the Kuriles, to a point about 60 miles east of
Japan.
472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
29 November 194J:
On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy
of a dispatch to CincPac for information which was received on
November 29th (Exhibit 19, Naval Court), which repeated a dis-
g atch which had been sent by the Army to Commander, Western
►efense Command, as follows : •
[1H] Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical pur-
poses with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come
back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile
action possible at any moment X If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided, the
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X This policy should
not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might
jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but
these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population
or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate message is being
sent to G-2 Ninth Corps area re subversive activities in the United States X
Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five
so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of this highly secret
information to minimum essential officers
The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not ap-
plicable to the Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in
that area, except as then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area,
Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further :
Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X Be
prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan
in case hostilities occur
On the 28th of November, ComFOURTEEN addressed to OpNav,
information CincAF, and stated :
Following received by British consul from usually reliable source X Japanese
will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on one December without ultimatum or
declaration in order get between Bangkok and Singapore X Attackers will pro-
ceed direct from Hainan and Formosa X Main landing to be made at Song-
kholaX (Slngora)
ComSIXTEEN in a dispatch of the 28th addressed to CincAF,
OpNav, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, stated that an unidentified ship
believed to be a light cruiser had apparently relieved the KASHII as
flagship, Southern Expeditionary Fleet; that this ship was now in the
Camranh Bay-Saigon area.
OpNav, indispatch 281633, addressed CincAF, info CincPac,
ComSIXTEEN, ComFOURTEEN, and supplied information from
State Department, from Saigon, dated November 26th, which stated
that five days previously [i76] Orange troops and supply
vessels began to put in at Saigon, taking up all available quay space ;
that 20,000 troops had landed and that 10,000 had arrived Horn the
north by rail during the same period; that the total troops in South
Indo-China totaled 70,000. It observed that there was an estimate
of some 128,000, but considered that too high. It reported that many
trucks had landed and were moving troops and supplies to the interior. ,
It observed that this movement is of large proportions and indicates
hostilities against Thailand may begin soon. It also forwarded
information from Hanoi, also from the State Department, dated
November 26th, that said supplies and military equipment, particu-
larly railway, rolling stock, gasoline, landing at Haiphong even |
recently augmented and are being transshipped south. Among re-
cently landed artillery are anti-tank guns; that the Japanese had
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRT
473
recently purchased a considerable number of native boats along the
coast of Tongking Province. It was reported they desired to pur-
chase 500. These boats were being sent south. Further reports
from Hanoi, dated November 25th, said that the American Consul
had received reliable information that the Governor General had
ascertained from an agent that around 1 December, without either
declaration of war or ultimatum, Nippon Navy will attack Kra
Isthmus. Simultaneously the Army would advance on Thailand;
that great increased troop landings and movements were noted south ;
that during last few days about 4,000 men have landed. On Novem-
ber 25th and 26th, 1,500 would go south by special train; that in
Tongking there were approximately 25,000 Jap troops and at Gillam
there were approximately ninety airplanes. Dated November 26th,
Hanoi, was the report that on early November 25th the Haiphong
mayor had advised all interested persons that the Japanese intended
to sequester all freight en route to China, that the Japanese had
demanded keys to an warehouses by noon November 25th.
The ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary of the 28th,
delivered the 29th, stated generally that traffic volume was normal,
communications to and from South China and between the Mandantes
and the Empire were very heavy. No tactical traffic was seen. The
suspected radio intelligence net was very active and was becoming
more so. Much traffic was directed to the Tokyo direction finder
command from various stations and this command also originated
messages of high precedence to the major fleet commanders. It was
said that “This activity is interpreted to indicate that the radio in-
telligence net is operating at full strength upon U. S. naval com-
munications and IS GETTING RESULTS.” As to the Combined
Fleet, it was stated that there was no indication of movement of any
of its units. As to the Third Fleet, there was little activity from
its units save for the Commander in Chief. The bulk 6f the Fourth
Fleet was said to be still at Truk. The Commander in Chief of the
South China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed
his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief,
Second, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleets. There was little
indication of submarine activity. This summary was initialed by
Admiral Kimmel.
'\116~\ The ComSIXTEEN communication intelligence unit sent
a dispatch on the 29th noting various recent developments from radio
intelligence, such as various encrypted addresses noted in the
preceding two days traffic, that various additional units now appeared
to be associated with the “first section” (South China area), referred
to in ComSIXTEEN’s November 26th dispatch, that the Hiyei (which
in fact was en route to Pearl Harbor) and Kongo appeared to be
associated definitely with the “first section,” but no movement from the
Takao area had been noted, and, that the Cine Combined Fleet was
to leave the Kure zone that day, the Sasebo zone on December 1st, and
enter the Bako zone on the 2nd.
SO November 19^1 :
On 30 November 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch to CincAF for
action and to CincPac for information (Exhibit 76, Naval Court),
which advised in part :
Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra by overseas expedi-
tion . . . desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days
commencing upon receipt of this dispatch X . . .
474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A second similar dispatch was also sent on the same day (Ex-
hibit 77, Naval Court) requesting a daily report from CincAF ,
even if there were no contacts ana the information were all nega-
The communication intelligence summary of the 29th delivered this
day stated generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that
the traffic to South China was still very high. A good share of the
traffic was made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo
intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to major commanders
both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo
sent four long messages to the major commanders. In addition to the
stations normally reporting to Tokyo radio Yokosuka (near Tokyo)
sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit
reports. The direction finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was
up during the night with much activity. The Navy Minister origi-
nated his usual AlNav, and the naval general staff addresed Com-
manders, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and the
South China Unit. A unit which had been addressed as the 103rd air
group originated one dispatch whose address was composed entirely
of enciphered calls and it was apparent that he had no navy call list.
One address was “Eleventh Air Fleet.” Since this had appeared
before, it was evidence that the use of Eantai was intentional in
making positively known the existence of an air fleet. Its composition
was unknown. The dispatches indicated that various units were under
the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet,
including Cardiv 3, and the Third Fleet.
Associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships but their
assignment was not yet definite. Various messages were sent by the
Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, and he held extensive communi-
cation with [777] the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet,
and Bako. The Cine Fourth Fleet was relatively inactive. He was
still in the Truk area. There was some traffic for Commander Sub-
marine Force, who was at Chichyima the previous day, and also some
traffic from the Commander in Chief, China Fleet.
1 December 194.1 :
A copy of a dispatch by CNO to CincAF, 301709, was received by
CincPac, referring to the previous dispatch which had directed an
air search on the line Manila to Camrann Bay, directing that a report
be made daily even if the information were all negative (Exhibit
77, Naval Court).
A dispatch from OpNav, dated 1 December 1941, was also received
referring to a Thailand- Japanese intrigue aimed at forcing the
British to attack Thai as a counter-move to a Japanese landing in
Kota Bharu, whereupon Thai would declare war and ask Japanese
help.
A dispatch of 1 December from ComSIXTEEN advised of radio
intelligence information indicating that various units under Cine
Third Fleet were in the Takao area and that Cine Second Fleet had
shifted from Kure to Sasebo apparently en route to South China
waters.
The communication intelligence summary for November 30th, de-
livered on December 1st, stated generally that traffic volume was less
than for the past few days, that the traffic consisted largely of dis-
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
475
patches bearing old dates. No reason could be given for the re-
transmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for
the past few days had prevented the repetition of dispatches. The
numoer of dispatches originated on the 30th was very small. The
only tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and
several MARUs. As to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, it was
stated the Chiefs of Staff of those Fleets were in Kure. In the same
message, the Chief of Staff, Second Fleet, was not listed in any loca-
tion. Other traffic indications were that he was at sea. The Com-
mander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent one dispatch to his usual ad-
dressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Forces, but also in-
cluded the KONGO and HIYEI, which it was said placed them as
members of his task force. (The HIYEI was actually en route to
Pearl Harbor.) As to the Third Fleet, it was said, “No information
obtained as to the location of the Commander in Cnief, Third Fleet,
which gives the strong impression that he is underway.” The Fourth
Fleet was believed to be still in the Truk area. It was said that the
continued association of Jaluit and Commander Submarine Force,
plus his known progress from the Empire to Chichijime to Saipan
made his destination obviously the Marshalls ; also that since one of
his large units arrived in the Marshalls some time ago, that unit
could not agree with ComSIXTEEN that there was not a submarine
concentration in that area. “Every evidence points to a concentra-
tion, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there, but also a
f ood proportion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force.”
t was also said that “the presence of a unit of plane guard destroy-
ers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, al-
though this has not been confirmed.” This communication summary
was initialed by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War
Plans Officer.
[778] A dispatch was received from ComSIXTEEN, addressed
to OpNav, information CincAF, CincPac, and ComFOURTEEN, to
the effect that a reassignment of all Japanese naval calls had occurred
at midnight.
2 December 1941 :
On 2 December 1941, ComSIXTEEN reported that Cine Second
and Cine Third Fleets were in the Takao area, and, that broadcasts
to fleet units were being sent to Takao or Bako in addition to Tokyo.
Also reported was the fact that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok
had requested permission to destroy codes.
CincAF also reported that a patrol plane had spotted nine sub-
marines on a southerly course in the South China Sea between Cam-
ranh Bay and the Philippines. Also that three submarines were
sighted 070 from Saigon, 180 miles, heading south, and that twenty-
one transports, with air patrol overhead, were at Camranh Bay.
A report from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised of
the arrival of 14,000 troops sailing from there the week ending the
22nd. .
The communication intelligence summary for the previous day
stated generally that all service radio calls of forces afloat changed
promptly at 0000 1 December. Previously service calls had been
changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed
on 1 November 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month
476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active op-
erations on a large scale. lor a period of two to three days prior to
the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches
from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the Japanese Navy
was adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic
prior to 0000 1 December indicated that an effort was made to deliver
all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls
there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent
confusion and compromise. Either that, or the large number of old
messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it ap-
pear as if nothing unusual were pending. It should be noted that
the sentence in the above summary reading “The fact that service calls
lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in
prepfaring for active operations on a large scale” was underscored in
red pencil commencing with the words “service calls.” Captain Lay-
ton testified that to the best of his recollection this was underlined by
Admiral Eimmel at the time.
The summary further stated as to the First Fleet “nothing to in-
dicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters.”
As to the Second Fleet, it was stated “This fleet is believed proceeding
from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-
China Takao did not appear to play an important role in the traffic ;
consequently, the assumption was made that this fleet was passing
up Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated there was “nothing
to report except that the [ii.9] same associations of Second,
Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-
China Forces continued. As to Fourth Fleet, “No change in the Fourth
Fleet or Mandates area.” As to Fifth Fleet, “Nothing to report.”
As to submarines, it was stated a large number of the Submarine
Force was believed to be in the area eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima
and Saipan. As to Combined Air Force, it was stated “No change.”
As to carriers, it was said “No change.” This summary was initialed
by Admiral Kimmel.
In accordance with the request of Admiral Kimmel, Layton, the
Fleet Intelligence Officer, prepared a memorandum for the Admiral
dealing with the location of the Japanese Fleet. This memorandum
was prepared, according to Layton, on the evening of 1 December,
and was submitted by him to Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941.
The original memorandum is Exhibit 23. The memorandum bears
certain notations in red pencil which, Layton testified, were inserted
by him on December 2nd prior to submission of the memorandum to
Admiral Kimmel, and which reflected the later information received
after preparation of the memorandum on the night of December 1st-
2nd. It also bears certain lead pencil notations which Layton identi-
fied as the handwriting of Admiral Kimmel. This memorandum, ac-
cording to Layton, summarized his best estimate of the location of
the Japanese Fleet, based on all information available to him and to
Admiral Kimmel up to and including 1 December 1941.
Layton’s estimate stated that from the best available information,
units of the Orange (Japanese) were “ thought ” to be located as listed
in the memorandum. In the Kure-Sasebo area he listed the Com-
mander in Chief of the Combined Fleet and Commander in Chief,
First Fleet, with six battleships, “(?)”, and other units. He listed
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
477
the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, at Nagara initially and then
corrected it in red to indicate that it was at Takao. Also in the Kure-
Sasebo area he located Cruiser Division 8.
In the Shanghai area, Layton’s estimate located the Commander
in Chief, China Fleet, the Shanghai base force, and an air group.
In the Bako-Takao area, Layton listed Third Fleet submarine
squadrons and various destroyers and the Commander of the Com-
bined Air Force with numerous air groups and the KASUGA MARU
(thought to be a converted carrier with 36 planes). He estimated
that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, had been en route to
Takao (this he corrected in red pencil to indicate that he was at
Takao) with a cruiser division, destroyers, and with “Cardiv 4 —
two CV and four DD ; Cardiv 3— two CV' and 3 DD ; Batdiv 3 lass
HARUNA — 3 BB (maybe 2 BB)” and, he added in red pencil, cer-
tain cruisers and Destroyer Division 2.
In the Hainon-Canton area, Layton located the Commander in
Chief of the South China Fleet and various cruisers and destroyers
and transports. In the French Indo-China area, he located the
Commander in Chief of an Expeditionary Fleet with various ships
including 21 transports and some base forces among others. In the
Mandates area, he located at Palao an air group [ISO] and
base force ; at Truk, the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet with
cruisers and destroyers, and a base force and an air group. At Saipan,
he located the Commander in Chief of the Submarine Force with pos-
sibly submarines and various air groups and a base force. In the
Marshalls area, he located various air groups and the carrier
“KORYU ? plus plane guards”, and several submarine squadrons and
base force.
Layton’s memorandum did not make any reference to the location
of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 of the Japanese Fleet (which in fact were
en route to attack Pearl Harbor) . According to Layton, on 2 Decem-
ber 1941, during his conference with Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral
noticed and commented on the absence of information concerning
Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. In his testimony, he described
the conversation on this point as follows :
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said,
as besi you recall it?
Captain Layton. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, “What ! You don’t
know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?” and I replied, “No,
sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are.
The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.” Then Admiral
Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance
and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, “Do you mean to say that
they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn’t know it?” or words to
that effect. My reply was that, “I hope they would be sighted before now,” or
words to that effect. . . .
Mr. Sonnett. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out
of your description of Admiral Kimmel’s twinkle in his eye when he spoke.
What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of
information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?
Captain Layton. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said,
“Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?” and I said, “I do not know precisely, but if I
must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we
haven’t heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished
operations only a month and a half ago,” and it was then when he, with a twinkle
in his eye, said, “Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?”
or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete
ignorance as to their exact location.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 81
478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Son nett. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about
those carriers?
[121] Captain Layton. This incident has been impressed on my mind.
I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a state-
ment to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but
hadn’t so indicated their location.
3 December 19^1 :
It will be recalled that on December 3rd dispatches were sent by
CNO to CincPac and others advising that Japanese diplomatic and
consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washing-
ton, and London, had been ordered to destroy the “purple” machine
and most of the codes and ciphers.
Layton testified that at the time Admiral Kimmel asked him what
the “purple machine” was; that he did not know and made inquiry;
that he advised Admiral Kimmel that it was the Japanese diplomatic
electrical coding machine ; that he did not then know whether or not
the Japanese consul at Hawaii had such a machine ; and, that he sub-
sequently learned that the Japanese consul there did not have such
a machine.
The communication intelligence summary delivered on the 3rd,
covering the 2nd, stated generally that the most prominent factor in
the traffic was the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for cer-
tain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There was instances where
the same dispatch was repeated several times after it had appeared
on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao radio received the same
dispatch that it had previously sent. It was stated that ComSIX-
TEEN had reported Second ana Third Fleets in Takao area, and that
Takao radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it
was said, was not uncovered at ComFOUBTEEN and contrary to the
location report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not
close to Takao. In several instances, Takao radio forwarded traffic to
Tokyo for these fleets. It was said that “Summing up all reports
and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second,
Third and First Fleet units, has left Empire waters, but is either not
close enough to Takao for good communications or is proceeding on
a course not close to Takao. It was further stated, “The change of
calls on December 1st has prevented this office from making definite
statement as of this date of the units now in the southern area. To
further complicate the situation^ Shanghai radio handled a consider-
able amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined
for units in the Takao area.” Also it was pointed out generally that
“There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic origin-
ated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo.” As to the First Fleet,
it was stated that despite the lack of positive identifications, the
First Fleet appeared relatively quiet and that “from inconclusive
evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original
or normal combined fleet staff and that these may be two supreme
commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates one
combined fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets, and
apparently in company, while another combined fleet call appears not
associated with the Second and Third Fleets.” As to the Second Fleet,
it was stated “No units have stood out prominently in [11$]
the last two or three days. This is probably due to lack of new identi-
fications, but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
479
the Second Fleet is underway in company.” As to the Third Fleet,
it said there was nothing to report. As to the Mandates, it was said
that the association of submarine force and Fourth Fleet continued.
Concerning carriers, this summary stated, “Almost a complete
blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications
has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since
over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change
on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered,
it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.” This summary was
initialed by Admiral Kimmel.
4 December 1941 :
On 4 December 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (Exhibit 21, Naval
Court) to NavStaGuam for action, and to CincAF, CincPac, Com-
FOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN for information stating:
Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified
matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retain-
ing minimum cryptographic Chanels necessar y for e ssential communications with
CinCAF CincPAC ComFOTJRTEEN ComSIXTEEN and Opnav X be prepared
to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X
Report crypto channels retained.
ComSIXTEEN advised, in a dispatch received on December 4th,
that seven transports had been sighted off Saigon on 15 November
1941, and on the 20th a seaplane carrier northeast of Amoy.
The Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised, in a dispatch
received 4 December, that several large liners had been carrying sup-
plies and personnel to the Carolines, that 3,000 laborers had landed
at Jaluit and that certain islands were being specially developed.
The Naval Attache, Tokyo, advised in a dispatch received this day
that a transport loaded with aircraft and another with naval person-
nel had left Yokahama on 27 November 1941.
The previous day’s communication intelligence summary stated
under the heading “General,” that traffic volume was normal with re-
ceiving conditions good. The present state of call recovery did not
permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use
of alternate calls by the major commands slowed up identification of
even these units. Very few units had been positively identified so
far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long
dispatches to the Commanders in Chief, Combined, Second, and Third
Fleets. Tokyo intelligence originated nine [725] dispatches
to the same addresses. It was stated that the presence of the Com-
mander in Chief, Second Fleet, in Taiwan waters was not revealed
by radio traffic. It was stated that it was the impression that both
the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but that this was not
verified by radio intelligence means. It was also stated that there were
some Fourth Fleet units in the Marshall Islands but their identity was
not known. It was stated also that there was “no information on
submarines or carriers.” This summary was initialed by Admiral
Kimmel.
5 December 1941 :
There were no dispatches of an intelligence nature received by
CincPac. The previous day’s communication intelligence summary
stated that in general traffic volume was normal with fair receiving
480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
conditions. Takao radio instituted a fleet broadcast system using
the prefix UTU in heading so that there were two fleet broadcasts now
in operation. So far only a few messages had been placed on the
Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages,
most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Tokyo intel-
ligence originated messages to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, Com-
bined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Tndo-China
Force, and same. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the
major commanders. As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated “The
outstanding item of today’s traffic is the lack of messages from the
Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Third
Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very
quiet. While the fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of
traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two
commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that
the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, is in the vicinity of Takao
and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined
for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CincSecond Fleet is still copy-
ing.” As to the Fourth Fleet, it was stated that the Commander in
Chief sent a message to various units and that no further check could
be made on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls
and that Jaluit appeared many times in the day’s traffic, being as-
sociated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo radio and an
oil tanker. As to South China, it was stated that Bako continued
as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon.
Except for traffic between South China commanders, all units in that
area were quiet. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.
6 December 1941 :
Several dispatches dated 6 December 1941 were found .in the
CincPac files, but it does not appear whether or not they were re-
ceived prior to the attack. One was an OpNav dispatch authorizing
CincPac to direct the destruction of secret and confidential docu-
ments at our outlying islands “in view of the international situation
and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands.” (Exhibit
22, Naval Court.) Other dispatches dated the 6th, from the Naval
Observer at Wellington, advised of Japanese destruction of codes;
from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised of the departure
south of Japanese troops and increase of Japanese gendarmerie force
in Shanghai ; and, from CincAF, advised of a [124] 25-ship
convoy, a 10-ship convoy, and 3 ships, off Saigon, French Indo-China,
all of which appeared to be headed in a westerly direction, also 30
ships and a cruiser were sighted in Camranh Bay.
The radio intelligence summary for 5 December, which was de-
livered on the 6th, was the last summary delivered to Admiral Kim-
mel before the attack. It stated in general that traffic volume
was heavy. All circuits were overloaded with Tokyo broadcasts going
over full 24 hours. Tokyo Mandates circuit in duplex operation.
There were several new intercept schedules heard. It was noted that
some traffic being broadcast was several days old which indicated the
uncertainty of deliveiw existing in the radio organization. There
were many messages of high precedence which appeared to be caused
by the jammed condition of all circuits. A plain language message
was sent by the captain of the OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao, prob-
REPOST OP HEWITT INQUIRY
481
ably for further relay, addressed to the Chief of the Political Affairs
Bureau saying, “In reference to the Far Eastern crisis what you said
is considered important at this end, but proceed with what you are
doing, specific orders will be issued soon.”
As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that neither the Second nor
Third Fleet Commanders had originated any traffic. They were
still frequently addressed but were receiving their traffic over broad-
casts. It was stated that “They are undoubtedly in the Takao area
or farther south since the Takao broadcasts handles nearly all their
traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force
has been seen either.”
There was no traffic from the Third Fleet, but some traffic
for that fleet. There was also some traffic to the Fourth Fleet ad-
dressed at Jaluit, strengthening the impression that the Commander
in Chief, Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls. As to South China,
there was much traffic addressed to the Commander in Chief, Second
Fleet, by Sama. Bako continued as an active originator with many
dispatches to the Second and Third Fleets. The Commander Com-
bined Air Force appeared to be busy with the movement of air corps,
several of which were moving probably to Indo-China.
[ 125 ~] 29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire
information from coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese
Government and its representatives. Through the interception of
Japanese diplomatic messages and their decryption and translation in
Washington, D. C., prior to the attack, knowledge was obtained of the
Japanese Government’s actual views concerning the diplomatic situa-
tion, of the Japanese Government’s intention to wage war, and of the
fact that hostilities were impending and imminent.
30. The information acquired in Washington through the intercep-
tion of Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly
disseminated at Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to
the Chief of Naval Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State
Department, and to the President.
81. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the
Chief of Naval Operations for information as to the status of the
diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be
kept fully informed on this subject.
32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelli-
gence at Washington were not transmitted to the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, as such. Reasons advanced for this course of
action were that the Japanese might intercept the naval messages and
learn of the Navy’s success in decrypting Japanese codes; that the
volume of intercepted messages was so great that the transmission of
them, particularly during the critical period, would have overtaxed
the Navy’s communications facilities ; and, that it was the duty of the
Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate such information and to advise
CincPac of the important facts learned.
33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on
the information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages.
34. The warnings sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
duringNovember (particularly the “war warning” of the 27th) and
early December, 1941, indicated in unmistakable language that, the
482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
diplomatic negotiations had ceased, that war with Japan was imminent,
and that Japanese attacks might occur at any moment.
35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indi-
cating interest in the location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were
more specific than other intercepted messages indicating Japanese
interest in the movements of ships to or from other ports.
[/&>] 36. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully
advised of certain other information obtained from intercepted Japa-
nese messages after the November 27th “war warning,” which made
further evident the termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations
and the Japanese intention to wage war.
37. On tne morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the
attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message
in which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to
present to the State Department at 1 p. m. the Japanese Government’s
final reply terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention was
made of the fact that 1 p. m. Washington time was about dawn at
Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. No one
stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.
38. This so-called “1 p. m. delivery message,” which consisted of one
sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at
Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to the
Navy Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available in the
Navy Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was sent to the
Army for translation because there was no Japanese translator on
dutv in the Navy Department at that time. The translation, which
could have been done by a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not
received from the Army until after 0900.
39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant infor-
mation several hours before the attack, and there were available means
whereby the information could have been transmitted to Admiral
Kimmel immediately, including a “scrambler” telephone maintained
by the Army, Admiral Stark initially was not disposed to, and did not,
send any message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied on the trans-
mission of a message by the War Department to General Short, which
was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.
40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not con-
sider it necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning
of 7 December and that he had not telephoned at any time previous
to the attack, but that one regret which he had was that he nad not
telephoned a message that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled
the Army message on the naval radio system.
41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941,
which was received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were
S resenting an ultimatum at 1 p. m., that they were under orders to
estroy their code machine, that it was not known just what signifi-
cance the hour set might have but that the addressees were to be on the
alert accordingly, ana that the naval authorities were to be informed.
42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack,
on November 24th, that “a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possi-
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
483
bility,” and, on November 27th, that “an aggressive movement by
the Japanese is expected [1#7] within the next few days.
The number and equipment of Japanese troops and organization
of naval task forces indicate an ampnibious expedition against either
the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.”
43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commanaer-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention
to probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward
of "Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the
Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.
44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941,
which were to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their
representatives information concerning the status of relations be-
tween Japan and the United States, and other countries. These were
known as the “winds” code and the “hidden word” code. The “winds”
code was designed to indicate a break in diplomatic relations, or
possibly war, with England or the United States or Russia by the
use in weather broadcasts of certain Japanese words signifying wind
direction.
45. The interception of a “winds” message relating to the United
States during the first week of December, 1941, would not have
conveyed any information of significance which the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not
already have.
46. No message in the “winds” code relating to the United States
was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department
to whom such a message would have come had it been received in
the Navy Department. No such message was intercepted by the radio
intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines, although
intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such
a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message
was intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to
intercept such a message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of
the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet
nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office
of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval
Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director
of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the
effect that a “winds” code message was received prior to the attack
was given by Captain Safford, in charge of Op-20-G, a communica-
tions security section of the Navy Department, who stated that such
a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it related to
the United States, and that no copy could be found in the Navy or
Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford
named, in addition to himself, three other officers who, he stated,
recalled haying seen and read the “winds” message. Each of those
officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only
other testimony to the effect that a “winds” message was received
was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op-20-G,
who said that he recalled that there was a message but could not
recall whether or not it related to the United States or England or
484 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this [ 128 ] in-
vestigation, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a “hidden
word” message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had
been a “winds” message.
47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted “hidden word”
code message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the
necessity ot delivering other messages, including the “1 p. m. delivery
message,” he overlooked a code word relating to the United States and
translated the message as meaning only that “relations between Japan
and England are not in accordance with expectations.” He testified
that he later discovered the error and a few minutes before 1 p. m. on
December 7th, he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in
the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military In-
telligence.
48. Except for the omission of the United States, the “hidden word”
code message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect
previous diplomatic interceptions which indicated that the message
was to convey the idea of a crisis involving the countries in question.
49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in
addition to the Chief of Naval Operations, the District Intelligence
Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Fleet Intelli-
gence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.
50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of
the FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Jap-
anese Consul General and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were
tapped for some months prior to the attack. These were discontinued
on 2 December 1941 because the District Intelligence Officer feared that
the existence of such taps might be discovered, resulting in undesirable
complications. No information of military or naval significance was
obtained by means of the telephone taps.
51. On 6 December 1941 the local representative of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence
Officer a transcript of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation
between a person in Honolulu named “Mori” and a person in Japan.
This was examined by the District Intelligence Officer. It was decided
that the conversation should be further studied by a Japanese linguist
of the District Intelligence Office, who was to listen to the recordingof
the conversation. This was not done until after the attack. The
transcript furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in
Japan was interested, among other things, in the daily flights of air-
planes from Honolulu and in the number of ships present. During the
conversation, references were made to flowers, which, it now appears,
may have been code words signifying the presence or absence of ships,
and a method of conveying information to the approaching Japanese
ships, which presumably would have been listening in on the conversa-
tion. Prior investigations indicate that the “Mori conversation” was
also brought to the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941.
[ 129 ] 52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence
Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable
messages from and to the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via
a commercial communications company, were obtained during the
first week of December, 1941. This was the first time that such mes-
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
485
sages had been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts were
made immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages
were decrypted before the attack. These contained no information
of particular significance.
53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means
of the telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the
Japanese Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an
attack on Pearl Harbor.
54. One of the Japanese Consul General’s messages, which was ob-
tained by the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 De-
cember 1941 to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and trans-
lation, was a message dated December 3rd. This message was in a
Japanese code known as the “PA-K2.” It was descrypted and trans-
lated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack.
The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised
of a change in a method which had been established for communica-
tion by visual signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the
beach, the use of a sailboat, certain want ads to be broadcast over a
local radio station, and bonfires, would convey information as to the
presence or absence of various types of warships of the Pacific Fleet.
Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was unable to
decrypt this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted
and translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian trans-
lator in Op-20-G of the Navy Department in Washington. That sec-
tion had received the message from an Army radio intercept station at
Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer testified he had no specific
recollection of having seen this translation prior to the attack, but
the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown to him on
the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of work on
other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was taken
on the translation until 8 December 1941.
55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu
received a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the
existing situation, the presence of the ships in port was of utmost im-
portance, that daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports
should advise whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl
Harbor, and whether or not the warships were provided with anti-
torpedo nets. This message was intercepted by an Army radio inter-
cept station at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded
by mail to the War Department for decryption and translation. The
translation supplied by the Army indicates that the message was
translated on 30 December 1941.
56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul
General at Honolulu sent two messages in the “PA-K2” code which
indicated the likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that
there were no sigps of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor,
that in all probability there was considerable opportunity left to take
advantage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford,
and Ewa, and that the battleships [. ISO ] did not have torpedo
nets. The second message reported on the ships at anchor on De-
cember 6th, and stated that it appeared that no air reconnaissance
was being conducted by the Fleet air arm. These messages were not
obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to the attack.
486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station
at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The
translations of these messages furnished by tne Army indicate that
they were translated on December 8th. They could have been de-
crypted and translated in the Navy Department in about an hour
and a half.
57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy com-
municated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of
Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Mili-
tary Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained in
the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing
such information, and had access to radio intelligence information
available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed
with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian
Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese
movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.
58. The War Department had information which led that De-
partment to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls
in November, 1941. This appeal's from a War Department dispatch
of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral
Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be
flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among
other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The
reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes werfe
not made ready.
59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence bulletin was
distributed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his com-
mand. This bulletin set forth the available information concerning
the organization of the Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin
on the same subject and pointed cut that fhe principal change was a
further increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from
the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate
forces. Tne bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese
Carrier Fleet consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five
divisions, each having two carriers.
60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning
the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained
by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intel-
ligence Officer, who received it primarily from the Radio Intelligence
Unit at Pearl Harbor. Such information also was contained in dis-
patches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Phi lip pines and
from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington,
G . C.
61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of
Naval Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others.
These included summaries of the information concerning Japanese
naval forces which had been received from the Radio Intelligence
Units at Pearl Harbor and at the Philippines.
[7J7] 62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch
to OpNav, information to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN,
which summarized the information as to Japanese naval movements
obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the
preceding month. The dispatch indicated that the Commander Sec-
ond Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units of
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
487
various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a
strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls,
which included at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a
carrier) , plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. The estimate
was that a strong force night be preparing to operate in southeastern
Asia while component parts might operate from Palao and the
Marshalls.
63. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in
the Philippines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable
because of the location of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio
intelligence unit in the Philippines, in a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav
and others, commented on the above dispatch of ComFOURTEEN
and stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated
that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various
fleets units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided
into two sections. The first section was expected to operate in the
South China area. The second section was expected to operate in the
Mandates. It was estimated that the second section included “Car
Div 3, RYUJO, and one MARU.” This dispatch also stated that the
ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition that carriers
and submarines in force were in the Mandates, and that their best
indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure
area. It was stated that this evaluation was considered to be reliable.
64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting
reports from the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which
were received by Admiral Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of
important Japanese naval forces to the southward of Japan. These,
however, did not report the movement of carriers.
65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl
Harbor continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the
information received through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval
communications, which were submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelli-
gence Officer, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following
morning. Admiral Kimmel received and initialed these summaries
daily on and after 27 November. On December 6th, he initialed the
summary dated December 5th, which was the last one he received
prior to the attack.
66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication
intelligence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among
other things, that there was no further information on the presence of
a carrier division in the Mandates and that “carriers were still located
in home waters.” The next day, he received the November 28th sum-
mary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese
radio intelligence net was [13S] operating at full strength
upon U. S. Naval communications and “IS GETTING RESULTS.”
There was no information set forth in the summary as to carriers. On
the following day, Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated
November 29th, which, among other things, indicated that Carrier
Division 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-
Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st, Admiral Kimmel received the
previous day’s summary which stated as to carriers that the presence
of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated the presence of at least
one carrier in the Mandates, although tfti§ b&d not been confirmed.
488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received,
stated that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed
promptly at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service calls had
been changed after a period of six months or more and that calls had
been last changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated, and
was underscored by Admiral Kimmel, that “The fact that service
calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step
in preparing for operations on a large scale.” It also stated, among
other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be
east of Yokosuka-Chichi jima and Saipan, and as to carriers that there
was “no change.”
68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memoran-
dum which Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This
contained Layton’s estimate, on the basis of all available information,
of the location of J apanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the
Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Division 3, which
included four carriers, and the “KASUGA MARU” (believed to have
been a converted carrier) . The estimate placed one carrier “KORYU
(?) plus plane guards” in the Marshalls area.
69. Layton’s written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier
Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was de-
liberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the information
as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a
reliable estimate of their whereabouts.
70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the fol-
lowing conversation :
Captain Layton. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, “What! You
don’t know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?” and I re-
plied, “No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know
where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their loca-
tion.” Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with some-
what a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said,
“Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn’t
know it?” or words to that effect. My reply was that, “I hope they would be
sighted before now,” or words to that effect. * ♦ *
[ 138 ] Captain Layton. His question was absolutely serious, but when he
said, “Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?” and I said, “I do not know precisely, but if
I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we
haven’t heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished
operations only a month and a half ago,” and it was then when he, with a twinkle
in his eye, said, “Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?”
or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete
ignorance as to their exact location. * * *
Captain Layton. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say
that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me
in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn’t so
indicated their location.
71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was de-
livered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers :
Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identi-
fication has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over
200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of
December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier
traffic is at a low ebb.
72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel
on December 4th stated, in part, “No information on submarines or car-
riers.” The summary delivered on December 5th made no mention
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
489
of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6th stated, in part,
“No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has
been seen either.”
im iv
Reconnaissance
A. The Responsibility for Long Distance Reconnaissance .
1. The Navy's obligation . Under the Joint Coastal Frontier De-
fense Plan (Exhibit 80), which was in effect prior to the attack, the
Navy was responsible for long distance reconnaissance.
Annex VTI, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
made provision for joint air action by the Army and Navy for defense
against hostile raids or air attacks prior to a declaration of war. Un-
der this agreement, if the naval aircraft were insufficient for long
distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made
available, the Army aircraft were to be used by the Navy. This plan
was implemented by the Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, under
which Admiral Bellinger would command the Navy and Army patrol
planes. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan and the Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan were not operative
prior to the attack. An agreement between the Commanding General
and ComFOURTEEN that threat of a hostile attack was imminent
was a prerequisite to the operation of Annex VII, Section VI. No
such agreement was made prior to the attack.
2. (Jontrol of the Pacific Fleet patrol planes . The Pacific Fleet
patrol planes were actually under the control and operating in ac-
cordance with the orders of Admiral Kimmel. Thus, on November
22nd he approved the schedules for the employment of those planes,
which remained in effect up to the time of the attack. His responsibil-
ity for the operations of the patrol planes, which were under the com-
mand of Commander, Task Force Nine, of the Pacific Fleet, is further
indicated by the fact that he directed search operations by those planes
at Midway and Wake.
Admiral Bellinger, who commanded Task Force Nine, which con-
sisted of Patrol Wings One and Two of the Fleet, was under the com-
mand of ComFOURTEEN only when the Naval Base Defense Air
Force Plan was activated for the purpose of drills.
The responsibility for the employment of the fleet patrol planes was,
as Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court, his responsibility
and was accepted by him. He testified further that Admiral Bloch
had asked for the dispatch of patrol planes for a search if he had felt
that it was necessary. In this connection it should be noted that on
October 17, 1941, Admiral Bloch had asked for certain Fleet utility
planes to be used for inshore patrol and that they were not made
available to him (Exhibit 46, Naval Court). It should be noted that
ComFOURTEEN had no planes assigned to him.
Admiral Bellinger testified that he was responsible for the opera-
tion of the Fleet planes in accordance with the orders of Admiral
\_13S\ Kimmel. He said, however, that it was not his responsi-
bility to decide whether or not long range reconnaissance should be
conducted. Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, who was the Fleet Air Officer
on CincPac’s staff in 1941, testified before Admiral Hart that his
490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
duties were primarily, if not almost entirely, concerned with technical
training and logistic matters.
3. Conferences after 27 November 1941 concerning reconnaissance.
There is no evidence that on or after 27 November 1941 the necessity
or advisability of long distance reconnaissance was specifically dis-
cussed between Admiral Kimmel and any member of his Staff or
Task Force Commanders. Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer,
testified that he thought the subject was discussed, but that he could
recall no specific conrerence dealing with this subject. Admiral Bell-
inger testified that there was no such conference in which he partic-
ipated. Admiral Kimmel’s testimony before the Naval Court was to
the effect that on November 27th he decided not to conduct long range
reconnaissance. It is significant that Captain Layton, who was the
Fleet Intelligence Officer, stated that he did not tell Admiral Kimmel
E rior to December 7th that aerial reconnaissance from Oahu would
a advisable in view of the available intelligence because he knew that
reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet patrol planes. He
said that he was not familiar with the extent of the reconnaissance,
but definitely believed that reconnaissance was being conducted.
Neither the Chief of Staff nor the Assistant Chief of Staff and Opera-
tions Officer could recall any discussion of the advisability or necessity
for long range reconnaissance from Oahu between November 27th ana
December 7 th.
B. Reconnaissance Conducted from Oahu.
Although the schedules for the Fleet patrol planes (Exhibit 37)
did not provide for any reconnaissance from Oahu, the Fleet Security
Letter (Exhibit 8, NC) directed that there be a patrol of the Fleet
operating areas. The Fleet operating areas were thirty miles to the
south of Oahu.
During the period 30 November to 7 December 1941, certain searches
were flown from Wake and Midway. The extent of these searches
appears in Exhibit 50A of this investigation. One squadron had been
sent to Midway on the 30th of November and searched en route ; an-
other squadron had been sent from Midway to Wake on the 1st of
December and returned to Pearl Harbor prior to the attack, searching
en route (Exhibit 50, 50A).
Prior to 7 December 1941 the last daily long distance reconnaissance
flown from Oahu was in the summer of 1941. According to Admiral
Bloch’s previous testimony, some time during the summer of 1941,
on the basis of some intelligence or information which he could not
recall, he asked Admiral Kimmel to direct reconnaissance on a sector
towards Jaluit and this was done for several days. Admiral Kimmel
recalled that such reconnaissance had been flown for a few days on
the line from Jaluit to Pearl Harbor and stated that they had in mind
that they might catch a submarine on the surface out there and perhaps
any other vessel there. Despite thorough examination of the available
records of Pat wing Two, of the CincPac operation files, of the Com-
FOURTEEN,files, of the CincPac secret dispatches for 1941 and con-
fidential and restricted dispatches for June, July, and August, 1941, no
record of this reconnaissance could be found. None of the witnesses
examined recalled the reconnaissance or the reasons for it.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
491
[136] C. Proposed, Arniy Reconnaissance to Jaluit.
In the Army report it was stated that on November 26th the Army
directed General Short to send two B-24’s to Jaluit on a reconnais-
sance mission to look for various things, including ships. However,
the Army report does not state whether this reconnaissance actually
took place.
Before the Roberts’ Committee, General Gerow said that reports
had been received of Japanese concentrations in the Mandated Islands
and they assumed that every effort was being made to identify any
Japanese movements in that direction. He stated that those two
B-24’s were sent out with an idea of trying to confirm information
that had been received from other sources. If no reconnaissance at all
were done after the Army’s message to General Short which directed
such reconnaissance as he deemed necessary, General Gerow said that
would have been considered a failure to obey orders.
The status of this reconnaissance has been quite definitely confirmed
by Captain Layton’s testimony in this investigation. In the latter
part of November, 1941, Captain Layton stated, either Admiral Kim-
mel directed him to establish contact with the Hawaiian Air Force
pertaining to this reconnaissance or else his opposite number, Colonel
Raley, came to him with the information of the pending reconnais-
sance and requested his assistance towards delineating the appropriate
objectives and to furnish the pilots and crews with intelligence ma-
terial for briefing. He was also requested to assist in the projected
reconnaissance. The reconnaissance unfortunately never material-
ized, he stated, because only one plane arrived and there were delays
due to uncompleted camera installations. He was never informed
that one plane had arrived, but later learned that it was destroyed
in the attack on Hickam Field. The Navy was extremely anxious
that the reconnaissance be made at the earliest possible date, and
Admiral Kimmel, upon receipt of Captain Layton’s memorandum con-
cerning information he had obtained at the conference, asked him
how soon the reconnaissance might be expected. Captain Layton
relayed Colonel Raley’s answer to the Admiral to the effect that the
delay was due to non-installation or non-completion of installation
of cameras and the time was still not definitely fixed. A photostatic
copy of a memorandum of November 28th from Captain Layton to
Admiral Kimmel concerning this reconnaissance appears in the record
as Exhibit 28. Furthermore, Captain Layton was questioned as to his
knowledge of any discussion concerning the possibility of the use
of Navy planes for this reconnaissance. Captain Layton replied that
it was not discussed with him, but he thought that PBY “Catalinas”
could not be used because their appearance over the Marshalls would
have been an overt act, while the Army planes, on the other hand,
would have been flying ostensibly from Wake to Port Darwin en
route to the Philippines. Captain Layton was particularly anxious
that this reconnaissance be carried out to check on his information
as to the presence or absence of air strength and carriers and sub-
marines and naval concentrations in the Marshalls area, including
Truk. This was an ideal opportunity to establish the reliability oi
existing intelligence on Japanese naval dispositions and developments
in the Mandated Islands.
Admiral Bellinger recalled nothing concerning the proposed Army
reconnaissance flight over the Mandated Islands.
492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[757] D. The Direction to Execute an Appropriate Defensive De-
ployment.
Among the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet by the Basic Navy
War Plan was to protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the
Pacific area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land
and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that
hemisphere. It will be recalled that the Pacific Fleet War Plan, which
was designed to implement the Navy Basic War Plan, provided, among
other things, that in the event of war with the Axis Powers, including
or excluding Japan, the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet were to con-
duct the maximum reconnaissance possible of the approaches to Oahu.
The Pacific Fleet Plan was not ordered to be executed prior to the
attack. On the 27th of November, however, in the war warning, which
advised that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within a few
days, the Chief ofNaval Operations had directed Admiral Eimmel to
“Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carry-
ing out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.
On the following day, the Chief of Naval Operations, in his dispatch
which repeated tne Army dispatch advising that hostilities were
possible at any moment, had directed that Admiral Eimmel was to
“Be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.”
Admiral Eimmel testified before the Naval Court that as the result
of the “war warning,” he continued the security measures already in
effect (supra, page 64) ; carried out the planned movements of carriers
to Wake and Midway, with reconnaissance en route; carried out re-
connaissance at Midway and Wake; increased security measures in
fleet operating areas southward of Oahu; and, on November 28th,
issued an order directing extreme vigilance against submarines in op-
erating areas and depth bombing of all contacts, suspected to be hos-
tile, in certain of the operating areas (page 5, Exhibit 70)7 There is
no evidence of any other specific action taken by Admiral Eimmel
after 27 November 1841, in order to carry out the direction contained
in the war warning or the direction in the message of November 28th.
It does appear that so far as the Fleet patrol planes at Oahu were con-
cerned, their training continued along the same lines which had been
followed prior to the “war warning.”
The testimony by Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Oflicer, and
others in this investigation, is to the effect that the establishment of
long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an “Ap-
propriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks
assigned in WPL-46.”
It is interesting to note that the memoranda prepared by the War
Plans Oflicer on November 30th and 5 December 1941, setting forth
the action to be taken if war developed with Japan in twenty-four or
forty-eight hours, contained no provision for the establishment of
reconnaissance from Oahu (Exhibit 69A and 69B, Naval Court). As
Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff, testified, what they were thinking
about in the Pacific was not the defense of Pearl Harbor. They were
thinking about the Fleet and the readiness of the Fleet.
E. The Reconnaissance that Could Have Been Flovm.
A review of past reconnaissance during Admiral Eimmel’s tour
of duty sheds no light on this problem because he testified that he
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
493
had never attempted to cover any large sector by lang range recon-
naissance and that a patrol out to 300 miles was almost useless unless
as a guard against an air raid, although any patrol has some value
as far as surface ships are concerned. However, his predecessor, Ad-
miral Richardson, had established a distant patrol, “in view of the
fact that constant and repeated warnings were received of the pos-
sible outbreak of the war in the immediate future” (p. 1053, Naval
Court). This patrol, he said, was designed to cover [ASS] a
given sector adequately and was rotated daily. The sector which was
primarily covered more adequately and frequently than any other was
from 170° to the westward to about 350°. That to the eastward was
not covered.
Admiral Richardson also testified that this patrol would not have
been adequate to positively detect an approaching combat force hav-
ing as its intention the delivery of an attack early in the morning,
but that it certainly would have made the attack more difficult. These
patrols were discontinued when or shortly before Admiral Kimmel
relieved Admiral Richardson.
Admiral Bellinger’s testimony on the reconnaissance that could
have been.flown during the critical period is obviously the most valu-
able on the subject. He stated that after October 28th, while there
were 107 VP assigned to all units of Aircraft Scouting Force, only
eighty-one were available. Of these, fifty-four had just arrived and
were the PBY-5 type, with limited available spare parts. The num-
ber of plane crews didf not quite equal the number of planes available.
If one could consider eighty -one planes available, and assuming that
there would have been none lost because of breakdowns requiring
spare parts, it would have been practicable to use one-third, about
twenty-seven planes, for daily patrol. Each plane could cover a
sector of eight degrees with a radius of 700 miles, totalling approxi-
mately 216 degrees daily. This, however, would have been the ab-
solute maximum because of the lack of sufficient crews and spare parts.
144 degrees could have been covered daily based on the use of eighteen
E lanes daily of the fifty-four new PB Y-5’s. Actually, on 7 Decem-
er 1941 there were in all only sixty-one planes available at Oahu, one
squadron of which had just returned from Midway and Wake and
required overhaul. This left forty-nine planes actually available, one-
third of which would have been arne to cover 128 degrees.
Admiral Bellinger testified that if he had received a directive from
Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, to conduct
360 degrees reconnaissance with the available Navy planes, it would
have been possible to maintain such reconnaissance for not more than
four or five days. His estimate of the duration of the daily 128-degree
search was that it could have been flown until the failure of planes
and the lack of spare parts reduced the planes to such an extent that
further reconnaissance was impossible. It appears that such recon-
naissance could have been carried on for an indefinite period and
Admiral Bellinger’s “vague” estimate was that it could have been
carried on for several weeks.
Admiral Davis testified before Admiral Hart that: “There were
not enough planes and pilots to establish and maintain a long range,
360 degree search indefinitely, or even for more than a limited time.
There were, however, enough to approximate this by using relatively
79716 — 46 — Ex. 167 82
494 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
short range planes in the least dangerous sectors, and by obtaining
some assistance by available Army aircraft, so that I think it could
have been undertaken, had it been considered essential, on the basis
that reenforcements could have arrived before personnel and materiel
fatigue set in. Unless reenforcements arrived, it could not have been
maintained.”
[139"] F. The Sectors Which Would Have Been Covered.
Had partial reconnaissance been flown from Oahu during the first
week of December, 1941, it appears that the northern sectors would
have been covered. Admiral Bellinger testified that he considered
the northern sectors as the most dangerous sectors primarily because
of the prevailing winds which would facilitate carrier-based plane
operations in that sector. He stated that had the normal plan been
carried out after the attack, on December 7th patrol planes would have
searched the northern sector, and that some few planes did search
that sector. But there had been searches made to the south because of
information received from CincPac to the effect that a radio bearing
indicated that the attacking force was to the south.
[7-40] FINDINGS
73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other
sources, the only practicable way by which the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, could have obtained information as to the location or
movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 Decem-
ber 1941 was by long distance air reconnaissance.
74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had
the obligation, through Com 14, to conduct distance reconnaissance,
and under Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier De-
fense Plan, naval forces were to be supplemented by available Arm j
aircraft if the naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol
and search operations. As previously pointed out, the latter plan was
not in operation because an agreement between the Commanding
General and Com 14 that threat of a hostile attack was imminent was
a prerequisite and no such agreement had been made prior to the
attack. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, which implemented
the agreements for joint Army-Navy air action, similarly was not
operative prior to the attack.
75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch.
The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were
the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.
76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of
Admiral Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization.
They were operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with sched-
ules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to
the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not
provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.
77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry
that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant re-
connaissance.
78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral
Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the u war
warning,” as to the advisability or practicability of long range recon-
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
495
naissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject
must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The
Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed
of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral
Kimmel had no such discussion with him.
79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet
Patrol Planes, and General Martin; Commanding General, Hawaiian
Air Force, which was used as a basis for the joint Army-Navy agree-
ments, was prophetic in its estimate that in the event of attack on
Hawaii, the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an
air attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles from
Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter-
measure included daily patrols as far as possible from Oahu, to sectors
through 360 degrees, to reduce the possibilities of surface or air
surprise. It further stated that such [X£I] patrols could be
effectively maintained with the personnel and materiel available at
the time (March, 1941) for a very short period and that such patrols
were not practicable unless other intelligence indicated that a sur-
face raid was probable within narrow limits of time. According to
Admiral Bellinger, it was realized by the responsible officers of the
Pacific Fleet that another course of action wnieh was always open
was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degrees, with the available air-
craft, covering the more dangerous sectors.
80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward
of Oahu was being carried out prior to tne attack, in accordance
with the provisions of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet
at base and in operating areas.
81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the
critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous
distant reconnaissance flown from Oahu appears to have been for
several days during the summer of 1941 on a sector toward Jaluit.
This reconnaissance had been directed by Admiral Kimmel at Ad-
miral Bloch’s request.
82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a recon-
naissance flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting
by providing intelligence. The reconnaissance was not flown because
the Army planes were not made ready prior to the attack.
83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the%Pacific Fleet the
task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pa-
cific area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land
and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in
that hemisphere. Under the provisions of Pacific Fleet Operating
Plan Rainbow Five, when that plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet
patrol planes were to maintain maximum patrol plane search against
enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due re-
gard for time required for overhaul and repair of planes and for con-
servation of personnel.
84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that
negotiations with Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by
Japan was expected within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations
directed that Admiral Kimmel “execute an appropriate defensive
depl oyment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in
496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch,
which, among other things, advised General Short that Japanese
future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible
at any moment. The Navy dispatch directed that Admiral Kimmel
was to undertake no offensive action until Japan had committed an
ov ert a ct and that he was to “be prepared to carry out tasks assigned
in WPL-46 so far as they apply to .Japan in case hostilities occur.
86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from
Oahu would have been an “appropriate def ensiv e deployment prepar-
atory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.”
[ 142 ] 87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the
week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360
degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.
88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet
to the Navy Department to increase the number of patrol planes
assigned to the Fleet. Some new replacement planes had been sent to
the Fleet during October and November, 1941. Additional planes, as
evidenced by the prompt arrival of reenforcements after December
7th, could have been made available by the Navy Department, but at
the expense of defenses in other areas. The Navy Department pre-
sumably knew that the number of planes available at Oahu were not
sufficient to conduct 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a
few days. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that after
November 27th, responsible officers in the Navy Department thought
that reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu to the extent
practicable with the planes available there.
89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact avail-
able at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown,
for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees
to a distance of about 700 miles.
90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being
the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if
the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.
91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu
after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern
sectors probably would have been searched.
# The Attack on Pearl Harbor
A. Prelude: Japanese Submarines on 7 December 1941.
At 0342, 7 December 1941, the USS CONDOR, a minesweeper,
sighted a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor.
Tnis was in a defensive sea area where American submarines had
been restricted from operating submerged. When sighted, the sub-
marine was proceeding toward the entrance buoys. It was about
100 feet from and on a collision course with the CONDOR, but turned
sharply to port. The CONDOR simultaneously turned to starboard.
The CONDOR reported the incident by blinker to the USS WARD
between 0350 and 0358. The WARD was a destroyer of the Inshore
Patrol then engaged in patrol duty off the entrance to the harbor.
The CONDOR then continued on its assigned mission. The message
to the WARD read :
Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course, speed 9 knots.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
497
After receiving this visual signal, the WARD made a sonar search
for about an hour and a half, without result. It then communicated
by radio with the CONDOR, asking :
What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine that you
sighted?
At 0520 the CONDOR replied :
The course was about what we were steering at the time 020 magnetic and
about 1000 yards from the entrance apparently heading for the entrance.
In response to further inquiries made by the WARD between 0521
and 0536, the CONDOR advised again that the last time it had sighted
the submarine was about 0350 and that it was apparently headed for
the entrance. On receiving the message giving the submarine’s course
as about 020 magnetic, the captain of the WARD realized that his
search had been in the wrong direction. He then continued searching,
but again without result.
The CONDOR made no report of the incident, except to the WARD.
The captain considered that the identification at that time was not
positive enough to make a report to other than the Senior Officer
Present Afloat. The Senior Officer Present Afloat, Lieutenant Com-
mander Outerbridge, who commanded the WARD, made no report
to higher authority. The captain of the WARD thought that the
CONDOR might have been mistaken in concluding that it had seen
a submarine.
The radio conversation between the WARD and CONDOR was
overheard and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop’s
Point, Oahu, a radio station then under the jurisdiction of the
Commander, Inshore Patrol, 14th N. D. (Ex. 18). Since the con-
versation was solely [1-44] between the ships and was not ad-
dressed to the Section Base and no request was made that it be relayed,
the Bishop’s Point Radio Station did not relay or report it to higher
authority. The loudspeaker watch on the same frequency, which was
maintained in the Communications Office, 14th N. D., did not over-
hear or intercept the WARD-CONDOR conversation.
At the entrance to Pearl Harbor there was stationed a gate-vessel
charged with opening and closing the net at the entrance. This
anti-torpedo net was, according to Admiral Bloch’s previous testi-
mony, 45 feet in depth. The deepest part of the channel was 72 feet.
A Japanese submarine subsequently recovered was about 20 feet from
keel to conning tower.
The instructions of the Captain of the Yard were that the net
should be kept closed from sunset to sunrise and opened only on orders
from him, from the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or from the Yard
Duty Officer who could be reached via the signal tower (Exhibit 43).
The log of the gate-vessel indicates that the net was opened and
closed a number of times during the night of December 6-7. At
0458 on the 7th, the gate was opened and the CROSSBILL and the
CONDOR stood in. It was not until 0846 that the gate was closed.
The Commanding Officer of the CONDOR testified that at 0532, when
the CONDOR came in, conditions of visibility were very good and
were “approaching daylight conditions.”
The log of the signal tower for December 6-7, 1941 records the
closing of the gate at 2250 on 6 December, which was followed by
498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
an entry at 0600 that the ANTARES was reported off the harbor
(Exhibit 46).
The USS ANTARES, with a 500-ton steel barge in tow, arrived
off Pearl Harbor from Canton and Palmyra at about 0605, when it
exchanged calls with the WARD. At 0630 the ANTARES sighted
a suspicious object, which appeared to be a small submarine about
1,500 yards on its starboard quarter. The ANTARES notified the |
WARD and asked it to investigate, and several minutes later, at
about 0633, observed a Nayv patrol plane circle and drop two smoke
pots near the object. (Exhibit 73.)
The WARD complied and at 0640 sighted an unidentified sub-
marine one point off its starboard bow, apparently following the
ANTARES into Pearl Harbor. General Quarters were sounded and
all engines ordered full ahead, increasing the WARD’S speed from
five to twenty-five knots. At 0645 she opened fire with guns 1 and 3,
firing one shot from each gun. The attack lasted only one or two
minutes. The first shot, at a range of approximately 100 yards,
passed directly over the conning tower; the second, from No. 3 gun,
at fifty yards or leas, hit the submarine at the waterline junction
of the hull and conning tower. At about this time, the ANTARES,
observing the fire of the WARD, also noted that the Navy patrol
plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charges at the submarine.
The submarine heeled over to the starboard and started to sink. The
WARD ceased firing and then dropped depth charges. A large
amount of oil appeared on the surface. The submarine went down
in 1,200 feet of water. (Exhibit 74.)
\llf5 1 At 0651 the WARD sent a radio message to the Comman-
dant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit 18) :
We have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea area.
The captain of the WARD, after reflecting that this message might
not be interpreted as showing a surface submarine contact, at 0653
sent the following supplementary message :
We have attacked fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine op-
erating in defensive sea area.
This message was received by the Bishop’s Point radio station, re-
layed to the Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Inshore Pa-
trol, a nd d elivered by the Communications Watch Officer, FOUR-
TEENTH Naval District, to the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer.
The Duty Officer notified the ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff at 0712
and, at the latter’s direction, the Duty Officer of the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715.
The ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff informed Admiral Bloch.
Because of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their
reaction was that the WARD had probably been mistaken, but that
if it were not a mistake, the WARD and the relief ready duty de-
stroyer MONAGHAN, which was dispatched, could take care of the
situation, while the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to whom
they had referred the information, had the power to take any other
action which might be desired.
The CincPac Staff Duty Officer was given the report at about 0720
by the Assistant Duty Officer. After several attempted phone calls
to ascertain whether Admiral Bloch knew of the report, the Staff Duty
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY 499
Officer received a phone message at 0740 from the duty officer of
PatWing 2 that a patrol plane had reported that a submarine had been
sunk in the defensive sea area; simultaneously, another phone call
from FOURTEENTH Naval District advised the CincPac Staff Duty
Officer that Admiral Bloch had been informed of the sinking and had
ordered the ready duty destroyer out to assist the WARD and the
standby destroyer to get up steam. The Staff Duty Officer then phoned
Admiral Kimmel and gave him both messages and the information
as to the action taken by Admiral Bloch. About this time, Captain
Ramsey, of PatWing 2, phoned again and the Staff Duty Officer sug-
gested he make his search planes available in case the Admiral wanted
tnem.
Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court that between
0730 and 0740 he received a report that a submarine had been attacked
off Pearl Harbor. He said tnat he was waiting for an amplification
of this report when the air attack commenced. He also stated that
the officer who reported the sinking of the submarine should have
broadcast in plain language, but that he had reported in code, which
caused delay. Admiral Kimmel also testified that after 27 Novem-
ber 1941, there had been about a half-dozen of such reports, and hence
amplification of the report was necessary.
The evidence indicates that the reports by the WARD
were in plain language but that a request for verification by the
WARD was later sent in code by the ComFOURTEEN Communi-
cation Officer at the direction of the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer.
The WARD’S reply to that request was also in code and was deci-
phered at about the time when the air attack commenced.
A Japanese midget submarine entered Pearl Harbor and, after
the air attack had commenced, fired both of its torpedoes, one of
which exploded on the beach of Ford Island, passing between the
RALEIGH and the CURTISS, and the other buried itself, it was
believed, in the mud near the berth of the UTAH. This submarine
was sunk by the CURTISS and recovered from the harbor some
weeks after the attack. It had been so thoroughly destroyed that
nothing of intelligence value could be obtained from it. Whether
or not this was the submarine which had been sighted by the
CONDOR could not be determined. No other submarine was de-
tected in the harbor.
Another Japanese midget submarine was beached off Bellows
Field, Oahu, and captured on the next day, along with its command-
ing officer. Various documents were recovered from this submarine
including a chart of Pearl Harbor, on which was laid out a course
into the harbor, around Pearl Harbor, and out of the harbor (Ex-
hibits 32A, 33A). On this chart (Ex. 33A) were indicated the posi-
tions of various ships in the harbor. The charted positions differed
substantially from the actual berthing arrangements on December
7th. This fact led the Army Pearl Harbor Board to conclude that
the submarine had been in the harbor for reconnaissance prior to
December 7th.
The conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board that the Jap-
anese midget submarines “must have been in the harbor , a few days
before the attack and evidently were moving into and out of the
harbor at will” (Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, page 155) is
500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
based wholly on the legends appearing on the Japanese maps (Ex-
hibits 32, 32A, 33, 33A) captured in the midget submarine that was
sunk off Bellows Field, and on the testimony of Robert L. Shivers,
FBI Agent in charge at Honolulu on 7 December 1941, which, in
turn, is likewise based solely on the legends appearing on the same
maps (Rep. APHB, page 155). At the present time, Mr. Shivers
is Collector of the Port at Honolulu, and is in a precarious physical
condition due to a serious heart ailment. Mr. Shivers was inter-
viewed in Honolulu during the first week of June, 1945, and he stated,
as also appears in the Army Pearl Harbor Board report (page 155),
that his conclusion that Japanese submarines had been in Pearl
Harbor prior to the attack was based on an examination of the maps
in question, and that he had no other information to sustain his con-
clusion. Mr. Shivers likewise had no further information to supply
in respect of the intelligence situation or the intelligence information
that was available in Honolulu prior to 7 December 1941, except to
say that he was mystified that the ONI tap of the telephone line of
the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu was lifted on 2 December 1941,
pursuant to an order issued by Captain (now Rear Admiral) May-
field, the DIO. Since Mr. Shiver’s statements were no different from
those given by him in his testimony of record before the Army
Pearl Harbor Board, and since the basis of his, and the conclusion of
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, are shown to be erroneous by a care-
ful study of the legends on the maps in question, on which those con-
clusions were based, and since his health was so precarious, it was
deemed not necessary to call him as a witness.
[7^7] For the following reasons, it appears that the Japanese
midget submarine from which was obtained the chart of Pearl
Harbor was not in the harbor on that day, and probably had not been
there on any prior occasion :
(a) The following facts lead to the conclusion that the recovered
chart was an attack 'plan rather than an actual track and log of events :
(1) The characters marking certain points on the chart (Exhibits
33 and 33 A) were in Chinese ideographs which give no indication of
tense. For instance, the notation which has been variously translated
as “enemy ship sunk” and “Attack and sink enemy ships” could have
been the future meaning. Similarly the notation translated as “Fixed
position,” could mean “Position to be fixed,” a natural course of action
before entering the channel.
(2) The times marked on the chart were unquestionably Tokyo
time (-9). This is confirmed by the computation, on the back of the
chart, of the time of dawn and sunrise at Pearl Harbor on December
8 (Tokyo time).
(3) Based on (2), times along the track were all in daylight, com-
mencing at the channel entrance at dawn.
* (4) The northwesterly portion of the track, to the northward of
Ford Island, passed through an area which was, and had been,
occupied by a number of ships moored to buoys, and could not have
been followed by a submarine.
(5) The courses and notations were much more neat and meticulous
than any that could have been made during the passage of narrow and
crowded waters by the navigator of a two-man submarine.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
501
(6) The major Japanese operation plan for the Pearl Harbor attack,
as reconstructed by a captured J apanese yeoman, and confirmed gen-
erally by captured documents, provided that the midget submarines
were to enter the harbor and after the initiation of the air attack were
to attack with torpedoes. The times on the chart were in conformity
with this, since, converted into Honolulu time, there was a waiting
period inside the harbor entrance from 0545 to 0840 and the turning
point south of Ford Island was timed 0900.
(b) The submarine had its full allowance of two torpedoes when
recovered.
(c) The submarine commander, on interrogation, stated that he
had failed in his mission (Exhibit 68).
(d) The information on the chart was of a nature that could
more readily be obtained by civilian observers from the area surround-
ing Pearl Harbor than by dangerous submarine reconnaissance. As
has appeared earlier, the J apanese Consul General had been communi-
cating just such intelligence to Tokyo.
(e) Notations on the chart indicate that the submarine commander
received intelligence reports as late as December 5th.
[ 14 &] Intelligence information recently received indicates that
the midget submarines were carried by and launched from mother
submarines (Exhibit 69.). They were carried on the main deck abaft
the conning tower and secured to the pressure hull by means of heavy
clamps. The midgets used in the Pearl Harbor attack were 41 feet
in length, had a reported cruising range of 175 to 180 miles at their
most economical speed of 4 to 6 knots, did not have a radio transmitter,
and carried a crew of two men. They were armed with two torpedoes
and apparently carried the same designation number as their mother
subs. The exact number with the Japanese task force is not definitely
known, but there is substantial proof that there were at least five.
The midget submarine beached off Bellows Field from which the
chart was recovered bore the designation of “1-18,” apparently that of
its “mother.” In the recovered chart, at various points along the sides
of the entrance channel from Hammer Point to Hospital Point, are
notations in faint pencil, “IZ16,” “1-20,” “-22,” “1-18,” “1-24.”
From information received, it is now known that these are the designa-
tions of the submarines which carried the five midgets known to have
been present. The times on the recovered chart indicate a waiting pe-
riod in the narrow harbor entrance area from 0115 to 0410 ( 0445 to
0840, Hawaiian time) . It therefore appears to be a logical assumption
that the five midget submarines were to lie in wait in the narrow en-
trance channel, approximately in the positions indicated, with the ob-
ject of torpedoing ships attempting to sortie, thus blocking the chan-
nel ; and that after the initial air attack had been completed, they were
to proceed around Ford Island and complete the destruction. The
midget submarine which was sunk west of Ford Island apparently
followed just such a plan. Confirmation of this assumption is found
in a captured copy of the Japanese Plan for this operation, wherein
the following initial task is assigned to the Sixth Fleet (Submarine
Force) : “Will observe and attack American Fleet in HAWAII area.
Will make a surprise attack on the channel leading into PEARL HAR-
BOR and attempt to close it. If the enemy moves out to fight he
will be pursued and attacked.”
502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
B. Suspicious Submarine Contacts Prior to 7 December 19£1.
It was suspected in Washington for some time prior to December
7th that our Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was being kept under obser-
vation by Japanese submarines, there having been, over a period of
six months, reports by our destroyers of such contacts. The Fleet
also received reports that Japanese submarines were reconnoitering
the approaches to Pearl Harbor. The number of such reports at Pearl
Harbor prior to the attack was placed by one witness at from ten to
fifteen, several of which occurred in the unmediate vicinity of the en-
trance to Pearl Harbor. The contacts were on underwater sound con-
tacts, which were not confirmed by sightings.
A search of the files of CincPac has resulted in locating dispatches
that refer to three suspicious contacts during the five weeks preceding
Pearl Harbor :
(1) On 3 November 1941, an oil slick area in latitude 20-10, longitude
157-41 was observed by a patrol plane, and crossed by Task Force
One ; an air search of a fifteen mile area by the patrol plane, a sound
search of an unspecified area by the T7SS WORDEN and an investi-
gation by [149] the USS DALE produced negative results ( Ex-
hibit 48; dispatches 031920, 032035, 032133, 032300, 040042).
(2) On 28 November 1941, after the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, had issued an order requiring extreme vigilance against pos-
sible hostile submarines, restricting submerged submarine operations
to certain areas, and providing that all submarine contacts in other
areas suspected to be hostile were to be depth bombed, the USS
HELENA reported that a radar operator, without knowledge of the
CincPac alert, was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area
(Exhibit 48; dispatch 280835). A search by a task group with three
destroyers, of the western border and the northern half of that area,
pursued from 281050 to 281845, when -abandoned by 290900, produced
no contacts (Exhibit 48; dispatches 281050, 281133, 281704, 281845).
(3) During the night of 2 December 1941, the USS GAMBLE
reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-23,
which was lost in a change of range, that was evaluated to have been
too rapid to indicate the presence of a submarine (Exhibit 48; dis-
patch 022336)*. An investigation, order to be made by Desron 4
(Exhibit 48; dispatch 030040), apparently was negative.
C. Detection of Aircraft by the Army Radar System.
It appears from the prior investigations that about 0702 on the
morning of 7 December 1941, two Army privates on duty at a mobile
radar unit on the northern part of Oahu discovered an unusually large
response on the radar in a northerly direction and from about 136
miles. This information they reported, at about 0715, to an Army
officer on duty at the Army Information Center. The Army officer
stated that he had some information to the effect that a flight of Army
B-17’s was due in that morning, and he thought that the planes de-
tected by the radar were those Army planes. He did not suspect
enemy planes and made no effort to report to his superior.
The evidence indicates that neither this information nor any other
information as to the direction from which the planes approached or
on which they departed was transmitted to the Naval authorities on
the day of the attack.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
503
D. The Air Attack.
The Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor, according to most ob-
servers, started at 0755. It began with dive bombing and strafing
of the Naval Air Station at Ford Island, and at the Army’s Hickam
Field. This was followed at Pearl Harbor by attacks on major units
of the Fleet, launched by torpedo planes and dive bombers, and was
accompanied by strafing. Next there occurred two distinct horizontal
bombing attacks from nigh altitudes, the last immediately preceding
a final intensive dive bombing attack. Almost simultaneously with
the raid on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese attacked [750] the
Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station and Ewa Field at Barber’s Point was
strafed. Approximately 150 planes took part in the attack on Pearl
Harbor. The raid is reported variously to have ended at from 0940
to 1130 and some Japanese planes are biown to have been over Oahu
after 1200.
The CincPac Staff Duty Officer learned of the inception of the air
raid during his second telephone conversation of the morning with
Admiral Kimmel, when he was advising of a report by the WARD,
after its submarine reports, that it had detained a sampan. He im-
mediately told the Admiral of his receipt from the signal tower of this
message :
Japanese are attacking Pearl Harbor X this is no drill.
[757] E. Location of Pacific Fleet Units.
At the time of the attack, the forces of the Pacific Fleet were, ac-
cording to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 73), disposed partly in port
and partly at sea as follows :
til In Pearl Harbor:
(a) Task Force One, Vice Admiral Pye commanding (less one
battleship, one light cruiser and one destroyer) comprising five bat-
tleships, four light cruisers, seventeen destroyers, two light cruisers,
and four mine layers.
(b) Task Force Two (under the command of Vice Admiral Halsey,
who was at sea with units thereof constituting a separate task force —
' Task Force Eight) comprising three battleships, eight destroyers,
one light cruiser, and four mine layers.
(c) Task Force Three (less detached units under command of Vice
Admiral Brown at sea, and less a separate task force — Task Force
| Twelve — which was at sea under Rear Admiral Newton’s command)
comprising two heavy cruisers, and four mine layers which were
under overhaul.
(d) Five submarines and the submarines tender PELIAS of Task
Fore© Seven.
(e) The TANGIER, HULBERT, CURTIS, and THORNTON,
[ and Patrol Squadrons VP 11, 12, 14, 22, 23, and 24 (a total of about
sixty planes) of Task Force Nine.
(i) Marine Air Squadrons VMSB 232 and VMJ 252 (a total of
twenty planes) at Ewa, Oahu.
, (g) Two destroyer tenders and the Base Force, consisting of the
[ ARGONNE, plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, and planes of Base
Force Aircraft Squadrons VJ-1, VJ-2, and VJ-3, as follows: 19
J2F, 9 JRS, 2 PBY-1, 1 J2V.
504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(2) At sea:
(a) Task Force Eight (Vice Admiral Halsey commanding) con-
sisting of one aircraft carrier (ENTERPRISE) , three heavy cruisers
and nine destroyers, located 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, standing
to eastward, was returning to Pearl Harbor after landing a Marine
Air Squadron at Wake Island.
(b) Task Force Three (Vice Admiral Brown commanding), less
units in port, consisting of one heavy cruiser and one mine laying
squadron, less two of its divisions, was exercising with landing boats
at Johnston Island.
[152] (c) Task Force Twelve (Rear Admiral Newton command-
ing), ordinarily a component of Task Force Three, consisting of one
aircraft carrier (LEXINGTON), three heavy cruisers, and five de-
stroyers, located about 425 miles southeast of Midway, was nroceed-
ing on a westerly course to land a Marine Air Squadron on Midway
Island.
(d) One heavy cruiser and one mine laying division, ordinarily a
part of Task Force Three, were engaged in “normal operations” at
sea southwest of Oahu.
(e) Four submarines of Task Force Seven, somewhere at sea en
route to Pearl Harbor.
(3) At other places:
(a) At Midway Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and
Patrol Squadron VP-21 (consisting of twelve planes) of Task Force
Twelve.
(b) At Wake Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and a
Marine Air Squadron.
(c) At Johnston Island (in addition to Task Force Three, under-
going exercise) , two Base Force PB Y-l planes.
(d) At Mare Island, five submarines of Task Force Seven.
(e) At San Diego, four submarines of Task Force Seven.
To sum up: At Pearl Harbor, there were eight battleships, two
heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, two old light cruisers, one old
cruiser mine layer, eignt destroyers, five submarines, twelve mine
layers, two destroyer tenders, one submarine tender, four aircraft
tenders, various auxiliary and repair ships, and 111 aircraft of various
types, of which nine were under overhaul. At sea, there were two
aircraft carriers, eight heavy cruisers, fourteen destroyers, four sub-
marines, and one mine layer squadron less one division. At other
places, there were thirteen submarines, fourteen Navy Patrol planes
and one Marine Air Squadron.
Except as to Task Forces Eight and Twelve, which were on special
missions to reenforce Wake and Midway Islands, the dispositions of
Pacific Fleet Units as noted above were in accordance with a previously
worked out fleet employment schedule.
[153] F. Condition of Readiness.
(1 ) The ships in port :
The testimony in previous investigations showed some confusion as
to the condition of readiness which was in effect on ships of the Pacific
Fleet in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. It appears, however,
that whether or not Condition III, as prescribed in the Pacific Fleet
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
505
Letter on security of the Fleet, was in effect, the condition aboard the
battleships was in excess of that condition. Each of the battleships
had two 5-inch anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns
manned. While the Fleet letter on security fixed responsibility on
the senior officer present in each air defense sector for fire control in
his sector, no particular damage control organization was prescribed
in that letter or functioning on the ships in Pearl Harbor at the time
of the attack. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that the
anti-aircraft batteries of the ships were quickly manned and, consider-
ing the circumstances, were effectively used against the Japanese at-
tackers.
(2) The aircraft of the Pacific Fleet:
The condition of readiness in force as to the Fleet aircraft was
Baker 5 (50 per c.ent of the assigned aircraft to be ready on four hours
notice) with machine guns and ammunition in all planes not under-
going maintenance work. Three squadrons (one at Midway, one at
Pearl Harbor, and one at Kaneohe) were in condition Afirm 5 (100
per cent assigned aircraft to be ready on four hours notice). This
was augmented on December 7th by specific duty assignments which
required six planes from Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN and from
Patrol Squadron TWENTY-FOUR (at Kaneohe) and from Patrol
Squadron TWELVE (at Pearl Harbor) to be readv for flight on 30
minutes notice. On the morning of December 7th, three patrol planes
of a squadron based at Kaneohe were in the air on morning security
patrol armed with depth charges, three were ready for flight on 30
minutes notice, and four on four hours notice; and four planes of a
squadron at Pearl Harbor were in the air conducting tactics with sub-
marines and one plane was ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.
G. Reaction to the Attach.
The hostile character of the attacking planes was not recognized un-
til the bombs fell, but there followed an immediate and general real-
ization of that fact, and a prompt application of such defensive meas-
ures as were then capable of being carried out. General Quarters was
sounded in all units ashore and afloat and, as has been pointed out
above, anti-aircraft batteries were manned and, considering the dam-
aged condition of the ships, employed to the fullest possible effect.
There was, however, an unfortunate lapse of time before damage con-
trol measures on the ships in Pearl Harbor could be carried forward,
resulting in the suffering of much damage that might otherwise have
been prevented or minimized. The damages so quickly suffered in-
cluded a partial breakdown of the communication system, preventing
an accurate interchange of necessary information, including radio di-
rection bearings of the attacking force. The futility of the attempted
counter-measures in locating and attacking the Japanese striking
force was due, in [75^] large part, to a flood of wild and con-
flicting reports as to the location and strength, and probable intentions,
of units oi the J apanese force.
The evidence obtained in the previous investigations demonstrates
clearly that the officers and men of the Pacific Fleet met the attack,
individually and jointly, with great heroism.
506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
\_155~\ H. Composition and Movements of the Attacking Force.
The chief source of information concerning the J apanese force which
attacked Pearl Harbor is a Japanese prisoner of war who was captured
on Saipan during the Marianas Campaign. The POW was a chief
yeoman in the Japanese Navy, attached to the staff of the Commander
in Chief, Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto. The reconstruction
by the POW of the events preceding and leading up to Pearl Harbor
has been substantiated and verified by other information, including
that contained in a copy of Japanese Combined Fleet Operation Order
No. 1, recovered from the Japanese cruiser NACHI that was sunk in
Manila Bay. The prisoner’s reconstruction of the orders to the strik-
ingforce is contained in Exhibit 3.
The movements of the striking force were provided for in the Japa-
nese Secret Operation Order No. 1, dated 1 November 1941, which
stated that war would be declared on the United States on X-Day,
expected to be in the early or middle part of December, and that oh or
about X-16 Day the carrier task force would depart its base and pro-
ceed by way of Tankan Bay (Hotokappu Bay), Etorofu Island and
the Kuriles for Pearl Harbor, where it would deliver a surprise attack.
Japanese Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 3, dated 10
November 1941, fixed as X-Day, 8 December 1941, E. L. T. (Exhibit
3).
The Japanese striking force actually left Saiki Anchorage near the
Bongo Channel some time between November 20 and November 22,
1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu
Island. At the latter place it assembled and fueled, and departed on
or about 28 November 1941, E. L. T., and headed eastward under
heavy front. The force proceeded in an easterly direction heading
on course about 085°, to a point in longiture about 170° W ; then
turned southeast on course about 135 degrees, and proceeded to a point
northwest to due north of, and approximately 200 miles from, tne is-
land of Oahu, where it arrived early in the morning of 8 December
1941, E. L. T. From that position the Pearl Harbor attack was
launched. Following the attack, the striking force retired initially to
the northwest, on a heading of about 300°, to a point about longitude
170° E, thence to the southwest, irregularly on varying headings to a
point near 140° E, and thence northwest to Kyushu (Exhibit 3, page
16).
The striking force consisted of three of Japan’s five carrier divi-
sions, the KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1) ; HIRYU and SORYU
(CarDiv 2) ; SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU (sometimes referred to as
CarDiv 3, sometimes as CarDiv 4 and sometimes as CarDiv 5) ; the
HIYEI and KIRISHIMA (two of the battleships of BatDiv 3) ; the
TONE and CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8), and of various destroyers and
submarines.
Cooperating with the foregoing striking force was a large part of
the Japanese Sixth (Submarine) Fleet. That fleet left the Japanese
Inland Sea about 18 November 1941, E. L. T. At the time of the
attack, many Japanese submarines were concentrated at the mouth
of Pearl Harbor for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on any
United States ships that attempted to escape from the air attack in
the harbor. As previously pointed out, the evidence indicates that
only one midget submarine succeeded in entering the harbor.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
507
[156] I. The Casualties and Damage.
The facts as to the casualties and damage appear fully in the record
of tlie Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry : •
(1) An examination of reports in the Bureau of Personnel showed
that there were 3,963 casualties as a result of the Japanese Pearl
Harbor attack, of which 896 were wounded and 3,067 were either killed,
dead of wounds, or are missing and declared dead.
(2) The damage to fleet units in Pearl Harbor was extensive. The
Battleships ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OKLAHOMA, and WEST
VIRGINIA were sunk and the NEVADA beached to prevent its sink-
ing. The auxiliary vessels UTAH and OGLALA were also sunk. All
other battleships in the harbor, PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND,
and TENNESSEE, the Cruisers HELENA, HONOLULU, and
RALEIGH, the destroyers SHAW, CASSIN, and DOWNES, and the
auxiliaries CURTIS and VESTAL, were seriously damaged.
(3) The damage to airplanes was%s follows :
Type
Number
present
Dec. 7
Number
on hand
after raid
Number
usable
after raid
Patrol
00
45
11
Fighters
24
15
0
Scout bombers
60
20
14
Torpedo bombers
2
2
0
Battleship and cruiser planes..
02
82
11
Utility and transport planes
54
48
16
Totals
aoi
221
52
[157] FINDINGS
92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack
on Pearl Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile
submarine activity. The second advised of a surface and depth charge
attack on a submarine. Only the latter report reached responsible
officers. Due to reports on previous days of sound contacts with
submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated by Cora-
FOURTEEN, in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord
with the provisions of the Fleet security letter.
93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was
not received by Admiral Kimmel or by Admiral Bloch prior to the
air attack.
94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese
submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one
midget submarine known to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morning
of December 7th was sunk after making an ineffectual attack.
95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the
northward, obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installa-
tion for instruction purposes, was not communicated either to the
Navy or to responsible Army commanders.
96. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN
had no previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the
enemy at 0755. The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in
serious losses of life and damage.
508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
97. The battleships each had two 5" anti-aircraft guns ready and
two machine guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements
of Condition III as prescribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to
Fleet aircraft based at Oahu, seven were in the air (3 on morning
security patrol armed with depth charges and 4 engaged in tactics with
submarines) ; ten were on 30 minutes notice; and the balance of forty-
four on four hours notice.
98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued
in September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one exception,
were all in port and were either sunk or damaged. Due to the for-
tunate coincidence which resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea,
they were uninjured.
99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese
task force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki ' Anchorage, near
the Bongo Channel, sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941,
East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island,
in the Kuriles. The force then assembled and fueled. It departed
on or about 28 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded
in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southeast
to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.
100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions,
among which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the
attack, the Fleet Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel
that he could not reliably estimate the location of Carrier Divisions
1 and 2.
[168] 101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a
position 200 miles due north of Oahu.
[169] * VI
A. Findings
1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that
the United States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers,
either including or excluding Japan.
2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various
offensive tasks to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions
in the Marshalls and raids on enemy sea communications and posi-
tions, and various defensive tasks, including the task of protecting
the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and pre-
venting the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemi-
sphere by destroying hostile expeditions.
3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to
the Fleet various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet
security at the bases, at anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the
communications and territory of the Associated Powers by patrolling
with light forces an d p atrol planes, the establishment of defensive
submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guarding against sur-
prise attack by Japan.
4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes
included among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes
the maintenance of the maximum patrol plane search practicable in
the approaches to the Hawaiian area.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
509
5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on
W-day, which, it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day
that hostilities opened with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to
the attack.
6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was
based on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted
the basis of subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans,
and mobilization plans. The method of coordination under the plan
was to be by mutual cooperation until and unless unity of command
were invoked.
7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army’s task
was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and
against hostile sympathizers, and to support the naval forces. The
Navy’s task was to patrol the coastal zone (which included Oahu
and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense
of Oahu) , and to patrol and protect shipping therein, and to support
the Army forces.
8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH
Naval District, should provide for distant reconnaissance.
9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect
on 11 April 1941 by the Commandin g G eneral, Hawaiian Department,
and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.
[ 160 ] 10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan was an agreement between the Commandant, FOUR-
TEENTH Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, as to joint defensive measures for the security of the
Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hostile raids or air
attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.
11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan provided, among other tilings, for joint air operations and pro-
vided that when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol
and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, the
latter would be under the tactical control of the naval commander
directing search operations.
12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense .
Plan also provided that the Army was to expedite the installation of
its aircraft warning service, and that prior to the completion of that
service, the Navy, through the use of radar and other appropriate
means, would endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as
might be practicable.
13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOUR-
TEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently
imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take steps
to make available to the other the air forces at his disposal, in order
that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the plan.
14. The Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN did not effect
any agreement prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or
attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant placing Annex VII, Sec-
tion VI, in operation.
15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided,
among other things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with
79718 — 46 — Ex. 157 33
510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Army. One of the assumptions was that it was possible that a
declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise air attack on ships
in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable that there might be a surprise
submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a combination
of both forms of attack was possible.
16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin
stated, among other things, that the most likely and dangerous form
of attack on Oahu would be an air attack that would most likely be
launched from carriers which would probably approach inside of
three hundred miles. The estimate also stated that any single sub-
marine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undis-
covered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied
by a carrier. This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral Kimmel
and Admiral Bloch.
17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by Ad-
miral Bellinger and approved bv Admiral Bloch. This plan, which
was designated Annex “Baker” to the Naval Base Defense Force
Operation Plan, made specific provision for joint air operations by the
Army and Navy. The plan was effective upon receipt. .It was to be-
come operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack, or
might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions
of readiness for aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by [707]
ComFOURTEEN^as Naval Base Defense Officer, for Navy units.
18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in
operating areas, which was reissued by Admiral Eimmel in revised
form on 14 October 1941, provided that the Fleet’s security was predi-
cated on several assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of
war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, or a com-
bination of the two. This letter also stated that a single submarine
attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface force
probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.
19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures,
including provisions for defense a g ainst air attack. It provided,
among other things, that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense
Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over
the defense against air attack and tliat he should take other action,
including supervisory control over naval short-based aircraft, and
arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordina-
tion of the joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.
20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures
were to include intermitten patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore
patrol, and an air patrol. The air patrol was to consist of daily search
of fleet operating areas as directed by Aircraft Scouting Force, one
covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and one during the
entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.
21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the
attack of 7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, under which the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnais-
sance, and the Pacific Fleet security letter, under which the only air-
craft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet operating areas,
a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during the
entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
511
22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved
by the Chief of Naval Operations, m estimating probable enemy (Jap-
anese) action, visualized that one of the enemy defensive efforts would
be “destruction of threatening naval forces” ; that initial action would
include “possible raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midwhy, and
other outlying United States positions”', and that the initial Japanese
deployment would include “raiding and observation forces widely
distributed in the Pacific , and that submarines in the Hawaiian
area . . .” [Italics supplied.] The possibility of an attack on
Hawaii was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized.
23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of
command of the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Har-
bor was a possibility. Neither he nor the key members of his staff
appear to have considered it as a serious probability.
24. The method of command established in the local plans was that
of “mutual cooperation.”’ The relations between the responsible com-
manders were cordial. However, there was not in existence, prior to
the attack, any permanent operating setup which could insure the con-
stant and timely exchange of information, decisions, and intended
courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of joint operations,
particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the estab-
lishment or a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse
recommendations by the responsible local commanders, both Army
and Navy.
[162] 25. In accordance with “Joint Action,” unity of command
for the defense of Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agree-
ment between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department
and the Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. The
latter, however, would naturally not make such an agreement without
the approval of his immediate superior, the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for outlying islands
was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in connec-
tion with a proposal for reenforcement of Wake and Midway by Army
planes. General Short’s position was that if Army forces were in-
volved, the command must be his. Admiral Kimmel maintained that
the command of naval bases must remain with the Navy. The islands
were reenforced with Marine planes.
26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particu-
larly during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, re-
sulted in the frequent transmission to Japan of information of great
importance concerning the Pacific Fleet, the movements and locations
of ships, and defense preparations.
27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a com-
mercial communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding
the attack indicated the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.
28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by
the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the
likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by Army
and Navy radio .intercept stations and were decoded in Washington.
D. C. prior to the attack; that others which were obtained at Honolulu
by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack were, with the exception of a
few unimportant messages, in a code which could not be decrypted
there before December 7th; and, that three messages intercepted by
79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 34
512 CONGRESSIONAL IN VESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which
indicated the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War
Department for decryption but were either not received there prior to
the attack or were not decrypted prior to the attack. If the United
States intelligence services had oeen able to obtain and to decode
and translate promptly all of the espionage reports sent by the Jap-
anese Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 December
1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable
value.
29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire informa-
tion from coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Govern-
ment and its representatives. Through the interception of Japanese
diplomatic messages and their decryption and translation in Wash-
ington, D. C., prior to the attack, knowledge was obtained of the Jap-
anese Government’s actual views concerning the diplomatic situation,
of the Japanese Government’s intention to Wage war, and of the fact
that hostilities were impending and imminent.
30. The information acquired in Washington through the intercep-
tion of Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly
disseminated at Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to
the Chief of Naval Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State
Department, and to the President.
\ 163 ] 31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely
upon the Chief of Naval Operations for information as to the status
of the diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested
to be kept fully informed on this subject.
32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelli-
gence at Washington were not transmitted to the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, as such. Reasons advanced for this course of
action were that the Japanese might intercept the naval messages
and learn of the Navy’s success in decrypting Japanese codes; that
the volume of intercepted messages was so great that the transmis-
sion of them, particularly during the critical period, would have
overtaxed the Navy’s communications facilities ; and, that it was the
duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate such information
and to advise CincPac of the important facts learned.
33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on
the information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages.
34. The warnings sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
during November (particularly the “war warning” of the 27th)
and early December, 1941, indicated in unmistakable language that
the diplomatic negotiations had ceased, that war with Japan was
imminent, and that Japanese attacks might occur at any moment.
35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indi-
cating interest in the location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were
more specific than other intercepted messages indicating Japanese
interest in the movements of ships to or from other ports.
36. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was riot fully advised
of certain other information obtained from intercepted Japanese
messages after the November 27th “war warning,” which made fur-
ther evidence the termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations
and the Japanese intention to wage war.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
513
37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the
attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message
in which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to
present to the State Department at 1 p. m. the Japanese Govern-
ment’s final reply terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention
was made of the fact that 1 p. m. Washington tune was about dawn
at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. No
one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.
38. This so-called “1 p. m. delivery message,” which consisted of
one sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station
at Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to
the Navy Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available
in the Navy Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was
. sent to the Army for translation because there was no Japanese trans-
lator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. The transla-
tion, which could have been done by a qualified translator in a few
minutes, was not received from the Army until after 0900.
[ 164 ] 39. Although he was in possession of this highly signifi-
cant information several hours before the attack, and there were
available means whereby the information could have been transmitted
! to Admiral Kimmel immediately, including a “scrambler” telephone
( maintained by the Army, Admiral Stark initially was not disposed
to, and did not, send any message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he
relied on the transmission of a message by the War Department to
General Short, which was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.
40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider
it necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of
7 December and that he had not telephoned at any time previous to
the attack, but that one regret which he had was that he had not
; telephoned a message that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled
the Army message on the naval radio system.
41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941,
which was received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were
presenting an ultimatum at 1 p. m., that they were under orders to
destroy their code machine, that it was not known just what signifi-
cance the hour set might have but that the addressees were to be on
> the alert accordingly, and that the naval authorities were to be in-
formed.
42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack,
j on November 24th, that “a surprise aggressive movement in any direc-
tion, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility,”
and, on November 27th, that “an aggressive movement by the Jap-
l anese is expected within the next few days. The number and equip-
ment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces indicate
1 an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or
Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.”
43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention
I to probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward
I of Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the
i Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.
44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which
were to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representa-
tives information concerning the status of relations between Japan
and the United States, and other countries. These were known as the
“winds” code and the “hidden word” code. The “winds” code was
designed to indicate a break in diplomatic relations, or possibly war,
with England or the United States or Russia by the use in weather
broadcasts of certain Japanese words signifying wind directions.
45. The interception of a “winds” message relating to the United
States during the first week of December ? 1941, would not have con-
veyed any information of significance which the Chief of Naval Op-
erations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already
have.
[ 166 ] 46. No message in the “winds” code relating to the United
States was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Depart-
ment to whom such a message would have come had it been received
in the Navy Department. No such message was intercepted by the
radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines, although
intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such
a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message was
intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to inter-
cept such a -message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the
Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet
nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far. Eastern Section of the Office
of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message. The Chief of
Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the
Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony
to the effect that a “winds” code message was received prior to the
attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of Op-20-G, a com-
munications security section at the Navy Department, who stated
that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it
related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in
the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart,
Captain Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers
who, he stated, recalled having seen and read the “winds” message.
Each of those officers testified that he had never seen such a message.
The only other testimony to the effect that a “winds” message was
received was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to
OP-20-G, who said that he recalled that there was a message but
that he could not recall whether or not it related to the United States
or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this
investigation, Captain Kramer eironeously thought that a “hidden
word” message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been
a “winds” message.
47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted “hidden word”
code message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the
necessity of delivering other messages, including the “1 p. m. de-
livery message,” he overlooked a code word relating to the United
States and translated the message as meaning only that “relations
between Japan and England are not in accordance with expecta-
tions." He testified that he later discovered the error and a few
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
515
minutes before 1 p. m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction
to his superior officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an
officer of Armv Military Intelligence.
48. Except for the omission of the United States, the “hidden word”
code message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect
previous diplomatic interceptions which indicated that the message
was to convey the idea of a crisis involving the countries in question.
49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attabk included, in
addition to the Chief of Naval Operations, the District Intelligence
Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Fleet Intelli-
gence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.
[ 166 ] 60. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence
Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of
the Japanese Consul General and the Japanese Vice Consul at
Honolulu were tapped for some months prior to the attack. These
were discontinued on 2 December 1941 because the District Intelligence
Officer feared that the existence of such taps might be discovered, re-
sulting in undesirable complications. No information of military or
naval significance was obtained by means of the telephone taps.
51. On 6 December 1941 the local representatives of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelli-
gence Officer a transcript of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversa-
tion between a person in Honolulu named “Mori” and a person in
Japan. This was examined by the District Intelligence Officer. It
was decided that the conversation should be further studied by a
Japanese linquist of the District Intelligence Office, who was to listen
to the recording of the conversation. This was not done until after
the attack. The transcript furnished on December 6th indicated that
the person in Japan was interested, among other things, in the daily
flights of airplanes from Honolulu and in the number of ships present.
During the conversation, references were made to flowers, which, it
now appears, may have been code words signifying the presence or
absence of ships, and a method of conveying information to the
approaching J apanese ships, which presumably would have been lis-
tening in on the conversation. Prior investigations indicate that the
“Mori conversation” was also brought to the attention of General
Short on 6 December 1941.
52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of
the FOURTEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages
from and to the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via a com-
mercial communications company, were obtained during the first week
of December, 1941. This was the first time that such messages had
been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts were made
immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages were
decrypted before the attack. These contained no information of
particular significance.
53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by 'means
of the telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the
Japanese Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an
attack on Pearl Harbor.
54. One of the Japanese Consul General’s messages, which was
obtained by the District Intelligence Officer and turned oyer on 5
516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
December 1941 to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and
translation, was a message dated December 3rd. This message was in
Japanese code known as the “PA-K2.” It was decrypted and trans-
lated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack.
The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised of
a change in a method which had been established for communication by
visual signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the
use of a sailboat, certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio sta-
tion, and bonfires, would convey information as to the presence or
absence of various types of warships of the Pacific Fleet. Although
the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was unable to decrypt
this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted and trans-
lated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in
Op-20-G of the Navy Department in Washington. That section had
received the message from an Army radio intercept station at Fort
Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer testified he had no specific recollec-
tion of having seen this translation prior to the [ 167 ] attack,
but the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown to
him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of
work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was
taken on the translation until 8 December 1941.
55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu
received a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the
existing situation, the presence of ships in port was of utmost impor-
tance, that daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports should
advise whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl Harbor,
and whether or not the warships were ‘provided with anti-torpedo
nets. This message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept sta-
tion at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail I
to the War Department for decryption and translation. The trans-
lation supplied by the Army indicates that the message was trans-
lated on 30 December 1941.
56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul Gen-
eral at Honolulu sent two messages in the “PA-K2” code which indi-
cated the likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that there
were no signs of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in
all probability there was considerable opportunity left to take advan-
tage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and
Ewa, and that the battleships did not have torpedo nets. The second
message reported on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated
that it appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by
the Fleet air arm. These messages were not obtained by Naval Intelli-
gence at Honolulu prior to the attack. They were, however, both
intercepted by an Army intercept station at San Francisco and were
forwarded by teletype to the Army. The translations of these mes-
sages furnished by the Army indicate that they were translated on
December 8th. They could have been decrypted and translated in the
Navy Department in about an hour and a half.
57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy com-
municated to the Army estimates of the location and movetnents of
Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Mili-
tary Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained in
the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
517
such information, and had access to radio intelligence information
available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed
with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian
Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese
movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.
58. The War Department had information which led that Depart-
ment to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in
November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of
26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel,
concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over
Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things,
as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance
was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.
59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin was
distributed by the Commander-in-Chief ^Pacific Fleet, to his command.
This bulletin set forth the available information concerning
the composition of the Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin
on the same subject and pointed out that the .principal change was a
further increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from
the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate
forces. The bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese
Carrier Fleet consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five
divisions, each having two carriers.
60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning
the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained
by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intelli-
f ence Officer, who received it primarily from the Radio Intelligence
Jnit at Pearl Harbor. Such information also was contained in dis-
patches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from
the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D. C.
61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of
Naval Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others.
These included summaries of the information concerning Japanese
naval forces which had been received from the Radio Intelligence
Units at Pearl Harbor and at the Philippines.
62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav,
information to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which sum-
marized the information as to Japanese naval movements obtained by
the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding
month. The dispatch indicated that the Commander Second Fleet had
been organizing a task force comprising units of various fleets. This
dispatch stated that there was believed to be a strong concentration of
submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, which included at least
one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier), plus probably
one-third of the submarine fleet. The astimate was that a strong
force might be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while com-
ponent pads might operate from Paleo and the Marshalls.
68. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in
the Philippines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable be-
cause of the location of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio
intelligence unit in the Philippines, in a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav
and others, commented on the above dispatch of ComFOURTEEN
a-nd stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated that
518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was directing the various fleet
units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into
two sections. The first section was expected to operate in the South
China area. The second section was expected to operate in the Man-
dates. It was estimated that the second section included “CarDiv 3,
RYUJO, and one MARU.” This dispatch also stated that the Com-
SIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition that carriers and
submarines in force were in the Mandates^ and that their best indica-
tions were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area.
It was stated that this evaluation was considered to be reliable.
64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting
reports from the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which
were received by Admiral Kimmel, which confirmed the movement
of important J apanese naval forces to the southward of J apan. These,
however, did not report the movement of carriers. '
[ 169 ] 65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit
at Pearl Harbor continued the practice of preparing daily summaries
of the information received through their traffic analysis of Jap-
anese naval communications, which were submitted to Layton, the
Fleet Intelligence Officer, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the
following morning. Admiral Kimmel received and initialed these
summaries daily on and after 27 November. On December 6th, he
initialed the summary dated December 5th, which was the last one he
received prior to the attack.
66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communica-
tion intelligence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among
other things, that there was no further information on the presence
of a carrier division in the Mandates and that “carriers were still
located in home waters.” The next day, he received the November
28th summary which indicated, among other things, the view that
the Japanese radio intelligence net was operating at full strength
upon U. S. Naval communications and “IS GETTING RESULTS.”
There was no information set forth in the summary as to carriers.
On the following day. Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated
November 29th, which, among other things, indicated that Carrier
Division 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-
Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st, Admiral Kimmel received
the previous day’s summary which stated as to carriers that the
presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated the presence
of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been
confirmed.
67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received,
stated that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had
changed promptly at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service
calls had been changed after a period of six months or more and
that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This summary
stated, and was underscored by Admiral Kimmel, that “The fact that
service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive
step in preparing for operations on a large scale.” It also stated,
among other things, that a large number ot submarines were believed
to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and as to carriers that
there was “no change.”
68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memoran-
dum which Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
519
This contained Layton’s estimate, on the basis of all available infor-
mation, of the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate
placed in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Divi-
sion 3, which included four carriers, and the “KASUGA MARU”
(believed to h ave been a converted carrier) . The estimate placed one
carrier w KORYU # ( ?) plus plane guards” in the Marshalls area.
69. Layton’s written estimate made no mention of Japanese Car-
rier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission
was deliberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the in-
formation as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to
warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts.
70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the
following conversation :
[770] Captain Layton. As best I recall It, Admiral Kimmel said, “What!
You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I
replied, “No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know
where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their loca-
tion.” Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with some-
what a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said,
“Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't
know it?" or words to that effect. My reply was that, “I hope they would be
sighted before now," or words to that effect." . . .
Captain Layton. His question was absolutely serious, but when said, “Where
are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, “1 do not know precisely, but if I must estimate,
I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from
them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a
month and a half ago," and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said,
“Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that
effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to
their exact location. . . .
Captain Layton. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not
say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me
in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn’t so
indicated their location.
71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was de-
livered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:
Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identi-
fication has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over
200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the 1st of
December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier
traffic is at a low ebb.
72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel
on December 4th stated, in part, “No information on submarines or
carriers.” The summary delivered on December 5th made no mention
of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6th stated, in part,
• fc No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force ha9
been seen either.”
73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other
sources, the only practicable way by which the Commander-in-Chi‘ef,
Pacific Fleet, could have obtained information as to the location or
movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 December
1941 was by long distance air reconnaissance.
[i7i] 74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the
Navy had the obligation, through ComFOURTEEN, to conduct dis-
tant reconnaissance, and under Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, naval forces were to be supplemented
by available Army aircraft if the naval aircraft were insufficient for
long distance patrol and search operations. As previously pointed
520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
out, the latter plan was not in operation because an agreement between
the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEX that threat of a hos-
tile attack was imminent was a prerequisite and no such agreement had
been made prior to the attack. The Naval Base Defense Air Force
Plan, which implemented the agreements for joint Army-Navy air
action, similarly was not operative prior to the attack.
75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch.
The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were
the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.
76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Ad-
miral Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization.
They were operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with sched-
ules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to
the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did
not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.
77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry
that he decided on November 27th that there should l>e no distant re-
connaissance.
78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral
Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the “war
warning, 5 ’ as to the advisability or practicability of long range recon-
naissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the sub-
ject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion.
The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed
of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral
Kimmel had no such discussion with him.
79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger. Commander, Fleet
Patrol Planes, and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian
Air Force, which was used as a basis for the joint Army-Navy agree-
ments, was prophetic in its estimate that in the event of attack on
Hawaii, the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air
attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles from
Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter-meas-
ure included daily patrols as far as possible froift Oahu, to sectors
through 360 degrees, to reduce the possibilities of surface or air sur-
prise. It further stated that such patrols could be effectively main-
tained with the personnel and materiel available at the time (March,
1941) for a very short period and that such patrols were not practic-
able unless other intelligence indicated that surface raid was probable
within narrow limits of time. According to Admiral Bellinger, it
was realized by the responsible officers of the Pacific Fleet that another
course of action which was always open was to fly a patrol of less than
360 degrees, with the available aircraft, covering the more dangerous
sectors.
[775] 80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the
southward of Oahu was being carried out prior to the attack, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of
the Eleet at base and in operating areas.
81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the
critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous
distant reconnaissance flown from Oahu appears to have been for
several days during the summer of 1941 on a sector toward Jaluit.
This reconnaissance had been directed by Admiral Kimmel at Ad-
miral Bloch’s request.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
521
82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a recon-
naissance flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assist-
ing by providing intelligence. The reconnaissance was not flown be-
cause the Army planes were not made ready prior to the attack.
83. The Navy Basic War Plan, assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task
of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific
area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and
air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemis-
E here. Under the provisions of Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rain-
ow Five, when that plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet patrol
planes were to maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy
forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due regard for
time required for overhaul and repair of planes and for conservation
of personnel.
84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that nego-
tiations with Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan
was expected within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations di-
rected that Admiral Kimmel “execute an appropriate defensive' de-
ployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.”
85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch,
which, among other things, advised General Short that Japanese
future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible
at any moment. The Navy dispatch directed that Admiral Kimmel
was to undertake no offensive action until Japan had committed an
overt act and that he was to “be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in
WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.”
86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from
Oahu would have been an “appropriate defensive deployment prepar-
atory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.
87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding
the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnais-
sance daily for more than a few days.
88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet
to the Navv Department to increase the number of patrol planes as-
signed to tne Fleet. Some new replacement planes had been sent to
the Fleet during October and November, 1941. Additional planes,
as evidenced by the prompt arrival of reenforcements after December
7th, could have been made available by the Navy Department, but
at the expense of defenses in other areas. The [I7J] Navy
Department presumably knew that the number of planes available
at Oahu were not sufficient to conduct 360 degree reconnaissance daily
for more than a few days. The evidence in prior investigations in-
dicates that after November 27th, responsible officers in the Navy
Department thought that reconnaissance was being conducted from
Oahu to the extent practicable with the planes available there.
89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact avail-
able at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for
at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to
a distance of about 700 miles.
90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being
the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if
the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.
522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu
after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern
sectors probably would have been searched.
92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air
attack on Pearl Harbor, there were. reports of suspected and actual
hostile submarine activity. The second advised of a surface and
depth charge attack on a submarine. Only the latter report reached
responsible officers. Due to reports on previous days of souhd con-
tacts with submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated
by ComFOURTEEN in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was
in accord with the provisions of the Fleet security letter.
93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was
not received by Admiral Kimmel or by Admiral Bloch prior to the
air attack.
94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese
submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one
midget submarine known to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morn-
ing of December 7th was sunk after making an ineffectual attack.
95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the
northward, obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar instal-
lation for instruction purposes, was not communicated either to the
Navy or to responsible Army commanders.
96. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEER
had no previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by
the enemy at 0755. The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted
in serious losses of life and damage.
97. The battleships each had two 5" anti-aircraft guns ready and
two machine guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of
Condition III as prescribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to Fleet
aircraft based at Oahu, seven were in the air (3 on morning security
patrol armed with depth charged and 4 engaged in tactics with sub-
marines) ; ten were on 30 minutes notice; and the balance of forty-
four on four hours notice.
[174] 98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had
been issued in September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one
exception, were all in port and were either sunk or damagea. Due to
the fortunate coincidence which resulted in the aircraft carriers being
at sea, they were uninjured.
99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese
task force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near
the Bongo Channel, sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East
Longitude Time, and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the
Kuriles. The force then assembled and fueled. It departed on or
about 28 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded in an
easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southeast to a
point about 200 miles from Oahu.
100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions,
among which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the
attack, the Fleet Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel
that he could not reliably estimate the location of Carrier Divisions
1 and 2.
101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position
200 miles due north of Oahu.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
523
[776] B. Conclusion s
1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and
were designed to meet, with the available means, various types of at-
tack, including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The
basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in
time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed
the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presup-
posed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was
imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.
2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that
of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation be-
tween the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as
to the imminence of attack, which presupposed the possession and ex-
change of information concerning Japanese intentions and move-
ments of Japanese naval forces.
3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective ex-
ercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange
of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies
there was no organized system to ensure such exchange.
4. Current and detailed information which was obtained by the
Japanese as to the location and movements of American naval forces
and as to the preparations being made for defense against an attack
on Pearl Harbor contributed to the success of their attack.
5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United
States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, con-
cerning the Japanese Government’s actual views as to the diplomatic
negotiations and its intentions to wage war, by means of interception,
decryption, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages.
6. The information which was obtained in Washington oy the War
and Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully
exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy De-
partment as to Japanese naval movements was available to intelli-
gence officers o'f the War Department in Washington. The War De-
partment had information which led that Department to believe that
Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This
appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to
General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special
photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in or-
der to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and
location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because
the special Army planes were not made ready.
7. Although the Japanese Government evStablished in their diplo-
matic messages a code, known as the ‘Svinds” code, to be used in radio
broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to
the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message
was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words re-
lating to the United States.
[776] 8. The information obtained by the Navy Department
from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately dis-
seminated within the Navy Department.
9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made re-
quests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the
Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Op*
!4 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
/ erations did not communicate to him important information which
would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness
of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State
Department message oi November 26th and to send, by telephone or
other expeditious means, information of the u l. p. m.*’ message and its
possible import, were unfortunate.
10. Admiral Kimmel ? nevertheless, did have sufficient information
in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious,
and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war
were imminent. • This included the “war warning” message and simi-
lar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Op-
erations.
11. The available information in the possession of the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the
/‘war warning” message, was not disseminated to all of his important
\J subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable.
Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and
Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were
not informed of this and other important messages.
12. Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of
ytl ie Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that vari-
/ ous of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information
J was obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood
of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to
such caole messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence
agencies in the Hawaiian area.
13. Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at
Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of
ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations
j of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this infor-
j mation was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kim-
^ mel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army
prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl
Harbor but were not decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy
prior to the attack, apparently because the Army did not have suffi-
cient personnel for such work.
14. The only practicable sources from w r hich Admiral Kimmel could
have secured information, after the receipt of the u w*ar warning,” as
to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning
service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant
^ir reconnaissance from Oahu.
j [177] 15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by
\J the Army during certain periods of the day primarily for training
purposes, and, although not fully developed, could have served to give
some warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft.
16. The pnncipal basis for estimates of the location of Japanese
naval forces was the intelligence obtained by the Navy from traffic
analysis of Japanese naval communications.
17. A carrier attack could not, with certainty, have been prevented,
for the following reasons:
(a) Certain prevention of such an attack requires interception and
destruction of the carriers before attack planes can be launched.
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
525
(b) The forces necessary to insure such interception and destruo-
tion, anywhere in the vast area which would have nad to be covered,
were not available, and could not have been expected to be available.
(c) If the Japanese task force had been detected at nightfall, the
probability of its successful interception and destruction prior to
the following dawn would have been small.
18. Prior warning of an impending air attack, even as little as
one half hour, would have served considerably to reduce the effective-
ness of the attack, for the following reasons:
(a) Ships’ anti-aircraft batteries would have been fully manned
and ready. It is to be noted that the anti-aircraft fire was more
effective against the subsequent attacks than the initial air attack.
(b) Enemy character of the approaching planes would have been
immediately appreciated and they would have been engaged at once.
(c) The maximum condition of damage control readiness would
have been set, thus facilitating the isolation of damage received.
(d) Many planes could have been in the air, in readiness.
(e) Ground dispersal of planes could have been improved.
19. The only adequate means of assuring detection oi an approach-
ing carrier attack was by 360 degree distant air search from Oahu.
Sufficient planes were not available to carry out an all-around distant
air reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.
[ 178 ] 20. A thorough appreciation of the danger, the capa-
bilities of the available planes, and the importance of the defense of
Pearl Harbor might have justified the allotment by the Chief of Naval
Operations of additional patrol planes to the Pacific Fleet. Although
the additional planes, if assigned, would not have been sufficient for
a 360 degree daily search, they would have increased the area which
could have been effectively covered and might have acted as an induce-
ment to such employment. Admittedly, in making over-all plane
assignments, it was necessary for the Chief of Naval Operations to
weigh the prospective needs of the Pacific and the Atlantic, where
hostilities with Axis submarines were already in progress.
21. Partial air reconnaissance, covering a sector of some 120 degrees,
could have been maintained daily from Oahu for a considerableperiod
of time with the Fleet patrol planes controlled by Admiral Kimmel
and could have been designed to cover the most probable approach
bearings from which an attack might have been expected. Such
reconnaissance would have had a reasonable chance of success.
22. Neither the Chief of Naval Operations,- the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor the key members of the latter’s staff, seem
to have given serious consideration after 27 November 1941 to the
possibility or probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor or of its
possible effect.
23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was avail-
able to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the move-
ment of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his atten-
tion on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and
Malaysia. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel
during the first week of December 1941 indicated, however, that on
December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call
signs; that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no
526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan’s
ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers
thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location
of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible
to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the
Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air
attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable
precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The meas-
ures which reasonably were open to him were :
(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering
the most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a rea-
sonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.
(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness,
at least during the dangerous dawn hours.
(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness
by ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.
(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect- the larger vessels
in port.
[179] (e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to
intercept possible attack forces.
(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with
entry into port at irregular intervals.
(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense
ana aircraft warning installations.
24. Admiral Kimmel’s estimate as to the probability of submarine
attack in the Hawaiian area was justified by subsequent events.
25. Throughout his incumbency as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, Admiral Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and
positive in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for war. In considering the
action which he could have taken, it should be noted that :
(a) Establishment of the maximum plane reconnaissance would
have meant the stoppage of aircraft training which was of great im-
portance to the naval expansion program, and might have resulted
in wear and tear on planes and crews which would have reduced their
later effectiveness.
(b) Higher conditions of readiness would have interfered with the
rest and relaxation desirable in port for the maintenance of personnel
efficiency.
(c) Failure to install anti-torpedo nets was influenced (i) by infor-
mation from CNO which made it appear that effective drops of air-
craft torpedoes with the depths of water and length of run available
in Pearl Harbor were not probable; (ii) the interference such nets
would have caused in harbor operations due to crowded conditions.
(d) The presence of two carrier task forces at sea at the time on
necessary ferry trips did, in a way, provide striking forces and some
reconnaissance.
(e) In view of the submarine menace and the concentration of anti-
aircraft batteries, it was questionable whether ships were safer in port
or at sea.
26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine
attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been
effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in send-
ing out the ready destroyer. This information was of no immediate
REPORT OF HEWITT INQUIRY
527
interest to the Army unless it is fact indicated imminency of an air
attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical. In any events
confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced.
[ 180 ~\ 27. More effective action would have been taken both
before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor had there been in existence
in the Hawaiian area a suitable operating agency for the adequate
exercise of joint command functions. This omission was the fault
of no one person, but of the ixisting system.
28. War experience has shown that :
(a) The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on
one person; that is, there must be “unity of command.”
(b) In planning and executing joint operations, responsible com-
manders of the different services, who are to act jointly, and the
principal members of their staffs, must be in close physical touch, and
not entirely dependent on telephonic, radio, or similar communications.
In no other way can a full exchange of information and ideas be
assured nor the possibility of misunderstanding be prevented.
(c) Command organizations which are to function effectively in
an emergency must be in active operation prior to such emergency.
29. Based on the foregoing, military command of outlying stations,
such as Hawaii, should, even in peacetime, be established under the
principle of “Unity of Command/’ The commander exercising such
J oint command should be assisted by a joint staff, capable of advising
lim in the functions of both services concerned.
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